Topics in Tractate Makkot, Chapter 3 – Lesson 8 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For how many acts did he do it? Which of the conceptions does that resemble or fit? There are two conceptions regarding liability for a sin-offering. Is liability for a sin-offering for the lapse of awareness, only with the condition that there be an act? Or is liability for a sin-offering for the act, only with the condition that there be a lapse of awareness? A lapse of awareness? Right, definitely. Meaning, if I understand that the number of sin-offerings is equal to the number of lapses of awareness, then the most natural thing to say is that the liability for the sin-offering is really brought for the lapse of awareness, not for the act. True, it has to be realized in practice, but really you bring it for the lapse of awareness. And here’s the practical implication: if I have several lapses of awareness that all found expression in one act — someone has relations with his sister, who is also his father’s sister and his mother’s sister. All right? He has three lapses of awareness: he was unaware of the prohibition of his sister, the prohibition of his father’s sister, and the prohibition of his mother’s sister. Okay? But the act he performed was one act. How many sin-offerings must he bring? Well, it depends. If I bring the sin-offering for the act, then he brings only one sin-offering. There is a condition that it was hidden from him, that condition was met, but in the final analysis, the number of sin-offerings follows the number of acts, and here there was only one act. But if I understand that the sin-offering is brought for the lapses of awareness, then here there were three lapses of awareness, so he needs three sin-offerings. Ah, you’ll tell me: but those are only lapses of awareness that led to an act. Fine — this did lead to an act. True, it’s one act, but why should I care? I’m not bringing the sin-offerings for the acts; the act is only required so that the lapses of awareness have practical expression. So it doesn’t matter to me that the practical expression of the three lapses of awareness is one practical expression; I only performed one act of intercourse here. In the end, all three lapses of awareness had practical expression, so for all three he is liable for a sin-offering. Therefore, in my opinion, this law of his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister is a very clear indication that liability for a sin-offering is for the lapses of awareness and not for the bodies. Do you agree? What? Ah, so what happens when there are separate bodies? Or also, what’s the hierarchy? What divides more? I would say, what do you mean — obviously what divides more is the lapses of awareness. If there are three lapses of awareness, then obviously I need to bring three, because after all I’m bringing it for the lapses of awareness. If there is one lapse of awareness with three bodies, then why should I care that it found expression three times? It’s one lapse of awareness; seemingly I should bring only one sin-offering. You could tell me maybe that three bodies are like three lapses of awareness — he was unaware regarding this one, unaware regarding that one — okay, that’s a bit forced. Now another question arises: what’s the hierarchy between them? Which is more likely to divide — bodies or names? So obviously names, right? Obviously names. Even if I’m willing to accept that bodies divide and that one brings three sin-offerings for three bodies, there’s no doubt that if that’s so, then with three names I would obviously bring three sin-offerings, right? That’s obvious. Here I need forced explanations to explain why one would bring three sin-offerings at all, but with three lapses of awareness of three different names, obviously I need to bring three sin-offerings. Meaning, the initial a fortiori argument brought in our passage is natural, it has to be there, right? If the conception is that liability for a sin-offering is for the lapses of awareness, right? But in the Talmud’s conclusion that a fortiori argument falls apart, because they tell me: no, over there there are three separate bodies, so maybe not, and therefore there is no a fortiori argument. And now the other side also says: right, I too agree there is no a fortiori argument, and he learns something else. So seemingly, in the end it comes out the opposite, right? It comes out that the acts are what create liability, not the names. The person is still an unintentional sinner here. But the difference in general — with intentional sin you have to relate to the actual bodies. Of course, right. Our whole discussion is only about unintentional sin. Yes, yes. But I want to say that that’s not precise. Why is it not precise? Because the Talmud sees in bodies a consideration that is stronger than names, and it also sees in names a consideration that is stronger than bodies. Let’s say each one has some advantage. You understand that even then there is no a fortiori argument, right? When you say there is no a fortiori argument, that doesn’t mean that for you the hierarchy is that bodies divide more than names. It could be that there is one consideration according to which bodies divide more, and another, opposite consideration according to which names divide more, and because of that you can’t make an a fortiori argument in either direction, in either direction. There is a refutation for each side. When we had an a fortiori argument, then the hierarchy was clear. When there is no a fortiori argument, that does not mean the hierarchy is reversed. It means there is no clear hierarchy. It could go this way and it could go that way. Therefore you can’t infer from this Talmudic discussion that in the end liability for a sin-offering comes for the acts and not for the lapses of awareness, right? Even in the end that’s not correct. It could be that this itself is the doubt between the two sides in the Talmud, but even in the conclusion that doubt was at least not decided. I can still remain with the conception that the lapses of awareness really are what create liability for a sin-offering. Okay?

Now, why am I saying this? Because that’s where I really want to go. I want to argue that the lapses of awareness are what create liability for a sin-offering, and again, the most natural explanation is simply that we see in the Mishnah in tractate Sabbath that the number of sin-offerings is equal to the number of lapses of awareness, that’s all. So seemingly that is a simple practical implication; someone who wants to say otherwise is engaging in pilpul. If you want to say that the sin-offerings are brought for the act and that the lapses of awareness are only a condition, then why should I care that there were five lapses of awareness? Why should I bring — there was one act — why should I bring several sin-offerings? Why should I bring one sin-offering, sorry. Fine.

So I want to bring Afikei Yam. Afikei Yam is Rav Chaim Ozer’s brother-in-law. Rav Chaim Ozer’s brother-in-law. He investigates, seemingly, exactly this issue. Let’s see. בהא דקיימא לן דאוכל שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת אינו חייב אלא אחת, יש לי לחקור בטעם הדבר. אם הטעם משום דחיובא דחטאת אשגגה הוא, וכיוון שלא נודע לו בינתיים הרי חד אשגגה היא, ואף דאכל זה שחרית וזה בין הערביים, מכל מקום כולה חד אשגגה היא ואינו חייב אלא אחת, וכאילו אכלן בבת אחת ממש. דאפילו לרבי אליעזר דסבירא ליה דאעברה עליה משום דבאוכל שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחד חייב שתים, היינו דווקא באכלן שלא בבת אחת, משום דהוו תרתי חייב שתים אע”ג דחד שגגה היא. אבל באוכלן בבת אחת ממש גם לדידיה אינו חייב אלא אחת, וכמבואר שם דקצר וקצר חייב שתים, וקצר שתי גרוגרות בבת אחת אינו חייב אלא אחת. והרבנן דפליגי עליה דרבי אליעזר סבירא ליה דאע”ג דהוו תרתי מכל מקום כיוון דשגגה אחת היא הווי ליה כאילו עשאם בבת אחת מגזירת הכתוב ואינו חייב אלא אחת. Up to here that is one side of his inquiry. What is he saying? That liability for the sin-offering is liability for the error, right? The second side is really the side that I presented before, seemingly — that’s one possibility. The second possibility, which comes in the next paragraph: ויש מקום לומר דגם לרבנן דפליגי אליעזר סבירא ליה… דכיוון דהוו תרתי באמת מחויב תרתי מן הדין, ורק דגזירת הכתוב הוא דכל שלא נודע לו על חטאו ולא נתחייב בקורבן, מיפטר בקורבן אחד על שניהם. וכמו דהדין ביולדת דכל שלא יצאה לשעה הראויה להביא קורבן מביאה קורבן אחד על לידות הרבה. אבל בנודע לו בינתיים בין אכילה לאכילה, כיוון דחלה באכילה זו להביא קורבן, שוב לא שייך דיפטר בקורבן זה על מה דיאכל אחר כך. נפקא מינה מכל זה יבואר לפנינו. That is the second side. What is the second side? That the lapses of awareness matter, but the acts are what matter. The acts are what matter. The second side is that the acts determine liability; there is just a scriptural decree that if it was under one lapse of awareness, it is considered as though it were one act. Right? Not that it is considered as though it were one act. Rather, that the sin-offering for the first act also counts for the second act, because it was done under one lapse of awareness. But really I have two separate grounds of liability for a sin-offering. Is his inquiry the same as the inquiry I spoke about above? This is an interpretive exercise. What he’s really asking, they say, is whether a sin-offering is brought for the lapses of awareness or whether a sin-offering is brought for the acts. Right? So basically I’m saying this: if a sin-offering is brought for the lapses of awareness, then it is obvious why someone who ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat under one lapse of awareness brings one sin-offering, because there is only one lapse of awareness here — why should I care that he ate two portions? Right? But if the sin-offering is brought for the acts, then why indeed does someone who ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat under one lapse of awareness bring one sin-offering? A scriptural decree that if he brings a sin-offering for the first olive-bulk portion, it also counts for the second. Okay? That’s his second side. But not that it is brought for the lapses of awareness — it is brought for the acts. There is a scriptural decree that the sin-offering for the first act also helps for the second act. That’s what he claims. Okay? Meaning, the second law he speaks about is a law in the laws of sin-offerings: that one sin-offering can also count for another act that would require a sin-offering. Really I should be liable for two sin-offerings if I ate two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat, because the act is what creates liability. I’m liable for two sin-offerings. But there is such a law that if those two liabilities for a sin-offering are not separated by — meaning, if it is under the same lapse of awareness, I didn’t become aware in the middle — then the first sin-offering also counts for the second act. It’s just a law in how a sin-offering atones, that’s all. It has nothing to do with the question of how many transgressions I committed and how many sin-offerings I’m liable for. I’m liable for two sin-offerings. But the first sin-offering also counts in place of the second. And what is his first possibility? That no, I’m liable for only one sin-offering. That’s his claim. But now let’s read him more carefully and you’ll see that that’s not correct.

