Does the Torah Guarantee Proper Conduct? Rabbi Michael Avraham in Conversation — Dr. Roy Yuzvitz
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Opening and framing: Torat Yisrael and intellectual honesty
- Is the Torah a guarantee of proper conduct, and the implications of “understanding”
- Critique of Rabbi Ratzon Arusi and comparing democracy to Torah: theory versus practice
- Derashot HaRan, the king’s law, and the claim that the Torah is not a state system
- Applying the principles of Jewish law in a changing reality: assessments and presumptions
- “Better to dwell”: changing assessment and its implications for the laws of marriage
- The line between necessary change and reform: a systematic theory of halakhic change
- The Meiri example and the attitude toward non-Jews: “the non-Jew Jewish law did not know”
- Rabbi Soloveitchik and presumptions “from Sinai”
- The distinction between facts and norms: David Hume, is and ought
- Commandments that are no longer relevant in a changing reality: slaves, the Tabernacle, and the stubborn and rebellious son
- “An eye for an eye,” enactments, and interpretation versus uprooting a law
- “So what is all this for?”: human effort, the Kuzari, and ostrich policy versus the meaning of Torah
- The purpose of the Torah: a spiritual dimension and holiness beyond morality
- Holiness as an addition to the moral level: Rabbi David Mishlov’s remarks
- Truth versus educational usefulness: religious feeling, the Expulsion from Spain, and innocence
- Conclusion: recommendation of the blog, the books, and the series
Summary
General Overview
The speaker and interviewer speak with Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham about whether the Torah guarantees proper conduct and about the price of intellectual honesty when its conclusions are unpleasant. Rabbi Abraham argues that reality shows the Torah does not guarantee morality or proper social functioning, and that an “ostrich” illusion only causes harm, so one must seek proper conduct out of humanity and morality rather than slogans. From there he draws a distinction between theory and practice, and between facts and norms, and develops the need for a systematic halakhic “theory of change” that explains what changes and what does not, so as not to slide down a slippery slope. At the end of the conversation he defines the purpose of the Torah not as fixing society but as attaining a spiritual dimension/holiness, and prefers philosophical truth even if it has harsh consequences, while opposing education toward “innocence” based on falsehood.
Opening and framing: Torat Yisrael and intellectual honesty
The interviewer presents the conversation as a continuation of earlier discussions about the great ones of Israel and the holy things of Israel, and now about Torat Yisrael, and warns in advance that the conversation may anger people. He presents the channel as one dealing with education, intelligence, and intellectual honesty, and greets Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham at the start of a new tax year. The interviewer quotes from one of Rabbi Abraham’s columns the question, “Is the Torah a guarantee of proper conduct?” and emphasizes the obligation to weigh claims “on the scales of one’s intellect” and not accept them merely because they fit one’s worldview.
Is the Torah a guarantee of proper conduct, and the implications of “understanding”
The interviewer argues that the problem is not that people “didn’t understand,” but that the implications of understanding the claims are great, destructive, and problematic, especially on issues like God’s intervention in the world or whether the Torah guarantees good conduct. Rabbi Abraham rejects an “ostrich policy” and argues that if factually the Torah is not a guarantee of proper conduct, then that is the case, and the question is how to ensure proper conduct by other means. He says that the belief that the Torah guarantees proper conduct can actually be harmful, because it may lead a person to justify his own behavior simply because it is “attached to Torah,” and he explains that one needs to be “human beings.”
Critique of Rabbi Ratzon Arusi and comparing democracy to Torah: theory versus practice
The interviewer presents Rabbi Ratzon Arusi as the chief rabbi of Kiryat Ono, a member of the Chief Rabbinate Council, and holder of a doctorate in law, and describes his claim that the political and democratic failure in Israel proves the failure of secular democracy. He quotes Rabbi Abraham’s wording that the rabbi “brutally forces Jewish law to say what he himself is saying” in connection with claims about political conduct and Jewish law. Rabbi Abraham agrees that the basic problem is an unfair comparison between theory and practice, and argues that since the Torah “at the moment does not function on the practical level,” it is easy to present it as perfect, whereas in the actual practice of “those who bear the Torah” it “looks a bit less good.” He adds that when one examines the practice of religious/Haredi parties or city models, one does not necessarily see improvement, and that if one compares theory to theory, the result may be “the same thing or in favor of democracy.”
Derashot HaRan, the king’s law, and the claim that the Torah is not a state system
The interviewer cites the eleventh sermon in Derashot HaRan and argues that Ran writes that the human species needs a judge to adjudicate among its members and that Israel needs this like all other nations, but that “the law of the Torah is incapable of supplying this need,” with examples such as evidentiary rules and double payment in theft. Rabbi Abraham confirms that this is true, “as is obvious to any reasonable person,” and adds that Maharal says something similar, and that reality itself proves it, with the example of indirect damage, which in some respects does not incur liability in Jewish law and therefore is not suitable by itself for running modern public life. The interviewer asks, “So then what is the whole Bava Metzia for,” if the king’s law is not subject to Torah law, and Rabbi Abraham distinguishes between two different questions: the suitability of Jewish law to changing reality, as opposed to the question of how to run a state in practice.
Applying the principles of Jewish law in a changing reality: assessments and presumptions
Rabbi Abraham argues that proper application of the principles of Torah law in today’s reality may look very different from what appears in the Shulchan Arukh or the Talmud, and that specifically someone who insists on doing “what they did then” may actually “deviate from Jewish law.” He explains that a rule like “a person does not pay before the due date” is not a “principle” but a psychological assessment, whereas the halakhic norm is that when there is a relevant assessment one may extract money even without formal proof. He suggests asking psychologists, legal scholars, and common sense what the assessments are for “reasonable people today,” and then applying the halakhic norms to those.
“Better to dwell”: changing assessment and its implications for the laws of marriage
The interviewer raises the example of “It is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow,” and presents Rabbi Abraham’s position that the Sages’ assumption about a woman’s desire to marry “always and at any price” is not true today, and therefore rules derived from it should change. Rabbi Abraham confirms that the presumption is not a statistical claim about “more” but an absolute, binding claim, and says that today it is “factual nonsense,” especially in situations such as discovering that the husband is violent. He says he does not learn “what women want today from the Talmud” but “by asking women,” and stresses the need for empirical grounding and surveys.
The line between necessary change and reform: a systematic theory of halakhic change
The interviewer asks why one should accept Rabbi Abraham’s distinction between changing assessments and fixed “meta-halakhic norms,” and warns that once something changes once, reform will follow. Rabbi Abraham argues that changes have been made throughout the generations, and that the danger arises precisely when one does not put that on the table and does not build a “theory of change,” because then people conclude that “everything can be changed.” He presents his book as dealing with a “theory of halakhic change” and argues that conservatism that “bangs its head against the wall” is dangerous, whereas an orderly theory of change creates boundaries and distinguishes “what does and what does not.” He says that the fear of a “slippery slope” can itself become a slippery-slope argument, and that the price of conservatism is “no less heavy.”
