Ethics, Faith, and Halakha – Lesson 19 – Rabbi Michael Avraham

Okay, where are we?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where are we holding? We saw — we were dealing with the topic of morality and Jewish law, and I divided Jewish law into three subcategories: moral laws, non-moral laws, and anti-moral laws. The claim was that non-moral law basically shows us that there are non-moral goals within Jewish law, because the fact is that this has nothing to do with morality, and yet the Torah demands these things of us. Based on that, I said that the question about anti-moral laws disappears, because anti-moral laws really create a problem only because we assume that Jewish law is supposed to achieve moral goals, and here it doesn’t achieve that. But if we understand that Jewish law is also striving toward other goals — for the time being, other goals — then the question disappears. Meaning, Jewish law strives toward some religious goal, and yes, sometimes that comes at the price of a value — at the expense of a moral value — just as in intra-moral conflicts, the existence of one value tramples another value, and vice versa. And then I said that even when we move to the first type, the moral laws, I said that there too, in my view, Jewish law does not aim at moral goals but at religious ones, and that basically completes the total disconnect that I am proposing between Jewish law and morality. In other words, not that Jewish law has additional religious goals besides moral goals, but that it has only religious goals — meaning it has no moral goals at all. That is the claim. And I said that I brought some evidence for this, and I said that the fact that there is a correlation between moral laws and morality is not accidental — it is accidental, but not accidental. Meaning, it is accidental in the sense that Jewish law is aimed at religious goals, and morality at moral goals, so the fact that they coincide and demand the same thing from us is ostensibly just a coincidence. But on the other hand it is not a coincidence — at least it seems not to be — because I assume that when the Holy One creates the world, He will try to bring as close as possible, or to create as few contradictions as possible, between the pursuit of religious goals and the pursuit of moral goals. So then why isn’t it perfect? Because there are apparently situations in which it is simply impossible. Meaning, He wanted to, but it doesn’t work. And I said that this can happen where we are speaking about a logical contradiction between the two things, like a square circle. Right? Even if the Holy One wanted to create a square circle, He could not. He could not because there is no such thing as a square circle; it is an empty expression. Okay? So if we have a contradiction between the way to achieve the religious value and the way to achieve the moral value — if it is a contradiction — then even if the Holy One tries to coordinate the two, He simply cannot. Okay? And therefore, despite the desire to coordinate them, which really does create a pretty decent correlation, there are points where that correlation is not achieved. It cannot be achieved, and those are exactly the places we call anti-moral laws. Maybe I’ll just recall something and add one more point now that will clarify a bit this issue of the imperfect correlation. I’m going to take a kind of time-out here because I think it’s significant. I’ll start with an example. A person becomes religious. So his secular friends ask themselves: what happened to him? What kind of crisis did he go through? Right? Meaning, his grandmother died, he broke up with his girlfriend, I don’t know, something. Okay? So they look for an emotional, psychological explanation. Okay? What do the new religious friends he joins say? Ah — he discovered the light of lights of truth. Right? At last he understood what is true. Meaning, the secular people are psychologists and the religious people are philosophers. Right? What happens when someone leaves religion? Then religious people say that he wanted to permit sexual immorality to himself, right? The Sages already say this — they were religious. So they say: he wanted to permit sexual immorality to himself. Meaning, the religious people become psychologists. What do the secular people say? Oh, finally he understood his nonsense and grasped the truth, right? Meaning, then they are philosophers. Who is right? The religious people are right — but who is right in the interpretation? Both are right. Every step a person takes has explanations on the psychological plane, and at the same time it also has explanations on the philosophical plane. Meaning, a person who takes a very extreme step has probably had some emotional issue that caused him to do it. Does that mean there is no philosophical justification, no rational justification, for it? No. A person who takes a step generally also gives himself rationalizations, substantive justifications, for that step. Someone who becomes religious — maybe it happened because of some crisis he went through — but in the end he also explains to himself why it is right and why what he thought before was not right. Meaning, you can examine this step on the psychological plane, and you can examine it on the philosophical plane. So what that means is that both sides are right. Every step — certainly a drastic step that someone takes — has an explanation on the philosophical plane and an explanation on the psychological plane. Where is the lack of honesty? The lack of honesty is in choosing which plane to focus on. If someone moves away from me, leaves me, and goes to my competitor or my opponent, then of course I will explain his step on the psychological plane. Right? It’s more convenient for me. What, should I explain philosophically that he is right? I can’t philosophically justify what he did — after all, he is going against the truth as I understand it. So I’ll explain it on the psychological plane: he probably broke up with his girlfriend, okay? But if he goes in my direction, comes to me from somewhere else, then I’ll be a philosopher, because I’ll explain why he is really right — finally, he understood that he is right. Okay? So therefore the choice — both planes exist, every step can be explained on both planes. The choice of which of the two planes to focus on is often not honest. We choose the one that is convenient for us. If what he did threatens us or makes us uncomfortable, we become psychologists. If it suits us, we remain philosophers. Okay? So in that sense there is an agenda here, but the agenda is not that your explanation is wrong or right; both explanations are right. The question is which of the two you choose to focus on. Okay, and I’ll say more than that: in fact, it’s not even a bias — it’s actually justified. Why? Because say someone leaves religion. I really think he is wrong, right? Because I believe one should serve God, so I think he is wrong. Therefore it makes perfect sense for me to say: okay, there is no philosophical explanation for what he did, because in my eyes it really makes no sense. So I look for a psychological explanation. And of course vice versa. Okay? So really it is not even a bias. According to my own position, I came to the conclusion that this is right and that is wrong, so naturally I will look for the explanation on the psychological plane. That is not a bias. Okay. What I do think should be said about this is that there is no point in explaining things on the psychological plane — not that it is incorrect, just that there is no point. If someone left religion, then maybe he has psychological explanations, psychological motives, but he also gives himself rational, logical rationalizations. Every person does, right? So deal with those; there is no point in hitting below the belt. Why do you care about the psychological issue that caused him? Everyone has psychology; this one has his psychology. What is worth discussing? Right, exactly. It is worth discussing on the substantive plane, because on the plane of arguments they are supposed to be shared by all of us. If something is logical, then all of us are supposed to recognize that it is logical. Maybe there is a disagreement, but that is worth discussing. Psychology is not worth discussing. What do I have to discuss about the fact that he broke up with his girlfriend? So it’s not that the explanation is wrong, but rather that there is no point in discussing the psychological plane. And if someone takes a step that contradicts your view — where by nature you tend to explain it psychologically — even then, try to look for the philosophical explanation, because then at least you yourself will examine yourself more and maybe see that there really are good arguments against your position, right? So therefore I think that in general, anyone who chooses the psychological plane is not acting correctly. It’s not that the explanation is mistaken, but he is not acting correctly. He is not acting correctly because there is no point in talking to a person below the belt. Each of us has psychological motives, and for each of us you can find all kinds of psychological motives for why he does what he does. Okay? That is not the relevant plane of discussion. But for our purposes, what matters — I’m closing the parenthesis — what matters for our purposes is that I am basically saying here that there are two parallel planes of explanation, each of which can offer an explanation for the same action. A person did something, or some event happened, and I can offer a psychological explanation, and in parallel I can offer one… I said there is no point in dealing with a psychological explanation unless you are a psychologist. If you want to study psychology, fine, but in a discussion between people one should focus on the philosophical plane. But in principle there are explanations on both planes, both psychological and philosophical. Right? Is such a thing possible — two parallel explanations? Seemingly yes. Here is a psychological explanation and a philosophical explanation. Another example of this matter: Newton is sitting under the tree, an apple falls on him, and he concludes that there is a law of gravitation, that the earth attracts objects with mass. Okay? Now Newton was a devout Christian. He could have explained to himself that the apple fell on his head because he sinned yesterday, so the Holy One dropped the apple on his head. Why did he look for scientific, mechanical explanations — explanations of mechanics? There’s a good explanation, a theological explanation. Again the answer is probably that Newton could have accepted the theological explanation. On the theological plane that really is the explanation. On the physical plane there also has to be an explanation. There can be explanations on two parallel planes. The fact that I found an explanation on one plane does not rule out the possibility of finding another explanation on another plane. Okay? A third example, a more literary one, is The Happy Prince. Do you know Oscar Wilde’s story? It’s about a prince who lived in a palace and of course was indifferent to the suffering of everyone around him, because he lived a good life and saw nothing — there were high walls. After he died they erected a very tall statue in his memory, and then of course he stood on a high pedestal and saw the whole city. A literary point, but he began to see the whole city; suddenly he saw all the wretched people and the poor and the widows and the poor students and all kinds of miserable people suffering around him. Then some swallow arrived — all her friends were already in Europe — yes, Oscar Wilde, Britain — all her friends had flown to Africa because in winter they don’t want to remain in cold Europe. But this swallow missed the train and stayed there and lodged beneath him, and so on. To make a long story short, little by little he starts sending her on errands. He was covered with gold and precious stones and so on. He says to her, “Take the precious stone from here and give it to that poor widow there; take the gold leaf from my face here and give it to that poor student there,” and so on. Fine? In the end the winter grows harsher, the cold intensifies, and the swallow can’t hold out any longer. Swallows don’t fly to Africa for nothing; they can’t live in Europe. So she stays there and can’t go on, and then in some heart-rending scene she parts from the Happy Prince and says to him, “Listen, the cold — I’m going to die, so goodbye,” and so on and so on. Then she dies. Then he writes there: then a dull crack was heard inside the Prince’s body; his lead heart split in two. “Oh how dreadful the cold was” — that is the sentence that comes afterward. So you understand that literarily, his lead heart split from sorrow over the swallow, right? From grief, his heart broke — literally, his heart broke. But he says, “Oh how dreadful the cold was,” meaning that the lead split in two because of the difference in temperature. Meaning, it couldn’t withstand the cold, that low temperature, and therefore it cracked. Okay? So what was the reason the heart broke? Compassion for the swallow, or the temperature change? On the psychological plane, compassion for the swallow; on the physical plane, the temperature. So again, these are two parallel planes of explanation. Now all this is very nice — or not nice, you decide — but on the face of it, it doesn’t seem right. Why? Because from an explanation we demand that it be a sufficient condition for the thing explained. Okay? A sufficient condition for the thing explained means: if wood is inside fire, the fire burns it, right? Fire is the cause of its burning. Okay? So what does that mean? That whenever wood is in fire, it will burn. It cannot be in fire and not burn, right? When I say that the fire is the cause of the wood burning, I am basically assuming that this is what will always happen. Meaning, being in fire is a sufficient condition for the result. A sufficient condition means that if it occurs, the result necessarily occurs. That is what is called a sufficient condition. Fine? A necessary condition means that without it this won’t happen, but even in its presence it is still not certain that it will happen. And a sufficient condition means that if it exists, the result will necessarily follow. It is sufficient — sufficient to state it in order to know that the result happens. Okay? So an explanation usually — that is how it is generally defined — an explanation is a sufficient condition for the thing explained. Let’s go back to our newly religious person, okay? So with our newly religious person, we want to explain on the psychological level his step by some psychological crisis he went through. On the philosophical plane we explain it by the fact that he discovered the truth — meaning he changed his mind. Okay? Now if every explanation is a sufficient explanation, that means that if the psychological crisis happened, it is a sufficient condition for him to become religious, even if he does not find any rationalization, right? Because it is a sufficient condition — that’s the whole idea. If it happened, the result will happen; it doesn’t matter whether other things took place or not. That is the meaning of a sufficient condition. The same with the philosophical explanation. If he came to the conclusion that this is true — if you think the philosophical explanation is an explanation — then assuming he comes to the conclusion that something is true, he takes the step, right? Because it’s an explanation. And an explanation is a sufficient condition, even if he went through no psychological crisis at all. That is the meaning of the sufficiency of explanation. The sufficiency of explanation means that there cannot really be two parallel explanations. There is no such thing as two parallel explanations. Since if one explanation is correct, then the condition it requires is sufficient for the result to occur, and you do not need the condition required by the second explanation — and vice versa. Therefore, if we define the concept of explanation this way, it means that two explanations cannot exist in parallel, two parallel planes of explanation.

