A Look at Torah and Torah Study – Lesson 23 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Until now, basically, I was dealing more with the definition of what Torah is — the person-focused sense, the object-focused sense, Jewish law, and the other fields. And now, at the end of the previous session, I started moving over to the question of what learning is. Because when we want to define “Torah study,” we have to define both what Torah is and what learning is. It could be that we’re dealing with Torah, but it’s not learning. It could be that we’re learning, but what we’re learning is not Torah. And in order to define something as Torah study, we have to define both what Torah is and what learning is. So I tried to define what Torah is; now let’s see for a moment what learning is. So last time we began with the topic of “one benefits and the other does not lose.” Let me share that here for a second. Right, so we had — I’ll remind you of the opening of the topic. He said to him, Rav Hisda said to Rami bar Hama: לא הוית גבן באורתא בתחומא דאיבעיא לן מילי מעלייתא — you weren’t with us in the evening at the study area when we raised some excellent matters. Right, you missed out, there was a real experience in the study hall, we did amazing things, too bad you weren’t there — that’s what he says to Rami bar Hama. So immediately Rami bar Hama asks: מאי מילי מעלייתא? What? Tell me a little, what was going on there? He said to him: If someone lives in another person’s courtyard without his knowledge, does he have to pay rent or not? היכי דמי — what exactly is the case? If we say it is a courtyard that is not meant to be rented and a person who is not looking to rent, that is one who does not benefit and the other does not lose. But if it is a courtyard meant to be rented and a person who would otherwise rent, that is one benefits and the other loses. So in those two cases there’s no question, right? It must be referring to a courtyard not meant to be rented and a person who would otherwise rent. What can the owner say to him? This is a case where one benefits and the other does not lose. What can he say to him — what loss did I cause you? Or perhaps he can say: but you benefited. Right, basically the Talmud is discussing the case where I moved into your courtyard without your permission, and the question is whether I have to pay you. So the Talmud asks: what are we talking about? If I don’t have a place to live — meaning I gained something from moving in — then I benefited. If I do have a place to live, then I didn’t benefit. Right, that’s the distinction between a person who would otherwise rent and one who would not. And what about the courtyard — is it meant to be rented out? Meaning, were you planning to rent it, so that my moving in caused you a loss? Then that means you lost something. If not, then you didn’t lose. So the Talmud says: if we’re talking about a case where I benefited and you lost, then obviously I have to pay. If we’re talking about a case where you didn’t lose and I didn’t benefit, then obviously I don’t have to pay. So where is the discussion? Only in the case where one benefits — I benefited — and you did not lose, and then the question arises whether payment is required. That’s what he missed in the study hall. What? I don’t know whether that’s most cases, but that was the case they discussed. There’s no rule that we only discuss common cases. Sometimes they discuss something that will never happen. That doesn’t matter. So the question I asked last time was: what is so fascinating here? What is different about this topic from any other? And I said that what’s happening here in the Talmud is a kind of analytic inquiry, in the style of the later authorities. Think of a passage from Rabbi Chaim, where Rabbi Chaim says: we must consider whether, when one pays, one is paying for the benefit, or whether one is paying for the loss. There are two factors here, benefit and loss, and the question is which of them is the ground that obligates me to pay. Then Rabbi Chaim would say: look, in a case where there is benefit and there is loss, there’s no practical difference — whether the obligation stems from the benefit or from the loss, one has to pay. If there is no benefit and no loss, again there’s no practical difference, because whether it stems from benefit or from loss, in both directions one doesn’t have to pay. Where can there be a practical difference in our inquiry? Only in a case where one benefits and the other does not lose. And I also said that the Rif and Tosafot discuss the opposite case as well: one does not benefit and the other does lose — that too is a practical difference. But in the Talmud the practical difference that appears is one benefits and the other does not lose, and therefore that is the question, and from there they begin to clarify it. Okay? So what is all the excitement? I’m saying the excitement is that what seems obvious to us today — this sort of inquiry in the style of the later authorities, this analytic breakdown of concepts, this attempt to define two legal categories, find distinctions between them and practical differences between them — that’s our daily bread. We do this all the time. Every child does this. Okay? In the Talmud this was not something trivial. Meaning, when they suddenly encountered this kind of Rabbi Chaim move, it stirred excitement in them.

[Speaker B] It was like, wow, you really missed out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly — wow, you missed out, yes, you missed some wonderful analysis, some beautiful analytic move that in their time just wasn’t how people usually worked. Okay, what? A return to itself? Is that a whole method?

[Speaker B] So I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, you find it in very particular places, but very little.

[Speaker B] Right, right, that it really is beautiful to do this kind of analysis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but today, let’s say, if you learned this topic and then learned any other topic, you wouldn’t be impressed specifically by this one. Because in all topics we do this kind of analysis. There’s nothing special about this particular topic. What’s special here is not the subject but the method the Talmud used — which for us is the standard method; actually, if anything, it’s relatively primitive. We do it in a much more sophisticated way. And I gave the example — or at least mentioned it — of Maimonides’ “wonderful point.” Remember? What is the “wonderful point”? “And in these words of ours there is a wonderful point, and we will shed light on it, because it is a key to other matters besides the precision of analysis contained in it.” Fine? There’s something here that enormously excites Maimonides — this wonderful point, this precision of analysis, and it’s a root for many things. I think at the end, after he finishes, if I remember correctly he also says that it seems to him no one preceded him in this matter. And that’s why I say it really excites him. I don’t see it here; maybe it’s in the section I skipped. In any case, what’s the issue? He says that regarding the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition, he asks why the prohibition of meat cooked with milk should not take effect on top of the prohibition of forbidden fat. I take forbidden fat, which is prohibited to eat — a type of meat that is prohibited to eat — mix it with milk and cook it with milk. Fine. Now I eat it. So one prohibition does not take effect on another, and basically the only prohibition here is the prohibition of forbidden fat; there is no prohibition of meat cooked with milk. Maimonides asks: why not? After all, the prohibition of meat cooked with milk includes both eating and deriving benefit. And in a case of a more inclusive prohibition, the second prohibition can take effect on the first, because the second one is broader, so it does take effect. So that’s his question. And then he answers: meat cooked with milk is prohibited for benefit only because Scripture prohibited its eating, according to the rule we explained — that anything prohibited for eating is also prohibited for benefit unless Scripture specifies otherwise. And there is no separate verse prohibiting its eating and another separate verse prohibiting benefit from it; rather, both are one prohibition of meat cooked with milk. And since we said one prohibition does not take effect on another, therefore the prohibition of meat cooked with milk will not take effect upon the prohibition of carrion — or forbidden fat, doesn’t matter — and therefore it will not become prohibited for benefit, but rather will remain permitted for benefit, and one who eats it is lashed only because of carrion, and the prohibition of meat cooked with milk drops away entirely because it never took effect. What is he saying? He’s saying that the prohibition of eating and deriving benefit in meat cooked with milk is basically a prohibition of eating. It’s just that there is a rule that anything prohibited for eating is also prohibited for benefit unless Scripture says otherwise, as Scripture did in the case of carrion. Fine? But otherwise, if Scripture doesn’t specify, then whatever is prohibited for eating is also prohibited for benefit. If so, then he says: when I now discuss a case where I eat carrion cooked with milk, and I ask whether beyond the prohibition of carrion there is also a prohibition of meat cooked with milk, he says the prohibition of meat cooked with milk is first and foremost a prohibition of eating. And if it were only a prohibition of eating, then it would not take effect on the prohibition of carrion, because it has the same scope of prohibition; it is not more inclusive, not broader, so it doesn’t take effect. Once the prohibition of eating does not take effect, then the prohibition of benefit also never arises, because the prohibition of benefit is derived from the prohibition of eating. You don’t analyze this as one broad prohibition of both eating and benefit together; rather, it’s a prohibition of eating from which a prohibition of benefit branches out. But if the prohibition of eating cannot take effect on this prohibition, then once there is no prohibition of eating, there is also no prohibition of benefit to branch out from. And then there is nothing — there will be neither a prohibition of eating nor a prohibition of benefit. Okay, fine, we’ve already heard more brilliant insights than that, right? No, it’s fine, it’s nice, but okay — what? I would be embarrassed to give a lecture that was only that. What is all this excitement — “a wonderful point” and “no one preceded me” and so on? Again, it’s the same thing: the form of conceptual analysis we’re used to wasn’t there then. You have to get used to that. Okay, fine, that’s less important for our purposes. What matters for our purposes is that I’m going back to the topic of “one benefits and the other does not lose.” So I’m saying this: Rami bar Hama asks him what happened, tell me what was there. So Rav Hisda tells him about this inquiry of “one benefits and the other does not lose.” Rami bar Hama says to him: מתניתין היא — it’s an explicit Mishnah. What, are you making fun of me? You’re busy with conceptual hairsplitting and analysis and Brisker-style distinctions and all that — there’s an explicit Mishnah. What? Somebody once asked a question on Tosafot and said: listen, nobody knew how to answer this, and what do you say, Rabbi? He was speaking to Rabbi Chaim. So Rabbi Chaim said to him: what question? There is no such Tosafot. There is no such Tosafot. No one managed to understand the Tosafot because there is no such Tosafot. So they went to a book, opened it, and sure enough saw there is no such Tosafot. He had made a mistake, he hadn’t read it correctly — there is no such Tosafot. So he said to him: tell me, how did you remember? I just saw the Tosafot now — do you really remember all the Tosafot in the entire Talmud like that? He said: of course not. Tosafot can’t say something that silly. It was obvious it wasn’t right; I knew that a priori. Okay? In other words, sometimes you don’t need to check that there is no such Tosafot — it’s obvious there can’t be such a Tosafot. And on the other hand, sometimes you do all kinds of intricate argumentation, but the truth is there just is no such Tosafot, so why are you arguing? Okay? So here he tells them: there is such a Tosafot — it’s an explicit Mishnah! You’re giving me all these conceptual inquiries and learning and analysis — there’s an explicit Mishnah! Why are you splitting hairs? Splitting hairs. So Rav Hisda is stunned. The whole study hall, all the lions and sharp debaters, are there going through this issue of “one benefits and the other does not lose,” and he says: there’s an explicit Mishnah! What, nobody there knows Mishnah? How could we have missed this? So he says: הי מתניתין? Which Mishnah are you talking about? He said to him: לכי תשמש לי — first serve me before I answer you; I won’t answer for free. Serve me, attend to me, and then I’ll answer you. שקל סודרא כרך ליה — he took his scarf and wrapped it for him, as if to serve him. And then he said to him: “If it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received.” That’s the Mishnah in that very topic. Meaning, a cow that fell onto fruits — it does not have to pay as direct damage in the public domain, but if it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received. That’s what the Mishnah says. So what do we see? That in a case where one benefits and the other does not lose, he pays, right? He is obligated to pay. Okay? What do you say? Does it sound reasonable to derive from there that one benefits and the other does not lose means liability — from that Mishnah? Why not? Because it’s in the public domain?