The Meiri example and the attitude toward non-Jews: “the non-Jew Jewish law did not know”
Rabbi Abraham presents the attitude toward non-Jews as an example of an actual change that “no one dares put on the table,” and refers to his article “The Non-Jew Jewish Law Did Not Know.” The interviewer reads a description of Meiri as someone who noticed that the non-Jews around him were “bound by the norms of the nations,” and therefore changed an entire system of laws and claimed they were not relevant to the non-Jews of his time, while leaving the prohibitions of intermarriage and some prohibitions regarding worship objects intact, concluding with the quote: “There is no need to say that the prohibitions of intermarriage and even prohibitions concerning ritual objects remained in force.” The interviewer attacks the phrase “there is no need to say” as itself a major innovation, and asks why the change should not be extended to other laws as well if the metaphysical difference cannot be measured. Rabbi Abraham argues that basing things on metaphysics “will blow up in your face,” and presents his position that he is “ready to change whatever needs changing” within a systematic theory of change that distinguishes between laws that depend on the assumption of immorality and laws that depend on the fact that they are non-Jews or idolaters, and therefore “there really is no need to say” with regard to what is unrelated to the changed rationale.
Rabbi Soloveitchik and presumptions “from Sinai”
The interviewer brings up Rabbi Soloveitchik and argues that there is a claim that the components of presumptions stem from essential or evolutionary foundations, but Rabbi Abraham clarifies that his dispute is with the claim that the presumptions “came down from Sinai” and therefore cannot change. He calls that “complete nonsense” and stresses that the debate is not about possible empirical data, but about turning factual determinations into something holy and unchangeable.
The distinction between facts and norms: David Hume, is and ought
Rabbi Abraham explains that the basic line is the difference between “facts” and “norms”: “a person does not pay before the due date” is a factual claim that has no holiness and can change, whereas the halakhic norm is what is binding. He uses the language of “is” versus “ought” and emphasizes “You can’t derive ought from is” to explain that norms do not change with reality; only their application to different realities changes. He argues that reality is examined through observation, surveys, and empirical research, not from the Talmud.
Commandments that are no longer relevant in a changing reality: slaves, the Tabernacle, and the stubborn and rebellious son
The interviewer raises the example of slaves and argues that nothing remains of laws like “if I have one pillow, I must give it to the slave,” and Rabbi Abraham replies that if reality has changed and the norms depend on it, then they are no longer relevant, and there is no obligation that all commandments exist “at every given moment.” He gives examples such as a hypothetical situation “where there would no longer be meat in the world,” and says that then the prohibition of meat and milk would be irrelevant, and he mentions that the stubborn and rebellious son is a law that the Talmud says “never even happened.” He says, “We have 250 verses about the Tabernacle,” and at present there is nothing to do with them, and that is accepted as part of the halakhic structure.
“An eye for an eye,” enactments, and interpretation versus uprooting a law
The interviewer cites an idea in the name of Rabbi Kook that the Torah says what is true “in principle,” but in practice the Sages stop it, similar to “when adulteresses became numerous, the bitter waters ceased” and “when murderers became numerous” with regard to the heifer rite and the cities of refuge. Rabbi Abraham disagrees and argues that “when adulteresses became numerous” is a rabbinic enactment and the uprooting of a Torah law through passive non-performance, not an internal interpretation of the verse. He presents his view on “an eye for an eye” as derived from the Sages’ hermeneutics using tools like verbal analogy, and adds a theoretical example from an opinion in the Talmud about paying “the value of your eye” to reflect a principle of “an eye for an eye” converted into money, clarifying that this is one opinion and not necessarily the accepted ruling.
“So what is all this for?”: human effort, the Kuzari, and ostrich policy versus the meaning of Torah
The interviewer connects the difficulty to the question of God’s presence in reality and to Rabbi Abraham’s lecture series “The Holy One, Blessed be He, and the World,” and presents Rabbi Abraham’s claim that the obligation of human effort is a “logical fiction.” He gives examples against the claim that “our holy Torah” is a political system, such as hereditary monarchy from the house of David and the absence of elections, and also cites the Kuzari, where it is claimed that Jewish humility comes from weakness and that when “your hand finds strength, you will kill,” along with the response, “You have found the place of my disgrace.” Rabbi Abraham replies that the question “what is this all for” stems from the assumption that the purpose of the Torah is to repair society and the human being, and he rejects that because reality does not confirm it, and because conceptually “it cannot be that we were created in order to fix ourselves,” but rather that self-improvement is a means to some other end.
The purpose of the Torah: a spiritual dimension and holiness beyond morality
Rabbi Abraham argues that the Torah must have a goal beyond morality and a well-functioning society, and he says he does not know exactly what it is, but it is “apparently” spiritual/metaphysical. He brings examples like the prohibition of eating pork, creeping creatures, and the laws of sacred offerings and ritual purity to argue that they are not understandable as a program for building a healthy society. He claims that only a small part of the commandments relates to social repair, and that the prophets, too, rebuke the people for ritual observance without morality, emphasizing “What need have I of your many sacrifices?” and “Is it not to share your bread with the hungry?” as proof that keeping the book of Leviticus does not guarantee a repaired society.
Holiness as an addition to the moral level: Rabbi David Mishlov’s remarks
The interviewer cites Rabbi David Mishlov as saying that study and Jewish law do not make a person more moral, and that an immoral person who studies Torah may become “even more depraved,” but if a person is already on a moral level, Torah adds a “dimension of holiness” that cannot be achieved through any other system. Rabbi Abraham says he “completely agrees” and that this is “exactly the claim” he is making, and uses it to argue that speaking truthfully about the Torah’s limitations as a moral educator prevents abandonment and allows commitment to Torah for a different reason.
Truth versus educational usefulness: religious feeling, the Expulsion from Spain, and innocence
Rabbi Abraham says he does not see an obligation “to fuel religious feeling,” and that in the absence of such feeling there is a danger of abandonment, but he refuses “to go on lying.” He rejects the glorification of simplicity and innocence and formulates a position against “being an idiot,” even if innocence can lead to self-sacrifice, and says he does not “subordinate philosophy” to its practical consequences. He adds that he thinks some people actually “remain committed because of” his heresy, even though he admits that some may be harmed by it.
Conclusion: recommendation of the blog, the books, and the series
The interviewer concludes by recommending Rabbi Abraham’s blog and his three books, notes the price of “one hundred and fifty for three books,” and praises the writing as theology understandable to the modern person, even suggesting a possible comparison to Guide for the Perplexed in future generations. He recommends watching the lecture series “The Holy One, Blessed be He, and the World,” and Rabbi Abraham parts with a blessing for a good week.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] After in the first conversation we talked about the great ones of Israel, and in the second conversation we talked about the holy things of Israel, it’s time to talk about Torat Yisrael, and I apologize in advance to all the people this conversation is going to upset. Hello everyone and welcome to my channel, a channel that talks about intelligent learning and also about how to make you more intellectually honest in your next living-room conversation. Happy new tax year, have a good week, Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham. How are you?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank God, excellent. Have a good week.
