The Blessing over Torah Study and the Mitzvah of Torah Learning

Table of Contents

• Introduction to blessings and doubtful cases involving blessings
• The Torah-level status of Grace after Meals and the blessing over Torah study
• The nature of the blessing over Torah study from the verse and the comparison to Grace after Meals
• An a fortiori argument between the blessing over Torah study and Grace after Meals, and the claim of a shared character
• Tosafot, Nachmanides, and Maimonides on the status and classification of the blessing
• The formulations of the blessing over Torah study in the Talmud and the distinction between the three blessings
• Women and the blessing over Torah study in the Shulchan Arukh, and the criticism of the commentaries
• Responsa from Heaven and the separation of the roles of the three blessings
• Torah study versus the commandment of Torah study: the passage in Menachot 99
• Ben Dama, Greek wisdom, and the dispute over “not an obligation and not a commandment, but a blessing”
• The apparent contradiction between Menachot and Berakhot, and framing the tension as a unifying axis
• Implications: women, the blessing over Torah study, and expanding the concept of “Torah”

Summary

General Overview

The text presents an introduction to the different types of blessings and to the rule that in doubtful cases involving blessings one rules leniently, and it places the blessing over Torah study as a double question: both of validity and status—whether it is Torah-level or rabbinic—and of character—whether it is praise/thanksgiving, a commandment-blessing, or a request. It argues from the straightforward meaning of the Talmud that the connection between the blessing over Torah study and Grace after Meals teaches that the blessing over Torah study is fundamentally a blessing of praise and thanksgiving for the giving of the Torah, and from there develops a critique of the common assumption among halakhic decisors that it is a blessing over a commandment. It then interprets the passages in Menachot and Berakhot as setting up a tension between the minimal “commandment of Torah study” and “Torah study” as an essential value that does not derive from a formal command, and concludes from this that women are exempt from the formal framework but do belong to—and are even “obligated” in—the value of Torah study and in the blessing over Torah study as praise.

Introduction to blessings and doubtful cases involving blessings

Blessings are generally rabbinic in law, and therefore in doubtful cases involving blessings one rules leniently. The text lists blessings of praise and thanksgiving, blessings over commandments, and blessings over benefit, and emphasizes that in the Amidah there is also a category of request-blessings that does not appear outside prayer. It defines the blessing over Torah study as a subject that requires clarification both regarding its halakhic status and its character.

The Torah-level status of Grace after Meals and the blessing over Torah study

Grace after Meals is presented as a Torah-level blessing learned from the verse “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless,” in contrast to blessings over benefit recited before eating, which are rabbinic. The text presents the straightforward meaning of the Talmud in Berakhot 21 as also establishing the blessing over Torah study before study as Torah-level, from the verse “When I call out the name of the Lord, ascribe greatness to our God,” and emphasizes that the blessing over Torah study is recited before learning.

The nature of the blessing over Torah study from the verse and the comparison to Grace after Meals

From the verse “When I call out the name of the Lord, ascribe greatness to our God,” the text concludes that the character of the blessing over Torah study is that of a blessing of praise, because it is “ascribing greatness” to the Giver of the Torah and not preparation for performing a commandment. It notes that Grace after Meals is a blessing over benefit in the sense of thanksgiving for food, except that it is unusual in being Torah-level.

An a fortiori argument between the blessing over Torah study and Grace after Meals, and the claim of a shared character

The text cites Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives by an a fortiori argument the blessing over Torah study after it from Grace after Meals, and Grace after Meals before it from the blessing over Torah study. It defines these a fortiori arguments as logically strange, because each one undermines the basis of the other, and compares this to an a fortiori argument about mezuzah and tzitzit that yields absurd conclusions. It explains that the problem stems from the lack of an essential connection between different categories, and from there argues that when the Talmud derives by an a fortiori argument between the blessing over Torah study and Grace after Meals, it assumes that they share a common character—that is, both are blessings of praise/thanksgiving and not blessings over commandments.

Tosafot, Nachmanides, and Maimonides on the status and classification of the blessing

Tosafot on Berakhot 11 are presented as assuming that the blessing over Torah study is a blessing over a commandment, and therefore asking why one does not recite it every time one studies, as with sukkah, and answering that there is no interruption of attention because “a person is obligated to study” and “you shall meditate on it day and night.” Nachmanides, in his additions to Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 15, counts the blessing over Torah study as a Torah-level commandment of thanksgiving for “the great goodness” of the giving of the Torah, compares it to Grace after Meals, and states that “it is not fitting to count it as one commandment together with the reading.” Nachmanides presents Maimonides as not having counted the blessing because he includes it within the commandment of Torah study and not necessarily because it is rabbinic.

The formulations of the blessing over Torah study in the Talmud and the distinction between the three blessings

The text brings the Talmud’s question, “What does one recite?” and the formulations: “Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to engage in words of Torah” as a blessing over a commandment; “Please make the words of Your Torah sweet in our mouths” as a request-blessing; and “Who chose us from all the nations and gave us His Torah” as a blessing of praise. It interprets “Rav Hamnuna said: this is the finest of the blessings” as proof that the third blessing is the main Torah-level component of “ascribe greatness to our God,” while the first two are rabbinic additions, and it even connects this to the structure of request-blessings in prayer.

Women and the blessing over Torah study in the Shulchan Arukh, and the criticism of the commentaries

The Shulchan Arukh rules that women recite the blessing over Torah study, and the text describes how the Vilna Gaon, Magen Avraham, and Mishnah Berurah ask why, since women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, and they offer answers within the framework of a blessing over a commandment, such as the possibility that women recite blessings over commandments from which they are exempt, or that they are obligated to learn the laws relevant to them. The text argues that the entire question is born of a mistaken assumption, because the blessing over Torah study is a blessing of praise that does not depend on obligation in the commandment of Torah study, and therefore women belong to it as praise for the giving of the Torah. It adds that Maimonides places the blessing over Torah study in the Laws of Prayer, chapter 7, and not in the Laws of Torah Study, and understands this as a sign that it is part of the prayer liturgy more than a commandment-blessing, and suggests that in his view women can discharge men’s obligation in this blessing.

Responsa from Heaven and the separation of the roles of the three blessings

The text mentions Rabbi Yaakov of Marvege/Matroish and his responsa, which are based on questions asked through dream inquiry, and notes that in section 10 he distinguishes between the three blessings over Torah study and explains that each has a different function, though it does not go into the details.

Torah study versus the commandment of Torah study: the passage in Menachot 99

The text reads Menachot 99 as describing a very minimal threshold for the commandment of Torah study: one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, and even the recitation of Shema morning and evening, as fulfillment of “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” It interprets this as a deliberate move to empty out the formal dimension of the commandment in order to emphasize that real Torah study stems from understanding the value of Torah and not from a desire to “fulfill one’s obligation,” and explains that “and it is forbidden to say this in the presence of the ignoramuses” is said because an ignoramus may absorb only the minimum without understanding the value-based message. It presents Rava’s statement, “it is a commandment to say it in the presence of an ignoramus,” as an attempt to rescue the ignoramus from the formalistic perception and place him before the meaning of Torah.