[Speaker B] So what? Also because it’s a cow, and the other one does lose. There’s no such Tosafot, because he loses!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It ate the fruits — he lost his fruits. So what are you learning from here to a case of “one benefits and the other does not lose”? Then Rava looks from the side at the exchange between Rav Hisda and Rami bar Hama — all of this matters, pay close attention. Rava says: how unaware and insensitive is a man whom his Master helps, for even though it is not similar to the Mishnah, he accepted it from him. So Rav Hisda basically accepted the proof that Rami bar Hama brought — are they both idiots? Don’t you see that it’s not similar? The Mishnah is a case where the other one loses! Meaning, one brings a proof and somehow misses that, and the other, who is shocked that there’s supposedly such a Mishnah, doesn’t even note that in fact there is no such Mishnah for this issue — that’s not correct; in that Mishnah the other one loses. Meaning, both of them were blinded. What happened there? That’s what it means: how unaware and insensitive is a man whom his Master helps. He had heavenly assistance, so that the first idiot didn’t notice that the second one is also an idiot. What kind of heavenly assistance did they have? Even though it is not similar to the Mishnah — it’s not at all like the Mishnah, because here we’re talking about one benefits and the other does not lose, whereas in the Mishnah the other one does lose — still, he accepted it. These people are out of their minds. So why is it not similar? He says: that case is one benefits and the other loses, and this case is one benefits and the other does not lose. What connection is there? They’re not similar. The Talmud answers: but Rami bar Hama wasn’t an idiot either, so what, he doesn’t see that the other one loses? Ordinary fruits in the public domain, he effectively abandons them. What does that mean? If you place them in the public domain, then it’s as though you abandoned them. Now that’s not true. What do you mean? Anything I place in the public domain, I’ve abandoned? If I abandoned it, then why would he have to pay me for the benefit? It’s not mine! If you benefited from something that isn’t mine, do you have to pay me? I abandoned it! So decide: is it mine or not? If it’s mine, then I lose. If it’s not mine, why is he paying? He didn’t benefit from my property at all. Make up your mind.

[Speaker C] No, if you put something in the public domain, it means you’re not yet…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, all that twilight zone stuff aside — bottom line, is it mine or not?

[Speaker C] If you lost something and haven’t despaired of recovering it, is it mine? If you despair without knowing it, is it mine?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the problem? Then it’s a loss. So what kind of answer is that? So I’ll tell you what the answer is. There’s something subtle going on here. He says that when you placed it in the public domain, it wasn’t really ownerless — because otherwise there would be nothing to pay you for. Rather, you have what in modern legal language is called contributory fault. You are partly to blame for the damage. What do you want from him to pay? You put things in the public domain, everyone passes there with their animals. Fine, you didn’t make it ownerless — but what exactly are you now suing him over? Over your own recklessness? In today’s legal world they call that contributory fault. You significantly contributed to the damage that happened here, and therefore you can’t sue him. Okay, up to here I’m not really dealing with the legal topic itself of “one benefits and the other does not lose,” but now let’s return and look at the course of the passage. All right? Now look how beautifully this whole story comes together. He says to him: look what wonderful things there were in the study hall. Fine? Yes, some brilliant analytic conceptual move. Rami bar Hama says to him: go out and learn it — there’s a Mishnah. There’s a Mishnah. He’s stunned. What Mishnah? All those sages there didn’t catch that there’s a Mishnah? Which Mishnah? So he says to him: first serve me. Why “first serve me”? Because what I’m about to tell you is subtle. It’s not self-evident. At first glance you’ll think it’s wrong. Before I tell it to you, I want to see that you value me. Serve me. Fine? If you serve me, I understand that you’ll be prepared to accept things from me even if at first glance they seem wrong. Wait, one second. So if you serve me — yes, Rav Hisda — then I know I can tell you even strange things and you won’t dismiss them out of hand. You’ll think about them, because you value me. Okay, so he served him. Then what did he tell him? He said: “If it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received” — that’s the Mishnah. Fine? Rav Hisda says, interesting, very nice, and accepts it. Rava looks from the side and says: what, don’t you see? The Mishnah is not similar at all. How could you keep quiet? Right? What’s the difference between them? The difference is that Rav Hisda had served Rami bar Hama, while Rava had not. And that is why Rami bar Hama demanded that Rav Hisda serve him, because he knew that if he didn’t, he would react like Rava — he wouldn’t accept it. Now why not? Because at first glance it really is strange. How do we know? Because we see it. The Talmud itself says it — after all, this is a case of loss. Didn’t you notice? Now it’s so strange that obviously Rami bar Hama himself noticed; it can’t be that he missed such a simple point. So what then? He has an answer. But the answer itself is very tricky. He says: fruits placed in the public domain are effectively abandoned. What does that mean? If you haven’t served him, you say: what nonsense are you talking — effectively abandoned? If he abandoned them, then why should anyone pay? Those fruits aren’t yours. I have to pay you for benefiting from fruits that aren’t yours? You abandoned them. Right? And if you didn’t abandon them, then the other one loses. In short, you’re talking nonsense. That’s what Rava thought about Rami bar Hama. But Rav Hisda, who had served Rami bar Hama, heard something that sounded odd at first sight — but Rami bar Hama isn’t someone you dismiss, right? He’s a Torah scholar. So you have to think for a moment. And Rav Hisda did think, and he understood the answer. He understood that “effectively abandoned” means contributory fault, not actual abandonment. And therefore he accepted it. Exactly — therefore he accepted it. And Rava, who is laughing at him — Rava is the one who is mistaken, because Rava hadn’t served him and didn’t bother thinking a second time about the apparently strange thing he heard from him. Now look how beautifully this closes. Why did Rami bar Hama play this game? Couldn’t he just explain what he meant? After all, he’s mocking them. “If it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received” — Rav Hisda shouldn’t have accepted such a thing, and “first serve me,” and so on. The whole story here has nothing to do with the legal issue of “one benefits and the other does not lose.” The whole story is about what Torah study is. Rami bar Hama says to him: listen, you’re telling me that you learned these conceptual things there in the study hall, like Maimonides’ “wonderful point,” all this conceptual analysis — let’s see your powers of analysis. I’m no less of an analyst than you are. I’m telling you that what you did there is settled by an explicit Mishnah. An explicit Mishnah. Rav Hisda says: which Mishnah? What are you talking about? He says: “If it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received” — almost like a riddle, a kind of mocking challenge. Rav Hisda works it through and realizes, yes, there’s something to what he’s saying. And what’s the lesson? Don’t be condescending. Rami bar Hama is no less of an analyst than you are. You thought that in your study hall you had invented the wheel — what extraordinary conceptual work you had done. So here he gave you a short lesson to explain: don’t worry, I know how to do these tricks too. Meaning, this analytic breakdown — because that is exactly what he did here. He performed a kind of analytic move just like the Talmud had done earlier. And Rava, who stood on the side and hadn’t served him, for him, yes, on the face of it, this looked like nonsense. He didn’t bother to think about it again, probably because he didn’t value him enough — and that’s all. And what happened in the end? Rava was wrong. In the end, Rava is the one who was mistaken. Okay.