[Speaker A] Great. So we’re starting a new tax year, and one of the things you write in your column in thirty—yes, as if you said, how should we finish—how should we finish 2020 in a wonderful way, and your column actually begins with the sentence: Is the Torah a guarantee of proper conduct? And as you say, even though there are things that are nice for us to hear, intellectual honesty requires that even if things are pleasant for the listener, he still has to weigh them on the scales of his intellect and not accept them just because they fit his views. So I did look at part of your series The Holy One, Blessed be He, and the World, which is an excellent series that generally talks about the second part, and at the beginning of the series you say the following. You say: I’m now going to talk to you about things I already solved in the second part, but it seems to me people didn’t understand them. That’s what you say there, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember, but if you say so.
[Speaker A] It’s all on YouTube. And my claim is not that people didn’t understand them, but that the implications of understanding what you’re saying are major, destructive, and problematic implications, and I think that’s the reason. As someone who wrote a book about intelligence, I’m always surprised that people don’t understand the point that correlation is not one hundred percent and that whole story. And it seems to me that if you spoke to them in contexts other than intelligence, they would understand. Meaning, when you talk about questions like whether God intervenes in the world or whether the Torah is a guarantee of good conduct—if it isn’t a guarantee of good conduct, then yes, we would follow intellectual honesty all the way through, but that has a very big consequence. Are you with me on that point?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand what you’re saying, but I don’t agree. I don’t think an ostrich policy can improve anything. If factually I don’t see that the Torah is a guarantee of proper conduct, then it isn’t. Now the question is how to make sure there will still be proper conduct—apparently not by clinging to Torah, but by being human beings. In that sense I don’t think it’s destructive. Someone who thinks the Torah is a guarantee of proper conduct won’t thereby become someone who behaves properly. On the contrary.
[Speaker A] He might even think—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that if he behaves like this then it must be proper, because after all it’s attached to Torah. It can even be harmful.
[Speaker A] And anyone who reads your responses to people’s comments on the blog sees that you really recoil from tautology. Fine, so in order not to make ad hominem arguments—even though you do talk a great deal about Rabbi Ratzon Arusi in two respects—what you’re basically saying is this: right now we have the conduct surrounding the elections, we really can’t manage to form a government, and Rabbi Ratzon Arusi says—Dr. Ratzon Arusi, he’s the chief rabbi of Kiryat Ono, right, if I remember correctly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As far as I know, yes.
[Speaker A] And also a member of the Rabbinate Council, and also has a doctorate in law. He says: look, in the end, this democratic conduct—here, this is the failure of democracy no less. Secular democratic conduct brings us to this. Now if I went back a bit—yes, if I went back a bit—then what you basically say is that he says that what Lieberman did—so I’m not just saying this casually, in your column 219—you say that what Lieberman did, namely violating election commitments, is something forbidden according to the Torah, right? Something forbidden according to the Torah. And then you write: the rabbi brutally forces Jewish law to say what he himself is saying. And now—and here I want, before I get to what you say—in the end your claim is an interesting one. What Rabbi Arusi says, and again, not ad hominem but person for person, is that you can’t compare Torah with an operating legal or practical system for two reasons. First, because there is no practical Torah; there is theoretical Torah. That’s the first reason, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Comparisons between theory and practice are always crooked, if you like. And since the Torah currently doesn’t function on the practical level, it’s very easy to point to its perfection. In practice, when we see the bearers of Torah functioning, it looks a little less good.
[Speaker A] And that’s exactly the second claim. You say, okay, suppose you don’t want to do that—after all, you do have an opportunity to look at the practical conduct of people who are supposedly committed to Torah, right? The religious parties, the Haredi parties, the Bnei Brak municipality model. You bring up there the question of whether one may vote, whether one may refrain from voting. Then someone says: wait, in Beitar Illit don’t people refrain? So whichever way you slice it, if I look at the practical conduct of Knesset members committed to Torah, I don’t see improvement, and if I compare practice to theory I do see a difference—meaning it’s not fair. That’s the claim, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if you compared theory to theory, it would come out the same or in favor of democracy.
[Speaker A] And on top of that—and again—then you add another layer and say, listen, if you come and tell me that the Haredi Knesset members, in some of their conduct, are not acting according to Torah, then I’ll say to you that the secular Knesset members are not acting according to democracy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning theory is always perfect—that’s the point. Compare theory—who builds an imperfect theory? It makes no sense to do that. It may fail in practice, but why would a person build an imperfect theory? The thinkers of the democratic system, if there were such people—the Elders of Zion who devised the democratic system—did they devise a corrupt system? Obviously they devised the best system they could, according to their understanding. So when it doesn’t work in practice, it’s pretty clear that the problem is with people, and in that sense it’s the same in our context too.
[Speaker A] Okay, and now let’s go one step deeper, because in the end if you look at the halakhic references—and again, these references also draw from Between Pillars, which is the third part of your trilogy—by the end, after you had really reached the end, you said: all right, let’s not only slaughter sacred cows but also kick them, right? So you go through them one by one. But also from articles by Nadav Shnerb or people like that. In the end, everyone mentions Derashot HaRan, so in the eleventh sermon in Derashot HaRan, Rabbeinu Nissim, around a thousand years ago, basically says the following. I’ll read it here: The human species needs a judge to judge among its individuals, for otherwise each person would swallow his fellow alive, and Israel needs this just as the other nations do. But, he explains, Torah law is incapable of supplying this need. That is—and he gives an example from the laws of evidence, and the example that Shnerb and you bring is the example of paying double for theft: imagine that someone who steals an iPhone has to return two iPhones, and that’s only if they catch him. You can’t run a state like that. So it comes out that it’s not only that Torah is not a system that in theory can function, but according to Ran even in theory the Torah cannot function in practice. Do you accept that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In practice.
[Speaker A] Yes, Ran says you can’t take the theory—meaning even—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah is some kind of system which, according to his definition, in one sense is pure truth, and in another sense is basically a means for bringing upon us, yes, the divine matter—to cause the Divine Presence to dwell in Israel. But if you want to run life, it’s not advisable to work according to the Torah. Ran already wrote that seven hundred years ago or so. It’s obvious to any reasonable person; you don’t need Ran for that. I only bring Ran so people won’t think, once again, that I’m such a great heretic. Yes, this is a ruling from a primary source—
[Speaker A] We have to stick to the text, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Maharal says the same thing. But reality itself says it. What do you mean? Our perfect theory doesn’t obligate liability for indirect damage. Can you run life that way? Is that serious?