Ben Dama, Greek wisdom, and the dispute over “not an obligation and not a commandment, but a blessing”

Ben Dama asks Rabbi Yishmael whether, after having learned “the entire Torah,” he is permitted to study Greek wisdom, and Rabbi Yishmael answers with the verse “you shall meditate on it day and night,” establishing a demand for constant involvement. The text argues that there is no contradiction here to the minimal position of reciting Shema, because the minimum belongs to the formal layer of the commandment, whereas the verse describes the value-oriented aspect of Torah study. It emphasizes that the Talmud attributes the dispute not to Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai but to Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, who says that “this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing,” and interprets the verse as a blessing to Joshua because of how beloved Torah was to him. The text reads the conclusion of the passage—“words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, and yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them”—as summarizing this distinction between a narrow formal obligation and commandment-as-matter, something from which one cannot detach oneself.

The apparent contradiction between Menachot and Berakhot, and framing the tension as a unifying axis

The text cites Berakhot on “and you shall gather in your grain” as against “it shall not depart,” where Rabbi Yishmael instructs, “conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world,” while Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai challenges, “what will become of Torah?” and pushes toward constant study. It argues that the reversal as compared to Menachot is only apparent, because both passages distinguish between the minimal obligation of the commandment and the value-laden call for Torah to be a central occupation, and that in this way both strengthen the theme of reducing formalism in order to intensify the essence.

Implications: women, the blessing over Torah study, and expanding the concept of “Torah”

The text concludes that women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study in the formal sense, but are not exempt from Torah study as a value, and it argues that women are “obligated” in Torah study in the value-based sense exactly like men, and therefore belong to the blessing over Torah study as a blessing of praise. It notes that the requirement not to study “Greek wisdom” does not teach that Torah is defined only as Talmud and Jewish law, and suggests that branches of wisdom may be included within Torah, while noting that there are different medieval authorities (Rishonim) on the understanding of “Greek wisdom” and that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and Maimonides also engaged in the sciences. It concludes by saying that the discussion of the broader definition of Torah is a separate topic, and invites comments and questions and wishes everyone a happy holiday.