Now look at the introduction of Rabbi Shimon Shkop to Sha’arei Yosher. He brings this topic. He says: “For the beginning of the preparation necessary to be worthy of acquiring Torah, the Torah required special conditions. And the first condition is labor and exertion. To understand Torah, one must labor and exert oneself. As the Sages expounded, ‘If you walk in My statutes’ — that you should labor in Torah.” And the other matters required for acquiring Torah — yes, the chapter on acquiring Torah in Avot, the forty-eight qualities by which Torah is acquired. “And behold, I, whom God in His compassion placed among those who labor with the community…” I continue reading: “In the year 5644 I was called by my elderly uncle Rabbi Eliezer Gordon to teach students in the yeshiva in Telz, and in the year 5665 to the city of Maltsh, in 5667 to the city of Briansk, and afterward to Horodna,” which is Grodno, basically. “And I merited to draw after me the hearts of those who heard my teaching in all those places where Torah was spread, all of which was not according to my deeds and not according to my talents, but only by virtue of ‘you shall surely tithe,’ as we wrote — that from my youth until now my times have been tithed for myself and for those who hear my teaching.” Okay — I was blessed by the Holy One, blessed be He, because I invested time in students and in others; tithe so that you may become wealthy. It’s not by my own merit. Now he continues: “Therefore I hope that also in publishing this book of mine to spread it to the public, the Good and Beneficent One will graciously enable me to draw the hearts of those who labor in depth of Jewish law to study it and add understanding, and may my portion be with them forever.” And now begins the section important for our purposes: “And I know that this book of mine will not be accepted by all.” I have a friend in Bnei Brak who says to me: it’s crooked gates, not gates of uprightness. That’s what he says. I disagree with him completely — to my mind this book is truly magnificent. But if someone… well, that’s probably because he never served Rabbi Shimon Shkop. So he says: “And I know that this book of mine will not be accepted by all, because many learners have not become accustomed to analyzing in the manner of study that proceeds and turns through most of the matters said in this book of mine.” Yes, the style of analysis I use in this book — many are not used to it. Even those who studied with Rabbi Chaim, who was his teacher and colleague, are not used to the type of analysis in Sha’arei Yosher. It’s a different kind of analysis: more demanding, harder, broader, much longer. Rabbi Chaim usually has short pieces. So he says: “For there are many paths in Torah, and each person finds taste according to his habit. And in addition, most of the matters explained in it are matters that require analysis and exertion in the book, and will not be grasped even by an understanding heart at a mere glance.” Meaning, even someone who knows how to analyze will look at it at first glance and say: what nonsense. “And not every person wishes to attribute the deficiency to himself because of the depth of the concept and the limitation of the one grasping it.” When you see something that looks absurd, you don’t tend to say: all right, apparently I’m not clever enough to understand, and he’s a great genius and what he said is probably true. You don’t like to attribute it to his wisdom and your own stupidity, right? “And I heard a nice and acceptable explanation in the name of my late brother-in-law Rabbi Shlomo Zalman of Telz, regarding what is told in Bava Kamma, in the topic of ‘one benefits and the other does not lose,’ that Rav Hisda asked Rami bar Hama and he answered him, ‘First serve me,’ and he took a scarf and wrapped it for him — which at first sight is astonishing.” What are these games of “serve me” and all that? I asked you a question — answer it. “And the aforementioned rabbi explained that in a matter requiring analysis and exertion, the essential thing depends on whether the learner believes in the stature of his teacher. Then, if he does not understand the first time, he will attribute the deficiency to himself and gather the strength to exert himself more, and in the end he will understand. But if the words of his teacher are slight in his eyes and not worth his effort and toil, then if he does not accept the words at first weighing, if at first glance it doesn’t seem logical to him, he will leave them or dismiss them in his heart, and that is enough” — like with leaven on Passover, “he nullifies it in his heart, and that is enough.” “Therefore, when Rami bar Hama knew the depth of the matter he wanted to teach him” — why was it deep? We saw, because “he effectively abandons them” is not straightforward; at first glance it’s not logical — “and he did not want to teach him until it became clear to him that Rav Hisda desired to learn from him as a student from a rabbi, and therefore he did not teach him the matter until he served him as a student serves a rabbi. And the words of the wise are gracious.” That’s from his brother-in-law. What?

[Speaker B] A very clever tactic, yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s brother-in-law said.

[Speaker B] He gave him a little lesson in psychology.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then Rabbi Shimon Shkop continues and says that the main benefit is recognizing the stature of the elder and the teacher — “elder” meaning one who has acquired wisdom, of course. If the learner recognizes that it is fitting to deepen his study into the words of his teacher, then he will achieve the desired benefit, as was written. “And so too I think that only those who value my words before they have seen or heard them” — people who respect me before they even open the book — “only such people will find desire to study this book of mine, and it will seem worthwhile to them to deepen their analysis even if they do not understand it at first weighing. Then, with God’s help, they will accept my words.” But someone who doesn’t value me — in short, shouldn’t open the book. There’s no point. You’ll open the book, nothing will seem right to you, you’ll dismiss it, and that’s that. You won’t learn anything from it. Okay? That’s what he says there. The Talmud says: “If the rabbi resembles an angel of the Lord of Hosts, then seek Torah from his mouth; and if not, do not seek Torah from his mouth.” Why? Because if you value the rabbi like an angel of the Lord of Hosts, then you will seek Torah from his mouth, because when you learn something from him that you don’t understand, you’ll think about it again and see that it makes sense. By the way, later he also says that according to this there is a hint in Rabbi Yohanan’s words regarding the difference between a small student and a great student. A small student learns Torah from the teacher’s mouth. He learns from the mouth of his teacher because he is not fit to judge what to draw near and what to reject. A small student can’t know what is right and what is not, so he takes what the teacher says. But a great student, who has the ability to judge critically, does not learn Torah merely from the mouth. That’s his explanation of an aggadic statement. Likewise, one should awaken everyone who studies the books of the later authorities — like his own book, but more generally — not to learn Torah merely from their mouths. Don’t learn Torah from my mouth. Don’t make a foundation out of everything they say before you have carefully examined their words. Fine, and so on. What is he really saying? When I said that only someone who values me should open the book, I did not mean that you should accept my words as-is without thinking. On the contrary: I meant that you should analyze carefully; if something seems strange to you, keep thinking and reach your own conclusions. If you think again and again because you value me, there’s a good chance you’ll eventually discover that I did say something sensible. But if not, then reject what I say — that’s perfectly fine. I don’t expect you to accept my words just because I said them. In other words, what he said does not contradict intellectual autonomy; on the contrary, he demands intellectual autonomy. But he says it has to be intelligent intellectual autonomy. Intellectual autonomy can also mean: I don’t like what you’re saying, you’re talking nonsense. That too is intellectual autonomy. But that’s stupid autonomy, because you didn’t really seriously weigh what he said. It could be that if you think again, something will become clear to you that you did not notice at first glance. Now if after thinking again and again you reach the conclusion that it’s wrong, then go with your autonomy, say what you think, no problem. But only after you have seriously weighed other positions as well. Okay? I once told students in Yeruham that the only kind of argument you ever learn something from is one you lose. Because if it’s an argument you won, then basically the position you held at the start turned out to be correct, and you learned nothing new. In an argument you lose, you came with a certain position, and then it turns out you were mistaken. Then you learned something new. Fine? Of course, sharpening the argument you’re making is also something. But generally I’m saying: all the gain I ever get is only from what I did not know before — from where I was wrong and then improved. My view improved, or changed, and so on. Okay? That’s where I gain.

Magen Avraham writes — it’s based on a Talmudic statement — and he brings this Talmudic passage. You know the section 151 in the Shulchan Arukh, where it says, “Afterward he should go out to his business”? That’s the section. Once the morning prayer ends, all the way up to section 150 it’s the laws of morning prayer.

[Speaker C] That subsection isn’t all that well known.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That subsection isn’t all that well known. Right — they didn’t exactly run off to business. In any case, in section 151, “Afterward he should go out to his business,” Magen Avraham brings all kinds of laws there that he can’t find another place for. There are many, many laws there of various kinds that don’t have a natural place to be located. One of those laws is that one may say something in the name of a great person כי היכי דלקבלו מיניה — so that they will accept it from him. Meaning, if I want you to accept something from me, I’ll say, “Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said this,” and then you’ll accept it from me, because if I say it in my own name, you won’t accept it. That’s what the Talmud says: “If one wants to be hanged, let him hang himself on a tall tree.” That’s what it says — “If one wants to be hanged, let him hang himself on a tall tree.” That’s what Magen Avraham says. Yes, this is like Rabbi Shalom Schwadron. Rabbi Shalom Schwadron once said in the name of the Hazon Ish what Magen Avraham says. He said in the name of the Hazon Ish that one may say things in the name of a great person so that they will accept them from you. And I’m not even going to tell you whether the Hazon Ish said that either. So yes, that’s what you said before. In any case, for our purposes this is strange. Let’s say I tell someone, from my own reasoning, that one may sort on the Sabbath — just because I’m an ignoramus. And I tell him, “Yes, but Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said so,” and I’m just causing him to stumble in the laws of the Sabbath. What kind of permission is that? What logic is there in what Magen Avraham says? The answer is simple. Magen Avraham assumes that if something is told to me in the name of a great person, I do not automatically accept it. I do not accept it. Because if I did accept it automatically, then this would be forbidden — it would be causing someone to stumble. But if I don’t accept it, then why do this whole trick? You’re telling me the idea in the name of a great person in order that I should accept it. If the assumption is that I won’t accept it, then what’s the point? Exactly. The solution is what Rabbi Shimon Shkop said here. Meaning, if you say it in the name of a great person, you know that… after all, what are we talking about? Let’s say I say something to you and you look down on me — “okay, he’s an idiot, he’s not…” So now I feel I have a good argument, and you aren’t weighing it properly. That annoys me. I think you should weigh it again. Maybe you still won’t accept it, but I want you to think about it again. So I say, “Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said this,” and I’m lying to you. Why? Because I know that even if I say it in the name of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, you still won’t accept it automatically, so there’s no stumbling block here. What will I achieve? That you will think again about what I said. If you think again, maybe you’ll be convinced — maybe yes, maybe no — but I feel I’m not getting from you the proper attitude toward what I’m saying…

[Speaker B] So he blurts it out — he blurts it out — and then from his own reasoning the other person says maybe…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s the other side of the coin. The other side of the coin. So I’m saying: what I’m trying to gain here — this Magen Avraham, which on the face of it looks like the father of all those old-style traditionalists who say you have to accept things from a great person — is actually the exact opposite. What Magen Avraham says assumes precisely the opposite: that one does not accept things even if one hears them in the name of a great person. Otherwise it would be forbidden to do such a thing. It is obvious that he assumes people do not accept things even if they hear them in that name. So why say it? Because if it comes from a great person, I won’t dismiss it out of hand. I’ll weigh it again. Because maybe, yes — if I “serve” someone, if I value him, then…

[Speaker B] I’ll think again if he says it, and I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I won’t dismiss it out of hand.