[Speaker A] Wait, I’ll just explain for the secular audience that may say, “What’s indirect damage?” Indirect damage basically means someone who didn’t cause the damage directly, but caused something that then caused the damage. And today we say: what do you mean? If you did something and that act ultimately led to damage, then you’re responsible. So from here the question really arises—and again, I know, I also read Shnerb’s article and your articles and that book—so what for? If indeed this idea, that the thief returns double, doesn’t work in reality, and the king—or what you’d call the civil system, or the king’s law, because Ran talks about some kind of Torah law and the king’s law—and the king does… apparently there doesn’t even have to be any connection between the two systems. The king does whatever he wants, right? Or whatever seems proper to him according to morality and common sense.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As he sees fit, yes.
[Speaker A] So what is this whole thing for, then? Right? What is all of Bava Metzia for? What are all these topics for? I mean, what did we gain from it? Because even you say: I learn the norms from the Talmud. Just as an example you give: there’s a presumption that a person does not pay before the due date. And then you say: that’s not true. Today a person does pay before the due date because he’s paying interest. But the Sages established for us that there is a presumption, so you can extract money even without witnesses, right? That’s your move. So aside from that—is that all? Just to try to understand the tools? But again, even with those tools, where you say the Sages came and told us that because of the presumption a person doesn’t pay before the due date—but I don’t even need that, because the king doesn’t care what you say and doesn’t care about that mode of conduct. So why did you bring us here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, those are two different things. You have to distinguish between two things. The first example you gave, I brought as a demonstration that when we apply the principles of Torah law—of what’s written in the Talmud, in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and so on—to today’s reality, it can look completely different from what it looks like in the Shulchan Arukh or in the Talmud, and that would be the correct application. That is not halakhic change; on the contrary. Someone who does not do it differently—someone who ostensibly preserves what they did then—is precisely the one who deviates from Jewish law. If someone insists on clinging to that presumption that a person does not pay before the due date, when in reality, let’s say, there is a reality in which a person does pay before the due date, then he is not adhering to Jewish law; he is deviating from Jewish law. Because my claim is essentially that the halakha is not the principle that a person does not pay before the due date. That is a psychological assessment. The halakha is actually the norm behind it. Meaning: if you have some assessment, ask the psychologists, the legal scholars, and common sense what the relevant assessments are for the people around us today. Once you have those assessments, the halakhic norms come and say that by force of an assessment, you can extract money even without formal proof. Okay?
[Speaker A] But even when I read that—and then later you bring there your article “The Non-Jew Jewish Law Did Not Know,” which I’ll get to in a moment because there’s something there I don’t understand—in the end, you give the move about a woman who is supposedly—a woman prefers to marry always, right? “It is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow.” Meaning, you say this: a woman will always want to marry. That was the assessment, right? That was the idea in, I don’t know, the third, fourth, fifth century CE, when these things were written. And because a woman always consents to marry, or always prefers to be with a man—even a foolish man, just not to be alone—you can derive many halakhic rules from that. So you say: listen, a woman today doesn’t want to be alone, true? But since that was the ruling, and since that no longer applies, now all the rules that were derived from the Sages’ psychological assessment are no longer valid. That’s your move, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In reality today it is not true that a woman is willing to be in a relationship at any price. Everyone wants to be in a relationship today too, but not at any price—less so than in the past. So because of that, there are many halakhic consequences that we need to conclude should be changed.
[Speaker A] But now my claim, with your permission—don’t be offended—is maybe this is a kind of… you know, Rabbi Benamozegh says that the moment the Christians first said, “Listen, the gospel changed,” they brought reform upon themselves. It changed once, it changed a second time. Why should I accept your view that the assessment is psychological and valid only for its time, but the meta-halakhic norms are valid forever? Why can’t I come and say: no, the meta-halakhic norms are also not valid? Where is the line between what you’re saying and “every generation decides,” on the one hand, and meta-halakhic rules that are forever, on the other? Do you understand the question?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand the question. But first of all, the Reformation was a return to the sources, not change, it was—
[Speaker A] No, it was a return to the sources, but if the Catholics say the first time, “All right, fine, okay, nu, may God have mercy”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were not in favor of changes. The Reformation was actually in the opposite direction. But in our matter, what I want to argue is this: look, changes were made throughout the generations. The whole question is whether you put it on the table or not. And if you put it on the table, do you also build a theory of change? An entire section of the book you showed earlier deals with the theory of halakhic change. And there my claim is basically that if we do not build an orderly theory of halakhic change, that is precisely when the danger you mentioned arises. Why? Because everyone sees that changes are being made. Changes. And if you don’t build a systematic theory, people won’t understand, and then okay, so everything can be changed. But the moment you build an orderly theory, then you say: okay, clearly there is room for changes, but let’s see what does and what does not. Conservatism that goes headfirst into the wall is a conservatism that will smash your head. In the end people see that things change; you can’t fool them. So on the contrary, I say: put it on the table, build an orderly theory of halakhic change, which in my opinion is completely faithful to the sources. In my opinion, today’s conservatism is not faithful to the sources. The theory of halakhic change that I propose is completely faithful to the sources. And these fears of a slippery slope—we’ll become Reform, they’ll abandon everything, and so on—in my view the price of conservatism is no less heavy, even on those levels, aside from the fact that it’s simply not true.
[Speaker A] As you wrote, there’s a slippery slope in using the slippery-slope argument. But I do have to say to the secular viewer that what you’re saying—your approach is not, even though it looks that way, because it really looks like all you want to do is kick and slaughter—the approach of the third book really says: listen carefully, I’m solid up through the Talmud. From the Talmud onward, you know, every law is law for a halakhic decisor. The way you see these changes is really through halakhic practice. I’m just curious, as an aside, if someone asked me what the main or biggest thing is that changed over the last fifty years, how do you say, from the field itself, I would say that even though prayer books still say that on Rosh Hashanah the shofar blasts during the Musaf prayer are inside Musaf, now everyone puts the shofar blasts at the end. They decided that wasn’t good, even though it’s still in the prayer books, the blasts inside Musaf, inside the prayer. But I assume that’s not a change. So what is the change, in your view, when you say changes happen all the time? What de facto change would you point to and say, here, this already entered practical halakhic ruling?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, there are quite a few examples one can give. I’ll start with the attitude toward non-Jews, for example. No one dares put it on the table the way Meiri did. Again, six hundred years ago—
[Speaker A] Oh—look where I got to. Come on, look how prepared I come to our conversations. Come on, please, look—here, “The Non-Jew Jewish Law Did Not Know,” and it’s even quoted here. See how prepared I come? Come on, say something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good, excellent. You see—
[Speaker A] Right, so Meiri basically says—I’ll just explain for those who don’t know—Meiri says in the thirteenth century—when does he say it? Ah, one of the greatest sages of Provence in the Middle Ages. Meiri, who noticed that the non-Jews around him were not like those non-Jews the Sages spoke about, and that they were “bound by the norms of the nations” and ate with knife and fork and so on, and it did not seem plausible to him that the Sages were instructing him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Norms of the nations” doesn’t mean knife and fork. “Norms of the nations” means moral norms.