[Speaker B] There’s no such thing as half an explanation and half an explanation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get there in a moment. But on the face of it, when we speak of an explanation, an explanation is a sufficient condition. And a sufficient condition can only be one. Okay? Now the same thing with Newton. Right? If physics is a sufficient condition, then if I’m standing under a tree and I didn’t commit any sin yesterday, but the apple has weight and the branch isn’t strong enough to hold it against gravity, then the apple will fall on my head whether I sinned yesterday or not, right? That is the assumption of the physical explanation. A physical explanation basically says: give me the physical conditions and I’ll tell you what will happen. Meaning the physical conditions are a sufficient condition; there is no need for the additional fact that I sinned yesterday. Okay? And vice versa. If I understand that the theological explanation is an explanation, then that means that the condition set by the theological explanation is a sufficient condition. Meaning, if I sinned yesterday, an apple will fall on my head even if gravity is not strong enough to detach it from the branch. That is what it means for it to be an explanation. Or in other words, although we do use parallel planes of explanation, it’s not really justified. There is no possibility of two planes of explanation in parallel, two parallel explanations. So here’s the thing: sometimes there can be a situation where the explanations are simply a translation into another language of the same thing. When I give an explanation in Hebrew and an explanation in English, those are not two different explanations, right? Just two languages for expressing the same explanation. Now sometimes there are two explanations that appear to be different, but really they are just two different languages for expressing the same explanation, and then there’s no problem. We just imagine that there are two explanations, but that isn’t true; we are mistaken. It is one explanation, just in two languages. For example, if you know Fermat’s principle — do you know it in optics? Fermat’s principle in ordinary optics, geometric optics I’m talking about now — in geometric optics we know that if a ray of light… a ray of light always moves in a straight line, right? Now if it encounters some boundary between two media, say between air and water, then there is refraction in the angle of incidence, and that refraction is described by Snell’s law, which says that the ray travels like this, meets the water, the angle changes, and it continues at a different angle. Snell’s law determines the relation between the angles — between the angle of incidence and the angle after refraction. Okay? That is the standard explanation in geometric optics. Now it turns out that Fermat’s principle describes the same thing and explains the same thing in a completely different conceptual system. It basically says: light chooses the shortest path to its destination. That is its explanation for every path of light. Now understand that — let’s put it this way. Say there is… yes, this is always the example people bring — say there is a lifeguard on the beach, sitting in the lifeguard stand. Fine? Now there is someone drowning in the sea. The lifeguard sees that someone is drowning, and he has to reach him as fast as possible, right? Usually the fastest way is to go in a straight line, right? If you run in a straight line that is the shortest path; you will get there the fastest. But if here there is sand and after that water, then in water you have to swim — that’s slower. On sand you run — that’s faster. Therefore it is better to take more of the route on the sand and less on the water, right? Now the solution to this equation — meaning what is the path that will bring you to the drowning person in the shortest time — gives you Snell’s law. Meaning there is an angle at which you hit the water, and then an angle of continuation, and that gives you Snell’s law. In other words, light can be described in two ways: either it refracts this way according to Snell’s law, or according to Fermat’s principle. Light always moves along the path that will take the least time. This describes… and there is a mathematical proof that these are two equivalent possibilities. They give exactly the same result. Two different languages give exactly the same result. Incidentally, this exists in many fields of physics, not just optics. So what does that mean, really? How can two different, parallel explanations explain the same event? The answer is that it is the same explanation, just two different languages for describing it. They are just languages. One is teleological, outcome-based language — the language of wanting to minimize the time the journey takes. And the other is the causal explanation: I get there, then it refracts, then it proceeds like this. That is a causal explanation. A purposive explanation and a causal explanation are two different languages, but they describe the same explanation. So that is possible. Two different explanations that are completely equivalent — that is of course possible. But usually that is not the situation. Usually the situation is that there really is half an explanation here, as you said earlier. Think about the person who becomes religious. A person who becomes religious — what is the full explanation for what he did? He went through a crisis, and then he began to stir and search for his path. Without that he would have just gone on; he would not have thought too much. He would have continued. He went through a crisis and now decides to reexamine his path. He reexamines his path and reaches the conclusion that he was mistaken — secularism makes no sense, only being religious makes perfect sense — or the reverse, it doesn’t matter. Okay? Then he decides to become religious or leave religion. So what is the explanation for what he did? The explanation for what he did is the psychological plus the philosophical, together. The psychological element awakened him to think, and the philosophical element helped him shape his position while he was thinking, and then he reached that conclusion. That is the philosophical explanation. It turns out that neither of the two explanations is a sufficient condition. Meaning, if he had been awakened to think but philosophically had not been persuaded that religious faith is more correct, then he would not have become religious, even though he had gone through a crisis. Or if he had not gone through a crisis, then maybe if he had thought he would have concluded that religiosity is right — but he would not have come to think, because he did not go through the crisis. The crisis awakened him to reconsider his path, right? So it turns out that neither of these explanations is really an explanation, because it is not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is the combination of the two. If there was the psychological crisis and afterward he engaged in philosophical deliberation, that sum together gives me the step he took. The explanation is the sum of the two things together. It’s not two parallel explanations on two planes; it’s one explanation made up of components belonging to the psychological plane and the philosophical plane. But that whole complex — that is the explanation. Not either one alone. The explanation, the thing that provides the sufficient condition, is that whole complex. And you can—

[Speaker B] Can you explain the difference — why here it’s not the same language, and in the lifeguard example it is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was the same language there because—

[Speaker B] There there’s a proof that it’s equivalent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a proof that it’s equivalent, that you are basically saying the same thing in different words.