Take a look at your sheet there, it’s a source sheet. Just a second, I’ll enlarge it a bit so it’ll be easier for you to see. Okay. Maybe I’ll give a short introduction to the topic of blessings, although again, this is really just a way of getting into the issue. With blessings, we usually know the principle that in a case of doubt about blessings, we rule leniently. Meaning, blessings are a rabbinic law, and naturally with a rabbinic law, in a case of doubt we go leniently. The different kinds of blessings we know are: blessings of praise and thanksgiving—let’s say that’s more or less the same category; blessings over commandments, what we recite before performing a commandment; and blessings of enjoyment, what we recite before eating or over a fragrance or something like that. Blessings of thanksgiving and praise are things like when someone sees the great sea, right, all kinds of events you go through or something that happened to you, and then you thank or praise the Holy One, blessed be He, for it. In the Amidah prayer there are also blessings that are requests. Right, in the Amidah it’s divided into three parts, and there there’s another category of blessings that doesn’t appear outside the Amidah, namely requests. The requests within the framework of the Amidah are basically made in the format of blessings for some reason, but there’s no such category outside the Amidah. As for the blessing over Torah, meaning the blessings we recite in the morning—”and please make pleasant,” and all three blessings that we recite in the morning—it requires discussion on two planes. First, on the plane of its halakhic status: is it Torah-level or rabbinic? And second, on the plane of its character: what kind of blessing is it? Is it a blessing of praise and thanksgiving, a blessing over commandments, a blessing of enjoyment—though that last one is less relevant here. What is the character of this blessing? In order to understand why there is any room at all to discuss the halakhic status of the blessing, we need to preface that although we’re used to blessings generally being a rabbinic enactment, there is at least one blessing, and maybe two, that are exceptions. Grace after meals is a Torah-level blessing; it’s derived from the verse, “And you shall eat, and be satisfied, and bless.” We are speaking, of course, about what we today call Grace after Meals, meaning the blessing after we eat. Not the blessings before we eat—that’s what are called blessings of enjoyment, and those are rabbinic. So that’s one blessing that is from the Torah. The second blessing that apparently—at least that’s what emerges from the plain sense of the Talmudic text—is also Torah-level, is the blessing over Torah. So it is exceptional with respect to the force of the blessing, in that it is Torah-level and not rabbinic, apparently—I’ll comment on that further. The question is where its character stands—what kind of blessing it is. So let’s look a bit at the sources themselves. There is a Talmudic text in tractate Berakhot on 21a that brings the source for the blessing over Torah. Rav Yehudah said: From where do we know that Grace after Meals after eating is from the Torah? As it says, “And you shall eat, and be satisfied, and bless.” From where do we know that the blessing over Torah before it is from the Torah? After all, the blessing over Torah we recite before study, not after. Grace after Meals is after eating; the blessing over Torah is before study. From where do we know that one must recite it? As it says, “For I will proclaim the name of the Lord; ascribe greatness to our God.” So here we basically have a source for Grace after Meals and a source for the blessing over Torah. On the face of it, these look like Torah-level laws—both Grace after Meals and the blessing over Torah. So that’s with regard to the force of the blessing, that it is Torah-level. That was the first question I asked. The second question I asked is: what is the nature of the blessing? Now, to understand the nature of the blessing, let’s look for a moment at the verse from which it is derived. It says, “For I will proclaim the name of the Lord; ascribe greatness to our God.” What does that mean as translated into our issue? “For I will proclaim the name of the Lord”—before I’m about to study, to call in the name of the Lord, to study Torah—“ascribe greatness to our God”: one must give greatness to our God, to the giver of the Torah. So what this means is that the blessing over Torah, which is learned from this verse, is a blessing of praise. “Ascribe greatness to our God”—that’s a blessing of praise, not a blessing over commandments. A blessing over commandments, in the simple understanding, is some sort of focusing before performing a commandment, a kind of meditation. You need to say a blessing, direct your intention, and then move on to performing the commandment. A blessing of praise, a blessing of thanksgiving, is a blessing that doesn’t necessarily accompany an act, but rather praises the Holy One, blessed be He—“ascribe greatness to our God.” From this verse it somewhat appears that the character of this blessing, the blessing over Torah, is a blessing of praise and not a blessing over a commandment. Afterwards, Grace after Meals is of course a blessing of enjoyment, only one that is Torah-level. Then the Talmudic text continues and says as follows: after all, they brought these two blessings here in the same statement. They derive Grace after Meals, they derive the blessing over Torah. One could simply say it’s because both are Torah-level blessings, exceptional blessings. It doesn’t have to mean there is some connection between them, some essential connection in terms of their character, for example. This one is a blessing of enjoyment, that one is a blessing over a commandment or something else. There’s no connection between them. But both are Torah-level, so the passage brings the source for both. But later in the passage they continue and say this: Rabbi Yohanan said: We learn the blessing over Torah after it from Grace after Meals by an a fortiori argument. He says one must also bless after studying Torah, not only before. The blessing over Torah is before; that is learned from the verse. But one must also bless after studying. From where do I know this? It is learned by an a fortiori argument from Grace after Meals. How does that work? Right, so he says as follows: the blessing over Torah after it is learned from Grace after Meals by an a fortiori argument; Grace after Meals before it is learned from the blessing over Torah by an a fortiori argument. One can also derive the obligation to bless over food before eating by an a fortiori argument from the blessing over Torah, and learn the blessing over Torah after study from Grace after Meals. And in both there is an a fortiori argument. How does it work? So he says like this: the blessing over Torah after it is learned from Grace after Meals by an a fortiori argument. How does the a fortiori argument work? If food, which does not require a blessing before it on the Torah level, nevertheless requires one after it, then Torah, which does require one before it, all the more so should it require one after it. Right? Meaning, food does not need a blessing before it on the Torah level. We are speaking only on the Torah level. The blessing is only after it. And even so, it does not require one before it, but after it one does have to bless. So Torah, which also requires a blessing before it, then all the more so it should require a blessing after it. That’s one a fortiori argument. The second a fortiori argument turns the picture upside down. It says: If Torah, which does not require a blessing after it, does require one before it, then food, which does require one after it, all the more so should require one before it. So from this they derive that one must bless over food also before eating. Then they say one can refute it and so on—that’s another matter. These a fortiori arguments are strange a fortiori arguments. Because basically—maybe before I say that—these a fortiori arguments, when I make an a fortiori argument based on two data points, this is a bit related to the logic of a fortiori argument, I won’t go into it here in detail, but when I make an a fortiori argument based on two data points, there is supposed to be a connection between them. When I learn, for example, I say: if over food one blesses after it, then obviously over Torah one also needs to bless after it. Why is that obvious? If Grace after Meals is a blessing of enjoyment, and the blessing over Torah is a blessing over a commandment, then what is the connection? For some reason with blessings of enjoyment one blesses after. How do you derive from that the blessing over Torah, which is a blessing over a commandment? I learned it from Grace after Meals, so will it really be a blessing of enjoyment to bless over Torah after study, or will it be a blessing over a commandment? If there is no connection between the two things, then why derive one from the other? But in truth this whole passage is a strange one. You know, the masters of the rules say—I’ll preface something maybe. Do you know what the difference is between derush and pilpul? I once thought that derush is a terrible argument that leads to a correct conclusion, while pilpul is an excellent argument that leads to an incorrect conclusion. In other words, pilpul is often something that somehow seems like good reasoning, and it’s hard to put your finger on what the problem is. But how do we know there’s a problem? Because the conclusion is absurd. Right? The argument—various proofs or paradoxes we know, various proofs that one equals zero, you know those? There are all kinds of famous proofs like that. Ostensibly the proof is well built; it’s hard to put your finger on what the problem is in the proof, but the result is absurd. Meaning, it’s clear to us that somewhere there is a problem. So the result is an excellent argument that leads to a problematic claim, to a false conclusion. That’s pilpul. Pilpul is a kind of riddle: come show me, put your finger on what is problematic in the argument. Derush is just something trivial and tasteless. Why? Because derush basically says: take an argument that is terrible, but it will lead to a correct conclusion. Right—in the end you have to be humble and observe commandments and fear Heaven and everything is wonderful. So what do you care that I squeezed and forced all the midrashim and they have no connection whatsoever to what the midrashim say? In the end I reached the correct and expected conclusion, so everything is fine. So that’s basically the concept of derush. Yes, anyone who has ever been at a sheva berakhot knows this