[Speaker A] Yes, all right, fine, still, it’s also supposed to be a bit for the sake of— And it didn’t seem plausible that the Sages were telling him to relate to them like animals, because that’s what the Sages say about non-Jews. As a result of his innovative assessment of reality, Meiri did not say they were like “a pig that came out of the mouth,” and he did not quote rabbinic sayings. Rather, he allowed himself to change an entire system of Torah-level and rabbinic laws and argued consistently and systematically that they were not relevant with respect to the non-Jews of his time. And now—and this is the sentence I quoted: “There is no need to say that the prohibitions of intermarriage and even prohibitions regarding ritual objects remained in force in his eyes.” The non-Jews are still non-Jews, and some of them are still idolaters, but they are normative human beings like me and you. My claim against you is that under no circumstances can you write here “there is no need to say.” That is a very—that’s my claim: it’s a very big innovation. You—what do you mean, “there is no need to say”? If you say, listen, all we knew about non-Jews was that they’re like animals, and suddenly a sage in the thirteenth century comes and says no, they are bound by moral norms and they’re like me and you and all is well, right? After all, your whole article begins with the fact that you were a teacher in a hesder yeshiva in Yeruham and your students said that non-Jews are not moral. That’s where it begins, right? And you say, wow, these are graduates of religious education. So then it means that once we really thought non-Jews were so different from us that the Hatam Sofer said there was no point even studying medicine on non-Jews because the non-Jewish body is different from the Jewish body. And now God help us, the obvious solution is to move our testimony into the realms of metaphysics. The Jew really is different, only you can’t measure it, it’s not measurable, right? So today everyone really thinks that way—Rabbi Kook, Maharal, Chabad. What is different about him? He has some special spiritual quality. Can you measure it? No, you can’t measure it. But you say, forget even that. Right? So why do you say here, “there is no need to say”? Need not say what? If they are different, then maybe indeed a whole set of laws should change as well.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that is my claim. Someone who hangs everything on metaphysics is an exact example of what I told you in the previous sentence: it will blow up in his face. Because the moment he is honest with himself and discovers that the non-Jews are like me and you, you have canceled the entire Torah with respect to them. And that is exactly the alternative I’m constantly advocating: I’m willing to change whatever needs to be changed, but to put it on the table within an orderly theory of change. Because then I can tell you what does and what does not change. And the moment I explain that the non-Jews are different on the moral plane, there is no need to say that the laws regarding non-Jews that are unrelated to their moral level do not change. That is exactly the point. Because when you keep presenting it as: wait, where will you stop the change—maybe we’ll change this too and that too, and in the end nothing will remain—my claim is precisely that I am not creating that problem, I am solving it. Since I am trying to present an orderly theory of change, I tell you there are certain things that stem from the fact that the non-Jews are immoral—some of the laws. Those laws are void today because non-Jews behave like me and you. Some more, some less—of course I’m not saying they are all righteous, and not all Jews are righteous either—but like me and you. On the other hand, there are laws that are tied to the very fact that they are non-Jews, or idolaters, those among them who are idolaters, and that certainly will not change, and indeed there is no need to say so. Because when you keep saying, what do you mean there is no need to say, it’s because you’re not thinking about it in substantive categories at all. You’re saying: wait, if you change this, then everything changes. My whole point is to say: no, not like that. I want to make orderly changes according to the rules, to explain what does and what does not. And I’m not afraid to change everything, provided it’s correct, and what is not correct—there is no need to say—will not change. That is exactly the point.
[Speaker A] So I want to get to the word “correct.” I think that really—and don’t hold me to the exact wording—I think that in the introduction to Truth and Unstable, you write that there was a claim that religion makes people more extreme after Rabin’s assassination. And then you said: okay, but if that’s the truth, then I’m extreme. Meaning, the move you’re always making is what’s called intellectual honesty, right? In the end I have only what I see. You’re playing make-believe, once again. If I think that today a woman cannot—that today a woman will not consent to marry under all circumstances, and you reject what Rabbi Soloveitchik says as it appears in the text itself—meaning, in the text itself you say Rabbi Soloveitchik says: why should evolutionary psychology, or whatever, or what Jordan Peterson might say, that in the end the relationship between man and woman, by virtue of its evolutionary foundations, contains an element that is unequal or something like that—and these changes still, meaning even a woman can be a modern woman and still want marriage more than the man does, right? Just look at all the stand-up material today. Suppose you don’t accept that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I may accept that. That’s a factual question. I’m far from political correctness.
[Speaker A] So what is it that you don’t accept in Rabbi Soloveitchik? Meaning, what is Rabbi Soloveitchik’s claim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Soloveitchik is something else. Rabbi Soloveitchik wants to argue that all presumptions came down from Sinai, including the presumption that “it is better to dwell as two,” and that it’s not the result of observing reality; it’s the result of a datum that came down from Sinai and cannot change—which is, of course, complete nonsense. I don’t believe he himself believed that nonsense.
[Speaker A] Because when I read him—forgive me, you obviously know him better—but when I read him, I understood that what he was saying was that it’s not the presumption itself, right, but that in the essence or psychology of a woman there is this idea, meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I have no objection to—if only because I don’t have the data. I’m not familiar with studies or surveys that systematically checked to what extent women want to get married versus how much men do. The general impression is that women really do want to get married a bit more than men, but I don’t know. But I don’t see any holiness in that, first of all. Let them check, and whatever findings they find, that’s what they’ll find. Second, that’s not what I’m talking about. The presumption of “it is better to dwell as two” doesn’t say that women want to get married more than men, even if that were true. The presumption says that they want to get married always and at any price. Not just more.