[Speaker B] A mathematical proof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, how do we prove that it isn’t equivalent? I’m not proving it; I just don’t see why it should be equivalent. This is philosophical, this is psychological. After all, I can go through a psychological crisis even if my worldview would not lead me to become religious. Someone else will go through the very same psychological crisis and he will become religious. Let’s say it’s exactly the same psychological crisis. What does that mean? That we think differently. Meaning the crisis by itself is not a sufficient explanation, not a sufficient condition. You also need another condition — that he also think this is true. And if that condition is not met, then it won’t happen. And if there had been no crisis, then even if he would think it is true, it would not happen, because he would not come to think without the crisis. Okay? So therefore I think the simpler understanding is that the sum of the two is the explanation. That is the sufficient condition. And not that there are two explanations, each on a different plane. Okay? Now one of the examples of the parallelism of explanatory languages is coordinate systems in mathematics, right? Think about the plane, okay? On the plane there is an x-axis and a y-axis. We have a certain point, say the point x equals 2, y equals 2. Fine? That point. I can describe it with the vector 2 comma 2, where the first component is x, the second is y — x equals 2, y equals 2. That is one description of the point. I can… right? It’s the same description, right? Meaning there is a coordinate system, there are different coordinate systems, each of which offers me a description of all the points in the plane. Okay? So really these are two different languages for describing the same thing, because there is mathematical equivalence between the descriptions. There are even formulas that move me from one to the other. Yes, no problem producing those formulas. So what does that mean, really? It means that these are two different languages, but you are saying the same thing in two different languages. Right? Meaning, a one-to-one and onto correspondence in mathematics basically means that there is a language change here that describes exactly the same thing. Okay? Now think about an interesting point in this context — interesting literally. There is one point on the plane that is interesting in the mapping I described before, and that is the origin. The Cartesian description of the origin in x-y is 0,0, right? x equals 0, y equals 0. What is its polar description, in radius and angle? Polar. The radius is 0, right? The distance from the origin is 0. And what is the angle? Any angle you want. It is indifferent to the angle, right? If the distance is 0, then it doesn’t matter what the angle is. Okay? Meaning that the Cartesian point 0,0 corresponds to an entire line in the polar plane. The line where r equals 0 and theta equals whatever. The angle equals whatever. Think in terms of r and theta, so theta is arbitrary and r equals 0 — meaning the whole x-axis is mapped to one point in Cartesian description. Meaning the correspondence here breaks down. Many times this is where what are called topological defects are created — topological flaws in all sorts of places where these kinds of correspondences break. But what does that mean? The correspondence exists across the whole plane. Across the whole plane, give me a point and I’ll tell you its Cartesian description and its polar description, and it will be unique. There is one Cartesian description and one polar description. At the origin, there is one point where the correspondence cannot be achieved. One Cartesian description gives you infinitely many polar descriptions. Meaning this correspondence is perfect except for one point, the origin. And many times correspondences of this kind are correspondences that have points where the correspondence breaks down — what I called earlier topological defects. Correspondences in which there are points where the correspondence breaks down. And I think this is basically the meaning of morality and Jewish law. Morality and Jewish law basically mean: I want to coordinate moral principles with principles of Jewish law, so that they demand the same things from human beings and do not create conflicts. Okay? But there are certain points where this correlation breaks down. It doesn’t work. It is impossible. You cannot make them fit. And there a situation really arises where Jewish law tells me one thing and morality tells me another, and I am in conflict. Where else, for example, are there things like this? Another example — let’s go back to our Newton. Usually people say that behind everything that happens in the world, it is really run by the Holy One. And on the other hand we also have an explanation according to the laws of nature for what happens in the world. Right? That is what Newton was basically saying. There is a theological explanation for why the apple fell on his head — because the Holy One dropped it on him because he sinned — and there is a physical explanation: because of the force of gravity. Right? There is a theological explanation and a physical explanation. Okay? Where is there a topological defect in the correlation between theology and physics? Miracles! Exactly. Right? What happens in a miracle? The Holy One wants the Sea of Reeds to split. The laws of nature don’t do the job here, right? So what does He do? He halts the laws of nature and intervenes; He does what He decides. Now what is the problem? After all, He is all-powerful, no? So let Him build the laws of nature in such a way that they always realize what He wants on the theological plane. Is the Holy One lacking ability? He can’t do it? What is the problem? Why must He break the laws of nature that He Himself created in order for what He wants on the theological level to happen in the world? The answer is: because it is impossible. There is some essential mismatch between the laws of nature and the laws of theology, let’s call it that, and therefore points are created where we do not succeed in creating this correlation. At those points something has to break. Meaning, if you want to preserve the physics, you won’t preserve the… or vice versa. Okay? In the interpretive world too there are topological defects. We know that there is what they always call the fourfold approach, right? Plain meaning, hint, homiletic interpretation, and secret. You can interpret Scripture on these four levels, right? But even there, in the correspondence between the… meaning, that means that any interpretation according to the plain meaning should not come out contradicting the interpretation according to, say, the hidden level. If according to the hidden level one should not put on tefillin on intermediate festival days, then apparently according to the plain meaning one should also not put on tefillin on intermediate festival days. Because somehow it ought to fit. The hidden explanation should not contradict the revealed explanation. Okay? And here too there are topological defects. These defects are called scriptural decrees. What is a scriptural decree? A scriptural decree is when something is written and you have no logical explanation for it, right? That is a scriptural decree. Now then why was it written? What, is it not logical? Of course it is logical. There is some explanation known to the Holy One, but in the rational explanations of our world we do not understand it. So that means it has an explanation on the hidden level — things concealed that the Holy One knows — but it has no explanation on the level of plain meaning. Here the correspondence between plain meaning and hidden meaning breaks. And those breaks are called scriptural decrees. Miracles, scriptural decrees — all these are topological defects. Okay? Now what I am claiming is that non-moral laws are also a topological defect. Meaning that there is a correlation between religious values and moral values. In principle this is supposed to give me the same instructions about what to do, but there are places where it does not work — it breaks — and you cannot achieve this correlation, because there we are in a logical contradiction. Okay, so that was a very long parenthesis. I’ve closed it, and now I’m going back. That was an expanded summary of what I said last time. I now want to… yes?

[Speaker B] Would we say that in those laws that are not moral in our eyes, in God’s eyes there is some morality there that is hidden from us? Or is that where…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. In any event, I don’t believe that. Meaning, I want to argue that this is meaningless talk. To say that there is some hidden morality that nobody understands. I know what is moral. When you abuse a human being, that is not moral. Don’t tell me this is some hidden morality that nobody understands. There is a religious goal here, not a moral one. What is moral, what benefits society — I know that myself.

[Speaker B] And the reason the Holy One knows… there is no hidden moral significance in it for some reason? I didn’t understand. Right, there is some reason why the Holy One commanded that commandment… the religious goal. So isn’t the religious goal itself somehow obligated to morality? No. That is what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly my claim. That there is complete independence. Jewish law is meant to achieve religious goals. Morality is meant to achieve moral goals. There is a correspondence between them in principle because the Holy One created the world so that there would be maximum correspondence. And maximum correspondence does not mean total correspondence. There are topological defects. There are things that don’t work out — you can’t fit them together. And there you have to solve the problem; there is a conflict.

[Speaker B] But in the end they do serve moral goals…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Religious goals, not moral ones.