firsthand. In other words, that’s what you always hear there. Derush is just a waste of Torah study, but pilpul is interesting. Pilpul is an interesting thing, because it really is what is called a paradox in the logical context. Pilpul is a paradox, and it’s a correct proof to a problematic conclusion, to a false conclusion. And the riddle is: come put your finger on where the problem is. Let’s get back to our topic—that was just an appetizer. Back to the passage. So look, I’ll prove to you by an a fortiori argument that one need not put a mezuzah on a doorpost. You make an a fortiori argument, and there you have it. If a four-cornered garment, which is obligated in tzitzit, is exempt from mezuzah, then a doorpost, which is exempt from tzitzit, all the more so should be exempt from mezuzah. A fortiori. Or alternatively, a four-cornered garment should be exempt from tzitzit by the same reasoning: if a doorpost, which is obligated in mezuzah, is exempt from tzitzit, then a four-cornered garment, which is exempt from mezuzah, all the more so should also be exempt from tzitzit. A fortiori, right? Beautifully constructed. That’s pilpul. Why? Because the a fortiori argument seems good. What’s wrong with it? Except that the conclusion is clearly problematic to all of us. And first and foremost, what is problematic? That each such a fortiori argument refutes the other. The second refutes the first, and the first refutes the second. Because the moment I proved that the doorpost is exempt from mezuzah, I no longer have the basis for the a fortiori argument obligating the four-cornered garment in mezuzah. Because the advantage the doorpost had was that it is obligated in mezuzah while tzitzit is exempt—that disappears, because I learned that it is not obligated in mezuzah. And therefore it refutes the a fortiori argument that obligates the four-cornered garment in mezuzah, and vice versa. Right? These are two a fortiori arguments that refute one another. This is a typical characteristic of a fortiori arguments based on two data points and not on three. Usually an a fortiori argument is based on three data points. But for our purposes, what the Talmudic text is doing here is the same thing. It learns by an a fortiori argument that the blessing over Torah should be after it, and it learns by an a fortiori argument that Grace after Meals should also be before it. But if Grace after Meals also needs to be before, then you can’t make the second a fortiori argument. Because what are we saying? We want to say that food is more stringent than Torah, because the fact is we bless after it, right? So therefore, if Torah gets a blessing before it, then food certainly should get a blessing before it. But if that other a fortiori argument proved that over Torah one also blesses after it, then the advantage of food over Torah disappears. In other words, each such a fortiori argument dismantles the one facing it. Therefore these are really two a fortiori arguments standing opposite one another, and there is some logical problem here. What lies behind the logical problem? What is problematic in this pilpul? What’s not right here? What’s not right here, what everyone senses, is that there is no connection whatsoever between the obligation of a doorpost in mezuzah and the obligation of a four-cornered garment in tzitzit. There’s no issue here of stringency and leniency; they are simply two different things. The fact that one doesn’t put a mezuzah on a four-cornered garment is not because a four-cornered garment is more lenient than a doorpost. Rather, it’s because the idea of mezuzah apparently doesn’t apply to garments but only to doorposts, that’s all. So this is not a matter of stringency and leniency; it’s simply a different category, that’s all. Therefore we cannot derive one from the other when we’re dealing with two different categories. An a fortiori argument is a kind of analogy—an analogy somewhat stronger, but still an analogy. The moment you tell me these are two different things, there is no way to make an analogy between them. And here too, when the Talmudic text makes an a fortiori argument and derives the blessing over Torah from a blessing of enjoyment and vice versa, it is ostensibly telling me that they are of the same type. Because otherwise there is nothing to derive from one to the other. This continues what we saw earlier—that the Talmudic text really does bring both the blessing over Torah and Grace after Meals in the same statement, the sources for both in the same statement. Not only because both are Torah-level, but apparently because the Talmudic text sees in both some shared character, the same type. What is that type? Let’s try to think. If I go back to the categories I presented to you earlier, then it seems that apparently Grace after Meals is understood as some kind of thanksgiving for the food, and the blessing over Torah is some kind of thanksgiving for the Torah or praise for our having received the Torah, and then it starts becoming pretty similar. A blessing of thanksgiving and a blessing of praise are overall pretty similar. What is it unlikely that the blessing over Torah is? A blessing over commandments. Even though ostensibly we are blessing over the fulfillment of the commandment of Torah study—it’s unlikely. So the blessing over Torah is probably not a blessing over commandments, because if it were a blessing over commandments, it would have no common basis with Grace after Meals; there would be no room to make an a fortiori argument between them, no room to compare one to the other. Therefore from this Talmudic text, in the simple sense, it really seems that it is not a blessing over commandments. If so, then it’s no wonder that it is Torah-level. Blessings over commandments are rabbinic; this is a separate category that is somewhat similar to Grace after Meals, and therefore both are brought in the Talmudic text. Still, I’ll just note here, this is not agreed upon by all the medieval authorities (Rishonim). In my opinion most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it this way, but not all. For example, Tosafot in Berakhot, on 11b, asks the question—I blacked this out here on the shared page—“And if you would say, what is different about sukkah, where one needs to recite a blessing over every meal, ‘to sit in the sukkah’?” He asks why for the blessing over Torah one does not have to bless every time one studies, but only once in the morning. Behold, with the commandment of sukkah, every meal and meal that we eat in the sukkah we have to recite a blessing over it. What is the difference? What is the question? What is the underlying foundation of the question? What is the subtext of this Tosafot? Clearly he understands that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments, right? Just as we bless over sitting in the sukkah, which is a commandment—“who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to sit in the sukkah”—so too we bless over Torah study, which is also a blessing over commandments for the commandment of Torah study. And if so, Tosafot says, then what is the difference? Why here do we bless every time we perform the commandment, and there we bless only once a day and not every time we perform the commandment of Torah study? What would we answer based on the earlier Talmudic text? Very simply: there is no similarity. The blessing for sukkah is a blessing over commandments; the blessing over Torah is a blessing of praise. Therefore there is no reason to compare one to the other. But Tosafot doesn’t say that even in the answer. In the answer he says: “It may be said that Torah is different, because one does not remove one’s mind from it, since at every hour a person is obligated to study, as it is written, ‘and you shall meditate upon it day and night.’” Meaning, Torah is different from sukkah in a technical sense, because Torah is supposed to accompany us all the time. Meals in the sukkah we are not required to eat all day long, but Torah study in principle is supposed to accompany us all the time, and therefore a person does not divert his mind from it, and one blessing in the morning is enough; one need not bless every time one approaches study. But still, Tosafot’s conception is that this is a blessing over commandments. In principle one should have had to bless every time one fulfills this commandment. Why do we do it only once in the morning? Simply because there is no interruption of attention, that’s all. But he doesn’t make a fundamental distinction, or a categorical distinction, between sitting in the sukkah, which is a commandment, and the blessing over Torah, which is really a blessing of praise. Tosafot doesn’t have that. Tosafot quite clearly understood it as a blessing over commandments, even though, as we saw in the earlier Talmudic text, that is not likely. Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides on several points in the count of the commandments. He adds and subtracts commandments that Maimonides counted and adds in their place other commandments, so that in the end the total is still 613. Within the positive commandments, in Nachmanides’ additions to Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 15 is the commandment of the blessing over Torah. From this you can already understand that Maimonides did not count the blessing over Torah, and therefore Nachmanides has to add it, because in Maimonides it does not appear. So Maimonides did not count the blessing over Torah. The question is why. Some wanted to say that it’s because he held that the blessing over Torah is a rabbinic blessing. Certainly that fits with the idea that it is a blessing over commandments, because blessings over commandments are rabbinic blessings. Okay. Some read Maimonides that way. I’m not sure that is Maimonides’ intention. Maimonides may refrain from counting commandments for various reasons, not necessarily because they are rabbinic; in a moment we’ll see one possibility. But that’s how some understand Maimonides. By contrast, Nachmanides in Sefer HaMitzvot adds this commandment—he does count it—so first of all it’s clear that it is Torah-level. Now let’s read for a moment: “That we were commanded to give thanks to His blessed name every time we read from the Torah, for the great goodness He did for us by giving us His Torah and informing us of the deeds desired before Him, through which we inherit the life of the World to Come.” How does he understand the blessing? First of all, of course, it is Torah-level in terms of the question of force. In terms of type, what type of blessing is it? He says we must thank the Holy One, blessed be He, every time for the great goodness He did for us by giving us His Torah. That is blessings of thanksgiving, a