[Speaker B] That’s why there is permission to say it that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in a place where, when I say things in the name of a great person — as in most places today — they are accepted automatically…

[Speaker B] Then really there is no place…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …for Magen Avraham’s permission in such a situation. Magen Avraham’s permission applies only where people actually think — intelligent people, a great learner, one who doesn’t merely learn by parroting what he hears, as he writes. The emphasis of Maimonides — I’m thinking of this now — when they say not to quote what he said… I think in Guide for the Perplexed, that one should not use what he said merely because he said it… He preemptively waives that for you: don’t quote me by name. He wrote the whole thing, but not so that when you quote him you should invoke his name. Don’t say his name, so that people won’t accept it just because Maimonides said it. Fine, I don’t know, I’m not familiar. In any case, the point is that the right way to learn is first of all to go to someone you value. Otherwise there’s no point. Why is there no point? Because what happens if you go to someone you don’t value? If he says something that makes sense to you, you’ll accept it — but you haven’t gained anything, because you already knew that anyway, so you didn’t learn it from him. Anything he says that doesn’t fit what you already thought — precisely the places where you could gain something, because you can gain something by losing an argument — there you won’t listen. So what’s the point? You won’t learn anything from that book. You’ll leave with what you came with. In other words, you won’t receive anything additional, so there is no point in opening a book or learning from someone you do not value. No, no, even if you do accept something from him, fine — but you didn’t accept it from him; you accepted it because you already think that way. So if you thought that way from the start, you didn’t learn it from him.

And that brings me to the point I want to derive from all this. What is learning? I want to define what learning is. Learning — when I learn from a certain book, okay? Or from a person, it doesn’t matter — then two things must be present for that to be called learning. First, something new must have come to me, something I did not know before, did not think before — something in me has to change, okay? Second, that has to happen through the book or the teacher, because otherwise you didn’t learn it from them. Something changed in me, but learning from someone means that this someone conveys something to you, right? Meaning, it has to be taken from him, and it has to add something to you, change something in you. That is the definition of learning. In other words, if those two things do not happen, then you didn’t learn from so-and-so or from a given book, okay? Now when I apply this to Torah study — what is Torah study? For Torah study to count as learning, and without that it is not Torah study, it has to count as learning, and two things are required. First, what you learned has to be learned from the Torah — you didn’t just invent it yourself and that’s all. Second, you really learned something new, something you didn’t know before; perhaps you even thought the opposite, but the Torah said the opposite, and you value the Torah, you think it is correct or knows better, and therefore you accept what it said, okay? That is exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop is describing, yes? Or like what the rabbi from Brisk did. These are the two conditions without which there is no learning.

Now let me add another distinction. You know, there are many new study halls of this sort — pluralistic, secular, religious, all kinds of strange creatures — who usually learn aggadic passages, almost always, and in my view they don’t learn anything. They’re just idling. Stories… No, it’s not only that they’re stories — they’re not learning anything. They’re not learning, because the conditions I spoke about earlier are not met. If you walk in there, you’ll see that when they learn a passage, in the end they get out of it exactly what they wanted to get out of it. And it’s also nothing new to them — they knew it beforehand. Meaning, they conclude that one should be righteous and humble and help others and pursue peace. Fine, okay, got it. In other words, they didn’t learn that from the passage, and they also didn’t learn anything, because it’s not new — they came in with it, okay? So therefore, even from the aggadic material they already engage in, they don’t learn anything from that either, assuming they don’t touch the real issues. In short, it’s idling. When I talk to such people — and I’ve spoken to such people more than once — they say: no, for us Torah is a source of inspiration, not a source of authority. A source of inspiration — do you understand the difference? A source of inspiration means I am not really bound by what is written in the Torah, fine? If I discover in the Torah that one should beat one’s wife, I’m not going to do that, right? Meaning, I do not give the Torah credit to make me do something I don’t think should be done. But it is a source of inspiration for me. What does that mean? I read this thing and all kinds of ideas arise in me. A source of inspiration means that the ideas are not taken from there. It’s not that I learned something from there and extracted it, but rather… it’s like going out and seeing a beautiful tree, and it inspires me and I write a poem. I didn’t get the poem from the tree, but the tree triggered something in me, stirred something that brought me some insight or some new creation or something of that kind. That’s called a source of inspiration. Okay, fine, I accept that. Let’s say so. But a source of inspiration can also be looking at that beautiful tree outside. There are many sources of inspiration, even for Torah ideas. You can have Torah insights by looking at a tree — I don’t know — suddenly it triggers some point that solves a problem for you, answers a question, whatever it may be. So sources of inspiration can be all kinds of things. And the fact that your source of inspiration is Torah does not mean that you are studying Torah. It is exactly like the fact that when my source of inspiration is a tree, I am not studying botany, right? I’m not dealing with the tree. I didn’t derive anything from the tree. The tree stirred something in me and something happened to me. Okay, that happens many times; yes, “Torah is found by a person when his mind is elsewhere” — that happens a lot. But the claim is that this is not called studying Torah, because even if you used Torah as a source of inspiration, you didn’t learn anything from the Torah. What does it mean that Torah is a source of authority and not a source of inspiration? A source of authority means that if it were written in the Torah that I have to beat my wife every morning, then I would beat my wife every morning.

[Speaker C] Wow, you really took that one far.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said…

[Speaker B] Yes… okay…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes… it’s exaggerated… yes, I’m saying, that’s what it means to be a source of authority…

[Speaker B] Now you’re knocking out the whole principle of judgment and discretion…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another discussion. Obviously I took an extreme example here. But what I want to say is that when you speak about a source of authority, that is exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop is speaking about here. A source of authority means that I value the text or the person standing before me or the Holy One, blessed be He, who wrote the text, and therefore, even if I do not think it is right, I will accept it. I will accept it. In other words, I learned something new — I did not think that way before; after the encounter with the text or with the person, something in me changed, I learned something new. Now with something that is not a source of authority but a source of inspiration, that won’t happen. It won’t happen, because if I find something there that I don’t like — when these people find in the Torah, I don’t know, that there isn’t equality between men and women, they simply erase that passage and move on, or they turn it into a poem. They turn it into a poem. Fine, but then they haven’t done anything with it. Why not? Because for them, everything they study there only comes to reinforce what they already thought in advance. That’s all. They will not take from there anything that does not fit what they already thought.

[Speaker D] What do you mean? But even inspiration — when a person learns, doesn’t he change his status, his atmosphere, his condition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, no problem. But the question is whether in the end something new about Torah came to you.

[Speaker D] Not that you wrote a poem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I understand, but listen: in the end, the point is not to write a poem; in the end, the point is to understand the Torah. If I understand the Torah through inspiration…

[Speaker D] Wait, wait, wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the inspiration causes me to understand the Torah, then in the end I understood Torah, fine, so I learned. But the fact that it was inspiration is not important here, that doesn’t interest me. Because in the end I understood something about the Torah. But if what you’re doing isn’t to understand Torah at all, but to write a poem, or for it to give you all kinds of inspirations, I don’t know what for — fine, it’ll produce some induced current inside you, like in Kabbalah — okay. The ball just fell for me there. So I’m saying: why is that? Now understand: what I’m saying now may sound reasonable to you — I hope it sounds reasonable. But in a moment you’ll see what the implications are, and there you’ll start fighting with me, I promise you. And that’s why I say this is a very important point.

[Speaker C] Let’s go back.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.

[Speaker B] Yes, yes, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I want to say is this. Let me perhaps bring one more example that sharpens the point. In his second root — Maimonides has fourteen roots before Sefer HaMitzvot — in the second root he speaks about things learned from exegetical derivations. He says that their status is rabbinic. It is not Torah-level. Why not? Again, without getting into the fine details of wording, I’ll tell you the bottom line as I understand it: it is because he sees interpretation as something that expands the text, not as something that reveals another layer within the text. For example, when I say “You shall fear the Lord your God” — this comes to include Torah scholars — the common understanding is that the word “et,” which comes to include, actually reveals to you something else that is inside the verse. The Torah included within itself not only what is stated on the simple level, but also, through hints that the Sages draw out, more and more things that were inside the verse. Maimonides says no. “Like branches emerging from roots.” What does that mean? It means an expansion of what is in the verse, not the uncovering of something else that was inside it. The verse says “You shall fear the Lord your God” — that’s all, that’s all there is in the verse. The extra word comes to tell you: okay, but I’m extending this also to Torah scholars. Not that it revealed something more that was already in the verse; it expanded what’s in the verse. So what?