בהא דקיימא לן דאוכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחד דאינו חייב אלא אחת, יש לי לחקור בטעם הדבר, אם הטעם משום דחיובא דחטאת אשגגה הוא — up to here it looks exactly like what I said, right? וכיוון שלא נודע לו בינתיים הרי חד אשגגה היא. ואף דאכל זה שחרית וזה בין הערביים, מכל מקום כולה חד אשגגה היא ואינו חייב אלא אחת. Why? How would you explain why he is liable for one? Because it’s one lapse of awareness, and therefore what? Therefore it is only one lapse of awareness. But look what he writes: ואינו חייב אלא אחת וכאילו אכלן בבת אחת ממש. And if it’s not as though he ate them literally at one time, then what? There is still one lapse of awareness. Even the first side of Afikei Yam says that liability is for the acts, not for the errors. Only if this was done under the same lapse of awareness, then the act of eating the two portions is considered one act, so you’re liable for only one sin-offering — but not because the sin-offering is brought for what? For the lapse of awareness. The sin-offering is brought for the act; it’s just that two different acts done under one lapse of awareness are considered one act, so you’re liable for only one sin-offering. The second side says no, you are liable for two sin-offerings. Why? Because these are two acts, and the sin-offering is brought for the acts. So then why is one sin-offering enough when you eat two olive-bulk portions of forbidden fat under one lapse of awareness? Because there is a scriptural decree that the first sin-offering also counts for the second, but in principle he is liable for two. In other words, he assumes on both sides of his inquiry that liability for a sin-offering is for the act. He does not even consider the possibility that liability for a sin-offering is for the lapse of awareness. Liability for a sin-offering is for the act. The only question is: if two acts are done under one lapse of awareness — and that is exactly what is difficult about this approach, right? — if two acts are done under one lapse of awareness and liability is for the act, then why are you liable for only one sin-offering? I would say simply: because the lapse of awareness is one; the sin-offering is for the lapses of awareness, not for the acts. He doesn’t even entertain that direction at all; neither of his two sides is that. For him it is obvious that liability is for the act, and therefore he is really bothered by the question: so why are you liable for one sin-offering if it’s two acts under one lapse of awareness? So there are two explanations, but still within that conception that liability is for the act. The first explanation says: because it is one act. It is one act of eating, as though he ate them at the same time. Therefore he is liable for one sin-offering, not because the lapse of awareness is one, but because the act he committed is one. The fact that it was under one lapse of awareness only joins the acts together; since the acts are one act, therefore you are liable for one sin-offering. The second explanation says no, you are liable for two sin-offerings. It’s just that despite being liable for two sin-offerings, bringing the first one also counts to atone for the second. There is some law in the laws of sin-offerings like that, that’s all. But you see that both sides tie liability for a sin-offering to the act, not to the lapse of awareness. He does not even imagine the possibility that liability for a sin-offering is for the lapse of awareness, not for the act. Okay?

Now he brings — he repeats this once more, yes? This is what he says: מכל מקום כיוון דשגגה אחת היא הוה ליה כאילו עשאן בבת אחת מגזירת הכתוב ואינו חייב אלא אחת. You see? Meaning, it is considered one act of eating by scriptural decree. There is such a scriptural decree saying that if it was under the same lapse of awareness, he didn’t become aware in the middle, then the whole eating is considered one eating. According to what I’m saying, there is no need to reach a scriptural decree here; there is a simple reasoning: there is one lapse of awareness, so you are liable for one sin-offering. Why do we need a scriptural decree here? Liability for a sin-offering is for the lapse of awareness; there was one lapse of awareness, so you are liable for one sin-offering. All along, it is clear that it only seems as though he is making my inquiry — but he isn’t. He chose a side. According to both sides of his inquiry, liability is for the act, not for the lapse of awareness.

Now he brings Rashi in tractate Sabbath: וכן ייראה מלשון רש”י ז”ל, וזה לשונו: ולא דמי לידיעות שבין אכילת חלב לאכילת חלב שמחלקות לדברי הכל דהתם חיובי אשגגות הוא וכיוון שיש ידיעה בינתיים הוו להו שתי שגגות. What would you say about this Rashi — what does he hold? Errors. Right, exactly like I’m saying. Okay, he brings this Rashi as proof for his first possibility, which is not the possibility I’m talking about. Look what he writes: וכן יהיה לשון הש”ס דהעלמות מחלקות, אך אלו כחדא, מוכח מזה דעתם דאינו חייב אלא אחת, משום דהוה חד שגגה וחיובא אשגגה הוא. But for him this is an argument for the first side of his inquiry, that really liability is for the act, only it is one continuous act. One error simply turns all the acts into one act, and therefore your liability for the sin-offering is only one liability, because there is only one act here. But clearly the plain meaning of Rashi is not that. The plain meaning of Rashi is what I’m saying: that the sin-offering is brought for the error. If you have one error, then you are liable for one sin-offering. Why do we need a scriptural decree here? We don’t need any scriptural decree. The number of sin-offerings is equal to the number of errors, because the sin-offering is brought for the error. That’s all. Okay?

Now look. Now he resolves his inquiry from the Ran. In short, what comes out in the meantime is that Afikei Yam doesn’t even take into account the possibility that the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness. And that’s what I told you at the beginning: everyone’s initial intuition, if you ask them, will be that the sin-offering is brought for the act, not for the lapse of awareness. True, under one lapse of awareness you are liable for one; Afikei Yam gives two possibilities. But nobody even imagines the possibility that liability for a sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness at all, not for the acts. The act is only a condition so that the lapse of awareness be realized. But the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness. Okay? Now he brings proof from the Ran. So, as I said, Afikei Yam certainly assumes that. Rashi, in my opinion, does not say that. Rashi says like the approach I’m presenting.

[Speaker E] But like… what? Afikei Yam says as though he doesn’t mean that, but like, the analogy — but he really means…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does he have to say that it’s a scriptural decree and that it’s as though it were one act of eating at one time? There is one error and therefore he is liable for one sin-offering. That’s all.

[Speaker F] It’s like on the Sabbath, on the Sabbath where… after all he brought the chapter in tractate Sabbath. He did several acts and brought one sin-offering. For each and every one he would need one? No. One sin-offering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t know that it was Sabbath. If he didn’t know that today is Sabbath. If he knew, then he has several lapses of awareness, and therefore he brings several sin-offerings. He knew that today is Sabbath; he just didn’t know that sorting is forbidden on the Sabbath, he didn’t know that carrying is forbidden on the Sabbath — so each such lack of knowledge is a lapse of awareness. Yes, exactly.