[Speaker A] If I tell you something like this: the average man—women in general will not prefer… or rather, I want to sharpen this point, let’s say because of my intelligence discussions. What am I saying, after all? In the end, women will prefer—intelligent women will prefer—not to study engineering and physics but to study medicine. And therefore we shouldn’t be frustrated by the fact that the percentage of people finishing PhDs in physics is not fifty-fifty. But that statement is about the general population, and if a woman is found who loves studying physics, wonderful, thank God, blessed be she, welcome, ahlan wa-sahlan. Your claim says that the presumption—and by the way, it’s a question whether that’s even the halakhic / of Jewish law presumption—says no, this is not a statistical claim, but rather a claim that applies to every person in every situation always. And then that has a very great significance for the case at hand that I’m now discussing regarding divorce or something like that, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Meaning, it turns into a binding legal principle. Now take any specific woman who was betrothed to someone who turned out to be—I don’t know what—some terrible person. Okay? “It is better to dwell as two”—is it obvious that she consented, that even if she had known all this she still would have consented? That is complete nonsense nowadays. Again, in the time of the Sages I didn’t check; maybe they looked at reality and that really was the case there. I don’t know—that was a different reality. One thing I do know: nowadays it is not true. Now, if you ask me whether women want to get married as much as men—I haven’t checked, I don’t know. Maybe they want it more than men do. But you can’t say there is such an absolute presumption, especially in situations where there is no doubt there is an opposite presumption. Not only am I not sure—there is an opposite presumption. Meaning, a woman who discovers that her husband is a violent person—and not that the violence developed after the wedding; let’s say it was there before, although even after that it’s a question one can discuss. But let’s say it was there beforehand. Most women today do not want to marry such a person. Can anyone tell me otherwise? That’s factual nonsense. So how can you say there is a presumption that if the woman consented, then obviously she consented at any price? It simply does not work today. So that’s all—I’m simply against rigid fixation, that’s all. I’m not making any positive determinations; I’m making negative determinations. And the second thing I’m claiming is that determinations like these need to be backed by a survey in the field. I don’t learn what women want today from the Talmud / Talmudic text. I learn what women want today by asking women what they want today. That’s all. And I’m not saying that women today are completely different from what they were in the Talmud / Talmudic text, and that all female character is just social construction—I can’t stand those statements; in my view they’re baseless. If they were true and I were convinced, great, fine. But I really don’t think one has to say that in the name of political correctness. All I want to claim is that one has to be attentive to what is happening on the ground. It is inconceivable that we should learn about our reality from what is written in the Talmud / Talmudic text. That is a shocking disconnect.
[Speaker A] But again, with your permission, there’s still one thing I’m not grasping. Again, if it doesn’t come from reality on the ground, then look—the Sages say such a thing, the Sages say I have this presumption and then such-and-such follows. But again, where is the line between principles that applied in the period of the Sages and meta-halakhic / of Jewish law, meta-legal principles? Because I can’t manage to come and say, here, this is a principle. Meaning—and even if there is such a principle, then if I understand correctly it’s a principle of Michael Abraham, not a principle that came down at Sinai, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain, I’ll explain. I explained it there too; I also have some lecture that does it in a more orderly way. But the claim is this: there is a difference between facts and norms. That’s all. That’s the whole distinction. Very simple, very simple. “A person does not repay before the due date”—that is a factual claim. A factual claim has no holiness in it whatsoever. You need to look at what the facts are, and facts can change from time to time and place to place, and therefore there is no holiness at all in a factual claim that appears in the Talmud / Talmudic text. What appears in the Talmud / Talmudic text that binds us is a normative claim. That’s the whole difference. That’s all.
[Speaker A] But I can come and—wait a second—what a funny guy you are—but I can come and say that norms, as time goes on, also change. No, no, norms don’t change.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t mean what’s accepted, what is considered normative in society. For me, norms means Jewish laws or laws. Meaning in David Hume’s sense, of ought versus is. Is is facts, and ought is norms. Ought, yes—what ought to be. You can’t derive ought from…
[Speaker A] What ought to be done from what is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now I’m saying: there is no holiness at all in the is. You want to know reality? Look at reality. And if you can’t manage to see it, send psychologists to do a survey, to do what they call “research”—for some reason I don’t understand why—they call it a survey in plain Hebrew—and let them check what reality is. Okay? That is the way to check reality, not by reading the Talmud / Talmudic text. What is holy, or what is binding, in the Talmud / Talmudic text are the norms that appear there. The halakhic / of Jewish law norms, for example: when you have a presumption, it extracts money—what we talked about earlier regarding the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date. That is a normative determination. What does that have to do with facts? What change in reality today would change that norm? There is no connection between reality and norm.
[Speaker A] So you’re saying, let’s say, let’s talk about the reality of slaves, right? Meaning when—here—when a slave… after all, the whole issue of slaves, yes, has passed and disappeared from the world, right? Or unless we’re going with the idea that today we are all slaves, but I think the issue of slaves today has disappeared from the world. So what norm—what remains for us from all the discussion about a Hebrew slave or a Canaanite slave or whatever kind of slave—that if I have one pillow I have to give it to the slave?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing. Nothing remains from it. What’s the problem? If reality has changed and the norms that apply to that reality are no longer relevant, then they are no longer relevant. In a place where there will no longer be meat in the world, will we need to invent a new prohibition of meat and milk? No. The prohibition of meat and milk will simply become irrelevant. There’s no holiness there; it doesn’t have to be that all prohibitions or commandments exist at every given moment. You’re saying we have a situation here of relevance; the Torah says there’s nothing for you to do—so what?
[Speaker A] You’re saying we have two hundred and fifty verses about the Tabernacle—here, we have nothing to do with them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And then today we don’t have slaves, so the laws of slaves are not relevant. What’s the problem? Regarding the rebellious and wayward son, the Talmud / Talmudic text says it never even existed—not only that today it doesn’t exist, it never existed. It’s a commandment that was never fulfilled and also never will be. So there are commandments that once were fulfilled, but today are no longer fulfilled.
[Speaker A] No, but maybe—let me give an example—from the book Angels as Human Beings, from Rabbi Kook. Once someone asked him why it says “an eye for an eye,” while the Sages said it means monetary compensation, right? There are many reasons for it, but Rabbi Kook said: truly, the Torah says what should have happened in ideal truth. It’s just that then it’s like the father who is about to hit and the mother comes and stops him. So too, for example, when adulterous women increased, the bitter waters ceased; when murderers increased, the beheaded heifer ceased, or the cities of refuge ceased. Meaning, the Torah gives you a kind of legal conduct for when everyone is at some moral level or another. If everyone is at a high moral level, then it is fitting to use the bitter waters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is much more far-reaching; I don’t accept it.
[Speaker A] So why, when adulterous women increased, did the bitter waters cease?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they saw that it was no longer relevant. I think that’s from Rabbi Kook. I think that “when adulterous women increased, the bitter waters ceased” was a decision of the Sages not to do it; it was not an interpretation of a verse in the Torah saying that when there are many adulterous women, you shouldn’t carry it out. It was a rabbinic enactment; they uprooted a Torah law. They uprooted a Torah law through passive omission. Same thing when murderers increased—they stopped the laws of the murderer. I don’t think that’s connected to “an eye for an eye.” With “an eye for an eye” they made an exposition—“under” and “under”; they learn an analogy from that, and from there they learn that monetary payment is collected and the eye is not removed. Now, one can argue, one can fail to understand how the Sages did this, but with the tools they had, they arrived at the conclusion that the Torah intends for us to extract money and not an eye, even though it wrote “eye.” One can argue about that. There are those who claim that the Torah wrote some kind of pure truth, but in practice one must do something else. I actually think differently about that passage, following Anshka—I argue that the Torah says both things; both things need to be fulfilled together. But this matter of what also…
[Speaker A] To put out his eye and also make him pay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s more complicated. The Torah basically says—for example—there is an opinion in the Talmud / Talmudic text that you pay the value of your own eye, not the value of the injured party’s eye.