[— Part 2/2 —]

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides says: if I uncovered something from within the Torah, that is Torah-level, because Torah-level literally means from the Torah. Okay? But if the Torah merely served as a source of inspiration for me, if it merely caused me to think something, helped me understand something, but it’s not that as a result I really understood something more in the Torah itself, then it’s not Torah-level — then I didn’t really learn something the Torah said. Okay? Now here this is an intermediate case, because it’s not a source of inspiration for creating something entirely different; it’s a source of inspiration for adding to the spirit of the verse. So therefore here it is still Torah study, but it is Torah study that is not Torah-level according to Maimonides. That means: this is interpretation, but not revealing interpretation — expanding interpretation. In other words, you can uncover more and more things hidden within the verse, and you can interpret the verse by analogy and say: since the verse says this here, it seems to me that there too the same rule should apply. That’s not uncovering something inside the verse; that’s expansion. Now this expansion is not Torah-level, because Torah-level means what comes from the Torah. If you uncovered something inside the Torah, then it is from the Torah; but if you expanded, then it is not from the Torah, it is not Torah-level. “An eye for an eye” meaning monetary compensation is, according to Maimonides, apparently not Torah-level. And they would agree that this is… Maimonides — Maimonides alone. This is only Maimonides, a lone view, only Maimonides. Yes, and even there there are debates whether he really thinks that or not. I do think he thinks that, but that’s a different discussion; I once wrote a book about it.

[Speaker C] I think that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what Maimonides writes. There is also a debate in interpreting Maimonides himself, because it is so unusual and extreme that most of his commentators do not accept that he really means to say that all these derivations are not Torah-level.

[Speaker C] But there is logic to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a lot of logic to it. I wrote a whole book on why it’s correct.

[Speaker C] In any case, it’s not what’s written — now what are you thinking, fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, I want to use this Maimonides to clarify more what I said earlier. When I learn something from someone, I draw out something that was inside him, was inside it — even if he didn’t explicitly say it to me, I understand it. For example, Rami bar Hama: I served Rami bar Hama, and he tells me, “If it benefited, it pays for the benefit it received.” What did he mean? Now that’s all he said, he didn’t say anything else, but I understand that ordinary fruits in the public domain are effectively abandoned, and that this doesn’t mean actual abandonment but contributory fault. Now all of that, as far as I’m concerned, is what Rami bar Hama meant. He didn’t say it, but I understand that I uncovered what lay behind what he said. That’s not an expansion of what he said; that’s uncovering it. I’m quite sure that Rami bar Hama himself did in fact mean that; he concealed it because he wanted to play the game of conceptual analysis with me, but once I understand, I understand that this is what he meant. Therefore I learned Rami bar Hama. Because if Rami bar Hama had merely inspired me and I understood on my own something else by force of his words, then I didn’t learn that something from Rami bar Hama. He triggered it in me, but I didn’t learn it from him. Okay? So that’s what I want to say: Torah study requires two conditions — sorry, three conditions. First, that what you are learning be Torah. Second, that you actually learn the Torah. Now what does it mean to actually learn the Torah? Two more things. One, that you derive from it something that is, for you, a source of authority — such that if you derive something from it that contradicts what you think, you will still accept it, after thinking it through and checking whether that is indeed the conclusion; if in the end, after everything, you conclude that it says something contrary to your own view, you will still accept it. That’s one. And second, that this be something that comes out of the text you are learning — not that it merely serves as a source of inspiration, but rather that, in your opinion, this is really what the text says, I learned it from the text, from the Torah.

[Speaker C] That’s also subjective, because say there were Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so they disagree over what the text says — that’s okay. But Beit Hillel understand that this is what the text says, and for them that is what is written there; Beit Shammai think that is not what is written there, something else is written there. No problem — they disagree. But still, for each one, according to his own view, what he learned, he learned from the text. Okay? What God intended, meaning which of them is actually right, that’s another discussion. That’s not what concerns me right now.

[Speaker D] It comes out from what the Rabbi said that, in terms of learning, one has to go open a book or hear something. What if I hear it in my sleep, they hook me up to electrodes, and I learn it that way? Is there Torah study in that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think…

[Speaker D] …not,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and in fact maybe according to what I said…

[Speaker D] …then we wouldn’t be studying Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I…

[Speaker B] think…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think what you’re saying adds a third condition to the two I gave: that there has to be an actual act of learning on your part — not that insights be injected into you, but that it be your own act of learning. In any case, now look at the implications, and let’s see whether you still agree with me. You assume that the Talmud has authority, right? Meaning that if you learn something from it, it binds you.

[Speaker C] No, suppose, like the Rabbi said earlier with the psychology point. Many times I would make psychological applications, and now I’m trying to stop.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now you’re reaching the question of which fields. Now I’m getting to the implications, and we’ll see if we still agree there. Okay? For example, I want to claim that Hasidism is not Torah study. Categorically. Categorically, Hasidism is not Torah study — it is neglect of Torah study. Why? Because my claim is — and maybe I’m wrong, maybe someone else will understand it differently and reach another conclusion — but according to my description, I think this is so. When you study a Hasidic text, first, that text is not interpreting anything. It is the author’s reflections. Second, when you study the text, it is usually a source of inspiration for you. Meaning it stirs in you all kinds of ideas, maybe nice ideas, maybe not, but you didn’t learn them from the text. It stirred them in you. Okay? Now when you finish reading that Hasidic text, check yourselves: what did you think before, and what became new to you? Did you give up anything you previously believed — did something change? And did that happen by force of the book? My claim is no. And I claim that where it collides with a different intuition you already have, where it doesn’t fit what you think, obviously you won’t use it. It’s just like the study hall I described. You’ll simply reinterpret the book, or just leave it aside altogether. Okay? You will not accept something from it. If a Hasidic book says, I don’t know, that one should beat one’s wife every morning, you won’t do it. I hope, at least. And what that means is, first, that the book is not a source of authority for you. It’s very similar, in that sense. Right. So I’m saying, first, it is not a source of authority for you. And second, the interpretation is so flexible that it is very hard to say that what I got out of it is really what the text says — that I really drew it from the text. This is much closer to the pole where the text is a source of inspiration for me, not a source of authority.

Now I claim the same thing about studying the Hebrew Bible. Studying the Hebrew Bible, in my view, is complete neglect of Torah study. Complete neglect of Torah study.

[Speaker B] Completely? Categorically?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Prophets and Writings too, and also the narrative parts of the Torah. Why? Again: because I have never met, in all my life — and I wrote columns about this on my website and challenged people there to bring counterexamples — and to this day I still haven’t found one. I have not found a biblical interpretation from which someone drew a lesson that did not fit what he already thought beforehand, and then adopted it because that is what the interpretation said. It has never happened. Never. Meaning, if the lesson doesn’t fit what you think, then you’ll reinterpret it, you’ll do something else, you’ll find another commentator. In the end you come out with what you already think. And I haven’t found anyone who learned — I’m not talking about facts. If I hadn’t learned Torah, I wouldn’t know that there was an Abraham our forefather. That I learned from the Torah — that there was an Abraham our forefather. Facts can be learned from the Hebrew Bible. Or that there was King Hezekiah, or that this happened or that happened, that the Temple was destroyed. Fine — facts. But facts are not Torah. When you speak about Torah, you’re speaking about lessons, values, correct ways of conduct, things of that sort. Okay? I have never met a single value or a single mode of conduct that any human being learned from the Torah. None. I haven’t met it. Now someone sent me yesterday… So I’m saying, just look — I’ll give you an example, fine? When you study… it doesn’t happen. It just doesn’t happen. Maybe in the past it happened a bit, but it doesn’t happen now.

[Speaker C] Your value system was built on those parts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, possibly. That’s why I said maybe in the past it happened, and the Torah did bring values into the world. There are values that prevail today in the world as though self-evident, and I think the Torah has a significant contribution to the standing those values have today.

[Speaker C] Those values came from the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: the Torah has a significant contribution to the fact that these values are today perceived as binding moral values. I agree historically. I do not agree that this is what happens today. That’s why I said: maybe in the past this happened; today there’s no such thing. It simply doesn’t happen. I have never met anyone who changed his view because he studied a Torah portion. It has never happened. So in that column I told people: bring me examples, by all means. Give me one example: I thought one way, I studied such-and-such passage — and after all, the interpretive freedom is so broad that you can knead the verses and do with them almost whatever you want, and in the end it will fit what you want. Therefore I say there isn’t even a methodological way to derive an unambiguous lesson from those passages, even if you wanted to. You can manipulate them almost as you please. Not entirely as you please, but there are enough degrees of freedom that you can do almost whatever you want with them. After “an eye for an eye” turning into monetary compensation, it seems to me you can’t really say anything definite from the Torah anymore. It says “an eye” — no, that means money. The stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be, until his father and mother are equal in voice and appearance. In short, if you work that way, you will not learn anything from the Torah. And therefore the claim I want to make is that study in all fields — all the fields, I’m saying, all the fields that are not Jewish law — not only is it Torah in the person-focused sense and not Torah in the object-focused sense, which belongs to the definition of what Torah is; it is also not learning. What happens there is not learning according to the definitions I gave earlier. Learning does not take place there. It just doesn’t happen.