[Speaker F] So he also has a lapse of awareness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore that’s… on the contrary, from there is the proof for what I’m saying, that the sin-offerings are brought for the lapses of awareness. And therefore the number of lapses of awareness determines the number of sin-offerings. ועתה ניתנה ראש ונשובה אל מה שכתבנו לעיל, דיש מקום לומר דעתם באוכל שתי זיתי חלב דאינו חייב אלא אחת, משום דהוי כחדא אכילה וכאוכל בבת אחת. Do you see the formulation? That’s his first side, not the second. It’s obvious that this is not what I’m saying. והנראה לעניות דעתנו דכמו דעת הר”ן ז”ל בנדרים דף י”ז, אמר וזה לשונו: Now this is a quotation from the Ran: הילכך, מי שתלה נזירותו באם אוכל על כל כזית וכזית שבו תלה נזירותו, וכי אכל טובא, כלומר זיתים הרבה, ומתרין בו בין כל זית וזית לומר שאם יאכלנו יתחייב עליו נזירות אחת, חייב על כל אכילה ואכילה. Someone says, “If I eat an olive-bulk of something, I take upon myself thirty days of naziriteship.” Now he ate three olive-bulk portions, so he is liable for ninety days of naziriteship. Fine? If they warned him between each act of eating. Fine? If after the first eating they said to him, “Do you remember that for every act of eating you are liable for naziriteship?” and then he ate another one. And then, “Do you remember that…,” and then he ate another one. Fine? If there is a warning that divides in the middle, then he is liable for naziriteship for each and every one. If not, then he is liable for one naziriteship. Okay? Very similar to a lapse of awareness in liability for a sin-offering under separate lapses of awareness. Yes? Just notice: here this is not a prohibition or a punishment or anything. It is a liability of naziriteship — he made a vow. “If I eat, I am liable for naziriteship.” It is not a punishment or a transgression or anything. Okay? Now he says: ונראה בעיני דלא הכי בעינן דליתרו ביה בין כל כזית וכזית, משום דלא עדיפי אכילות הללו להתחייב עליהם נזירות כתלאו בהן מלהתחייב עליהם קרבן ומלקות כשנשבע שלא יאכל כיכר זו. כשם דלהתחייב קרבן ומלקות בעינן חילוק בין כל זית וזית, אי למלקות בהתראה ואי לקרבן בשתי העלמות, הכי נמי כתלא נזירות בהם בעינן שיהיו התראות מחלקות… דאי לא לא מיקרי אלא אכילה אחת ולא מיחייב עלה אלא חד נזירות. First of all, what does the Ran say? If he was not warned between one eating and the next, then it is called one eating, right? And what example does the Ran bring? Like division for sin-offerings. Why does he need to become aware in the middle in order to be liable for another sin-offering? Because if he doesn’t become aware in the middle and it all happened under one lapse of awareness, then it is as though it were one transgression, one act of transgression, one act of eating. Which is exactly — no, here Afikei Yam is right. From the Ran it comes out like the first side of Afikei Yam, not like my side that the lapse of awareness determines liability, but like the first side of Afikei Yam: that once it is one lapse of awareness, the action is considered one action. Because naziriteships certainly do not come for lapses of awareness — there I won’t disagree with Afikei Yam. Naziriteships do not come for lapses of awareness. After all, he said what naziriteship comes for. If he eats an olive-bulk, he takes naziriteship upon himself. So what does the naziriteship depend on? On the fact that he eats, right? That’s all. It has nothing to do with… there is no side here that says he is liable for naziriteship because something was hidden from him. The lapse of awareness doesn’t make him liable for naziriteship; the act of eating does. There it’s obvious that we’re talking only about the act, right? So how does he compare it to liability for a sin-offering, the Ran? Because liability for a sin-offering also depends only on the act of eating and not on the lapse of awareness. If it depended on lapses of awareness, what room would there be to compare this to that? In liability for a sin-offering it is obvious why you have to become aware in the middle to be liable for another sin-offering, because otherwise it is one lapse of awareness and you are liable for one sin-offering; if you became aware in the middle, you have two lapses of awareness and you are liable for two sin-offerings. What does that have to do with a nazirite? How do you bring proof from liability for a sin-offering to liability for naziriteship? In liability for naziriteship you say: however much I ate is what makes me liable for naziriteship. Why do I need a warning in the middle? What does that have to do with a sin-offering? What — is the number of naziriteships equal to the number of lapses of awareness? No, it’s equal to the number of olive-bulk portions I eat. It has nothing to do at all with the question of sin-offerings. The novelty is that even though it has nothing to do with the question of sin-offerings, still if it is under one lapse of awareness he incurs only one naziriteship. Why? So the Ran says: since if he doesn’t know in the middle, then all those acts of eating are considered one eating. It’s like you ate three olive-bulk portions, and one act of eating incurs one naziriteship. And that is apparently the same way the Ran understands liability for sin-offerings: that under one lapse of awareness it is considered one action or one eating, and therefore he is liable for one sin-offering. Not because he is liable for the lapse of awareness, but because the lapse of awareness joins the acts of eating. Therefore the Ran definitely goes like the first direction of Afikei Yam and not like me. Fine? But the Rashi we brought above, in my opinion, is like me. In other words, Rashi and the Ran disagree on how to understand liability for a sin-offering. According to Rashi, liability for a sin-offering is understood as being for the lapses of awareness, and realization is required as a condition, because otherwise one is not liable for a sin-offering on the lapse of awareness. And the Ran understands that liability for the sin-offering is brought for the act, but if it was under one lapse of awareness, then all the acts he did are considered one act. Okay?

This Ran is difficult, by the way; it’s difficult logically. Because think about someone who sorts, traps, and gathers sheaves on the same Sabbath. He didn’t know that today is Sabbath, right? So it’s one lapse of awareness. Does that mean he performed one action? After all, these are three different actions — he gathers, he traps — so all three are joined into being one action? Why? If they are actions of the same type — I ate an olive-bulk and then another olive-bulk and then another olive-bulk — you can tell me that I did one act of eating, it’s just that in that act I ate three olive-bulk portions, not one. Fine. So one lapse of awareness joins the three actions into one action. But in Sabbath desecration involving different kinds of labor, where I don’t know that today is Sabbath, that is one lapse of awareness. Why does that join them into one action? Or… it means that that really is not what the Ran says, but rather what I say and what Rashi says: that the sin-offering comes for the lapse of awareness, and therefore I don’t care that these are three different actions; the lapse of awareness was one, and that’s what you bring the sin-offering for. But then there would be no place to compare it to naziriteship, because in naziriteship the actions certainly are what determine liability. And from the very fact that the Ran compares naziriteship to sin-offerings, it is clear that he understood sin-offerings like Afikei Yam’s first side and not like me, not like Rashi. Okay? So according to the Ran, what creates liability for a sin-offering really is the action that he performed, and the lapses of awareness only determine how many actions you performed. According to Rashi, what creates liability for a sin-offering is the lapse of awareness. And in my opinion, that is the simple explanation. What creates liability for a sin-offering is the lapse of awareness, and therefore the number of lapses of awareness determines the number of sin-offerings.

As we saw in the Talmud, there were two sides, right? Whether division by separate bodies divides more than division by separate names, or less. If I understand that the offering is brought for lapses of awareness, then division by names is certainly more significant. And if I understand that the actions determine liability — you performed three actions — then that is much more significant than one action that contains three prohibitions, right? Therefore obviously separate bodies divide more. Now, in the Talmud’s conclusion, seemingly the Ran is right, that the actions determine liability. As I said before, that’s not correct. The Talmud rejects the a fortiori argument; it does not decide in favor of the second side, but says that there is also another side, and therefore you can’t learn it by an a fortiori argument. But there is still room for Rashi’s approach, that the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness. That has not been rejected. There is just another side as well, and therefore you can’t make an a fortiori argument, that’s all. So even from our Talmudic passage there is still room to go in either of these two conceptions.

There is a Mishnah in tractate Makkot on 21b later in our chapter. The Mishnah says: “One can plow a single furrow and be liable on account of eight prohibitions.” Yes? Look at what’s marked here. You see. There. “One can plow a single furrow and be liable on account of eight prohibitions.” He plows with an ox and a donkey together — that’s mixed species, right? And they are consecrated: the donkey for Temple maintenance and the ox as an offering — another two transgressions, that makes three, right? Mixed planting in a vineyard where he is plowing there, and it becomes mixed planting in the vineyard — four. In the Sabbatical year — five. And it is also a festival — six. On top of that he was a priest who was also a nazirite, and all this happened in a place of impurity — there are another two, so that makes eight transgressions. Fine? So he plows a single furrow and thereby violates eight prohibitions. Now what is that? True, here there are no separate bodies; it is the same action. But in this action, this talented fellow manages to violate eight different transgressions in that very same action. Just as an illustration, yes? He drove without a license on the sidewalk against traffic and crashed into a kiosk. Fine, what do you want from me, officer? Fine, I drove the wrong way on the sidewalk without a license and crashed into a kiosk, so what? Here too, yes, this fellow managed in one action to commit eight transgressions. How does that connect to what we were talking about above? Well, it doesn’t really connect. Because here the issue is how many prohibitions he violates. And if all this happened under one lapse of awareness, how many sin-offerings would he bring? Strictly speaking, I don’t know. You could say he would bring one, and you could say he would bring eight. Right? Not everything here carries a sin-offering, but let’s say hypothetically that it did. Yes? Like someone who has relations with his mother’s sister, his father’s sister, and his own sister — one woman who amounts to three transgressions. There he brings three sin-offerings. Fine? Here too, in principle, he would bring eight sin-offerings. But here the issue is how many transgressions he committed, not how many sin-offerings he brings, so this is not proof for my approach. It only shows you the mode of thought: the fact that I committed all the transgressions in one act — so what? I still committed eight transgressions. Right, it’s not connected. I committed eight transgressions here. So what if it was one act? I desecrated the festival, I violated the Sabbatical year, I made mixed species — these are different aspects, and each of those aspects is a separate transgression.

Yes, think about it — I already mentioned this — there is in the beginning of the chapter “What Is Interest?” the Mishnah, yes, that is chapter 5 in tractate Bava Metzia. The Mishnah there says that there is a prohibition of נשך and a prohibition of תרבית.

[Speaker E] There’s really no difference between them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Mishnah says that whenever one violates נשך, one violates תרבית, and whenever one violates תרבית, one violates נשך. Rashi explains there what the difference is: to violate two prohibitions, says the Talmud, but really there is no difference between them. Maimonides is very interesting here — Maimonides counts one prohibition; he does not count נשך and תרבית as two prohibitions. But within the laws, he writes that one violates two prohibitions. In the enumeration of the commandments he brings one prohibition, but it is clear that there are two prohibitions here. In terms of the rules of enumeration, this counts as one prohibition because it has the same content; these are overlapping prohibitions. It relates somewhat to the ninth principle that we talked about. Now, what happens there between נשך and תרבית? Rashi explains there: when I take interest from you, I “bite” into your property, right? So that is basically a transgression I committed against you — I bit off your money; that is the transgression of נשך. The transgression of תרבית is that I increased my own money as a result. Now understand: I am doing the same act, but that act has two aspects, and each aspect really reflects a different problem, even though I did one action. But this action contains problematic features of two kinds, so why should I care that it is one act? I basically did something containing two different kinds of problematic content. Okay, let’s say I picked a fig from your tree on the Sabbath. Then I both stole and desecrated the Sabbath. In tractate Bava Kamma 70, “one who plucks a fig from my figs and carries it to you” — so I committed two transgressions, both theft and Sabbath desecration. So what if I did it in one act? In terms of punishments there are various views, but there is no principled problem in one action counting as several transgressions. If there really are several aspects, then there are several transgressions here, no problem at all. And therefore, if you do this unintentionally, without knowing, you’ll bring eight sin-offerings, because you committed eight transgressions unintentionally; you have eight lapses of awareness, so bring eight sin-offerings. Even for the one who says you need different acts in order to be liable, I think this won’t be difficult for him either. Here too he could say there are eight sin-offerings. Why? Because he really did eight different acts in legal terms. He also plowed with mixed species, he also plowed on a festival, he also plowed in the Sabbatical year, he was also a priest and a nazirite in a place of impurity — and he also did many things. True, he did them all in the course of one action, but he really did eight different things from a halakhic perspective. There are eight different kinds of problematic content here; he violated eight prohibitions.