[Speaker A] Meaning, if a pilot puts out the eye of a singer—that’s a very big difference—which eye? After all, the eye of a singer is worth less.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So according to that opinion, you pay for the pilot’s eye. Why? Because first of all, you’re supposed to put out the pilot’s eye in exchange for the singer’s eye. And after that they say, yes, but instead of that, take money. So you are fulfilling both things. You are in effect removing his eye for his eye, but instead of actually removing an eye, you pay money. If they had said just pay money and that’s it, then you would pay the value of the singer’s eye. But that’s why they tell you, no—it is “an eye for an eye”; you need to remove the eye, and besides that, instead of the eye that you are supposed to remove, take money.
[Speaker A] Meaning, if a one-eyed person puts out the eye of a two-eyed person, then he has to pay a much larger fine?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to that opinion. That’s one opinion in the Talmud / Talmudic text; it’s not even ruled as Jewish law. I just brought it as an example.
[Speaker A] Okay, so from here I want to move to the end of my question, which really sits behind this whole story—and one of my friends too, whose copy of your book is on his bed, and we talk, and he’s also now watching the series—God and the World. He says, listen, this series is hard for me. You have a YouTube series about how much God is inside reality. And a religious person—or even, yes, a religious person—finds this series difficult, because in the end you’re basically saying: so if God is not present, right, if the discussion—what in my opinion is your most radical or brilliant move—is the idea that the obligation of effort is a logical fiction. There is no such thing. There is no such thing as saying there is an obligation of effort, right? That is a move that in my eyes is amazing. But then he says: so what for? If the Torah doesn’t really lead to better conduct, if this never really would have happened—you bring there, opposite Rabbi Ratzon Arusi, what should we take—that we have a king from the house of David and only from the house of David, from some particular caste, and if they want to replace him they need to murder him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said there was that our holy Torah certainly would not have brought us the problems we have today of four elections in four election rounds in a year, simply because in our holy Torah there are no elections at all. There is an inbuilt king who passes it on to his sons. And if that’s the enlightened and most moral Torah he found, then I disagree with him.
[Speaker A] And more than that—you also—and your claim is a claim that in truth many people skip over. In the Kuzari, right? The rabbi says to the king of the Khazars, right, “This is the defense of the humiliated and despised religion,” right? The rabbi condemns the conduct of the nations as violent and forceful—contempt, suffering, and killing—and there is a glory of power in it. In contrast, the Jews are poor, humble, modest, and needy. And the Kuzari replies to him, right: that would be so if they had acquired this willingly, but it is by compulsion—and when your hand gains power, you too will kill. It’s all because you’re not in power, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s very easy to be a perfect theoretician. That’s what he says to him.
[Speaker A] Absolute power corrupts absolutely. And then he says to him, “You have found the place of my shame.” Okay. And he says there’s something much bigger here, right? He says the mistake is not a logical mistake—you uncovered the demagoguery. So if that’s really the case, then what for? Meaning, with the whole Torah corpus—man, you have a series here that really is, like, you know, five… God help us, that’s six hundred pages times three, and I’m really reading it, you know, and trying—so what for all of it? It doesn’t even help me become a better person, right? What for?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look—let me answer you like a good Jew, with a question on a question. Suppose the Torah—suppose you believe that the Torah does help us become better. So now everything is clear? But when you look at practice, you see that it isn’t true. So now you have one of two options: either to practice ostrich-like imagination and keep reciting what we were raised on, that when we study Torah we become much better, when our own eyes see that it doesn’t happen—that’s one option. The second option is to say: friends, let’s be honest, let’s look and see that this business doesn’t work, at least today. I’m saying in previous generations I think it was a bit more so—back then there were still idol worshippers and the like—but in our generations it no longer happens. And then I say, okay, so let’s rethink what the Torah’s meaning really is. Stop with the slogans that it comes to fix society and us and people. I don’t accept that, because factually it isn’t true. On the other hand, you are assuming from within that same prism that if so, then what for? Because you assume that the only possible goal for this whole story is to constitute… to build a healthy society and good people.
[Speaker A] By the way, it’s not just that I assume it—I can also bring something from your book, how do you put it, that in a case of doubt you don’t do something, right? I don’t remember exactly how you said it—that the idea is that if there’s… well… in case of doubt regarding blessings, one rules leniently, and the idea of being lenient is not to perform commandments. That’s a move you bring. Right? Right or not? So I’m asking you, right? You say…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the difficulty, not the answer. That was the difficulty. Why does “leniently” mean not making the blessing? Why doesn’t “leniently” mean yes, making the blessing? So I answer that—you only brought the question. Never mind. “Leniently” means opening more options. It’s a logical move that people don’t understand—what is called a leniency. Ask Torah scholars, they have no idea what a leniency is. They don’t know what a leniency is. But that’s another issue. Returning to our topic: what I want to say is that it cannot be that the goal of the Torah is fixing society or fixing the person. First, because that’s not what happens. And second, I also think on logical grounds—and I already wrote this in the first book—there is some structure of the three books here, which together creates some complete picture. In the first book I argue that there must be some goal of the Torah or of the Holy One, blessed be He, beyond morality and a proper society. Because if we were created so that there would be a proper society, then don’t create us and we won’t need to be fixed. It can’t be that we were created in order to fix ourselves—that’s nonsense. It’s obvious that if we were created, then our being corrected is a means so that we can do something for which we were created. I don’t know what that thing is. But it has to be something beyond the proper functioning of society and the person. That cannot be the goal. And therefore I say, this is no answer at all. On the contrary: anyone who thinks the Torah’s role is to fix society and the person is saying absurd things, in my view. Not only do they fail the test of reality—even if they did pass the test of reality, I still wouldn’t accept them. Because they are absurd. I have no doubt that the Torah comes to achieve some goals—I don’t know, spiritual, metaphysical, I don’t know what—no idea. But that is probably what it comes to achieve. Because just go and see: does eating pork build a healthy society? The prohibition on eating pork? Or the prohibition on eating creeping creatures? Or I don’t know—sacrifices and ritual purity?
[Speaker A] I’ll tell you what builds—wait, sorry, wait, sorry—you’ve gone too far here. So I’ll tell you what: Joe Henrich, God willing, is coming to us in January, and Joe Henrich says that you see something very interesting—he wrote WEIRD People—he wrote that today, when we look at ancient cultures, we see that the more fenced-in a society is in matters of modesty, right, or among other things in monogamy, the more… the more the society advances scientifically and technologically. Meaning, it can reach other places. Now maybe that’s one of those things from Rabbi Neugroschel or Rabbi Amnon Yitzhak, but maybe there is some element here that yes, many things were said in order to direct you to places that are better, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I disagree. Even if he says that—I don’t know who Henrich is—but even if he says it, I disagree. First, it may be that in earlier generations that was true, because in earlier generations, once society was completely unrestrained and doing whatever it wanted, a lot of laws were needed to hold it together and focus it on things that were not just momentary hedonism. But I don’t think that’s true today. Second, even if you tell me that modesty somehow leads to a better society—I’m not entirely sure of that, but I’m willing to hear such a claim. But there are another six hundred and thirteen commandments, Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin, a very very branched and complex system. A very small part of it relates to the improvement of society. In my eyes, a negligible part. But even if not, it certainly is not all of it. So how will you explain the other laws to me? Perforce, there is some goal beyond improving society.