blessing of praise. It is clearly not a blessing over commandments, right? Blessings over commandments are not blessings of thanksgiving; they are blessings that direct intention toward performing the commandment. Here he says no: we must thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for the Torah. So he also says, first, that it is Torah-level, and second, that it is a blessing of thanksgiving and not a blessing of praise—well, of thanksgiving and praise, not a blessing over commandments. “And just as we were commanded regarding the blessing after eating, so too were we commanded regarding this.” Where did he get that from? From the Talmudic text we just saw, right? Which puts Grace after Meals and the blessing over Torah in the same category, and therefore Nachmanides also compares them—and again, according to his view, this is not a blessing over commandments. Both are blessings of praise to the Holy One, blessed be He, thanksgiving to the Holy One, blessed be He. And then he brings the Talmudic text in the third chapter of Berakhot and so on—I won’t go into all that; we already saw it. I’ll just read his concluding sentence: “And from all this it becomes clear that this blessing is from the Torah, and it is not proper to count it as one commandment together with the reading, just as the recitation over first-fruits is not counted as one with bringing them, and the telling of the Exodus from Egypt is not counted as one with eating the Passover sacrifice,” and so on. What is Nachmanides claiming here? Nachmanides is basically dealing here with Maimonides. Maimonides, after all, did not count this commandment, and Nachmanides comes here to disagree with him and say that it should be counted. But notice what he assumes about Maimonides. He says: it should be counted as a separate commandment. It is not included within the commandment of Torah study, just as when one has to bring first-fruits and one says the passage of the declaration over first-fruits, or the recitation over first-fruits, that is an independent commandment. It is not just a detail within the commandment of bringing the first-fruits. Nachmanides says: the same is true here. Therefore the blessing over Torah, too, is not just a detail within the commandment of Torah study, but an independent commandment. What do we see? How did he understand Maimonides, with whom he is arguing? He understood that when Maimonides does not count this blessing, it is not because it is rabbinic, but because in his view it is included within the commandment of Torah study. One of the details within the commandment of Torah study is that one must first recite the blessing over Torah. So it is not counted as an independent commandment—but not because it is not Torah-level, rather because it is included in a commandment already counted. So there is no need to devote a separate commandment to it. So Nachmanides definitely understood that according to Maimonides as well, this is a Torah-level commandment. There is only a disagreement here whether it is a separate commandment or the same commandment as the study itself. Maybe one more note on the Talmudic text we skipped over, at the very end. I do want to read something at the end of the passage. The Talmudic text asks: What does one bless? At first there is a dispute over what one blesses, but then the question is: what is the text of the blessing? Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to engage in words of Torah.” How does that sound to you? A blessing over commandments, right? Just like “who sanctified us” over taking the lulav. So here, “who sanctified us… to engage in words of Torah”—that is outright a blessing over commandments. Okay? And Rabbi Yohanan concludes with this: “Please make pleasant, Lord our God, the words of Your Torah in our mouths and in the mouths of Your people, the house of Israel,” and so on, “Blessed are You, Lord, who teaches Torah to His people Israel.” Right, that is some kind of request and perhaps also praise—“Blessed… who teaches Torah to His people Israel”—but also a request: “Please make pleasant, Lord our God, the words of Your Torah in our mouths.” That is a blessing of request. And Rav Hamnuna said: “Who chose us from among all the peoples and gave us His Torah. Blessed are You, Lord, giver of the Torah.” That is already clearly a blessing of praise. Right? We bless the Holy One, blessed be He, who chose us from among all the peoples and gave us the Torah. Rav Hamnuna said: This is the finest of the blessings; therefore let us say all of them. And that is indeed how Jewish law rules, and that is what we do every morning—we recite all three of these blessings as the blessings over Torah. But there is a very interesting formulation here. What does it mean, “This is the finest of the blessings”? What is more special about the third blessing than the first two? The third blessing is a blessing of praise. It is really fulfilling “ascribe greatness to our God.” Therefore I think that what Rav Hamnuna means to say is that the third blessing is the Torah-level blessing. That is “ascribe greatness to our God,” the blessing of praise in which we say to the Holy One, blessed be He, “who chose us from among all the peoples and gave us His Torah.” The first two blessings are not blessings of praise. Rather, the first is obviously a blessing over the commandment—“who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to engage in words of Torah”—and the second is a request, some type of prayer. We spoke about the fact that there are blessings of prayer, blessings of request, within prayer. The first two blessings are apparently rabbinic. And therefore Rav Hamnuna says: the third blessing is superior to them all, because here we fulfill the Torah-level law of “ascribe greatness to our God.” The other two are a blessing over commandments, like all blessings over commandments; this is a rabbinic enactment, just as one blesses before fulfilling every other commandment, so too one blesses before fulfilling the commandment of Torah study. There is no difference. But it is a rabbinic enactment. Therefore, when we recite all three of these blessings every morning, it is not correct to say that we are reciting the blessings over Torah in the sense of the Torah-level obligation. Only the third is Torah-level, the one that is a blessing of praise. That, at least, is what I think emerges from the plain sense of the Talmudic text. The first two are rabbinic blessings, even according to those who say that there is a Torah-level blessing, and they are the blessing over commandments and all the rest of what we’re talking about. Now let’s move on a bit further. The Shulchan Arukh writes: women recite the blessing over Torah. Women, too, need to recite the blessing over Torah. So all the commentaries there ask—the Vilna Gaon, the Magen Avraham, and the Mishnah Berurah—why? Women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. So why do they need to recite the blessing over Torah? What does that question assume? As we saw above in Tosafot, it assumes that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments. Whoever is going to fulfill a commandment needs to recite this blessing. So therefore they ask: but a woman is exempt from Torah study, she does not have this commandment, so why does she need to bless? What would we answer based on the conclusion we’ve reached up to now? Clearly it is a blessing of praise. What does that have to do with who is obligated in the commandment or not obligated in the commandment? Aren’t women supposed to bless the Holy One, blessed be He, for the fact that the Jewish people received the Torah? Why not? What does that have to do with the obligation in the commandment of Torah study? It is a blessing of praise. Therefore the question doesn’t arise at all. But for some reason all the commentaries on the Shulchan Arukh here ask this question and take it for granted that this is a blessing over commandments. It is obvious to them. That runs against the plain sense of the Talmudic texts, against most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). For some reason there is a sweeping disregard here of all that, which in my opinion is what the Talmudic text and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) demand. Everyone assumes this is a blessing over commandments. And then what? There are all sorts of answers. Some say that women recite blessings even over commandments that they are not obligated in. We know there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) on this matter—regarding positive commandments that are time-bound, if a woman fulfills them, can she recite a blessing? So the Vilna Gaon says: just as she can recite a blessing there, she can also recite one here, even though she is not obligated. But his assumption is that this is a blessing over commandments. He says that a woman too can recite a blessing over commandments even though she is not obligated, since she fulfills it as one who is not commanded and yet performs it. And over that too one can recite a blessing. Someone else says that women also somehow belong to this blessing because they need to learn the laws that pertain to them. It doesn’t matter—various answers like that—but all these answers basically remain within this paradigm that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments. When I think that this whole business is a mistake. The blessing over Torah is a blessing of praise, and therefore there is no question why women need to bless. Anyone who rejoices that the Jewish people received the Torah should bless. What, this has nothing to do with a blessing over commandments. Therefore Tosafot’s question as well, which assumes the same assumption—why don’t we bless every time we study—because this is not a blessing over commandments. I do not need to bless every time I approach Torah study. I bless it once in the morning; that is what the Sages enacted within the framework of prayer, that one should recite this blessing. By the way, when Maimonides brings the blessing over Torah, the laws of the blessing over Torah appear in his code not in the laws of Torah study, but in the laws of prayer, chapter 7 of the laws of prayer. Because from Maimonides’ point of view this is part of the text of prayer. We saw that there is a blessing that is a request, which appears only in prayer—blessings that are requests. And Maimonides, from his point of view, sees this as part of prayer; it is not a blessing over commandments. Therefore I don’t really understand all these halakhic decisors here in the Shulchan Arukh who struggle and hesitate, and there are all kinds of practical ramifications—whether women can discharge men in this blessing. In