[Speaker C] In נשך and תרבית, when he does one action, the נשך at the same time is also the תרבית. Here too. And here it’s unavoidable. Here too. So it’s not two actions but one action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too it’s that way.

[Speaker C] One action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He performs one action — plowing — and all these things happen.

[Speaker C] Right, but there he said that basically the foundation is that you can’t say that an action whose very meaning is that it is both נשך and תרבית can be two different things. Why? Because it’s the same action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if it’s the same action? Here too it’s the same action and it’s eight transgressions. It is one action with two problematic aspects — the aspect of נשך and the aspect of תרבית.

[Speaker C] Right, he did them together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In נשך and תרבית too, these are two different transgressions that he did together. Here too — what’s the difference? The נשך and the תרבית are also two different transgressions that he did together in one act. What prevents you from saying that?

[Speaker C] The definition of the two actions — by the very definition I always do them together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so what? You always do them together, so what? True, here it’s always so, whereas there it only happened that way by chance, but still — so what if it’s always so? It can still be that you always violate two prohibitions.

[Speaker C] No, but I can’t call them two prohibitions, because I can say that basically one causes the other, so they aren’t two prohibitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they happen simultaneously; one doesn’t cause the other. That’s what I’m saying — they happen simultaneously.

[Speaker C] So what? Is the difference in the definition or in the act itself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say, for example, that I tell you: look, I’m lending you 100 shekels, and when you repay me you have to give me 100 shekels and throw another 50 shekels into the sea. Fine? Now, seemingly that is fixed interest — I stipulated it in advance. But why? Since I said to you, “Give 50 and throw 50 shekels into the sea,” my money did not increase. How would we understand such a case? Of course one can say that my money did increase and I told you to throw my money into the sea, because if I demand it in exchange for my money, then really I am demanding those 50 shekels for myself. And I tell you, instead of bringing it to me, throw it into the sea — and then it is just ordinary interest. But there was room to distinguish between those two results and say that they are not inherently connected. But even if they are, it still doesn’t matter — then these are two transgressions done simultaneously.

Anyway, that’s the point. If we have time, I want to talk about the significance of this, and I’ll elaborate more next time. Basically I want to argue that an unintentional transgression that requires a sin-offering — I hold like Rashi. Meaning, in my view Rashi is right in this dispute, and this is the simpler conception: that the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness. Okay? What does that really mean? And not for the act. It has to be realized in practice, but you don’t bring it for the act. This means that liability for a sin-offering is liability in the person, not in the object. When you discuss whether there was a transgression here, you ask whether something happened — that is a discussion about the object, about what happened. Liability for a sin-offering does not ask whether there was a transgression, but whether there was a lapse of awareness. True, the lapse of awareness also has to be realized in an act in order to incur liability, but basically you are liable for the lapse of awareness. So what? When you punish a person, you punish him for — wait — his conduct. So the sin-offering comes for the forgetting, yes? For the person. That is the sin-offering. The guilt-offering — that is the guilt-offering, which comes for other transgressions — comes for a result, not for the person’s intention.

[Speaker B] It comes for the result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll illustrate this next time, but that is basically the conclusion. There is a difference between these types of offerings. The sin-offering comes for the negligence, perhaps, within the forgetting, for the lapse of awareness, and the guilt-offering comes for the result. Okay? Now, punishment — punishment for intentional sin — comes for the act of transgression. Once you performed the act of transgression, the actual act, not the intention — yes, the actual act that you did — that basically means you violated the prohibition and you deserve punishment. These are basically three aspects: one aspect is the decision to commit a transgression, or the lapse of awareness that leads to that transgression in unintentional sin, yes? The second aspect is the action that realizes that decision, or expresses that lapse of awareness. And the third aspect is the result, what happened as a result of my action. My claim is that this is the distinction between the sin-offering, the guilt-offering, and punishment for intentional sin. In intentional sin, what is required here is of course that it be intentional as a condition, but basically the punishment is for the action you performed. Fine? With a sin-offering, you bring the offering for the forgetting that led to that action, provided that it led to practical realization. And with a guilt-offering it is neither this nor that. With a guilt-offering it comes for the result. If a result occurred from what you did, regardless of whether there was even any transgression at all, you bring a guilt-offering. Okay, that is basically the division I want to make among these three things. I’ll sharpen that division more in… what? Yes, yes. I’ll talk about it in the next lecture. I’ll show it — all the guilt-offerings, all of them. And what is the idea behind it? The idea behind it is that if you act without intention, if you sin unintentionally, then you cannot punish a person for the act he did. That act happened to him; he didn’t do it. In philosophy they call that not being an agent — you are not an agent, yes? You are not acting. A human being is different from an animal and from anything else in that his actions are actions that he decided on, resolved upon, and carried out. Then the person acts as a legal entity, as an agent, as someone to whom you relate as a subject. Okay? That is an essential human action. When a person performs an act unintentionally, then he is not acting as an agent. He didn’t really decide on that act. And there you can hold him accountable for the lapse of awareness. You were negligent in not knowing, right? Because if it is close to coercion, then he really does not bring a sin-offering. A sin-offering is brought only for an unintentional sin that contains negligence, not for an unintentional sin that is close to coercion. Fine? You are held accountable for that negligence, that the lapse of awareness led you to perform the action, but the claim against you is for the negligence. Okay? Okay. And the guilt-offering is for the result. Again, it doesn’t relate to agency at all. Whether you were intentional or unintentional doesn’t matter. A guilt-offering is brought in any case, as long as the result occurred. Okay? That is the basic idea behind it. A guilt-offering cannot enter into punishment for the act, because I did not do the act intentionally. So how can you punish me for an act I did without intention? I did not decide at all to do that act. It is like a sheep that did that act. Okay, that is basically the point. And maybe I’ll just give one example to sharpen this. The Arukh, in tractate Chagigah 5, writes there — the Talmud says יש נספה בלא משפט, “one may perish without justice.” What? יש נספה בלא משפט. A person can die even though he does not deserve to die. Why? So the Arukh says: one may perish without justice, for example, when one person kills another. If I decide to murder you, then you may die even though Heaven did not decree that you should die; you don’t deserve to die. But if I decide to murder you, I may succeed. Meaning, you may die even though you do not deserve to die. Fine? That is what the Arukh says. This is called “one may perish without justice.” On the one hand, it really seems that a person can die even without the Holy One, blessed be He, deciding that he should die. Okay? There are lessons from this for many areas of our lives. And in tractate Makkot 10, the Talmud says there, three pages before our passage: what is a case of an unintentional murderer? Reuven killed unintentionally, Shimon killed intentionally, and the Holy One, blessed be He, arranges for them to be at one inn. Shimon is up on the ladder and Reuven is below, and then the iron slipped from the wood, and Reuven kills Shimon. Reuven goes into exile because he killed unintentionally, so he gets exile, and Shimon, who killed intentionally, dies — he deserves death for having murdered intentionally. So everything is arranged neatly. Now how does that fit with the Arukh? After all, “one may perish without justice” means that the one who perishes dies because another person killed him, not because the Holy One, blessed be He, decided it. Here in the Talmud it seems that everything that happens to us is only the result of a divine decision. Yes, it is all directed by the Holy One, blessed be He. So how does this fit with Rav Chananel?

[Speaker G] Like Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, individual providence…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Phrase it however you want, with Maimonides or without Maimonides — I’m asking a question from the Talmud. There is a contradiction here between these two passages, or at least according to how Rav Chananel understands the passage in Chagigah. So no, there is no contradiction, because Rav Chananel is speaking about an intentional murderer. If I decide to murder someone, I have free choice. The Holy One, blessed be He, gave me free choice, right? If I decide to murder him, I may succeed even though he does not deserve to die. That is the meaning of choice. If the Holy One, blessed be He, prevents me from murdering someone who does not deserve to die, then I have no choice, because He determines what I do, not me. But in the Talmud in Makkot we are speaking about something that happens on its own. I didn’t decide to kill him; the iron slipped from the wood. I did not decide to kill the one below. So why did it happen to him? Since it wasn’t the result of my choice, why did it happen? Because the Holy One, blessed be He, decided that it should happen to him. So the difference between the two cases is whether the person made a decision as an agent, in which case it really is his action and he decides, not the Holy One, blessed be He — that is the Talmud in Chagigah. Or whether the person acts unintentionally, in which case the person is like an axe in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He. It is not his decision; he did not decide to kill the one below. It happened to him. In that situation, it really is not the action of an agent. At most you can blame him for the negligence of the unintentional sin, and he goes into exile because that negligence is like a kind of sin — exile. Because in unintentional sin, he is not acting as an agent. When you do not act as an agent, then the Holy One, blessed be He, decided the matter. When you act as an agent intentionally, then you are punished for the action, because the action is the result of your decision. Fine? Okay. How does that fit with warnings?

