On the Essence of Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance – Lesson 3 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the previous two sessions I started with a discussion of the question whether there is a commandment to repent. We saw Maimonides’ approach, that apparently there is no commandment but there is an obligation. I explained from several angles what the logic of that might be, and I said that in essence it doesn’t really make sense to command a person to repent, because in principle repentance means returning to being a chooser, and just as you can’t command a person to be a chooser, you can’t command a person to be a penitent. We saw that for that reason as well, the contradiction that the Minchat Chinukh points to between Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot and in the Mishneh Torah doesn’t really exist. In Sefer HaMitzvot Maimonides counts the commandments that the Torah commands us to do, and regarding repentance there is no command in the Torah. “ושבת עד ה’ אלוהיך” — Maimonides writes in chapter 7 of the laws of repentance that this is a promise or a prophecy of the Torah about the future, and therefore it cannot appear in the count of commandments according to Maimonides. Because his view is that anything that does not have a verse explicitly commanding it is not included in the count of commandments — even if it comes from interpretation, reasoning, a law given to Moses at Sinai, whatever you want. But in the Mishneh Torah we include everything one is obligated to do, and if one needs to repent, then the obligation to repent will appear there too. Because just as there are rabbinic commandments or commandments derived through interpretation or whatever it may be, everything we need to do appears there, and therefore the obligation to repent appears there too. Why really does one need to repent? So as I said before, first of all it follows from simple reasoning: from the very fact that you have a possibility of cleansing yourself, it stands to reason that you are expected to make use of that possibility. And to that extent, the Meshekh Chokhmah for example argued — I think I mentioned this — that this is also the explanation for why Maimonides does not count the commandment of repentance, because it is already included within the Torah’s own commands to do this and not to do that. So if someone violated those prohibitions, from the very fact that they are defined as sins, why do you need to add yet another thing saying he has to abandon them or not do them? Okay? In my opinion that’s probably not correct, but I’ll get back to that later. In any case, at least in the sense that there is a simple logical reason that one should repent — that much I agree with. The fact that this is not enough to make the command itself redundant — that I do not accept, what he said, and I’ll explain later why. So that is regarding the explanation of Maimonides’ view. Nachmanides says there is a commandment to repent, yes, in this week’s Torah portion, that there is a commandment to repent because “המצווה הזאת לא נפלאת היא ולא רחוקה”, and Nachmanides says that “this commandment” is really the commandment of repentance. At first he says it means the whole Torah, and then he says that more correctly it means the commandment of repentance. And in the previous lecture I mentioned — I brought more examples in the first lecture, right? — of commandments, or things we need to do, that have no explicit command: character refinement, and we spoke about settling the Land of Israel, even though that doesn’t belong here, “קדושים תהיו”, all sorts of things like that.

[Speaker B] Torah study too, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, in the previous lecture I started talking about two paths of repentance, and I said that Maimonides’ laws of repentance are very unusual in the landscape of his legal compilations. There’s a lot of aggadic material there; very little of it actually deals with repentance at all. There are four chapters, and chapter 7 with all kinds of verses and midrashim in praise of repentance, and that’s it. Chapters 5–6 are about free choice. Chapter 8 discusses various philosophical issues, but they are not really connected either to Jewish law or to the laws of repentance. So the question is: what is the meaning of this strange structure of the laws of repentance in Maimonides? I said that I think that in every commandment, or every legal section in the Torah, we can distinguish between the formal legal dimension, in which we define what is permitted and forbidden and obligatory, and the philosophical dimension that tries to explain why it is permitted, forbidden, or obligatory to do various things. In the laws of repentance, I think there is a different relation between the legal dimension and the philosophical dimension. They are not really two sides of the same coin, as we know from other contexts. Rather, they are two parallel channels for doing repentance. Two ways of looking at the act of repentance — but these are actually different acts of repentance. It’s not two angles from which to look at the same act of repentance, philosophically and legally — no. These are two different angles because there are two different acts of repentance here. One kind of repentance — and I brought various sources, I won’t go through them all now — one