my opinion, of course they can. Okay, let’s skip already—Heaven help us. This is just an interesting work worth knowing: one of the Tosafists, Rabbi Yaakov of Marvege, or of Troyes—there are different versions—who wrote responsa on questions he asked through a dream inquiry. He asked Heaven various halakhic questions and received answers. One of the questions, section 10, deals with the blessing over Torah, and there he distinguishes among the three blessings and indeed explains that each one fulfills a different function: the blessing over Torah, the blessing over commandments, the blessing of praise. But we won’t get into that here. What I want is to speak a little about the underlying basis of the matter, and I said that this halakhic corridor through which I’ve been walking until now is really an opening into a broader perspective. I want to explain a bit what this praise is that we are supposed to give in the blessing over Torah. What is the meaning of this matter and what is it centered on? So look, there is a very interesting Talmudic text in tractate Berakhot—let’s read it. In tractate Menachot, sorry, not Berakhot. Menachot 99b. Rabbi Ami said: From the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” He says: if you studied something, one mishnah or one chapter, or you studied for a minute or two in the morning and a minute or two in the evening, you fulfilled your obligation. Not only did you fulfill your obligation—look, in my opinion the Talmudic text here is written with irony—you fulfilled “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” The verse says, “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” meaning that one must not stop engaging in it for even a moment. And Rabbi Ami comes and tells me: right, a chapter in the morning, a minute in the morning, a minute in the evening—you fulfilled “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Are you kidding? “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” means to be engaged in it all the time, not to stop for a moment. And now you come and set some minimal threshold, and that is what is called “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”? It simply makes no sense. Then look at the continuation. Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—Rabbi Yohanan is an amora, and he says it in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, who is a tanna—even if a person recited only Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart.” He says: forget Rabbi Ami, you’re still being stringent. You want me to devote a minute in the morning and a minute in the evening to study? Even that is not necessary. Do you say Shema in prayer in the morning and evening? That’s enough. With that too you fulfill Torah study. You don’t even need to study; reciting Shema is enough. In other words, he empties the commandment of Torah study of all content; nothing remains of it. The commandment of Torah study you fulfill automatically—you don’t need to do anything. You recited Shema in the morning and evening, you fulfilled your obligation. Everything is fine. There is ostensibly some sort of competition here—who can empty the commandment of Torah study of more content, who can leave less content in it. And it seems to me that Rabbi Yohanan wins by a landslide; in other words, he left it completely empty of content. But still, this whole process is strange. It is strange that they are trying somehow to leave the commandment of Torah study like, I don’t know, sails without wind, to take all the wind out of this sail. What is the idea? Are they coming to belittle the commandment of Torah study? What is the meaning of this thing—a commandment that obligates us to nothing, basically one can fulfill it without even noticing, without doing anything? There is an interesting sentence that concludes Rabbi Yohanan’s words. He says: “And this matter is forbidden to say before ignoramuses.” Now why is it forbidden? The simple understanding is: because if you tell them, they’ll permit themselves not to study. Right? If you tell them that in essence by reciting Shema morning and evening they fulfill their obligation, then they won’t do anything beyond that. Therefore don’t tell them, so that they won’t learn this from it. The question is why not tell them? Behold, this is the truth. The truth is that they don’t need to do anything other than that. So what are you afraid of? You’re afraid they won’t do anything beyond that? Fine—that really is all they need. So what’s the concern? Clearly what Rabbi Yohanan is coming to say, when he says, I am coming to empty the commandment of Torah study of all content, but don’t tell the ignoramuses—there is a complex message here. After all, I demand study all the time: “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” So what is the meaning of this move to empty it of content? I’m coming to tell you the following thing: the commandment of Torah study doesn’t interest me in the least. The commandment of Torah study is a marginal and unnecessary matter. We are talking about Torah study, not the commandment of Torah study. That is something entirely different. The commandment of Torah study is studying in order to fulfill the obligation of a commandment, like every other commandment, one of the 613 commandments, the commandment of Torah study—you have to study in order to fulfill your obligation. He says: you know what? For that, Shema morning and evening and you’re done. You are completely exempt—relax. But you don’t know what Torah study is—not the commandment of Torah study. Torah study means that you need to study—“this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” You need to study all the time. Why? Not because there is a commandment of Torah study. Because you understand what Torah is. Someone who understands what Torah is will study not in order to fulfill an obligation because there is some commandment. He will study because he understands that this is the breath of our nostrils, the most basic thing there is. Just as I breathe, so too I study Torah. Nobody needs to give me a commandment to breathe, right? The same way, nobody needs to give me a commandment to study Torah. That is the idea behind this strange competition at the beginning of the passage. The competition is basically to tell you: the commandment, the formal part of Torah study, is a marginal and unnecessary matter. Torah study in essence should be something altogether different. It should be something you do not because there is a commandment—there is no commandment—but because you understand the meaning of studying Torah. And therefore they make an effort to empty the formal halakhic part of the commandment of Torah study of all content; they leave nothing of it. They say: forget it. If you want to fulfill your obligation, you don’t need to do anything. Whoever studies Torah in order to fulfill his obligation doesn’t need to do anything—let him stay home and not study at all. One who does not understand that one needs to study Torah because it is Torah, not because there is a commandment to study Torah—such a person does not understand what Torah is. And therefore he says: “This matter is forbidden to say before ignoramuses,” because ignoramuses will not understand this idea. They think that what there is are commandments, and commandments have to be done. Anything beyond that, they do not understand that there is something beyond that. So you mustn’t tell him this, because clearly the goal is that he should study Torah, that we should understand the meaning of the matter—but not because of the commandment, rather because of the value of the thing. By the way, there is a similar statement with regard, for example, to the obligation to improve one’s character traits. A famous question that Rabbi Chaim Vital asks in Sha’arei Kedushah: why does the Torah not command this? Why is there no commandment to improve one’s character traits? So Rabbi Chaim Vital answers that the Torah gives commandments to human beings. Someone who is not a human being—there is no point commanding him. To command you to improve your character traits is to command you to be a human being. And if you are not a human being, you are not subject to commandment. Therefore there is no point in commanding that. But Rav Kook takes this one step further. He basically says that there are things that it is actually preferable to do not because of a commandment. The one who does them not because of a commandment is greater than the one who does them because of the commandment. And regarding those things, the Torah is careful specifically not to command. Therefore the Torah is careful not to command us regarding improving our character traits, because it has to come from us. We need to understand that we improve our character traits not because there is commandment number 233 to improve one’s character traits, but because we understand the human, moral, and spiritual importance of the matter, and therefore we improve our character traits. In this context I’m always reminded of the famous yeshiva joke about that young man who reached marriageable age. He starts meeting potential matches; all kinds of girls come, and he rejects all of them. The mashgiach at the yeshiva comes to him and says: tell me, are you the greatest scholar of all the exile communities? No one is suitable for you? Are you such a genius, such a uniquely special personality? You’re probably arrogant. Forget the shiddukhim—work on your character traits. Work on the trait of arrogance, and then go back to meeting girls. Fine, he works on his character traits enthusiastically, works on humility, improves his traits in an extraordinary way. After a year he comes back and starts meeting again another parade of candidates, and again he rejects all of them. So the mashgiach says to him: tell me, what is this? You worked a whole year on your character traits and nothing moved at all? So he says: why, Rabbi? A year ago, when I was arrogant, then no one was suitable for me. Now, after I worked on my traits and I’m so humble, all the more so no one is suitable for me. After all, now I am a much more select and praiseworthy personality. So of course no one is suitable for me—it’s an a fortiori argument. That’s what someone looks like who works on his character traits because he was instructed to work on his character traits. He does it because he needs to check the box on the commandment of character improvement. And that is precisely why the Torah does not give such a commandment. It doesn’t give such a commandment because it has to come from me; it must not come in order to fulfill some command. And in these commandments, greater is the one who is not commanded and yet performs. Contrary