[Speaker D] What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the problem with warnings?

[— second half / part 2 of 2 —]

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are really continuing in the Talmud on page 14. I said that each segment of the Talmud yields some different discussion: the previous one yielded a discussion about a positive commandment and a prohibition, and now we move to Rabbi Yitzchak. That was Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, both of whom say that there is lashes even when one is liable to extirpation. Rabbi Yitzchak disagrees with them and says there is no liability for lashes: where there is extirpation, there are no lashes. And he learns that from one’s sister, where extirpation is stated, and he learned that there are no lashes there, only extirpation. Meaning, extirpation is said with regard to one’s sister in order to teach that with one’s sister there is only extirpation and no lashes, and that becomes a paradigm for every case: wherever there is extirpation, there is only extirpation and no lashes. The Talmud continues discussing what Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael do with that verse of Rabbi Yitzchak. And the Rabbis — the Rabbis here are Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael — why do they need extirpation in the case of one’s sister? The Talmud says: to divide, and in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan, for Rabbi Yochanan said that if he did all of them under one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one. Yes, meaning, if he committed all the transgressions — all the forbidden sexual relations, if you like — under one lapse of awareness, then even though it is only one lapse of awareness, he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every one. Of course, regarding liability for death it makes no sense to speak this way; he is not liable for death for each and every one, because people die only once — cowards die many times, but ordinary people die once — and therefore when we are speaking here of division, it is only division regarding the sin-offering. Incidentally, extirpation is the same: there is no sense in speaking about division regarding extirpation, because if you are cut off, you are cut off; in that sense it is like death. Therefore, when it says here that if he did them all under one lapse of awareness he is liable for each and every one, the meaning is that he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every one. And from where does Rabbi Yitzchak derive division? How does Rabbi Yitzchak know that for each one he is separately liable? Notice we are talking about one lapse of awareness, yes? He derives it from ואל אישה בנידת טומאתה, “And to a woman in the impurity of her menstruation,” to make him liable for each and every woman. ואל אישה בנידת טומאתה — for each woman you are liable. And the Rabbis too — couldn’t they derive it from here? So why do they need the verse about one’s sister if it is learned from that verse? Indeed. Then why do they need extirpation in the case of one’s sister? To make him liable for his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. Yes, to make him liable if he had relations with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister, three times. The Talmud asks: that is obvious — after all, the bodies are distinct, and the names are distinct. Meaning, if he had relations with three such women, first of all these are three women, three separate acts of intercourse, and second, these are three separate names — different prohibitions: his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister are separate prohibitions. So what are you telling me, that he is liable for each and every one? Obviously he is liable for each and every one. So the Talmud says: rather, to make him liable for his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister. That is a magnificent case; tractate Yevamot was born for things like this, yes? There can be a woman who is also his sister, also his father’s sister, and also his mother’s sister. Interesting how that happens, no? The Talmud says: היכי משכחת לה? ברשיעא בר רשיעא — “How is it possible? In the case of a wicked man, son of a wicked man.” What does that mean? So here Rashi enlightens us: הבא על אמו והוליד שתי בנות וחזר ובא על אחת מהן והוליד בן ובא הבן על אחות אמו שהיא אחותו ואחות אביו. One who had relations with his mother and fathered two daughters, and then had relations with one of them and fathered a son, and the son had relations with his mother’s sister, who is his sister and his father’s sister. So she is also his mother’s sister, also his father’s sister, and also his own sister. Okay? Meaning, let’s say Reuven had relations with Leah, right? Reuven had relations with Leah and two daughters were born. Okay? Now Reuven himself had relations with one of the daughters — all right, a colorful, energetic fellow — and a son was born. Now that son had — remember that he has his mother and her sister, who are both in fact his father’s sisters. Okay? So he had relations with one of them. That one is his mother’s sister, his father’s sister, and also his sister, because she is his father’s daughter; she is his paternal sister, she is also his father’s daughter. Okay? So she is really his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. Hard to hold on, I can see.

[Speaker B] It reminds me of when I taught in…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here in the women’s study center, in the beit midrash for doctoral students. So it took a little time to get past those facial expressions. Meaning, like, “What, he can give his daughter to men afflicted with boils, and therefore this is okay? What, a father can give his daughter to men afflicted with boils?” I say yes — what’s the problem? Meaning, you don’t find it morally acceptable? I don’t either. But he has the legal right to do it. I’m not judging it morally right now; we are dealing with the legal question. The legal question has nothing to do with the moral judgment. Okay, so here too it’s the same thing. This fellow was a colorful fellow. He never existed; we’re inventing him only so we can have a case to discuss. And now we have someone who has relations with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister in one act of intercourse. He didn’t have relations with three women; he had relations with one woman, and that woman is also his sister, also his father’s sister, and also his mother’s sister. Okay? In one act of intercourse he managed to commit all three of these prohibitions, and this comes to teach us that he is liable for those three acts of intercourse — in short, three sin-offerings. The fellow is not only a wicked man son of a wicked man, he is also a fool. He doesn’t understand that she is his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. After all, he acted unintentionally. Why does he bring a sin-offering? Because he acted unintentionally. And what was he mistaken about? He didn’t know that she was his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. He didn’t know that it is forbidden to have relations with one’s sister, one’s father’s sister, one’s mother’s sister. It doesn’t matter. In any case, he is liable for three sin-offerings. From where does Rabbi Yitzchak derive that? How does Rabbi Yitzchak know this law? After all, he can’t live without this law — obviously he too has to know that one who has relations with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister is liable for three. From where does he know it? He derives it from an a fortiori argument. As it was taught: Rabbi Akiva said, “I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Emmaus, when they went to buy an animal for the banquet of Rabban Gamliel’s son: one who has relations with his sister…” Yes, they were going to buy an animal for the banquet, and this fellow says, wait a second — if there is the case of his sister, wicked man son of wicked man, with his sister who is his father’s sister and his mother’s sister, how many sin-offerings is he liable for? I’m going now to buy a calf for a wedding, why are you bothering me with this? It reminds me also of a story — there is a passage in tractate Nedarim, I think around page 50 or so. There is a wedding there of Rabbi’s daughter. So there’s a wedding, and naturally all the great and wealthy people are there — Rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And Bar Kappara comes and makes a bet with the guys. He says: “I’m going to drive Rabbi crazy now in the middle of the wedding.” He goes over to Rabbi and asks him: “What is תועבה?” He asks him a Torah question, as though regarding the verse that says תועבה. And then they start arguing there and so on. I don’t remember exactly how it ended, but he completely distracted him. He left the wedding and they started arguing there over what תועבה means. He won the bet. Rav Shmuel Rozovsky brings this story in his talks and says that this is the intoxication of Torah. Meaning, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi loved Torah so much that in the middle of his daughter’s wedding, with all the great people of the world there, the fellow asks him, “What is תועבה?” and he forgets the whole world and starts analyzing the question. Yes, that is a person who is wholly immersed in Torah; all the other matters are not the game being played in your world. So here too, they are walking to buy an animal in the market of Emmaus, and he asks them, “Tell me, what about someone who had relations with his daughter and his granddaughter and all those things?” In short, he said: is he liable for only one for all of them, or is he liable for each and every one? They said to him: this we have not heard, but we have heard that one who has relations with five menstruating women under one lapse of awareness is liable for each and every one. Yes, if he had — there is one lapse of awareness; he doesn’t know that it is forbidden to have relations with a menstruating woman, he doesn’t know that there is such a prohibition, but he has relations with five menstruating women — again, an energetic fellow. Fine? And all under the same lapse of awareness; he did not become aware in the meantime that there is a prohibition of menstruation impurity. So how many sin-offerings is he liable for? He is liable for each and every one. And this seems to follow by an a fortiori argument. If in the case of menstruation impurity, which is one name, he is liable for each and every one, then here, where there are three names, all the more so. In menstruation impurity it is one name, meaning it is the same prohibition each time — he had relations with a menstruating woman. Here in our case he violates three different prohibitions: his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. In menstruation impurity it is the same prohibition itself, only the bodies are distinct. Here it is one body with three distinct names. So he says this is an a fortiori argument. If for three bodies he is liable for three, then for three names he is certainly liable for three. Interesting a fortiori argument. Why is it an a fortiori argument? Notice, he performs one act of intercourse involving three names, and it is more obvious that there he should be liable for three than in the case of three separate acts of intercourse with the same name, only with distinct bodies, where there would be more reason to say he should be liable for one for three separate acts of intercourse. That’s a bit strange, no? So the Talmud says: and the other view says, the a fortiori argument is refutable. What is the comparison to menstruation impurity, where the bodies are distinct? In menstruation impurity you have three acts of intercourse. But in the case of his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister, it is one act of intercourse. The lady wears three hats, but it is one act of intercourse. Therefore there are arguments in both directions. And the other side too — this is certainly a refutable a fortiori argument. In fact, he also agrees that three distinct bodies is more significant, but he derives it from the later mention of one’s sister. And the other side — why do I need the later mention of one’s sister, to write “one’s sister, daughter of his father or daughter of his mother”? To say that one does not derive punishments by logical inference. And the other side — if you want, say that he derives punishment from warning. The next part we will learn in future lectures, the principle that one does not derive punishments by logical inference and those things. Right now I want to focus on the first part.