[Speaker B] Serving the Holy One.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a religious goal, not connected to morality. What does morality have to do with it? If I serve the Holy One, do you gain from that? Will someone else gain from that? No. It is my duty. No, of course not. Morality is to improve society, to make sure other people do not suffer, that things are good for them. When I serve the Holy One, that is a religious value, not a moral one. It is also a value, an important one. There is no need to map all values onto moral value. That was my whole claim. There are also values of other types. I talked about aesthetic values, moral values, religious values, and so on. There are all kinds. Okay, so now… so basically I now want to show two sources where you can see this conception. In Derashot HaRan, in sermon 11, he says this. He is discussing the king, the law of the king, and he says as follows: “אבל בעיני פשט הכתוב כך הוא. ידוע הוא כי המין האנושי צריך לשופט שישפוט בין פרטיו, שאם לא כן איש את רעהו חיים בלעו, ויהיה העולם נשחת. וכל אומה צריכה לזה ישוב מדיני”. “But in my view the plain meaning of the verse is this: it is known that the human species needs a judge who will judge between its members, for otherwise people would swallow one another alive and the world would be destroyed. And every nation needs this for civic order.” Civic means social here. “עד שאמר החכם שכת ליסטים הסכימו ביניהם היושר”. “So much so that the wise man said that even a band of robbers agrees among itself on justice.” Yes, even robbers have some kind of robbers’ ethics — like the bar association, for example. “וישראל צריכים זה כיתר האומות, ומלבד זה צריכים עליהם עוד סיבה אחרת, והוא להעמיד חוקי התורה על תילם, ולהעניש חייבי מלכויות וחייבי מיתות בית דין העוברים על חוקי התורה”. “And Israel needs this like the other nations, and besides this they need another thing as well, namely to uphold the laws of the Torah and to punish those liable to lashes and those liable to execution by the court when they transgress the laws of the Torah.” Meaning, in Israel a king is needed for two purposes. One purpose is for fairness and morality, social order. A second purpose is to uphold the laws of the Torah. Among the nations of the world the only thing needed is someone to judge between individuals — a king, a judge, or something of that sort, a government. Why do you need government? To maintain order. Right? Among the nations. Among Israel there are two reasons: also to have order, justice, morality, and so on like the gentiles, and also to establish the service of God, the religious obligation. Okay? “אם היות שאין באותה עבירה שום הפסד יישוב מדיני כלל” — even if that transgression has no civic-social damage at all. We are speaking about transgressions that have no moral significance; society is not harmed by them. But the role of the king in Israel is to ensure that even such transgressions are not committed, not only moral transgressions as among the nations. Okay? So already here we see it, right? What is he basically saying? He is saying that among the nations the only thing that obligates them, from their perspective, is moral law, and the role of government is to ensure proper, moral, just living and so on. That is among the nations. Among Jews there are two goals for government: one, like the nations, moral and decent life and so on; two, to make sure that God is served, that people do not commit transgressions, that they perform commandments. And that is not connected to morality; even if that thing involves no civic loss at all — which is what he writes, meaning society is not harmed by it. Right? So here he really does write the picture I described. Okay? More than that — you can even see here that in the moral aspect there really is no difference between us and the gentiles. It is the same thing. There is no such thing as a Jewish morality. The moral dimension in which we are equal to the gentiles is the same. What differs for Jews is not that we have a different morality, but that in addition to morality we also have Jewish law. These are different things. But our morality — which of course also obligates us — is not connected to Jewish law; it is universal, just like the morality of the gentiles. There is no Jewish morality; there is morality. Okay? “ואין ספק כי בכל אחד מהצדדים יזדמנו שני עניינים: האחד יחייב להעניש את זה איש כפי משפט אמיתי, והשני שאין ראוי להענישו כפי משפט צודק אמיתי, אבל יחוייב להענישו כפי תיקון סדר מדיני וכפי צורך השעה”. “And there is no doubt that in each of these areas two matters will arise: one in which justice truly requires punishing a man according to true law, and another in which it is not fitting to punish him according to true and just law, but one must punish him for the sake of civic order and the needs of the moment.” There you have it: sometimes on the moral level you do not need to punish him, but on the religious level you do. Someone who desecrates the Sabbath did nothing immoral, but he caused very great religious damage, and therefore he must be punished. Okay? “והשם יתברך ייחד כל אחד מהעניינים האלו לכת מיוחדת, וציווה שיתמנו השופטים לשפוט המשפט הצודק האמיתי, והוא אמרו ‘ושפטו את העם משפט צדק'”. “And the blessed God assigned each of these matters to a distinct body, and commanded that judges be appointed to judge true and just law, as it says: ‘And they shall judge the people with righteous judgment.’” Meaning, he comes to explain for what these judges are appointed and wherein their power is great, and he says that the purpose of their appointment is to judge the people with truly just law in itself, and their authority goes no further than that. “ומפני שהסידור המדיני לא ישלם בזה לבדו” — because civic order will not be perfected by this alone. Even if we keep Jewish law in every detail, society may still remain flawed, because you need morality in addition to Jewish law. “השלים אל תיקונו במצוות המלך”. “He completed its repair through the commandment of the king.” The one responsible for morality is the king; the one responsible for Jewish law is the court — the high court and the courts beneath it. They are responsible for enforcing Jewish law, determining Jewish law, upholding Jewish law. And the king is responsible for moral wholeness, exactly as among the gentiles. It is the king. Therefore, in terms of the king, it works the same way אצלנו and among the gentiles — his role is to ensure that life is proper on the social, moral, human level and so on. Beyond that, we have the religious issue, for which the court is responsible — the Sanhedrin, the court, and so on. “ונבאר עוד, כשנניח צד אחד מהצדדים, הרי שנינו בפרק היו בודקין תנו רבנן מכירים אתם אותו וכולי, התריתם בו, קיבל התראה, התיר עצמו למיתה, המית בתוך כדי דיבור וכולי. ואין ספק כי כל זה ראוי מצד משפט צדק, כי למה יומת איש אם לא שידע שהכניס עצמו בדבר שיש בו חיוב מיתה ועבר עליו? ולזה הצטרך שיקבל עליו התראה”. “And I will explain further: when we take one side of the matter, we learned in the chapter ‘They would examine’: ‘Our Rabbis taught: Do you recognize him?’ etc. ‘Did you warn him?’ ‘Did he accept the warning?’ ‘Did he permit himself to death?’ ‘Did he commit the act immediately afterward?’ etc. And there is no doubt that all this is appropriate from the perspective of true justice, for why should a man be put to death unless he knew that he was entering into something involving a death penalty and nevertheless transgressed? Therefore it was necessary that he accept the warning.” Yes, there is no justification for killing someone unless he was warned. For all you know, maybe he didn’t know it was prohibited. Right? “וכל יתר הדברים השנויים באותה ברייתא, וזהו משפט צדק אמיתי בעצמו הנמסר לדיינים. אבל אם לא ייענש העובר כי אם על זה הדרך, ייפסד הסידור המדיני לגמרי, שיתרבו שופכי דמים ולא יגורו מן העונש”. “And so too with all the other things taught in that baraita. This is true justice in itself entrusted to the judges. But if the transgressor is punished only in this way, civic order will be ruined entirely, for murderers will multiply and not fear punishment.” If you insist on this absolute justice, in the end we will have a problem. Why? Because murderers will multiply. Basically everyone will say, “No, I wasn’t warned; I didn’t know it was forbidden,” you know exactly how this goes. Okay? Therefore, “לכן ציווה השם יתברך לצורך יישובו של עולם במינוי המלך”. “Therefore the blessed God commanded, for the settlement of the world, the appointment of a king,” as it says in this section: “כי תבוא אל הארץ” etc., “שום תשים עליך מלך”. “When you come to the land… you shall surely set a king over yourself.” This is a commandment that we were commanded to appoint a king over us, according to what he sees is needed for civic society. In other words, what he is saying is that a society cannot be run according to Jewish law. Jewish law is not meant to run a society at all. Even the so-called moral laws — punishing a murderer, punishing a thief, all those laws — not even that. If you implement Jewish law, you will increase bloodshed in Israel. Because unless all kinds of draconian conditions are met, you cannot execute a murderer. So what will deter murderers from murdering? Absolute justice indeed says that you must verify that he knew and so on, but social order and the establishment of justice and morality do not allow things to be run that way. There is a wonderful example of this at the end of the first chapter of tractate Makkot. Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon say: “אילו היינו בסנהדרין לא נהרג אדם מעולם”. “If we had been in the Sanhedrin, no person would ever have been executed.” If we had sat in the Sanhedrin, the Sanhedrin would never have executed anyone. Why not? The Talmud says there that they would ask the witnesses: did you see that there was no perforation where the sword entered? A Jew stabbed another with a sword and killed him. But maybe exactly where the sword entered there was already a perforation, and the person would have died even without the stabbing, in which case he is not a murderer and doesn’t deserve death. So really you can never execute a murderer, because there is always some possibility that maybe there was a perforation where the sword entered, and so on. Okay? Did you see “a brush in a tube” — in adultery, all those things. So Rabban Gamliel says to them — this is Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon — Rabban Gamliel says to them: “אף הם מרבים שופכי דמים בישראל”. “They too would increase bloodshed in Israel.” Clearly he is alluding to exactly this point — it is even the phrase itself: increasing bloodshed in Israel. What does that mean? He said to them: if you insist on this, we will never punish a murderer, and there will be murders at every turn. We have to deter. Theoretically you are right that maybe indeed he is not liable to death, fine, but somehow you have to run the state. Notice who the speakers are here. Rabban Gamliel — what was his role? President of the Sanhedrin, right? And Rabbi Akiva, who was the son of converts, did not sit in the Sanhedrin. The son of converts cannot sit in the Sanhedrin. In other words, Rabbi Akiva sat in the study hall. Fine? In the study hall everything is wonderful; you can run things according to perfect justice. Okay? But in practice it cannot work. Rabban Gamliel says to them: listen, gentlemen, I’m responsible here for what will happen. The responsibility is on me. If we behave as you recommend, there will be murderers everywhere. And that is exactly the point: you have to govern the world also by considerations of morality, social justice, and not only according to abstract Torah truth in its ideal form, because you cannot govern the world like that. HaRan says: “נמצא שמינוי המלך שווה בישראל וביתר אומות שצריכים לסידור מדיני”. “It follows that the appointment of the king is the same in Israel and among the other nations, who all need civic order.” Right? So the king and morality and social order — civic means social — are the same in Israel and in the other nations. It is the same thing. Okay? “ומינוי השופטים מיוחד וצריך יותר בישראל”. “And the appointment of judges is unique and more necessary in Israel,” because with us there is also Jewish law, and the one responsible for Jewish law is not the king but the Sanhedrin. And as he further mentioned and said, “ושפטו את העם משפט צדק”, “they shall judge the people with righteous judgment,” meaning that the appointment of judges and their authority is that they judge the people according to judgments that are truly just in themselves. “ואני מבאר עוד זה, שכמו שהתייחדה תורתנו מבין נימוסי אומות העולם במצוות וחוקים אין עניינם תיקון מדיני כלל”. “And I explain further, that just as our Torah is distinguished from the conventional laws of the nations of the world by commandments and statutes whose subject is not civic repair at all…” There are things in our Torah that have nothing to do with morality and civic repair, right? Commandments and statutes. “אבל הנמשך מהם הוא חול השפע האלוהי באומתנו ואידבקו עמנו”. “But what follows from them is the application of divine influx to our nation and its cleaving to us.” What does that mean? The goal is a religious goal, not a moral one. Right? That is basically what he is saying. The application of divine influx — that means divine presence, that the goal is for the Holy One to dwell among us. It has nothing to do with repairing society. Repairing society is equally true among gentiles and Jews; that is morality. Jewish law includes many things that have nothing to do with morality. I argued earlier that nothing in Jewish law has anything to do with morality, but I’m not sure I can derive that from him. But clearly there is some essential difference. There are things in Jewish law that are not connected to morality at all. So what are they for? Religious goals. “חול השפע האלוהי באומתנו”. “The application of divine influx to our nation.” Okay? “בין שייראה העניין ההוא לעינינו כענייני הקורבנות וכל הנעשה במקדש”. “Whether that matter appears to us, as in the case of sacrifices and all that is done in the Temple…” Sacrifices and the Temple — those things, it’s fairly obvious to us, are connected with divine presence. We understand that on our own. It has nothing to do with morality, and there we understand in our own logic that it has to do with divine presence. “בין שלא ייראה כיתר החוקים שלא נתגלה טעמם”. “Or whether it does not appear so, as with the other statutes whose reason has not been revealed.” There are all sorts of other statutes — for example, it is forbidden to eat pork. It is not clear why that contributes to the application of divine influx to our nation, right? But “ומכל מקום אין ספק שהשפע האלוהי היה נדבק בנו וחל בפעולים ההם, עם היותם רחוקים מן היקש השכל”. “Nevertheless, there is no doubt that divine influx would cleave to us and take effect through these actions, even though they are far from rational inference.” And there is no wonder in this, because just as we are ignorant of many causes of natural processes — after all, we don’t fully understand physics either — “ועם כל זה נתאמת מציאותם”. “And yet their existence is confirmed.” So all the more is it fitting that we should be ignorant of the causes of the application of divine influx and its cleaving to us. “וזה שנתייחדה בו תורתנו הקדושה מנימוסי האומות הנזכרים לעיל, שאין להם עסק בזה כלל כי אם בתיקון עניין קיבוצם”. “And this is what distinguishes our holy Torah from the conventional laws of the nations mentioned above, for they have no involvement in this at all, only in the repair of their collective social life.” “ולפיכך אני סבור וראוי שייאמר, שכשם שהחוקים שאין להם מבוא כלל בתיקון הסידור המדיני והם סיבה עצמית קרובה לחול השפע האלוהי, כן משפטי התורה יש להם מבוא גדול, וכאילו הם משותפים בין סיבת חול העניין האלוהי באומתנו ותיקון עניין קיבוצנו”. “Therefore I think — and it is fitting to say — that just as the statutes have no role at all in repairing civic order and are a direct and intrinsic cause of the application of divine influx, so too the judgments of the Torah have a major role, as though they are shared between causing the divine matter to apply to our nation and repairing our collective social life.” Here he already writes differently from me. He says that within the Torah’s civil laws there is a part of repairing our social life, like among the gentiles, and a part of divine application. Since all that matters for the gentiles is the seven Noahide commandments, the overlap there is presumably rather small. “ואפשר שהם היו פונים יותר אל העניין אשר הוא יותר נשגב במעלה ממה שהם היו פונים לתיקון קיבוצנו, כי התיקון ההוא המלך אשר נעמיד עלינו ישלים עניינו”. “And it is possible that they were directed more toward the higher matter than toward repairing our social life, because that repair will be completed by the king whom we appoint over us.” If the laws of the state — sorry, the laws of Jewish law — interfere somewhat with the running of proper life, if they create a problem at the moral and social level, that is the king’s role. He will intervene there and deal with it. Therefore the king punishes outside the strict law. If someone murdered without warning, the king will execute him, even though according to Jewish law that is forbidden. He says yes, but this creates a social problem, right? That murderers will multiply. There the king intervenes. Okay? But the judges and the Sanhedrin — their purpose is to judge the people with true and just law in itself, so that from it the divine matter may cleave to us, whether or not the social order of the masses is thereby fully perfected. I don’t care whether it interferes with the social issue or not — the moral issue. Okay? And because of this — now this is a strong sentence — “ומפני זה אפשר שיימצא בקצת משפטי ודיני האומות הנזכרים לעיל מה שהוא יותר קרוב לתיקון הסידור המדיני ממה שיימצא בקצת משפטי התורה”. “Because of this, it is possible that among some of the laws and legal systems of the nations mentioned above there is that which is closer to repairing civic order than what is found in some of the laws of the Torah.” If I asked you which system is more moral — Jewish law or British law — HaRan says: British law. Obviously. Why? Because this is like math. Meaning, say you have a kosher restaurant and a non-kosher restaurant. Where is the food tastier? Obviously at the non-kosher one, right? Because if the kosher were tastier than the non-kosher, then the non-kosher would serve the kosher food. Right? Only where the non-kosher is tastier can only the non-kosher serve it, whereas the kosher cannot. So that is a lower bound. Meaning, the non-kosher restaurant is at least as tasty as the kosher one, and maybe more. You can also factor in price — price plus kashrut plus taste and so on — the sum of those is fixed. Now each comes at the expense of the other. There are additional constraints, but basically the more constraints you have, when you optimize each one separately you will get less far, because you also have to optimize the other. Right? A washer-dryer combo — clearly it dries less well and washes less well than a machine that does only one. “A sailor should not be boastful; let a craftsman have only one trade,” as the Talmud says, right? If you try to achieve two things together, you will probably be less good at each separately. Fine? So it is always like that. Therefore if Jewish law is really meant to achieve other goals, not moral ones, then obviously the gentile legal systems will be more moral than ours, because as far as they are concerned, what they seek to achieve is only the moral goal. Whereas with us we are limited because we also want to achieve religious goals, and that can come at the expense of moral goals precisely in those places where there is a clash, right? The anti-moral laws — there it will show up אצלנו, not among them. Among them it will not appear, because they have no reason to do something immoral. They only have moral rules, so what’s the problem? So therefore what he is basically saying, as I said, is like a theorem in mathematics: it is obvious that our legal system is less moral than the legal systems of the nations. But he says, “ואין אנו חסרים בזה דבר, כי כל מה שיחסר מהתיקון הנזכר היה משלימו המלך”. “And we lose nothing by this, because whatever is lacking in the aforementioned repair, the king would complete.” Don’t worry — our society will remain properly ordered. Why? Not because of the laws of the Torah. Despite the laws of the Torah it will remain complete. Because the king will intervene and say: okay, here you do not apply the Torah law, here you do; here I will execute someone who does not strictly deserve it; here I will fix all the defects that may arise in our social structure, in our social functioning. Meaning, the fact that we live fully moral lives is despite Jewish law, not because of it. But, he says, we have a great advantage over them, because “מצד שהם צודקים בעצמם, רוצה לומר משפט התורה, כמו שאמר הכתוב ‘שפטו אותם משפט צדק’, ימשך שידבק השפע האלוקי בנו”. “Because since they are just in themselves — that is, the law of the Torah, as Scripture says ‘judge them with righteous judgment’ — it follows that divine influx will cleave to us.” We will also achieve the religious goals, and not only the moral goals. That is our advantage over them. As for moral goals, don’t worry — yes, they have an advantage in terms of the legal system, but our king will take care of all the places where there is a problem. The king — that is his role.