to the usual rabbinic statement, in these commandments greater is the one who is not commanded and yet performs. And therefore the Torah does not command character improvement. My claim is that this is Rabbi Yohanan’s statement here. Rabbi Yohanan wants to say: we do not study Torah because there is a commandment. In Torah study, greater is the one who is not commanded and yet performs. Therefore the Torah is careful not to command us. In order to command us, Shema morning and evening is enough. But what is demanded of you is “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” How is Shema morning and evening fulfilling “it shall not depart”? That’s not the point. “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” means that you should engage in it all the time because you understand the meaning of the matter. And how does that happen? Only if you understand that this is not a commandment at all. The commandment is Shema morning and evening—that is marginal. Torah study is not the commandment of Torah study. Torah study is the value of Torah study; it is not the commandment of Torah study, not a formal matter. And that is what he means when he says, “This matter is forbidden to say before ignoramuses.” Now one can understand the whole continuation of the passage. Notice that it continues exactly this business further along the same line. The whole passage is strung together; it is links threaded on this axis. And Rava said: it is a commandment to say it before ignoramuses. Why a commandment? Because why is the fellow an ignoramus? He is an ignoramus because he thinks that what one needs to study is only in order to fulfill the obligation of the commandment of Torah study. On the contrary—disabuse him of that. Tell him the meaning of the matter, that the commandment of Torah study is a marginal issue. Explain to him the meaning of Torah—that due to the immense importance of this commandment, of this matter of Torah study, the Torah does not want to put it in the framework of a commandment. Maybe then he will stop being an ignoramus. If you explain that to an ignoramus, it will be much better. It is a commandment to say it before ignoramuses. Maybe that will save him from remaining an ignoramus. Further. Ben Dama asked—I continue reading the Talmudic text. Look how it continues on the same axis. Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Yishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Yishmael: for someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah, what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom? Now here someone once asked me a sharp question—actually it was on Shavuot night in Yeruham when I lectured there in the hesder yeshiva. A certain young man came to me and asked: if Ben Dama learned the entire Torah, then how does he not know this? He learned the entire Torah, didn’t he? Now he has a halakhic question. He comes with a halakhic question to his uncle, Rabbi Yishmael. He says to him: look, I’ve learned the whole Torah. Now I have a halakhic question: am I allowed to study something else? Is that neglect of Torah? Is that included in the commandment of Torah study? I don’t understand—if you learned the whole Torah, then you ought to know that too. If you’re asking it, apparently you don’t know everything. So what—well, maybe he learned everything except that. I told him something else. I said to him: look, “he learned the whole Torah” means he knows everything Jewish law says—what is obligatory, what is forbidden. All of Jewish law; he was tested for judgeship and for ordination; he knows everything. But the principle of learning Torah all the time is not a halakhic principle. On the halakhic level, Shema morning and evening is enough. What lies outside Jewish law, that he did not learn, that he does not know. That is what he comes to ask Rabbi Yishmael. He says to him: I learned the whole Torah. I know all the commandments, what is permitted, what is forbidden, what is obligatory—I know everything. Now tell me: is there anything more than that in Torah study? Is there some other issue besides fulfilling one’s obligation? Because as far as that goes—Shema morning and evening—I’m done. Now can I go study other things? So Rabbi Yishmael says to him: he read to him this verse: “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” The same verse as above, remember? “And you shall meditate upon it day and night.” Go and find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night, and study Greek wisdom then. After all, “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” all the time, “and you shall meditate upon it day and night.” So how do you want to study other things? Behold, every second you need to study this. I don’t understand. A line earlier they explained to me that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” is fulfilled with Shema morning and evening, right? Now Rabbi Yishmael brings the same verse and says to him: here, there is an explicit verse. How can you—what don’t you understand here? Clearly—clearly Rabbi Yishmael is continuing the same point. Rabbi Yishmael says that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” comes to tell you not the formal parameters of the commandment of Torah study, but the obligation of Torah study, the idea of Torah study. And that is not Shema morning and evening; it is everything—“this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Therefore he says to him: if you know of some hour that is neither day nor night, do what you want. But both by day and by night one needs to study Greek wisdom—sorry, one cannot, one needs to study Torah. Now look at the continuation. Look how beautifully it continues. The same axis, everything threads through everything, threading the whole passage. “And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani.” Right? This statement of Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. Now notice—this is interesting. If we’re looking for whom Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with, I have a much better candidate. Rabbi Yishmael is a tanna. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani is an amora. What does it mean that a statement of a tanna disagrees with an amora? Strange. More than that, a line earlier you have a tanna who disagrees with him: Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. He says, “Even if a person recited only Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled.” Rabbi Yishmael says: what do you mean? “This book of the Torah shall not depart”—go find an hour that is neither day nor night. One needs to study all day. You’re looking for whom he disagrees with? Well, you have him one line earlier—Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. What’s the problem? No. Rabbi Yishmael disagrees, do you know with whom? Not with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, but with the amora Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. What about Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai? He does not disagree with him. That is exactly what I claimed. He does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai also agrees that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” day and night. The formal parameters of the commandment of Torah study are Shema morning and evening. Rabbi Yishmael agrees with that too, and Ben Dama knew that too. What Ben Dama asked Rabbi Yishmael was whether there is something more, an extra-halakhic principle. And to that Rabbi Yishmael answered him. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai fully agrees that one needs to study all the time. So he doesn’t disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai. Now let’s see how they reached the conclusion that it is Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani with whom he does disagree. Look how beautiful it is—every word is precise. “For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This verse, ‘this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” What is this double language? It’s very rare in the Talmud. What does “neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing” mean? He says it is not a formal halakhic obligation, and it is also not a commandment; it is also not an issue. Rather, what is it? It is a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that Joshua—that words of Torah were most beloved to him, as it is said, “and his attendant Joshua son of Nun, a lad, did not depart from the tent.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are words of Torah so beloved to you? “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” He blessed Joshua. This verse doesn’t tell us a commandment, but it also doesn’t give us an extra-halakhic instruction. It is a blessing to Joshua son of Nun. This indeed disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael. Because he claims that from this verse we learn neither commandment nor obligation—it is just a blessing to Joshua son of Nun. Rabbi Yishmael says this verse is a commandment. It is not an obligation, it is a commandment. So why does he disagree with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani? Because Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani says it is not an obligation and also not a commandment; it is only just a blessing to Joshua son of Nun. The whole movement of the passage is like this. In other words, everyone agrees that the obligation is Shema morning and evening, or a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening, and that’s it—completely minimal. Beyond that there is a commandment. “Commandment,” again, not in the formal sense—what is called in this Talmudic text “obligation.” “Commandment” means there is an idea, an issue. An issue to study Torah because of the importance of Torah. This has nothing to do with the formal part of Jewish law. Everyone agrees to this except Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani says it is only a blessing to Joshua son of Nun. That doesn’t mean he disagrees with the principle; he just interprets this verse as a blessing. The principle may exist, but from another verse—that is open to discussion. Now look how this ends. It ends in an illuminating way. A teaching from the school of Rabbi Yishmael: “Words of Torah should not be an obligation upon you, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” This is the end of the passage. What is this? We would have understood, were it not for all I’ve explained until now, some sort of moral or psychological statement: don’t relate to it as some burdensome yoke, but try to love it. No. This is the continuation of the conclusion of the passage. It says: “Words of Torah should not be an obligation upon