[Speaker E] If this were sports, then it wouldn’t matter…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why I said — I already said — facts, yes, I learn facts. Obviously, when I studied the book of Genesis, now I know there was an Abraham our forefather; before, I didn’t know. That’s obvious. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about conceptual study, drawing values from it, a correct way of life. Torah is instruction. Torah is not… If I learned from a history book that there was Abraham our forefather, and there was Lot, and he did this, and he bowed… would that be Torah study? I learned the same facts. I learned facts. No, that’s not Torah study. Why not? Because the Torah did not come to teach me facts. The facts are a means to teach me values, a way of conducting myself — that is supposed to be the main point of Torah.

[Speaker F] You found a model, but it doesn’t change the model.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So you learned more facts, yes, facts you can learn from the Hebrew Bible and from the Torah.

[Speaker F] So learning it from another book won’t help you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It won’t help — there’s nothing there. No Torah. There’s just the other book. You studied it, and now you know the passage. Why? You learned the passage — if there is some Torah value in knowing that Abraham’s shepherds and Lot’s shepherds quarreled with each other, then suppose I found it written on some scroll in ancient hieroglyphs, decoded it, and discovered that such an event happened, okay? Did something in my soul change? Did I then study Torah in the essential sense — not in the formal sense of the commandment of Torah study? Did the same thing happen to me that is supposed to happen when I study Torah? No one… Why not? Because facts are not Torah. Facts are not Torah. Facts are the medium through which messages are conveyed to me; the messages are the Torah. And I’m saying: the messages do not get conveyed.

[Speaker B] So in Torah there are two kinds of things — things that one learns and things that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait, I’ll explain, I’ll explain.

[Speaker B] But that’s the question within Tosafot, wait…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, I understand. That’s exactly why I’m getting there. So the point is this. What I’m trying to claim is that, in light of the definitions I gave earlier, it comes out that almost all the areas that today are called Torah study are actually neglect of Torah study. They aren’t learning Torah there. Now that doesn’t mean the activity is worthless. It simply isn’t the commandment of Torah study. Because when I spoke about Torah in the person-focused sense, for example, it could be that Torah inspired me and I had all sorts of very beautiful and lofty intellectual ideas, values, and so on — all fine. I did not learn that from the Torah. Of course it can stir all kinds of things in me. Right — but that tree can also do that. In that case the tree too would be Torah in the person-focused sense, and that’s fine, and there is no significance to the fact that my source of inspiration happened to be the Torah rather than that tree. The question is what came out of it. If what came out has value, then very good, I gained something of value. But that is not called learning Torah. Do you understand the claim?

[Speaker C] Can we compare this to hearing a lecture in physics or mathematics where someone tells you a beautiful story about stars, or about quantum mechanics, or even about Newton’s laws? Until you actually solve exercises and really learn it yourself and see the surrounding structure, you don’t really understand it. And the analogy? The analogy is like the stories in Torah: you have stories, but until you really learn the laws and understand…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the details are not an implementation of the stories. The stories are stories and the laws are laws.

[Speaker C] But maybe the laws there in the Torah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Laws are not practice exercises for the stories.

[Speaker C] But maybe I do…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There may be some connection between them. No, I don’t see it. Anyway…

[Speaker C] But the change in you happens only from learning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I agree. I’m just saying it doesn’t seem to me connected to the analogy you gave earlier. But the point itself I understand.

[Speaker C] …and in the day itself you don’t see these things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah? No, I don’t see. These things just bore me, not because they aren’t interesting — they simply sound so heavenly and detached to me that I don’t know what to do with them. But beyond that — and this really goes beyond personal taste, because taste is personal; some people are interested and some aren’t, and that’s perfectly fine. There are very smart people who are interested in this, so it’s not that I’m disparaging it. I’m just not interested. But the question whether it is Torah study is not a question of personal taste. Here I am making an essential claim, not a claim of taste.

Now I want to qualify what I said. It’s hard to say that when I study Genesis I’m not studying Torah, right? That sounds a bit problematic. This is the Torah that was given to us at Sinai. I defined Torah as what was given to us at Sinai, and the interpretations and traditions attached to it. Clearly the book of Genesis is part of what was given to us at Sinai. So I want to make the following claim: the Written Torah, the biblical text — its meaning or value is not because of its content. Its holiness is the holiness of the wording, not of the content. The difference between Scripture and Talmud is this: the Talmud, as phrased, has nothing intrinsically holy about its wording. You can translate it into English and it will be holy to exactly the same degree. What matters is the content. If you study the content, and say it in any language, in whatever form, that is what matters — the content. The book itself has no significance. That is why the Oral Torah was not even supposed to be written down at all; that’s not the point. And even if they decided to write it, that doesn’t turn it into a holy book. In principle, strictly speaking, one wouldn’t even have to place such books in genizah. So what matters there is the content. When I deal with the content, I am studying Torah, even if I’m not doing it from that particular book but from a computer or from somewhere else — what difference does it make? From my own notebook. Okay? That’s Torah study in every respect. But with the Written Torah, with Scripture, there the content is not the main point. The wording is. What I said earlier: if I had learned all the events of Genesis from some hieroglyphic text I found in an archaeological dig — okay? — that would not have been Torah study, even though the whole content of Genesis would have reached me. My claim is that this content consists of facts, and facts are not Torah. Facts are not Torah. In principle, the facts could have been learned from other sources as well, if we had found some source describing those events. So what makes the Torah unique? The Torah packaged those stories, those facts, in a very particular wording. It chose what to include and what not to include, and that editing is really the essence of Torah, not the content. The packaging, yes — the editing that the Torah chose. So if someone rewrites the Torah in English or Hebrew in his own wording, then you have not learned Torah.

[Speaker C] There’s also the issue that the numerical values and the structure of the letters — there is also learning in that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you believe that is true, then yes. No, I mean that seriously, not as a joke. According to what I’m saying, that is possible. But I’m not saying that therefore it is true. According to what I’m saying, one could hold such a view, I agree. That doesn’t mean that if I say this, then automatically that view is correct. I can say gematria is nonsense and still maintain what I said earlier.

[Speaker C] Yes, because you’re saying, okay…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because gematria may not be the right way to read this text, for example, if that’s my view. Right, I said: what I’m saying allows such a conception, but does not require it. Allows it? Absolutely, completely.

[Speaker C] The classical Jew, who really believes we received it at Sinai — if someone isn’t like that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he’s not in the game. Someone who isn’t like that is not in the game — what do you mean? Obviously. The Talmud in tractate Shabbat says that a Torah scroll that was erased, and eighty-five letters remain in it, like the section ויהי בנסוע הארון, then its holiness remains. The question there is whether the letters are scattered or not; there’s a dispute among the amoraim there. But its holiness remains. What remains of the scroll? Scattered letters — no event, no content, nothing, not even a continuous word, the letters are scattered. Because the holiness of the scroll is not the holiness of content. As long as the body of the scroll still remains, it is still the same scroll that once had the whole thing written in it; its identity has not entirely fallen away, so its holiness remains. In other words, we see from this that the holiness of Torah scrolls, of Scripture — not of Talmud, not of the Oral Torah — the holiness of Torah scrolls is the holiness of the wording, the holiness of the book, not of the content. By the way, there’s a famous Rabbi Chaim on the topic of ruled lines in tractate Gittin 6, where he says that ruled lines are a law concerning content and not a law concerning the book — unlike sewing and all the parchment laws and those kinds of things — but he has some move there. In any case, what I want to claim is that the wording of the Torah scroll is the essence. And therefore I can’t say that someone dealing with Genesis is not studying Torah. It is Torah in the object-focused sense, even if not in the person-focused sense. This is the Torah we received from Mount Sinai — I cannot say that it isn’t Torah. Now in practice, if you ask me whether people learn something from it, the answer is no. For me, this is a divine decree. That’s why I say: if the choice is in my hands, and as long as I haven’t learned the Talmud yet — meaning I still have what to learn before I get to Genesis — then I don’t occupy myself with Genesis. It bores me, and it also seems pointless and valueless to me. True, by divine decree, it is Torah, and dealing with it is the commandment of Torah study. With that I cannot argue. It is Torah; we received it from Sinai. Okay. But I still think that when you occupy yourselves with it, you aren’t learning. In other words, you don’t gain anything from it.

[Speaker C] No, but maybe if you read it many times, or read it a lot, ideas will arise in you — like inspiration. No, not inspiration; you’ll understand gematria, say. Suddenly you’ll find that gematria works.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe you’ll find some rule… So I’m saying: your test will be when the gematria tells you something that previously you thought was wrong, and you then adopt it because the gematria says it. When that happens, come talk to me, okay?

[Speaker C] No, but maybe another idea will come to you, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Another idea — what kind? One that doesn’t contradict what I think? Fine, then it’s a source of inspiration. So I won’t accept it as authority. What I’m saying is: assuming you have such complete trust in gematria… no, not only gematria, some other method, doesn’t matter. And from the book you come to an insight that one must not be humble, let’s say. Fine? That’s what came out for me from some Torah passage. Not through gematria, yes through gematria, I don’t care how. That is what I got out of a Torah passage. Okay? The question is: what will I do with it? I’m saying that anyone to whom such a thing comes out will go back to the passage and interpret it differently. He won’t change his value system.

[Speaker C] And if he comes out saying that one may drive on the Sabbath with an electric car?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, you’re getting into stories. No, what stories? How did that come out?