[Speaker B] Does that mean that HaRan holds differently from Maimonides regarding the division of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I argue that Jewish law does not cover both morality and other things, but only the other things. Jewish law strives only for religious goals. Morality is a different system, unrelated to Jewish law. He apparently understands it as part of Jewish law itself.

[Speaker B] Is that what the Rabbi said — that all the moral commandments are not moral commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said —

[Speaker B] That their goal is not moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, what appears to be a moral commandment — my claim was that it is not a moral commandment. It is not meant to achieve a… We call it a moral commandment because it fits, and it fits moral conduct, but that is just a label. My claim was exactly this: that even those commandments are not moral; they are non-moral, meaning they are unrelated to morality. So I think that this passage in HaRan really says what I said, completely on the level of basic conception. The small difference is regarding moral commandments: with moral commandments, HaRan understands that they really are morality and are part of Jewish law, whereas I claim that they are not. Okay? I said that I brought some illustrations or evidence for this, right? For example, someone who murders indirectly, or a case where death comes from exposure to the sun, and things like that, is exempt. Now “do not murder” is a moral commandment. Why is he exempt? Morally speaking, of course he should be punished just like an ordinary murderer. I argue that even moral commandments are really meant to achieve religious goals — unrelated to the moral issue. Anyway, that is what HaRan says. Now I’ll bring you another passage from the Maharal. In Netiv HaTorah, I think chapter 15, he says this: in chapter 2 of Bava Metzia they said there that one does not need to return a lost object after the owner has despaired. And this seems to people far-fetched, that a person should take what is not his, even though he did not labor or toil for it, and covet another’s money. Because you find a lost object and the owner has despaired. Okay? According to Jewish law you may take it, right? Now what — it isn’t yours; it is his. He worked and toiled and bought it, and it really is his, and it isn’t yours — you didn’t work or toil, and this is just coveting your fellow’s property that you take. And Jewish law allows you to do it; after the owner has despaired, you may take it, right? So he says: and this seems to people far-fetched — why are you taking what is not yours? Again, this is a case where we know who the owner is. Like an object swept away by the sea. Yes? Something fell into the sea, the owner despaired. But I know it is his, and I know he despaired because it is lost — it’s going to sink. Now I’m an Olympic swimmer; I jump in and save it. Fine? Now the Talmud says that I am allowed to take it. He despaired; it is no longer his. But there is a force… it’s not that I don’t know who the owner is. I do know who the owner is, and I can return it to him. Why may I take it? Let me ask him perhaps for money for the work I did — fine, I understand that. But why don’t I have to return the object itself?