you.” It is not an obligation. “Yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” There is certainly a commandment. Commandment again, not in the formal halakhic sense—an issue, an idea. In contrast—and this is Rabbi Yishmael—in contrast to Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani, who said that it is neither obligation nor commandment, but a blessing. This is not a moral statement. It is the halakhic summary of what is written here throughout the whole passage. It weaves every link in the course of this passage. The whole passage is aimed toward this closing line, which says that yes, it is a commandment. It is not an obligation, but it is a commandment—against Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. And that is what is written: “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” Don’t be an ignoramus. Don’t think that with Shema—don’t think that if you recited morning and evening you fulfilled your obligation, so you are exempt from everything else. You are not permitted to exempt yourself from them. And that is what one needs to say to the ignoramus so that he won’t remain an ignoramus. Therefore it is a commandment to say it before an ignoramus. That is the whole movement of the passage. Now look at the Talmudic text in Berakhot. Many of the medieval and later authorities ask about a contradiction between these passages. The Talmudic text in Berakhot says something that is apparently completely the opposite. It says as follows: The Rabbis taught: “And you shall gather in your grain.” What does this come to teach? Since it is said, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” right, one needs to study Torah all the time, one might think that the words are to be taken literally. In their plain sense? So one cannot do anything except study Torah? The verse therefore says, “And you shall gather in your grain.” Conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. You can go to work; you don’t need to study all day. In your free time, study. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: is it possible for a person to plow in the season of plowing, sow in the season of sowing, reap in the season of reaping, thresh in the season of threshing, winnow when there is wind—what will become of Torah? So this is very hard agricultural work; it takes your whole day, all the time. When will you study? What will become of Torah? Therefore he said: what do you mean? When Israel do the will of God, don’t do any of this; let the nations do it. You should study Torah all the time. If there is no choice, there is no choice. But in principle one should study all the time. Now everyone asks that this passage is the exact opposite, one hundred and eighty degrees, of the passage in Menachot. In the passage in Menachot, what does Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai say? Shema morning and evening is enough. What does Rabbi Yishmael say? What do you mean? “This book of the Torah shall not depart”—go find an hour that is neither day nor night. One needs to study all day. What is written here? Exactly the opposite, one hundred and eighty degrees—they switched sides. Rabbi Yishmael says you can go to work; you don’t need to study all day. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says what do you mean—even work, no, you need to study all the time. How does that fit with saying that Shema morning and evening is enough? Everyone asks—there is a frontal contradiction here between the passages. The way we learned the passage in Menachot, there is no contradiction at all. They both agree, completely agree. There is no dispute whatsoever. The Talmudic text itself says that Rabbi Yishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai; he disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai has no disagreement with Rabbi Yishmael, and here too this is not a disagreement. Both agree that the commandment is Shema morning and evening. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says this explicitly, and the Talmudic text says that Rabbi Yishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, so he too agrees. So what does “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” all day and all night mean—where here suddenly Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai also joins that? This is the idea of Torah, not the commandment of Torah study—this is Torah study. Everyone agrees about that. The question is only: to what extent, or how much, may I engage in other things at the expense of Torah? That is another issue. On that there may be some sort of disagreement. It may not even be a disagreement; these may be recommendations. That is already a different discussion. But on the principled level, it is entirely clear from the relationship between the passages, and this strongly reinforces the whole theme that runs through the Menachot passage—that the whole story is this tension between the formal layer, which they try to reduce as much as possible, and the meaning of Torah study as an idea that is so fundamental that precisely because of that they reduce its formal dimension and leave it as some kind of idea that obligates by virtue of the understanding of what Torah study is. Now a few implications, and with this I’ll close the circle with which I opened. First, if that is indeed the situation, then the fact that women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study is completely irrelevant. They are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, not from Torah study. What does the commandment of Torah study have to do with Torah study? The commandment of Torah study—they are exempt, fine. But when we study Torah, the commandment of Torah study within that is an utterly negligible part. Shema morning and evening and you fulfill your obligation. Torah study is a matter of reason. It is something that needs to be done because we understand that this is the most basic foundation of our spiritual lives. Now to whom is that addressed? It is a matter of reason. To anyone who understands the reasoning, to anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant, then clearly that person is obligated in it. There is, by the way, much evidence for this. Commandments whose basis is reason are not subject to these rules that women are exempt, minors are exempt, I don’t know, other exemptions—there are no exemptions. Anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant is obligated in this commandment. Therefore in my view women are obligated in Torah study exactly like men—to study the entire Torah from beginning to end with all the commentaries in depth, not only practical law, from all sides and aspects—they are obligated exactly like men. Obligated in the value sense, not in the formal halakhic sense. From the commandment of Torah study women are exempt, but from Torah study women are obligated. Now the question is: in the Shulchan Arukh we saw earlier that women recite the blessings over Torah. Everyone pounced on the Shulchan Arukh there—why, what do you mean? Behold, they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. I said that all those pouncing assume that this is a blessing over commandments. But I argued that the blessing over Torah is a blessing of praise. What do we bless for in a blessing of praise? For the praise that we understand the meaning of the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave us Torah. Whoever understands what Torah is praises the Holy One, blessed be He, for having given it to us. And here women not only understand the praise, they are also obligated to engage in Torah in that sense—not in the commandment of Torah study, but in the principled conceptual meaning, the principled meaning of Torah. In that context women are like men. So certainly they are obligated in the blessing over Torah—these are not excuses. I would say it by simple reasoning that they are obligated in the blessing over Torah. There is no need for excuses why the Shulchan Arukh does not exempt them. It is obvious that they are obligated, just as they are obligated to study Torah—obligated in the sense of a commandment, not in the sense of an obligation. This is Torah study not in the formal sense, but the idea of Torah study. So they also recite the blessing over Torah, because the blessing over Torah is the blessing of praise of “ascribe greatness to our God.” That is what the verse says. Whoever understands what Torah is needs to bless the Holy One, blessed be He, for having given us this thing. Just one note so we don’t leave it hanging—after all I’m speaking here to students. In the Talmudic text we read there in Menachot, it says that to study Greek wisdom one needs to find an hour that is neither day nor night; all the rest one must spend engaged in Torah. That of course raises the question: what is Torah? Now, defining what Torah is is of course a subject for a separate lecture, but in my opinion involvement in the sciences certainly is included in this matter. What is called there “Greek wisdom,” several medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain, is perhaps certain writings of Homer or various things that might lead to attachment to Greek culture in a very particular sense. It has no connection whatsoever to ordinary study of the sciences. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say yes, but it seems obvious to me that that is simply not correct, and there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say it is not correct. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) studied Greek wisdom; Maimonides studied Greek wisdom. So where did this prohibition go? Therefore I think—and I often say to students—that the only place in the world where they still study Greek wisdom is in the yeshivot. In other words, who today studies Greek philosophy? Only people learning Guide for the Perplexed and Saadia Gaon. In other words, this is basically Greek philosophy. Others are no longer dealing with Greek philosophy; it’s anachronistic. My claim is that one should not infer from here that Torah is by definition something in the narrow sense in which the term Torah is usually defined—meaning learning Talmudic text and halakhic passages and things like that. Rather, there is something much broader here, and that needs to be discussed separately. Whoever knows my trilogy knows that there is a long discussion of this in the second book. But I won’t be able to get into that here. So, I’ll stop the sharing for a moment, and you’re welcome to comment or ask—whoever wants, gladly. Thank you very much. Gladly. That’s it? Okay, then we’ll stop here. Have a happy holiday, and thank you very much for everything. Thank you very much, happy holiday. Happy holiday.