So look, first maybe some general introduction. There is a Mishnah in tractate Sabbath in the chapter “A Great Principle.” The Mishnah says: “A great principle was stated regarding the Sabbath: anyone who forgets the very essence of Sabbath and performs many labors on many Sabbaths is liable for only one sin-offering.” “One who forgets the very essence of Sabbath” means he does not know at all that there is such a thing as Sabbath in the Torah. Sabbath is the seventh day; there is day one, day two, day three, day seven — he says it is all the same as every other weekday. He does not know at all that the Sabbath day has any special status. He performed many labors on many Sabbaths, meaning he violated many different primary categories of labor on each Sabbath, and he is liable for only one sin-offering. “One who knows the principle of Sabbath and performs many labors on many Sabbaths is liable for each and every Sabbath.” How is this case understood? He knows that there is a law of Sabbath in the Torah. What does he not know? Meaning, he does not know the different labors of the Sabbath, and he performed many labors on many Sabbaths, and he is liable for each and every Sabbath. And what about each and every labor?

[Speaker C] Ah, in that case, why is he not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why isn’t he liable for each and every labor? Why only for each Sabbath? Because he doesn’t know the labors. Ah — so it’s not that he doesn’t know the labors; he knows the labors, he just doesn’t know that today is Sabbath. So he has one lapse of awareness that is responsible for all the labors he violated on that Sabbath. The next Sabbath is another lapse of awareness; he doesn’t know that the next Sabbath is also Sabbath. Therefore the number of his sin-offerings is equal to the number of Sabbaths, not connected to how many labors he did. Okay. The third case: “One who knows that it is Sabbath” — and from this definition we clearly understand that in the previous case he didn’t know that it was Sabbath — “and he knows the principle of Sabbath, and he also knows that today is Sabbath, but he does not know the labors, and he performed many labors on many Sabbaths, is liable for each primary category of labor.” But not for each Sabbath. For each primary category of labor — no matter how many Sabbaths he violated — one sin-offering. Fine? “One who performs many labors all of one type is liable for only one sin-offering,” and that does not change.

What do we see here in the Mishnah? We have cases of different prohibitions such that if committed intentionally, they incur extirpation, and if committed unintentionally, they incur a sin-offering. And we usually understand that when you commit a transgression unintentionally, then you are liable — you really committed a transgression, yes, but your guilt is reduced, so you do not deserve court-imposed punishment; instead you bring a sin-offering. Fine? But really you committed a transgression, because after all you desecrated the Sabbath, only your guilt is lessened or something like that. If that were the situation, then why, if he does not know that today is Sabbath and he performed several primary categories of labor, is he liable for one sin-offering? Right? Why? After all, he committed several transgressions, right? Distinct transgressions, and he also knows — so these are several transgressions and he knows the difference: this is sorting, this is trapping, this is gathering sheaves, sewing, and so on. He knows all the primary categories of labor; he just didn’t know that today is Sabbath.

[Speaker D] So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t know, so therefore he acted unintentionally — I understand. But why does that one unintentional error bring one sin-offering rather than seventeen? He performed seventeen primary categories of labor on that Sabbath.

[Speaker D] Is the idea…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is the conception that the actions themselves are acts of transgression, only you are not liable for punishment because you acted unintentionally? Fine? Okay, then bring seventeen sin-offerings. Why one sin-offering? Because there was only one error here. So the number of sin-offerings reflects the number of errors. That’s the rule. Fine? The number of sin-offerings reflects the number of errors. How many errors did he have when he performed all those labors on the same Sabbath? One error: he did not know that today is Sabbath. Therefore he brings one sin-offering. Meaning that the number of sin-offerings — sorry — is not determined by the number of transgressive acts he performed but by the number of errors. Fine? That is basically the rule that emerges from the Mishnah.

Now, when you go back to the Mishnah in the three cases, you’ll see that it all fits. Look how many errors he has — that is the number of sin-offerings he brings. If he does not know the very essence of Sabbath, then all the labors on all the Sabbaths he performed all stemmed from one error: he simply doesn’t know that there are Sabbath prohibitions in the Torah. So he brings only one sin-offering. If he doesn’t know that today is Sabbath, but he performed several primary categories of labor, and the same thing happened the next Sabbath, then he has two errors, one for this Sabbath and one for the next Sabbath, right? And the labors are within the same error, so he brings two sin-offerings. Okay. If he doesn’t know that today is Sabbath and also doesn’t know that labors are forbidden — or let’s say he doesn’t know that these particular labors are forbidden, but he knows that today is Sabbath — then he will bring according to the number of labors he performed, right? Meaning, everything is determined by the number of errors. The number of errors determines the number of sin-offerings. Fine, that’s the rule. What does that really mean? Now we have to count — how do you count errors? How many errors does he have? Okay? On the face of it, I would say: let’s see how many items of information he lacks. If he lacks two items of information, that’s two errors, two sin-offerings. If he lacks thirty items of information, that’s thirty sin-offerings. Fine? But in the Talmud they talk about distinct bodies and distinct names, here in our passage. What does “distinct bodies” mean? Let’s say he has relations with a menstruating woman, and afterward with another menstruating woman and another menstruating woman, all under one lapse of awareness. Meaning he didn’t know that it is forbidden to have relations with a menstruating woman. Fine? Because if regarding each one he didn’t know that she was menstruating, then of course it’s three sin-offerings, right? Those are three different errors. But if he doesn’t know that there is such a thing as menstruation impurity in the world, and he has relations with three menstruating women, okay? Then seemingly he should bring one sin-offering. But the Talmud says there are distinct bodies. If these are three women, then he brings three sin-offerings even though it is under one lapse of awareness. And that is problematic. So if the number of lapses of awareness determines the number of errors, then here there was one lapse of awareness. He didn’t know that it is forbidden to have relations with a menstruating woman. Okay? So why does he…

[Speaker E] What? If he had relations with the same woman several times?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so. I haven’t checked, but I think so. Because if the knowledge issue is that he doesn’t know the prohibition of menstruation impurity, not that he doesn’t know that she is menstruating — yes, if he doesn’t know that she is menstruating, then that is one lapse of awareness. But if he doesn’t know that there is a prohibition of menstruation impurity, that is something else, because bodies divide. Meaning, when there are distinct bodies, then from our perspective it is as though he really has three missing items of information. There is a prohibition against relations with her, a prohibition against relations with her, and a prohibition against relations with her. When the bodies are distinct, this is considered like three errors.

Now look at our case, for example — someone who has relations with his sister who is also his father’s sister and his mother’s sister. Here there are no distinct bodies; it is the same woman. Right? But how many lapses of awareness are there? It depends what he didn’t know. If he didn’t know these three prohibitions — he didn’t know that it was forbidden for him to have relations with his sister, with his father’s sister, and with his mother’s sister — then that is three lapses of awareness. Right? Three lapses of awareness. So if there are three lapses of awareness, he needs to bring three sin-offerings even though there was one action here. This is what is called “names divide.” The names of the prohibition divide, meaning these are different prohibitions. Fine? “Bodies are distinct” means: the same prohibition under the same lapse of awareness, but you did it with different bodies. Okay? Now we want to examine the meaning of this division by bodies. In the Talmud they are basically discussing that he is liable for each and every one. Here that is obvious: the names divide, the bodies divide, so obviously he is liable for each and every one. Right, at first they did speak that way. Look at this Talmud passage. Rabbi Yochanan said that if he did all of them under one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one. What does that mean? He had relations with forbidden relatives, yes? So he is liable for each forbidden relative. Why? Because both the bodies divide and the names divide, right? Different forbidden relatives are also different prohibitions and also distinct bodies — different women. Okay? Now Rabbi Yitzchak asks, and the Rabbis too — the Rabbis say: why do I need extirpation in the case of one’s sister? To make him liable for his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister. Again, his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister are actually three bodies and three names, right? So that’s obvious. After all, the bodies are distinct and the names are distinct. There is both division by bodies and division by names, so of course he is liable for three — that’s called three. So he says: rather, to make him liable for his sister who is his father’s sister who is his mother’s sister. Here we are talking about one body and three names. Right? One body and three names. Now the question is: how much is he liable for? It says here: liable for three. Meaning that division by names is enough; you don’t need both division by bodies and division by names, as we saw above. That is the novelty. Yes, according to Rabbi Yitzchak in the case of one’s sister, you do not need both bodies and names to divide; one body with divided names is enough and he is still liable for three. Okay? And then the Talmud asks: from where does Rabbi Yitzchak know this? It is learned by an a fortiori argument. Fine? Rabbi Akiva asks Rabban Gamliel — the a fortiori argument from menstruating women. What happens there? There the names do not divide; only the bodies do. It is five women but all under the prohibition of menstruation impurity. Right? So if they are all under the prohibition of menstruation impurity, then only the bodies divide, not the names. And there too he is liable for five. So if when bodies divide and the name is the same he is liable for five, then when the body is the same body but the names divide, all the more so he should be liable. Fine? So we descended from a case where both bodies and names divide to a case where only bodies divide or only names divide. Either-or. Yes. And now the whole remaining question is a smaller one: which is more obvious? Can one make an a fortiori argument from divided bodies to divided names, or not? Right, that is basically the question in the Talmud.