[Speaker B] It’s not a commandment if I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, no. There is no commandment of returning a lost object here. So he says, yes, it seems to people far-fetched that a person should take what is not his, even though he did not labor or toil for it, and covet another’s money. “ודבר זה אינו לפי דת הנימוסית”. “And this is not according to conventional law.” What does he mean? “Religion” here means law, right? “And the law was issued in Shushan the capital” — law. Not religiosity in the modern sense. Fine? So what does it mean that this is not according to conventional law? It means not according to moral law, the laws of the gentiles. It doesn’t fit. According to the laws of the gentiles — here is an example of gentile law being more moral than our law — according to them you should return the lost object in such a case. If you know who the owner is, what difference does it make whether he despaired or not? You should return the lost object. It is his. Okay? So he says this is not according to conventional law, because conventional law requires returning a lost object even after the owner has despaired. I’ll tell you more than that: there is also no textual source for the law of despair in Jewish law. The Sages derived it from reasoning, even though it goes against morality. That is really strange. Fine, if there were a verse I could understand, but here it is reasoning. “וסיבה זאת, כי דת הנימוסית מחייב דבר מה שראוי לעשות לפי תיקון העולם. אף כי אין השכל מחייב דבר ההוא, רק שכך הוא תיקון העולם”. “And the reason is this: conventional law obligates whatever is fitting to do for the repair of the world, even if reason itself does not require that thing, but simply because that is what repairs the world.” “לפיכך דת הנימוסית יש בה לפעמים חומר בדבר מה אף כי לפי השכל והמשפט הישר לא היה צריך לעשות, ולפעמים דת הנימוסית מקילה ביותר כאשר הדבר ההוא אינו צריך לעשות לפי תיקון העולם אף כי אינו ראוי לפי השכל רק לפי הדת הנימוסית”. “Therefore conventional law is sometimes stricter in some matter even though according to reason and upright justice it should not have to be done, and sometimes conventional law is more lenient when that thing need not be done for the repair of the world, even though according to reason it would not be fitting — only according to conventional law.” What is he saying? He says: conventional law — say a gentile legal system — which is meant only to achieve justice and morality. Okay? And let us take the halakhic system. Fine? He calls that “reason and upright justice.” We think that what is rational is precisely morality. But no — “reason and upright justice” is Jewish law. Morality is the repair of society. Okay? Then he says: there are things where morality is stricter than reason — meaning Jewish law — and there are things where Jewish law is stricter than reason. There is no clear hierarchy here. There are things where one is stricter, there are things where the other is stricter. Okay? But these are two different systems. Now he brings examples. “לכן לכך צריך לפי דת הנימוסית להחזיר האבדה אחר ייאוש, אחר ייאוש בעל האבדה. ודבר זה הוא חומרא”. “Therefore according to conventional law one must return the lost object after the owner’s despair, and this is a stringency.” “וכן להפך, אם מצא כלי כסף וכלי זהב והכריז עליו פעם אחת או שתיים ולא דרש אדם אחר האבדה בשנה או שנתיים, הרי הוא מעכב לעצמו ומשתמש בכלי ההוא, כי אין בזה תיקון העולם אחר שהכריז עליו כמה פעמים והמתין שנה או שנתיים או יותר שוב לא יבוא. ודבר זה אינו לפי התורה, כי אם מצא כלי כסף וכלי זהב והכריז עליו הרבה פעמים, אסורים לו לעולם, גם אם הוא לא יבוא אף פעם המאבד. רק יהא מונח עד שיבוא אליהו ולא ייגע בהם. הרי שהחמירו מאוד”. “And conversely, if one found silver vessels or gold vessels and announced them once or twice, and no one came to claim the lost object after a year or two, then he keeps it for himself and uses that vessel, because there is no worldly benefit in more than that; once he has announced it several times and waited a year or two or more, the owner will not come. And this is not according to the Torah, for if one found silver vessels or gold vessels and announced them many times, they are forbidden to him forever, even if the owner never comes. Rather they must be left until Elijah comes, and he may not touch them. So you see that the Torah was much stricter.” Fine? There is a stringency and a leniency. Take returning a lost object after despair. According to morality you should return it. According to Jewish law you are exempt. Right? There morality is stricter. Right? Now I found gold vessels and silver vessels, and the owner did not despair. I found them, announced them, waited a year, two years, three years — the owner doesn’t come. What would morality say? Use them; at least you’ll get enjoyment from them. That person is not going to come; there is no chance. At least you use them, enjoy them. What does Jewish law say? No — they must remain untouched until Elijah comes. You are not allowed to use them; you must keep them for the owner, if he ever comes. So here Jewish law is stricter, right? In the example of returning a lost object after despair, morality is stricter. Here Jewish law is stricter. How do we understand such a thing? So he says: “וכל זה כי דברי חכמים על פי התורה שכל דברי תורה משוערים בשכל וכאשר ראוי לפי השכל כך ראוי לעשות, כמו שאמרה תורה ‘ושמרתם ועשיתם כי היא חוכמתכם’ וגומר. ואינו דת נימוסית מניח הדברים לפי הסברה ולפי המחשבה. והתורה שכלית לגמרי ואין התורה פונה אל הסברה”. “And all this is because the words of the Sages follow the Torah, for all the words of the Torah are measured by reason, and as is fitting according to reason, so it is fitting to do, as the Torah says, ‘You shall keep and do them, for this is your wisdom,’ etc. But conventional law leaves matters to opinion and to thought. And the Torah is entirely rational, and the Torah does not turn to common intuition.” That is a terribly confusing formulation. The Torah is entirely rational, and therefore it does not turn to intuition — well, of course it does. Here “rational” means something detached from our natural feelings. We know that it is right. “Intuition” means what comes to us from instinct, from our simple natural feelings. Okay? So morality belongs to intuition. Jewish law or Torah is reason — the truly just thing, the truth. Here morality is only to repair society — intuitions, feelings, however you want to call it. It is not reason; it is not abstract truth. His terminology is very confusing, because if I asked people, the rational commandments are the moral ones, right? The statutes are the non-rational commandments. Meaning, we call something we understand, something moral, a rational commandment. Okay? He calls it the opposite. Something we understand is “intuition.” Something we do not understand is the rational commandment. Meaning, you are supposed to act according to reason, detached from your natural feelings, but only because you know it is right because it is written in the Torah. Okay? So his terminology is confusing, but he basically means exactly what I said and what Derashot HaRan said.

[Speaker B] The rational view — how we infer logically from what the Torah says — that’s what he says obligates us halakhically. Right. So if our reason changes over time, then we are no longer listening to the conditions, or the opposite?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Reason” here means listening to the Torah. It does not mean going after what you think. Going after what you think — that is morality, that is intuition.

[Speaker B] Maybe just the use of reason itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The opposite. When today, for example, we speak about a rationalistic person — what is a rationalistic person? A rationalistic person acts in a certain way even though his natural feelings could lead him to act differently. But he lets reason rule over the feelings. Going with natural feelings is not being rationalistic; that is being emotional. A rationalistic person reaches the conclusion that something is right and does it even though his natural feelings do not tell him to do it. Now you can reach the conclusion that it is right not because you understand why it is right, but because the Holy One said so, and you trust that what He said is right. So if something is written in the Torah and I do not understand it, still keeping it is rational conduct, just as much as if I understood why it is right. It is like with a doctor. A doctor prescribes me a medicine, and I do not know how the medicine works; I did not study medicine. Should a reasonable person take the medicine or not? Yes — it is reasonable to take the medicine, because I assume the doctor understands better than I do. Same thing here: I assume that the Holy One and the Torah know that this is the right way for me to act, and therefore they command me. So a rationalistic person will do what they command. But he will do so also in places where his natural inclinations do not draw him in that direction, but in another one. By contrast, a non-rationalistic person is someone who follows his natural inclinations. Okay? By the way, in my opinion the right is rationalistic and the left is emotional — speaking generally — contrary to the accepted view in the world today. What is the accepted view? Maybe among right-wingers comforting themselves, but usually if you ask ordinary people, I think they’ll tell you the opposite. The right is some kind of nationalism, from the gut, you operate from the gut, feelings of anger and nationalist emotions; and the left is rationality — we act for peace, for values, we don’t let the gut control us. Yes, that is the… it’s not correct, okay? Just one example — someone spoke about the hostage deal, the debate over the hostage deal. Right? There it was very clear that those who support a hostage deal — not all of them, but many of them — are people driven by the gut. You see those miserable people sitting in tunnels, you can’t stand it — and rightly so, you understand that these are people in a terrible situation. You are willing to pay any price for that. Afterward a lot of people may die and there may be terrible costs for all of us? That is already a rational consideration; it is not connected to our natural inclination. So a rationalistic person can make reason govern those feelings, those intuitions. An emotional person cannot; an emotional person will go with his feelings. Today people often went with their feelings, but in our era, over the last couple of generations, following feeling has already become an ideology. That is what has been renewed in recent generations. Meaning, people always followed feeling rather than reason, but now it has become an ideology, because there is some kind of despair of reason. Okay? Fine, that is for another discussion. In any case, the Maharal and Derashot HaRan are basically — you notice — saying what I said earlier. They are saying that there are two systems of values and goals: a religious system — the application of the divine matter, the divine influx — and a moral system, which is civic repair, social repair. Different governing bodies are appointed over these two systems. The Sanhedrin and the courts are appointed over the Torah-halakhic system, and the king is appointed over the civic-moral system. The king also intervenes in the halakhic system where moral and social problems arise, and then the king steps in there and punishes outside the strict law and so on. Therefore it can really happen that gentile laws will be more moral than our laws, and that is exactly where the king has to intervene. If he sees that some problem is being created, then he must intervene. Okay? By the way, not always. It’s not that the king will now abolish the prohibition on mamzerim marrying. Ostensibly he should abolish it, right? Because that is immoral, and Jewish law here created something immoral, so let the king intervene and cancel it. After all, he is supposed to make sure that moral bugs are not created. But it doesn’t work like that. Because when the Torah said that mamzerim may not marry, it also took that into account. The king intervenes only where something new arises — a new situation — and suddenly a moral problem is created. Okay? But where it is already built into the Torah itself, the king is not supposed to intervene. Because that is fine; the Torah also took that into account and still told us that a mamzer may not marry. Okay. So this basically means that we have two systems. We spoke about problems of Torah and morality. But now I want to qualify things a little.