[Speaker C] You’ll find some inspiration, some verse…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …to prove it, justify it.

[Speaker C] So I’m saying I wouldn’t do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? You wouldn’t do it. Not inspiration — a verse proving it. “I wouldn’t do it” means you can’t really prove it. That’s the point. You can’t prove it. The interpretive freedom is such — and that’s part of the issue — that you cannot derive unambiguous conclusions from the verses. If it clashes with something you already think, you’ll always find a way to reconcile it, and so on. You won’t adopt something that contradicts what you think.

[Speaker C] But you can say the same thing about learning Jewish law… I’ll go to the Shulchan Arukh…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait, in a moment I’ll explain why that isn’t true. That is exactly the point. Everything I’m saying applies to studies in fields like Jewish thought, ethics, the Hebrew Bible, Hasidism, and in my opinion also the aggadic passages of the Talmud — I don’t think there’s any value there; I skip the aggadah.

[Speaker B] You can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay.

[Speaker B] Regarding aggadah, the question is why that is; I think one needs the midrashim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I disagree with many great and worthy people.

[Speaker C] Yes. I don’t think it’s something negative to engage in…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not negative. It simply doesn’t have the value of Torah study. For me it’s like reading the Brothers Grimm.

[Speaker C] For me it’s…

[Speaker B] …like reading the Brothers Grimm.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Kabbalah is somewhat different. Kabbalah is something a bit different. Kabbalah is something…

[Speaker B] What, black fire on white fire?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait. Kabbalah is… hold on. Let a Jew speak too; he’s also allowed to open his mouth once in a while. Anyway, I’ll get to Kabbalah in a moment. I want first to say this. What I really want to say is that in almost all areas, except Jewish law — and in a moment I’ll explain why Jewish law is different — learning does not actually take place. It simply does not happen in practice. Now many people say to me: look, how can that be? The Hebrew Bible is divine — so why did God write it? My answer is: I don’t know. I have no answer. But factually, show me how you manage to learn something from it. My claim is factual, not ideological. I wish I could learn something from the Hebrew Bible and relate to it as learning, because I really do think it makes no sense that God would give us a text we can do nothing with — that we cannot really derive something from. I agree that it doesn’t make sense. But factually, that’s the situation. What can I do? Fine, but I’m saying: there are aggadic passages in the Mishnah and Talmud too. Exactly — that is my point. So I’m saying, one has to understand that many people… wait, everyone, let me finish, otherwise we’ll never get through this. People very often attack me when I say and write such things: how can this be? The Hebrew Bible is divine; what, God wrote things that…? Right, it should be otherwise — I don’t know what to do. But that can’t change the facts. Factually, show me a way to learn from the Hebrew Bible. I agree that there ought to be such a way, that it is very logical that there should be, all that is true. But factually it doesn’t happen. What can I do?

Now let me take an example people brought me there. You can see it all on my website. I took an example and showed them: you didn’t learn anything from there. David and Bathsheba. “Whoever says David sinned is merely mistaken.” What does that really mean? I think the plain sense there is that David certainly sinned, but he did not sin in adultery, because anyone who went out to the wars of the house of David gave his wife a conditional bill of divorce. Anyone who went out to the wars of the house of David gave his wife a conditional divorce. So she was not actually another man’s wife. Yes, after he died she was not another man’s wife. So what does it mean, “Whoever says David sinned is merely mistaken”? It means, whoever says David sinned in adultery is mistaken, because she was not another man’s wife. Formally there was no such transgression. But when Nathan the prophet rebukes him, what does he rebuke him for? For the poor man’s ewe lamb — for theft. Theft was there. Theft in the sense of taking something that belonged to someone else. There is no formal issue of adultery here, because formally she was divorced retroactively. Once he died, she was divorced retroactively. So there is no formal issue of adultery, but there is certainly a moral problem. Of course there is. That’s what Nathan the prophet says. It’s not a weak argument.

[Speaker C] No, it’s not a weak argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Talmud says, in my opinion.

[Speaker C] It’s not weak at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyone who goes out to the wars of the house of David gives a bill of divorce — every soldier gives his wife a divorce.

[Speaker C] Fine, he said if I return alive…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, but he didn’t return alive.

[Speaker C] Therefore the divorce takes effect retroactively.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and now the divorce takes effect retroactively, so she was not another man’s wife. Factually, she was not another man’s wife. Anyway, that’s what the Sages tell us. I don’t care right now whether they’re right, but that’s what they say. Fine? Now I ask you: what did I learn from this passage? Fine, I understood the passage. Brilliant interpretation. Rabbi Medan wrote an entire book on it, and that is his conclusion basically. What? That the sin here was a moral sin, but the formal halakhic sin was not present. Okay, so that is the accepted approach, let’s say, in the Gush and its offshoots. And I also completely agree — that was my understanding of the passage from the outset. But what did I learn from this passage? Fine, I finished everything, I learned that David didn’t sin legally, but morally yes. What did I learn from this passage? Nothing. What? Obviously I wouldn’t have done that anyway. Does anyone think it is moral? Did I learn from the passage that it’s immoral? The whole passage is built on the fact that everyone understood even before it was written that it was immoral. That’s why Nathan the prophet rebukes David, because David should have understood that it was immoral before he did it — before the passage was written, before he learned Bible. Everyone understands that it’s immoral. So I’m asking you: what did I learn from this passage? Nothing. What did I derive?

[Speaker G] That’s a fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so what?

[Speaker G] If you hadn’t been under pressure you wouldn’t have married…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did you learn from the fact that you got what you got?

[Speaker G] Right, that’s the question. Right, that’s the question. Right, that’s the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the question I’m asking there too. Exactly. It’s not from one detail or another; from no detail do you manage to learn. This isn’t a question about this detail or that detail. There is no place — look at everything. I went through things online, just for a sample, things that were written on the weekly Torah portion at the time I wrote that column. I went through all the smart people, everything they wrote on the portion. There is not one thing I learned from all that, nothing. Everything you saw there was just each person putting into the Torah the values that we all already understand are right. Not that they aren’t right — they are completely right. We just understood them before. And now he explains why you can also see them in the Torah. Fine, I understand. I knew that before, and now maybe I can also derive it from the Torah, in the best case. Usually it’s a clever line that they can’t really derive from the Torah at all. But even if, say, they did succeed, they succeeded in deriving what I already knew in advance. I go back to Rabbi Shimon Shkop: if you only accept what you already knew beforehand, and you won’t accept something that contradicts what you think beforehand, then you didn’t learn. There is no point in opening the book or the person from whom you are learning. Right? That’s Rabbi Shimon Shkop.

[Speaker C] Fine, but that’s a bit of a privilege, because after you grew up inside this environment…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said exactly that, exactly. I already said earlier that historically there certainly was a process in which things were derived from the Torah.

[Speaker C] That doesn’t mean that today I should stop learning it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I do suggest stopping, yes. Today it has no value.

[Speaker C] No, if people stop, maybe it’ll be forgotten.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it won’t be forgotten. No one will forget it. No one will forget it.

[Speaker C] What Jewish law says…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: do what Jewish law says. You ask whether there is value in this kind of study? The answer is no.

[Speaker B] The commandment of Torah study is part of… fine, okay, the commandment of Torah study is part of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said: on the contrary, the commandment of Torah study exists there too, but there is no value of learning in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you study Genesis, which was given at Sinai with the Torah, then of course that is the commandment of Torah study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s just that there’s no learning here. It’s a divine decree that this is called the commandment of Torah study. Is there a scale, you ask? No — it’s not a matter of levels. There is simply no learning here at all. Level zero. None. What did we acquire anyway? There is no learning here. You mean preparation — reading the weekly portion on the Sabbath? That’s what I’m saying: you’re just playing with names. Nothing. It’s not learning in the essential sense. What is it then? Preparation. What does preparation mean? Like a preparatory act for a commandment — you orient yourself toward the Torah reading, yes. So in short… Rabbeinu Nissim?

[Speaker B] Okay, Rabbeinu Nissim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a whole arsenal of devices. We’ve got a laboratory. Let me explain where the exceptions are. Why is Jewish law different? I claim Jewish law is different. Jewish law is different — and also the legal verses in the Torah from which I began this whole distinction, the first Rashi if you remember, and also the legal discussions in the Talmud — there the situation is entirely different. Entirely different. When I learn, for example, the prohibition of eating pork, I don’t come with some agenda. The Torah taught me that it is forbidden to eat pork; I learned that, and now I know that it is forbidden to eat pork. The whole of Jewish law consists of things I learn entirely from the Torah, entirely. In ethics, we have our own conceptions; we know what is moral and what is not moral. In values, in ways of conduct, in all these places, we have our own conceptions. So when we study Torah there, we are really imposing our own conceptions on the Torah. In Jewish law it is not like that. In most of Jewish law — not all, but most — it is not like that. When I learn that it is forbidden to eat pork, then it is forbidden. They tell me this is not the normal manner of eating, so one does not transgress — I didn’t know that either. I learned it from the Torah. We don’t say migo in order to extract money. I would never know that if I hadn’t learned the passage. Now I studied the passage, and I know that we don’t say migo in order to extract money. Jewish law by its very nature, when you study it, is Torah study. You derive things you didn’t know before, and if they are written there and you conclude that they are written there, you will accept them, even if perhaps they don’t appeal to you. And therefore it fulfills all the conditions of Torah study. But that is only in Jewish law — almost only in Jewish law.