Now, since they raised it as an a fortiori argument, they assumed that if bodies divide, then names certainly divide. What is the idea behind that? After all, “names divide” means that I performed one act of intercourse. And yet it is more obvious that there I should be liable for three sin-offerings than in the case where I performed three separate acts of intercourse. And indeed, yes — that seems to be the Talmud’s direction. Why? Because the sin-offerings are brought for what was hidden from me. Here three prohibitions were hidden from me, so I am liable for three sin-offerings. In the case of menstruating women, only the prohibition of menstruation impurity was hidden from me. Why should I care that these are three different women? The bodies divide — so what? From the perspective of the lapse of awareness, there is only one lapse of awareness regarding menstruation impurity, so what if the bodies divide? Again, this is an indication that the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness, right? The number of errors determines the number of sin-offerings. But then the Talmud says: no, what are you talking about? There the bodies divide. And suddenly the Talmud retreats and says, wait — no, there is no such a fortiori argument, that if bodies create several sin-offerings then names certainly create several sin-offerings. No. Because there there is division by bodies, while here he did one act of intercourse and there three acts of intercourse. Then indeed he agrees there is such an a fortiori argument and learns something else from it.

Now, the fact that he accepted this refutation — does that leave us with a conclusion about which is more severe? Division by bodies or division by names? Which is more severe in the conclusion? None? Then why does he accept that the a fortiori argument has fallen? Seemingly because the bodies are distinct — that is the conclusion, no? That bodies divide more than names. Because when you want to learn by an a fortiori argument from bodies to names, in the end all the sages agree that you cannot learn that a fortiori argument, because it could be that bodies require three but names maybe do not. So bodies divide more than names.

Do you understand what lies behind these things? What lies behind them is the question whether you really bring the sin-offering for the transgression you committed, the act of transgression you committed — only because it was unintentional, therefore it is a sin-offering and not the punishment of extirpation. Okay? But the sin-offering itself — what do you bring it for? For the act. And therefore, if there are three bodies here, then obviously you bring three sin-offerings; there are three acts of transgression. But when you have relations with one woman who bears three names of prohibition, you performed one act of transgression. So bring only one sin-offering, because the sin-offering comes for the acts. By contrast, what does the initial a fortiori argument assume? That the sin-offering comes for the lapses of awareness, not for the acts. And when he had relations with three menstruating women under one lapse of awareness, there was only one lapse of awareness. But if he had relations with his sister, his father’s sister, and his mother’s sister, he has three lapses of awareness, three different prohibitions that he did not know. Therefore he must bring three sin-offerings. So the dilemma in the Talmud is over what one brings a sin-offering for. Do we bring a sin-offering for the act of transgression that I committed, only there is a condition that I be unintentional, because if I were intentional I would be liable for punishment and not for a sin-offering? But basically the sin-offering is for the act. Or does the sin-offering come for the lapse of awareness and not for the act? Then of course if I have three lapses of awareness, even if it is one act, I bring three sin-offerings.

I’ll refine it a bit. No one claims it is simply the act or simply the lapse of awareness, end of story. As with every Brisker-type conceptual analysis, these simplistic formulations never hold up. The question is — obviously both are needed: you need an act and a lapse of awareness. The question is whether the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness, but only a lapse of awareness that found expression in an act brings a sin-offering. Suppose the prohibition of menstruation impurity was hidden from me, but I didn’t have relations with anyone. I just didn’t study the passage; I don’t know. Am I liable for a sin-offering? No, right? And even someone who says that the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness will not say that if there is a lapse of awareness, I am liable for a sin-offering. The lapse of awareness has to find expression in an act, right? Only then do I bring a sin-offering. But the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness. The act is only a condition. If the lapse of awareness found expression in practical failure, then that lapse of awareness makes me liable for a sin-offering. And the sin-offering comes for the lapse of awareness, but of course on condition that it be realized in an act. Okay? That’s one side.

The second side begins to sound very similar, but it’s still not the same. What does it mean? The second side says no, no — the sin-offering comes for the act. But if I had been intentional, then it would be extirpation, not a sin-offering. If I am unintentional, that is the condition for becoming liable for a sin-offering. But what am I liable for the sin-offering on account of? The act. Not the error, okay? The error is a condition making it not a punishment, a lenient condition, so that it is not punishment but a sin-offering. But what is the sin-offering brought for? Not for the error. It is brought for the act. Okay? Notice, we started with the question whether the sin-offering is brought for the lapse of awareness or for the act, and now it is more subtle. On both sides you need both a lapse of awareness and an act. Right? The whole question is only which is what creates liability and which is the condition. Is what creates liability the lapse of awareness, with only the condition that it be realized in an act? Or is what creates liability the act, with only the condition that it be done under a lapse of awareness? Okay? That is basically — and it seems to me that this is the dilemma in the Talmud. Which is more severe than which? Division by bodies or division by names. That is really the discussion. The discussion is whether one brings it for the lapse of awareness and the act is only a condition, or whether one brings it for the act and the lapse of awareness is only a condition. Okay? That is really the practical implication. It’s not exactly a practical implication; it’s more a matter of interpretive significance, a question of whether one can derive it by an a fortiori argument to another place. In the end there is no actual practical implication here, because both bodies divide and names divide. I’m only saying that the question of which of them is more severe for the purpose of that a fortiori derivation really reflects a very fundamental dispute: what is a sin-offering? What is a sin-offering brought for?

I’ll sharpen this a little more. It seems that the Talmud says: someone intended to eat pig meat and ended up eating lamb meat — he needs atonement. Fine? Someone intended to eat lamb and ended up eating pig meat — what is that? Unintentional sin. Right? And so that’s unintentional sin; here there is no sin-offering because pig meat incurs only lashes, not extirpation. But in principle he transgressed unintentionally. He committed a transgression unintentionally. But someone intended to eat pig meat and ended up with lamb — what about him? Clearly he is exempt. Both are exempt. But is it the same status as someone who intended to eat lamb and ended up with pig meat? Notice: someone who intended to eat lamb and ended up with pig meat performed an act of transgression; he ate pig meat. He is not guilty — or not fully guilty — because he acted unintentionally. Okay? Someone who intended to eat pig meat and ended up with lamb did not perform any act of transgression at all; he didn’t eat pig meat. Right? He intended. Okay, intention is nice, but what does that have to do with transgressions? And the Talmud says that he needs atonement. What does “needs atonement” mean? On the plain level, it means something like this: there is really no transgression here, not even an unintentional transgression. He didn’t eat pig meat. What transgression does he have? Under what heading did he violate anything? If you want to say someone committed a transgression, tell me under what heading. Eating pig meat? He didn’t eat pig meat. A transgression of bad thoughts? There is no transgression of bad thoughts. Huh? “Do not stray”? Okay, interesting comment, although “do not stray” in the plain sense is only about sexual immorality and heresy. What? Is there really such a prohibition in the legal code? Not in the count of commandments, no. Yes — no, why it is bad is obvious, I don’t need explanations for that. I’m only saying that the Talmud itself says he needs atonement. What does “needs atonement” mean? Plainly it does not mean that he violated a prohibition, unintentionally or otherwise. No — there is no prohibition here; he didn’t eat pig meat. Okay?

Now the Brisker Rav wants to make a very interesting claim. He wants to say: this is an actual prohibition. Someone who intended to eat pig meat and ended up with lamb transgressed the prohibition of eating pig meat. What’s the connection? There is a scriptural decree that one is not lashed for it. It’s like…

[Speaker H] Like a woman whose husband annulled her vow and she did not know, and God will forgive her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Rashi at the beginning of the portion of Mattot. It comes from that same place in the Talmud. So the Brisker Rav wants to say that he really committed a full transgression; he is just not punished. Now we have to think for a moment. Look — there is a lot of logic in what he says, even though intuitively it seems wrong to us, not sensible. It is the most sensible thing in the world. Someone intended to eat pig meat, took a piece of meat and ate it. Now it turns out that not only is he wicked, he’s also a loser — he doesn’t even know how to sin. Meaning, he took lamb instead of pig. He is no less wicked than someone who intended to eat pig and actually ate pig, right? If you ask me how wicked he is, how much he is not serving God, how much of a criminal he is — he is equally criminal, right? Only what? He didn’t succeed. His failure has nothing to do with being more righteous; he was equally wicked. Therefore, on the conceptual level, what the Brisker Rav says makes a lot of sense.

[Speaker F] Fine, I have…

[Speaker I] a thought. I want to go to the beach on the Sabbath, drive to the beach — so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t know that. If we knew, then yes, correct.