[Speaker E] You said that all the words of Torah are according to religious law and not according to moral law. Right? Yes. So how can you say… how can you understand that these cases were considered immoral? The king!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The king has to intervene. After all, what did HaRan say? That where following Jewish law creates a social-moral problem, don’t worry — the king’s role is to solve those problems. So where Jewish law gives an apparently immoral instruction, the king should intervene and say: here I freeze Jewish law; here one must act differently. But we said that can’t be — we said the king does not intervene to change basic laws of Jewish law that contradict… the king does not intervene to say that we should not kill Amalekite babies, or that a priest’s wife who was raped should not have to leave her husband, or that mamzerim should be allowed to marry, right? The king does not intervene in those places. Why not? Because in those specific laws the clash is built in. Meaning the Torah itself, when it gave that instruction, was certainly aware of the moral aspect as well, and took it into account and still gave that instruction. So there the king really says: okay, the Torah told us here not to behave according to morality — no problem. Where a problem arises because of situations, circumstances, things like that, there the king can intervene and say no. Right? When, for example, the king sees that murderers are multiplying, then he will start executing people even without witnesses and warning. But he will not establish this as the law for all generations — that I hereby cancel the need for witnesses and warning and execute every murderer whether or not the conditions were met. There are halakhic rules; the king does not cancel halakhic rules. If a problem arises that is not built into the rules, but arises because of changing circumstances or something of that sort, then the king will intervene and may also act against Jewish law. He can do that too. Okay?

[Speaker F] So that means the Torah is already aware that this blocks the moral consideration?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does not block the moral consideration, but—

[Speaker F] Still, can’t you say that the king nevertheless could… less likely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, where the Torah gave such an instruction and it is built in and comes along with a moral problem, it is less likely to say that morality will prevail. That does not make it moral; it still remains immoral. But in conflicts of that type, I think Jewish law has the upper hand when the clash is inherent. Only if the clash is incidental, a result of circumstances of one kind or another, is there room for morality to prevail as well. Why?

[Speaker C] Why specifically the hand of Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because when the Torah said to do this, it is reasonable to assume that the Holy One, the Author of the Torah, also took into account the moral problem involved and still said to do it. He didn’t write something so that we would never do it, right? Why did He write that a mamzer may not marry? If I’m really supposed to cancel that because it’s immoral, then why is it written in the Torah? It would never be carried out; it would be a dead letter. Only where the thing in principle stands, but circumstances can arise in which there is a problem — there the king can intervene. Okay?

[Speaker B] Why does the Torah care about morality in the first place? What? Why are there places where the Torah cares about morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker B] Like for example in the case of King David who took… so what is the question?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Morality matters a great deal to the Torah. What do you mean?

[Speaker B] In general — if its goal is religious…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Jewish law’s goal is religious, not the Torah’s. Jewish law. I’m saying the opposite: my whole claim was that the will of the Holy One is expressed in two systems — the halakhic system, which strives for religious goals, and the moral system, which strives for social-moral goals. And the Holy One wants both from us. In the Torah it says, “ועשית הישר והטוב”, “You shall do what is right and good,” and Nachmanides explains that this means moral conduct. At the same time, he does not count it among the commandments. Why? Because the Torah indeed wants it, but it is not Jewish law — it is Torah. The concept of Torah is broader than the concept of Jewish law; it includes both Jewish law and morality. Or the will of God includes both Jewish law and morality. That is also why I said that in conflicts Jewish law does not always prevail, because both are the will of God. It is not God versus something else; both are God. It is just a dilemma between two values, both of which are the will of God.

[Speaker B] And in places where there is supposedly a more authentic law — say, a heavenly voice comes out — is there some preference then? Suppose, for example, that the law according to “follow the majority” is immoral, whereas according to the heavenly voice, what the heavenly voice says is moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — not that it is moral, but that that is what should be done. It is not saying that it is moral; it is saying that halakhically that is what should be done.

[Speaker B] Right, so I’m saying: in a case where there was a simple legal ruling without a heavenly voice — there was a majority of sages who said one thing, but that thing is not moral. On the other hand, a heavenly voice came out and said something that is not according to the law — but what the heavenly voice says is actually moral. It fits morality. Yes. Are we expected—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that makes a difference.

[Speaker B] There’s no preference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. “לא בשמיים היא” — “It is not in heaven.” But Jewish law still says what it says. Morality says what it says even without the heavenly voice. So I have a conflict between Jewish law and morality, and it has to be handled like any other conflict. I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] Give an example, then, where there is a very strong moral demand and we ignore Jewish law and become stricter because morality requires it. That is a circumstantial case. Is there a non-circumstantial case?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by non-circumstantial — one that is built in? I said that generally, when it is built in, no. If Jewish law said its piece and it is built in that this contradicts a moral principle, then Jewish law itself took that into account. The Holy One Himself took that into account and still said to do it. But now I want to qualify this a bit. Why? Why not? Listen, I didn’t understand. You’re saying that He—

[Speaker H] He has nothing to take into account, or didn’t take into account, and it is forced on Him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is forced on Him that this is moral, but the question is whether He requires us to behave in that moral way. I said this in general even apart from these issues — morality still needs God. The definition of what is good and what is bad is imposed on Him, but our obligation to behave according to the good is because the Holy One commands us to do so. I am speaking about His will in the sense that He expects us to behave this way, not in the definition of good and bad. In the definition He has no say. Yes. So I am saying: nevertheless, despite this very dichotomous distinction I made, I do want to qualify it a bit. There are places where you can see that morality takes part within Jewish law, even though these are seemingly two independent categories. First of all, where Jewish law is lenient and morality is strict — there there is no problem. It is obvious that if you ask a question, they will tell you to follow morality, because you are not violating Jewish law if you follow morality. Jewish law simply does not obligate it; it is lenient. So it is not that you are going against Jewish law. Example: returning a lost object. If I want to return a lost object after the owner has despaired, okay? Jewish law does not forbid me from returning it after despair, right? It says you are not obligated; you may take it for yourself. But morality does say to return it. Therefore they tell me: return it. Fine? Otherwise you will be a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah if you don’t return it. Yes, exactly. Okay? Why? Because the Torah says you are allowed not to return it, but someone who does not return it is a scoundrel because it is immoral not to return it. So he is a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah. Fine? Therefore the Sages say — and this is exactly the point — the Talmud says that Shmuel’s father, and afterward this was codified as law by Maimonides and in the Shulchan Arukh, that the Sages are pleased with one who returns a lost object after the owner has despaired. Now this itself is a refutation of the argument that identifies morality with Jewish law. Because someone who wants to claim, “Why don’t we return a lost object after despair? Because the Torah has some higher morality that we don’t understand,” let’s say — okay? If that were so, then why do the Sages say: yes, but morally you should still return it? After all, our morality here supposedly says not to return it, doesn’t it? So clearly not. Morality is universal morality. Jewish law does not obligate it. And the Sages say: Jewish law does not obligate it, but it is permitted, so if morality says return it, then return it. Not only that; according to many opinions they even compel this. They compel morality even though Jewish law does not require it. At least if you are rich. If you are poor, maybe not. But they compel it. And the obligation to return after despair is a moral statement — going beyond the letter of the law — not a halakhic statement. It appears in law codes, in Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, but one has to understand: that is not Jewish law; that is morality. The moral instruction slipped in there, but it is still moral, not Jewish law. That is about a situation where Jewish law is lenient. Now consider the captive beautiful woman. Today it would be unthinkable to do such a thing, right? Jewish law permits such a thing; it does not require it. And we could say and enact a law forbidding the captive beautiful woman. Is that going against Jewish law? No. Morality says it is forbidden. Jewish law permits it but does not require it. Okay, so we will follow morality and say it is forbidden, right?