[Speaker C] But that’s only if you accepted the learning. Suppose someone tells you… because you accepted the Torah… say: do no work. Fine, it says not to do work on the Sabbath, okay, so I don’t work. But then when you come to interpret it — what counts as not working?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he interprets it differently. Fine, so he interprets it differently. And that’s perfectly fine.

[Speaker C] And that’s perfectly fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He studied Torah and made a mistake. In disputes, one side is right and one side is wrong. Even the mistaken side studied Torah, because he understands that that is what the Torah says, and that’s okay. You’re allowed to be mistaken; it is still Torah study. You are trying to understand what the Torah says. We are all human, we can all err. Okay? So I’m saying that only in Jewish law is there a possibility that this is truly an act of learning. In all the other things, it just doesn’t happen — in almost all the other things, it almost never happens.

Now why did I say that Kabbalah needs separate discussion? Because here it depends a bit on how you relate to it. There are those who understand that Kabbalah was also given at Sinai. Everyone, give me a second, let me finish. So if we assume that Kabbalah was given to us orally alongside the Written Torah at Sinai, then of course it is part of Torah. We received it. Whoever believes that — then if something comes out of his Kabbalistic study, he will also implement it, he will adopt it. Therefore Kabbalah, in that sense, is actually similar to Jewish law — if you really accept it as an authentic source, a source with authority. If you don’t think that is true, if it wasn’t given at Sinai, if it is a human invention, then there really is no point in it. That’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: if you value me, you can learn from me; if you don’t value me, there’s no point. But I’m saying: if you do accept it as a source of authority, then fine, it is learning in every respect. Okay? That’s why I said Kabbalah is its own category. Because with Kabbalah too, I don’t come with my own agendas. It is also one of those areas where either I accept it or I don’t, but it isn’t something where I come with my own agendas and impose them on the field. In that sense it resembles Jewish law. Okay? Kabbalah also deals with Jewish law; it just treats it somewhat differently, but it also deals with legal topics.

Let me draw one more aspect of the same distinction. When we study a halakhic topic — and check yourselves on this too — our orientation is interpretive. We are in interpretive mode. Meaning: I look at what the Talmud says, the medieval authorities, Maimonides, Shulchan Arukh, halakhic decisors, later authorities — with my own approach, whatever. But in the end, every generation interprets the earlier generations back to the Talmud and back to Sinai, assuming it started there. Okay? The mode is interpretive. Now it’s true that in Jewish law too there are many disputes, and obviously your worldview influences how you learn. The Ketzot HaChoshen and the Netivot disagree; I assume that is not disconnected from the conceptions they had. Right? But still, each of them clearly understood that he was engaged in interpretation of the Talmud or of the Shulchan Arukh. Okay? The mode is interpretive. In contrast, when you write a book of Jewish thought, or ethics, or Bible, or whatever… In Bible it is maybe a bit different, but in the value-based conclusions you draw from the Bible — not the factual ones — when you interpret the facts, that really is interpretation, you’re trying to understand what the facts were. But when you try to derive some ethical move or life lesson, that is not interpretation. You are simply creating your own thought. Think about Jewish thought: does Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed look to you like he is interpreting something? Or the Maharal? Or Rabbi Kook? Or whoever else? None of them. It is not interpretation. Again, I’m not saying this disparagingly — I said this is a genre. It is not interpretive literature. He occasionally brings verses, but the verses are illustrations, and the Sages too are illustrations. What the Maharal does to the Sages is a group assault. He takes aggadic statements of the Sages and forces them until they fit his move. Don’t tell me he is interpreting the aggadah. He is not interpreting the aggadah. Interpretive mode means that I am attached to the text. I can be very autonomous in deciding what the text says — I won’t accept what you say, and not because I want to understand… But my goal is to understand what it says, in an interpretive mode. In thought, in intellectual literature, the mode is: what is true? What do I think is true? I create thought. I have influences — Aristotelian or otherwise, doesn’t matter — everyone has his own sources of influence, and I produce some body of thought. That thought is not a tradition that continues in one continuous line. Each person creates his own thought. Again, that’s neither a fault nor a reduction in their importance. I’m just saying: it is not interpretation of the Torah given at Sinai. And in that sense I’m joining the two aspects here. On the one hand, this is not really learning; and on the other hand, what I’m doing is not really Torah. It is neither learning nor Torah. Because Torah, as I defined “Torah in the object-focused sense,” is what was given at Sinai and the interpretations built on it, right? That was our definition of Torah at the end of the whole process. The Guide for the Perplexed does not meet that definition. It was not given at Sinai, and it is not an interpretation of what was given at Sinai. It is philosophical reflection that seemed correct to Maimonides, and in its light he then perhaps interprets various things — but it doesn’t start from the Torah; it starts from Aristotle. And afterward he explains to me that this too is written in the Torah. Fine. And if he had studied Plato instead of Aristotle, then he would have explained to me that Plato, and not Aristotle, is what is written in the Torah. The mode is not interpretive.

And there is no tradition of thought, contrary to what people try to sell us. There is no such thing as a continuous tradition of thought in Jewish thought. There is a legal tradition, absolutely. Despite all the disagreements, there is a legal tradition; there is debate, evidence, objections. In Jewish thought there really aren’t proofs and objections the way we know them from Jewish law. Each person has his own thought, his own system. Everything is fine, let everyone be healthy. There are no objections, no resolutions, no proofs, nothing. What — did anyone ever try to decide between Maimonides and the Kuzari because of some aggadic midrash somewhere? Please. No one really means to do that. Because it is not interpretation. I’m trying to show you that the distinction between Jewish law — and perhaps also Kabbalah to some extent, at least for those who accept it — and all the other fields is present on both planes. The other fields are Torah in the person-focused sense; they are not Torah in the object-focused sense. That is one difference from Jewish law. And the second difference is that in the other fields, what I am doing is not learning, according to the criterion I gave earlier — whereas in Jewish law it is. And therefore I claim that Torah study in the essential sense is only the study of Jewish law. That is Torah study in the essential sense. That does not mean it is the only thing of value — again, I explained that. Occupying oneself with Torah in the person-focused sense, with important ideas, all fine, maybe it even has more value, I don’t care. But categorically, for example, I would not recite the blessing over Torah study for learning Hasidism or for learning ethics.

[Speaker B] But this is knowledge of God, like Maimonides says, “Know the God of your father and serve Him.” Knowledge of God — if you don’t believe, how will you study Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but wait. Knowing that God exists is not knowledge of God. Knowing that God exists — fine.

[Speaker B] That’s what Maimonides means by knowledge of God: “Know the God of your father.” Also philosophy. “Know the God of your father” is not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …just knowing that God exists, but understanding what God is, understanding what He does with the world. That is called knowledge of God, not merely knowing that He exists. Knowing that He exists is a prerequisite. Obviously. It is the first positive commandment in Maimonides: to know that there is a First Being. Positive commandment number one. That belongs to Jewish law, not to thought. Because without that, all your commandments are worth nothing. But everything else — everything else that appears in Maimonides under knowledge of God — falls into the category I described earlier. It is not Torah in the object-focused sense. Because Maimonides is imposing that on the text: this is a body, no it has no bodily form, fine — he thinks one way, another thinks another way, there are different reasonings — that is not interpretation of anything. On the contrary, everyone pointed out that regarding bodily form, the plain sense of the Torah says specifically that He does have bodily form. That’s the plain sense. If you studied the Torah simply, the plain sense is that He does have bodily form. Maimonides philosophically decided that He does not, and then he explained — following Onkelos, yes — that everything written in the Torah is really metaphor and all kinds of things of that sort. So you see here a living example of the point: the thought does not emerge as interpretation of the Torah. On the contrary — you have a philosophy, and then you impose it on the Torah and call that interpretation. In Jewish law it doesn’t work that way. Even though it looks very similar — there are disagreements among thinkers and there are disagreements in Jewish law — it is not the same thing. In disagreements in Jewish law, each side is part of a tradition continuing from Sinai; every generation relates to the earlier generations and interprets them. It is a continuous tradition in Jewish law, and only in Jewish law. Everything else — each person has his own inventions. He invented Hasidism, he invented this thought, that thought, all kinds of things, and then they dress them up in various ways, nicer or less nice, each according to his taste. All fine.

[Speaker C] What about the fact that you just read the Torah, just read the text — is there some object-based value in that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: by scriptural decree, that is called Torah study. I can’t argue with that. But can I tell you that I see value in it? I don’t know. It doesn’t teach me anything.

[Speaker C] Why do you see value in learning not to eat pork?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because by learning the prohibition of eating pork you learn God’s will. What do you mean? You understand what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants from you.

[Speaker C] And when you read the Torah you also have that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, maybe there is some hidden spiritual quality there, I don’t know. It may be that there is some hidden quality there. I said: I’m not arguing with the fact that reading the text is Torah study. I’m not arguing with that. This is the text we received at Sinai; I can’t argue with that. That too is what I meant when I said the holiness is in the wording, not in the content. But for me, learning is learning content, not mumbling wording. Okay? Fine. Next lesson — which, in principle, is the last one — and there we’ll deal a bit with tradition, which I have just now also finished touching on.

[Speaker D] And next year, what are we planning? What comes next?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She has her own plan. I’m on a half-sabbatical, though — I’m on a half-sabbatical next year. Half-sabbatical. What, next year a sabbatical?