[Speaker I] So what — because of that I am…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you took it one step too far; I’ll get to that in a moment. So what I want to say is that the Brisker Rav’s words are very sensible, very sensible. I was always very puzzled by the whole justice system in the world, and also by the Israeli legal system: why do they distinguish between attempted murder and murder? What’s the difference? Someone attempted murder and failed — he missed, or his firing pin was broken and no bullet came out. He is just as wicked as the murderer. He failed for some technical reason; he didn’t succeed. So what, because of that he is less wicked? Fine, but I’m asking you logically: is he less wicked? He is equally wicked. So why should I care about the act? He is equally wicked. Do I punish him for the act? What does the act have to do with it? I punish him for being a wicked person who carried out a wicked action. That’s what we punish. He carried out a wicked action to the same degree. Think about all the prisoner deals with terrorists. “These have blood on their hands, these do not have blood on their hands.” I tear my hair out every time anew. What difference does it make whether they have blood on their hands? That one who has no blood on his hands also tried to kill, he just didn’t succeed. So what, is he more righteous than someone who tried to kill and succeeded? He is only a bigger loser, that’s all. He has exactly the same intentions, he is equally wicked. Next time he tries, he’ll probably succeed too. What difference is there between having blood on one’s hands and not? We are so mentally locked into this idea that it all seems self-evident to us. Of course, that’s attempted murder, not murder; or that one doesn’t have blood on his hands, the other does. What’s the difference? It makes no difference at all. It doesn’t depend on him at all, and it indicates nothing whatsoever about the degree of his wickedness. The problem is technical — he just didn’t succeed, that’s all. But the act he did is the same act itself. I should always punish attempted murder exactly like murder. There is no difference. Likewise — what difference is there? Now one second, and I’ll get to your question.

Fine. So if that’s the case, what if I thought of eating pig meat and didn’t eat anything? I just thought of eating pig meat. There wasn’t any pig meat, or I didn’t feel like going to look for it, but if it had been here, I would have eaten it. What about that?

[Speaker D] Thought does not combine… thought and act are not there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look, on the conceptual level — if I formulate it sharply — let’s say the person reached the point where if pig meat had been here he would have eaten it, only it just didn’t work out because there was no pig meat there. That is really just like attempted murder, right? So on the conceptual level it is the same. But in human law, and this already relates to our first series this semester, it is hard to judge that. You don’t know his mental state. How would you know whether he really decided or merely thought, or whether he even thought it at all? So obviously for such a thing we would not judge him, right? Whether that is because he is not sufficiently wicked or because we simply have no way to determine it. But practically speaking, for that we would certainly not judge him. Okay? What does that mean? It means that even when I see the thought as the wicked thing — and obviously the thought is the wicked thing, or the decision — that decision must be realized in action in order for me to punish for it, right? But that is not because I punish for the act; I punish for the evil intention you have. But only an evil intention that you were also ready to realize, and in the realization you not only were ready — you actually did realize it. It just so happens that you missed; it was lamb and not pig. Okay? Then you are punishable. So it is a transgression in every sense. A scriptural decree says you are not punished, fine, but it is a transgression in every sense. But that is only if your thought was realized. Again, not realized in the sense that you ate pig — you ate lamb, not pig. But you performed the practical action that was supposed to realize your thought. It didn’t work for reasons unrelated to you. The moment that you yourself acted on the basis of that decision, that’s it. That is a decision for which one is liable. So notice…

[Speaker G] Who says? You didn’t eat lamb, you didn’t eat pig.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says? I didn’t say — I’m observing. No, we don’t punish, but we don’t punish because it is a scriptural decree. There is a prohibition here, of course there is. The prohibition of eating pig meat — what do you mean? Of course. The prohibition of eating pig meat. I don’t understand why one would say there is no punishment.

[Speaker C] There is control over thoughts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He should have been punished. No, what do you mean “control over thoughts”? He ate — he took a piece of meat and ate it.

[Speaker I] You’re talking about before he ate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about before; I’m talking about after. That’s exactly the point. No — before, that is exactly the point: we do not punish for thought. We punish for thought — wait — only if I realized it in action. But still I’m saying that even if I realized it in action, the punishment is for the thought. But for what kind of thought do we punish? A thought that was realized in action. And here the fact that an act is needed in order to punish…

[Speaker G] You didn’t eat lamb, you didn’t eat pig.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that an act is needed in order to punish does not mean that I punish for the act; it means that I do not punish for a thought that was not realized in action. But for a thought that was realized in action, I do punish — but I punish for the thought, not for the act. Because that is a thought that preceded action, meaning you were actually prepared to act on it; it wasn’t just some thought that crossed your mind. There is no control — everyone has all kinds of thoughts. The inner decision, not just the passing thought — that is what we punish. And a decision is something that was realized in action.

[Speaker G] So a person who just happened to think about killing someone, just for a second it passed through his mind…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That means there is no transgression in it whatsoever. You also have no control over thoughts; it is nothing. If you decided to kill, only the firing pin was broken, then basically you are a murderer. Fine? On the conceptual level, in terms of degree of wickedness, you are fully a murderer. Okay?

[Speaker E] It’s a technical problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So I’m bringing this up in order to — well, maybe one more side remark now that we’ve entered this issue, about the theory of punishment. Yes, I said in the theory of punishment I don’t understand why you need the result of the act. You need realization in action, but not that the action actually achieve the result. Let’s say if you pulled the trigger, that for me is realization. Even if the firing pin was broken and the bullet never came out and you didn’t kill anyone. Because it is obvious that you already performed an act of murder. Meaning, the thought was realized as far as you were concerned; it found practical expression. The fact that in the end it didn’t happen has nothing to do with you.

[Speaker G] Not the result you intended, only the act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You need the act, not the result. Yes, exactly. If it was realized in action, then yes. Right. So first of all I say that attempt and completed act should be punished the same. I’ll go further than that. Even the level of punishment, in my opinion at least — this is a side point unrelated to us, but since we’re talking about it — if we’re already in it, so not to leave it half-done. In terms of the severity of punishment, in my opinion it also should not be tied to the severity of the act. Let’s say someone abused his wife, but not severely; he only beat her a little, he didn’t kill her, fine? So okay, he’ll go to prison for a year, not life imprisonment. Okay? After a year he comes out and beats her again. What is the logic? What is the logic of releasing him after a year? There is no logic at all. I claim that the length of imprisonment should not be a function of the severity of the offense, but of the future danger you pose. It should not at all be tied to the severity of the act. I think our whole theory of punishment is warped. It should not be a function at all of the severity of the act, but should be a function of the risk you present. Let’s say someone stole one shekel. In my opinion he should go to prison for life and never see daylight again. Why? Because if I release him — one second — he will go on stealing one shekel. So each time I’ll give him a week in prison; he’ll steal another shekel; I’ll give him another week in prison…

[Speaker B] prison, and he’ll steal another shekel. What are you talking about? As long as there is a concern that he’ll steal one shekel, prevent it in advance — put him in prison in advance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly.

[Speaker B] It’s like the law of the pursuer. I kill him instead of waiting for him to kill the other person and then punishing him for being a murderer. I kill him now and don’t let him murder. Okay? It’s preventive punishment. Right, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean “not right”? You claim — I claim that punishment should be prevention. I claim that punishment should, first of all, be prevention. The punishment as retribution is an additional thing. Meaning, it could be that even if in terms of prevention there is no longer a need to punish him, I would still punish him as retribution, okay? As retribution for what he did. But prevention is certainly a necessary condition, even if not a sufficient one. Meaning, as long as he presents a danger, he should be in prison. It doesn’t matter whether it is a danger of stealing one shekel, of hitting someone, or of murder. What difference does it make? Anything that is a transgression and that you would punish if it were carried out — if there is concern it will be carried out, he remains in prison until he convinces the parole board that he has rehabilitated and is no longer dangerous, and so on. Of course you can never really know, but we make the best estimate we can. Fine?

[Speaker J] Would you give life imprisonment for every transgression?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, yes. Obviously. But he might get out next week if he has really changed… No, then the chance that he will do it again… truly some action that prevents him from doing it again, if there is concern he will do it again. But unintentional sin usually is not something that repeats. Intentional sin is something that repeats, because you do it because you decided to do it. But I’m saying, in principle, that’s true too. Meaning, as long as he poses danger, it’s like the law of the pursuer. Everyone who poses danger has the status of a pursuer. That’s all. Fine, I’m closing the parenthesis — just to complete my critique of our theory of punishment.

In any case, for our purposes, what do we see here? Why did I bring all these examples? Because you see the same idea that we also see here. The punishment is really punishment for what happened in your mind. True, realization in action is required, because only if it was realized in action do we punish you for your mental act. A mere mental act we do not punish; only if it was realized in action. The same in unintentional sin. In unintentional sin, I said there are two sides: either I punish for the act, and the act is really a transgression, except that because you were unintentional it is not ordinary punishment but a sin-offering. Or not — I punish for the error in the matter, for the lapse of awareness. That is what I punish, or what creates liability for a sin-offering. But then again, I do not impose a sin-offering for just any lapse of awareness. If I forgot that sorting is forbidden on the Sabbath, am I immediately liable for a sin-offering? No. If I forgot that sorting is forbidden on the Sabbath and as a result actually sorted, then I am liable for a sin-offering. But the fact that I need an act does not mean that I punish for the act. I punish for the lapse of awareness — only a lapse of awareness that was realized in action is one for which we punish and one that incurs a sin-offering. Exactly like what I said about someone who intended to eat pig and ended up eating lamb.

So if that is so, we have two possible ways to understand liability for the sin-offering. And now I want to ask you about practical implications. Look, we know that if a person sinned unintentionally — we saw this in the Mishnah in tractate Sabbath — then the number of sin-offerings he brings…

[Speaker C] is equal to the number of lapses of awareness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right?