[Speaker I] And that doesn’t create a problem of adding to the Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Because if I do not present it as a halakhic command, but explicitly say that Jewish law permits it and I am obligating you on moral grounds, then I have not added anything. “Adding” always means presenting something as a halakhic command, because then you are adding to the halakhic commands that the Holy One gave us. If, for example, I don’t know, I… I don’t step over the line in basketball because then it’s out of bounds. Is that adding to the Torah? I am doing something extra that the Torah did not forbid me. So how is such a thing allowed? Because I am not doing it as Jewish law; I am doing it because of the rules of basketball. Adding to the Torah is when you present something as Jewish law when it is not Jewish law. You say: this too is Jewish law. You thereby add something to the Jewish law we received. That is called adding. Therefore Maimonides, for example, in the laws of rebellious elders, says that any court that enacts an ordinance must emphasize that this thing is an ordinance and not a Torah law, because otherwise it would violate the prohibition of adding. But once it emphasizes that, it no longer violates that prohibition, because it is not presenting it as an addition to the Torah. Okay? Now there are places where Jewish law is stricter than morality, and still we take morality into account. Why? For example, in a case of doubt. Doubt whether this is pork or not pork; doubt whether the chicken is non-kosher or not non-kosher. What is the law according to Jewish law? A Torah-level doubt is treated strictly, right? One must be strict and not eat it. Now a poor, unfortunate woman comes, okay? And this is the only chicken she has — she has nothing to eat. What do you do in such a situation? So the decisors often are lenient. They say: okay, she is poor and miserable; we are lenient for her, let her rely on the side that permits it. And there is even a dispute among decisors: if one authority permits and one forbids, for a poor person we say: you may rely on the lenient opinion. For a rich person, we would not say that. Now ostensibly that goes against Jewish law, because as far as Jewish law is concerned, if you are in doubt, a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. What difference does it make whether you are rich or poor? Are there different laws of doubt for the rich and the poor? That seems against Jewish law. No — if it were a life-threatening matter, that would be different. I’m not talking about life-threatening; let her eat something else. So I want to argue as follows. It’s true that morality is not overriding Jewish law here, because Jewish law itself says one should be strict and morality says one should be lenient with this poor, miserable woman. But the question is: how do we understand the laws of doubt? Usually when you understand the laws of doubt as requiring stringency, you are basically saying: I have two options, I do not know how to decide between them, therefore I must be strict, right? Meaning, the instruction to be strict in a case of doubt comes only after you have reached the conclusion that you have no other way to decide which of the two paths to choose. If you have no other way, then a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. If I do have another way to decide — for example, the majority of authorities say this — then I follow the majority of authorities, even leniently, right? Even though I am in doubt whether it is this way or that, I have a way to decide, so the laws of doubt do not apply to me. Right? The laws of doubt are always the last link in the chain. Right? You first check the possible ways of deciding. If you didn’t arrive at one, and you have no way at all to decide, and you remain with two equally balanced sides, then the laws of doubt come and say: a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. I want to claim that if you have two paths, one lenient and one strict, and a poor person comes before you, one of the ways to decide is based on pressing need — that in a pressing situation you are allowed to be lenient for him. Then what? Once you have a way to decide, we are no longer in doubt; we have decided. If we are no longer in doubt, then the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly no longer applies. That rule speaks only to someone who has two paths before him and absolutely no way to decide between them. If I see deciding on the basis of pressing need as an internal halakhic decision tool, then it works perfectly well. And that is my claim: yes, in situations where you are in doubt, even though formally a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly, we often find ways to be lenient in pressing circumstances. You may rely on a minority view, rely on one side of the doubt in pressing need. What does that mean? If it’s a Torah-level doubt and even Jewish law requires strictness, what difference should pressing need make? Does pressing need make it permissible to eat forbidden carcasses? The point is that I want to claim that when they are lenient in pressing need, it means that the pressing need itself is a decision tool. If you have two possibilities and you don’t know which, you are allowed to choose the more lenient one if you are poor. In principle, no — but if you are poor, then yes. And once you have chosen, then it is no longer an undecided question. You already have a decision. Only about undecided questions do we say: a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. This question has been decided, so that rule does not apply to it. Yes.

[Speaker D] Is that specifically about women’s testimony? And you gave the example of a murderer in the ritual bath — Agatha Christie, yes. So is it the same thing here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Why is it the same thing? What doubt do you have there?

[Speaker D] Because you said we can’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a “this just doesn’t fit” consideration. I’ll get to that in a moment. That is not the consideration I’m discussing now. In the consideration I’m discussing now, in pure principle, you have two possible paths, and you may use a moral criterion to decide which one to choose. And not that you must always say that a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. That is the claim. Meaning morality can serve as a decision rule even within the halakhic framework — but only if both paths are really legitimate from a halakhic standpoint. If you have two ways and both are possible according to halakhic considerations.

[Speaker J] Why do they have to be legitimate? Why not? If it’s a doubt, then it’s not clear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. My claim is first of all: why am I in doubt? Because both paths are possible and I have no way to prefer one over the other, right? That’s why I’m in doubt. Now I’m saying: okay, there is a rule — where you have two paths and no way to decide, a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly. But if I do have a way to decide between them, then I am no longer in doubt. And this is like the famous story about Rabbi Yehonatan Eybeschutz, where the priest came to him and said: after all, we Christians are the majority, and the Torah says “אחרי רבים להטות”, “follow the majority.” Why don’t you follow us? So he answered that the rule “follow the majority” is said about anyone who is in doubt. If you are in doubt, go with the majority. If I am not in doubt, why should I go with the majority? I am not in doubt whether the Christians are right or the Jews are right; I know the Jews are right, so there is no relevance to following the majority. Think about a piece of meat you found. In the city there are nine non-kosher butcher shops and one kosher shop. I found a discarded piece of meat, but it has a top-quality kosher seal on it. Do I need to be strict? After all, there is a rule that you follow the majority, and most of the shops here are non-kosher. Of course not. But if I am not in doubt — I know the piece is kosher — then it apparently came from the kosher shop. I am not in doubt. Rules for deciding doubts are conditioned on my really being in doubt. The same with the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated strictly: it is conditioned on my truly being in doubt. If you are in doubt, be strict. If I have a rule that decides the doubt, then I am no longer in doubt. And pressing need is a rule that decides the doubt. Is it really still a doubt? No, because pressing need is a rule that decides the doubt. It does not decide who is right, but—

[Speaker K] It does help you decide what to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you have decided, you are no longer in doubt. And if you are no longer in doubt, then the rule of a Torah-level doubt being treated strictly does not apply. In short, in other words: suppose, not in doubt and not in pressing need — I have two interpretive options. One of them creates a severe moral problem, and the other is fine. Then on the moral level I will decide in favor of the acceptable one on moral grounds even without invoking pressing need. Because that itself is pressing need. If going the other way means I will commit a terrible moral wrong, that itself is pressing need. If I have another interpretive option, I will choose it for the moral reason.

[Speaker K] Is that interpretation from the outset?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. No, but I’m saying that even though I am interpreting Jewish law, and Jewish law is not aimed at morality, so what relevance is it that this path is more moral and therefore more correct? What is the connection? No — it does not mean that because of that it is more halakhically correct, but it does mean that because of that I am allowed to go with it. Not because it is more halakhically correct, but because it is halakhically equivalent, so let’s choose the more moral path. And that there are two interpretive sides? Right. In a factual doubt? It makes no difference — that too. Those too are two interpretive sides. The question whether there is pork here or not is two possibilities, two possible interpretations that I do not know how to decide between. If you do not know how to decide, then choose the more moral interpretation. A third possibility is truly extreme situations — I think we discussed this — of “a transgression for its own sake.” Yes, there are situations where you are in such an extreme case that the moral cost is terrible. And there, even if I have no other interpretive option, I am required to act against Jewish law — morally, against Jewish law. But notice: this is no longer a halakhic decision. Here morality is not involved within the halakhic field. Rather I am saying: my moral consideration is to act against Jewish law. Not that this is what Jewish law says — I am going against Jewish law. Yes, that is the concept of “a transgression for its own sake” in the Talmud in Nazir. Yes, Lot’s daughters, who decided to have sexual relations with their father because they thought the world had been destroyed and there were no more human beings — humanity was disappearing. The only way to save humanity or continue it was to have sexual relations with their father. Now there is no halakhic permission for this, because forbidden sexual relations are among the sins for which one must die rather than transgress. There is no situation that permits them. And nevertheless the Sages praise Lot’s daughters. People don’t know this so well. In the Talmud in Nazir on “a transgression for its own sake” there is praise for Lot’s daughters — that they acted properly, acted well. Why? But this is a transgression. Right — but the moral or human cost was so unbearably heavy that these are extreme situations where it just doesn’t fit. Meaning you cannot behave according to the halakhic rule. Fine? Then you really do go against Jewish law. There morality prevails over Jewish law, not by choosing between halakhic options. And even there — why? That is a situation where morality prevails over Jewish law, but it is not a situation where morality plays a role on the halakhic playing field. That was true only in the first two situations I brought. There is one final qualification: there are situations where the Sages insert a moral rule into Jewish law. For example, in the Talmud in Bava Batra, “we compel against the trait of Sodom,” or the law of the neighboring property owner. What does that mean? There is a situation where, say, I am dividing my deceased father’s estate with my brother. Fine? We need to divide my father’s field into two parts, and each one… now I already have a field adjacent to my father’s field, and half of my father’s field is adjacent to my field and the other half is farther away. Okay? Now my brother and I need to divide the two halves. I say to him: listen, give me the half adjacent to my field; it will be more convenient for me to work the whole area together, a field and a half. It’s inconvenient for me to jump around. Okay? My brother doesn’t want to give it to me. So the Talmud says: that is the trait of Sodom; this is the law of the neighboring property owner. Someone whose property borders it gets priority. Now clearly that law is not according to strict Jewish law. According to strict law he has the right to demand a lottery; there is a lottery and each one gets whatever half he draws. But there is a moral rule, “we compel against the trait of Sodom,” which says no — we compel him against the trait of Sodom. But this rule is not really Torah law, even though it appears in the Shulchan Arukh; it is rabbinic law. The Sages decided that this moral principle is so significant that they insert it as a binding halakhic rule, and because of “לא תסור”, “do not depart,” a rabbinic enactment has halakhic standing. So this is a channel by which moral principles can enter Jewish law, and they receive the status of rabbinic law, not Torah law. Okay? If it contradicts Torah law, I mean. If not, then perhaps it is reasoning — we explained what reasoning is, but…

[Speaker C] But once it becomes rabbinic law, doesn’t it suddenly have some religious goal too? Is it always against something?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no — it is a moral matter. Again, you also fulfill a religious value by obeying the Sages, but the value you fulfill in the law of the neighboring property owner is only a moral value. Yes — to uproot something from the Torah passively. And there are certain places where you see in the medieval authorities that even by positive action they can uproot something from the Torah. Okay, we’ll stop here.