[Speaker A] By the way, even more than that: all the prophets speak only about the commandments of repairing society, when it’s as though it’s not even happening. Meaning, corruption and all that—you know—what difference does it make to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether one slaughters from the back of the neck or from the throat? Right? But I don’t agree. What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are also rebukes in the prophets about things that are not only moral. But never mind, because they saw the corruption there. On the contrary, it says: “Why do I need your many sacrifices?” “Who needs your sacrifices if you conduct yourselves in such a corrupt way?” Fine, excellent. “Surely to share your bread with the hungry, to bring the poor that are cast out into your house…”
[Speaker A] You’re giving me all of Leviticus, but you behave like garbage. And therefore the prophet says that doesn’t fit. So he said—I brought exactly the source you mean in order to show you that it proves the opposite of what you’re saying. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I ask you: if Leviticus brings about a proper society, then how did the society that keeps all of Leviticus come out like that? Yes, that’s why I brought it, yes, right. Yes, yes, right. I really did bring that to strengthen the point.
[Speaker A] And by the way, that’s an argument—so look, at one point—I don’t know if you know Rabbi David Mishlov, he taught mathematics at Bar-Ilan and afterwards Talmud. Know him by reputation a bit, yes. In any case, one of the things I once asked him about this whole issue—after all, in the end you can…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come and say also, okay, so…
[Speaker A] if the Torah also doesn’t make you into a moral person, then what does? And then he said something interesting to me that has stayed with me for a very long time, and I’d be happy to get your feedback. The Torah doesn’t make you more moral, right? Of course a person needs to be moral in order to study Torah and all these things, and first of all a person needs to be decent, because if you’re not moral and you study Torah, you’ll become even more vile. He says: if you are already at that level—like, say, Rabbi Kook talks about a level—if you are at a moral level, then the Torah or the set of Jewish laws can give you, in addition, a dimension of holiness. And the dimension of holiness is a dimension that you could not get in any other system. With that I completely agree, and that is exactly my claim. My claim says that the Torah is not intended to fix society, but to bring some kind of spiritual benefit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Call it a dimension of holiness—that’s what you call it—it’s the same thing. That is exactly my claim. And that’s why I say that all the people—people think that… again, I return to the same argument because it keeps coming up. People constantly accuse me of ruining things, and through those accusations I show them why I’m fixing them. Because you are basically calling—let’s say they adopted the thesis you’re defending here; I don’t care whether you actually think this or whether you’re just saying it in order to ask me—but the thesis you’re defending here is essentially to keep educating people that only the Torah will fix society and the person, the way Rabbi Ratzon Arusi preaches in the lesson I took issue with there. So if we keep educating them that way, will that fix anything? When a person looks around and sees the facts I pointed to, he sees that it doesn’t work. So what conclusion is he supposed to draw? Exactly what you’re saying: if so, then what’s the point of the whole thing? Leave it all. In contrast, I say to him: “You’re right; we need to be honest. Look at the environment and see: the Torah does not fix society and the person. And still, there is another reason why one must keep the Torah and commandments.” Therefore, even if you see the facts straight and maintain moral integrity and don’t keep reciting like an idiot what you were educated on, you can continue—and should continue—to be committed to Torah and commandments. So now the question is: is that called ruining or fixing? I think that’s called fixing. To prevent people from being honest just so that, heaven forbid, questions won’t arise for them—but in the end, if someone is honest and the questions do arise, then what? Then he finds himself before a broken trough. I have a class on Maimonides, and one of the things Maimonides tried, among other things—there are those who say that Maimonides basically tried that the perplexed person would not…
[Speaker A] lose his religious feeling and fervor even after he came and investigated everything, right? And in my opinion, historically, maybe it worked for Maimonides and a few others, but in the end most people… How did Rabbi Steinsaltz say? “I saw Leibowitz praying at Yeshurun; he didn’t pray the way he wrote.” That’s the saying, right? Look, I—maybe—I’m also not built on emotion in general, and religious emotion in particular. Litvak, Litvak. Religious experiences—but I also don’t see any ideal in that. If someone has such experiences, good for him. I don’t see it as my duty to fuel people’s religious emotion. True, in the absence of emotion there is some danger that they will abandon or lose their commitment. What can I do? Because of that, should I keep lying to him? No. But many said that the expulsion from Spain was some kind of place, you know, where this philosophy works only as long as you’re okay, as long as you’re not cold and not hot and not hungry and not thirsty. Philosophy was not born in order to work; philosophy determines what is true. And if what is true does not work, I’m very sorry—then it doesn’t work. What can I do? But it is still what is true in my eyes. By the way, that’s also the reason—when you talk about the expulsion from Spain—meaning, about those simpletons who went and died in sanctification of God’s name, as opposed to the intellectual stratum that made all kinds of halakhic / of Jewish law and legal maneuvers and kept living. That’s the Bnei Brak myth of the Hasid Yaavetz—that the Hasid Yaavetz was among the exiles of Spain, and he said there that specifically the Torah scholars fell, while the simple laymen gave up their lives. And from that there’s this glorification or empowerment of ordinariness, of simplicity, of innocence. And I’m against that. I’m against it not because something else works better; I’m against it because I’m against being an idiot. And the fact that you can persuade an idiot to give up his life does not mean it is good to be an idiot—although, true, I’m speaking in a place where it is indeed right to give up one’s life. And if a sophisticated person finds for himself a thousand excuses, and some of them are wrong, not to give up his life—including me myself, I’m completely aware of that—then what are you proposing? That I should nevertheless educate people to be idiots because it works better? I disagree. Meaning, I do not subordinate my philosophy to its practical consequences. If from my perspective this is what is true, then this is what is true, period. By the way, I also think—and this is a bonus, I wouldn’t care if it weren’t so—but factually I also think that very many people do remain committed because of my heresy. There are others for whom this really can cause harm—I agree. What can you do? It will be interesting, very interesting, to see what the responses to our conversation will be. So Dr. Michael Abraham, I warmly recommend, first of all, the blog, and second, the books. Is it still one hundred and fifty? Yes. So listen well: one hundred and fifty for three books, in my opinion—I print books, right?—that’s just the printing cost, one hundred and fifty. Anyone who really wants to read theology written—I don’t want to say at eye level—but written in a way understandable to the modern person, right? If we had The Guide for the Perplexed, and a guide for the perplexed of our time and the perplexed of this generation, then maybe in a few hundred years we’ll have the trilogy of Michael Abraham—that’s how we’ll define it. Thank you very much. May you have a good tax year. Highly recommended to go into the lecture series God and the World, and that’s it. Thank you very, very much. Thank you very much, have a good week. Good week.