kind is a legal, formal act. It has four stages: abandoning the sin, regret, resolution for the future, and confession. And it is discussed like any other legal topic: what is indispensable, in what order, and so on. This is what we can call the small repentance, the formal, technical repentance. And then there is the great repentance, in which a person simply becomes someone else, is turned around, transformed. Therefore in the great repentance — what I called the second repentance — there are no legal rules about what is indispensable and what is not, and in what order. You don’t need all those details mentioned in the context of the small repentance; they emerge automatically, but you don’t need them. Because the moment you have changed, then you are a penitent — that’s obvious. You need legal details only in the channel where you go along the formal legal track. Then we tell him: fine, if you’re going along that track, this is what you need to do. But if you are a genuine penitent, no one has to tell you anything. A genuine penitent is a genuine penitent. There’s nothing to play with here. And I said that I began this line of thought with two interpretations of what “righteous,” “intermediate,” and “wicked” mean — whether it is a matter of counting commandments and sins, as the Emek Berakhah holds, or whether it means what your basic spiritual direction is: positive, negative, or the kind of person who has, as it were, two opposite tendencies within him, hovering between two sides — that is the intermediate person. And from that the whole issue follows: according to the second approach, repentance means turning your spiritual direction into a positive one; according to the first approach, repentance means erasing sins, simply checking off each sin as deleted. And therefore I explained why only repentance helps during the Ten Days of Repentance and not just doing more commandments, and so on — we saw various implications of that. We also saw in Maharal that he explicitly writes that there are two paths of repentance, learned from or governed by two different names in the list of the Holy One’s attributes: “ה’ ה'”, “אני ה’ לפני שיחטא ואחרי שיחטא וישוב” — that is the great repentance; and “ונקה”, yes, “מנקה הוא לשבים ואינו מנקה לשאינם שבים” — that is the small repentance. Otherwise, why would we need two attributes in the list of the Holy One’s attributes that both deal with repentance? I said that the difference is not — yes, Maharal says that the small repentance is repentance for some of the sins, and the great repentance is repentance for all of the sins. I said: if the difference were only quantitative, then do the small repentance several times and it would cover all the sins. It can’t be only a quantitative difference. So I said the difference is qualitative, not quantitative. If you regret one particular sin all the way, that regret cannot be only about that sin. If you truly regret, then you regret the very fact that you violated the divine command. It makes no difference whether it was selecting on the Sabbath, or not honoring your parents, or desecrating the Sabbath, or I don’t know, eating forbidden foods. It doesn’t matter at all what act you did. Deep regret, true regret, is regret over the very fact that you acted against the command. Therefore, in its essence, such regret is regret over all sins. There is no such thing as true regret over only some sins; conceptually it’s simply not defined. If it’s only over some sins, then it isn’t true regret, okay? Therefore, regret over all the commandments that Maharal speaks about is really the great repentance I mentioned earlier. And the small repentance is basically going through each individual sin one by one, checking them off; and the Holy One did us a kindness that even this is accepted, and it manages to erase sins for us. But then every sin you repented of, you repented of; every one you didn’t, you didn’t. “מנקה הוא לשבים ואינו מנקה לשאינם שבים” — whatever you repented of, yes; whatever not, not. That is said only of “ונקה”, not of “ה’ ה'”. “אני ה’ לפני שיחטא ואחרי שיחטא וישוב” — after he sins and returns, everything is erased; there is no such thing as some sins he returned from and some he did not, because if he truly returned, then there are no sins he returned from and others he did not. True regret is regret over everything. So I think Maharal’s intention is really these two mechanisms of repentance. And I brought various proofs for this point, that the great repentance does not need all the details — for example, one who betroths a woman “על מנת שאני צדיק”, on condition that I am righteous. Even though he isn’t known to be righteous, she is doubtfully betrothed. Why? Perhaps he had a thought of repentance. And if he had a thought of repentance, so what? Where are regret, resolution, verbal confession, abandoning the sin, and so on — for every sin he committed? Checking off all four boxes for every one? He did all that while saying “הרי את מקודשת לי”? He did all of that there? Obviously not. Another example is, yes, Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya, who in one hour — “יש קונה עולמו בשעה אחת” — who also committed every sin in the world, and suddenly cried and cried, and received atonement. “רבי אלעזר בן דורדיא מזומן לחיי העולם הבא”. Where are all the formal stages required in the process of repentance? He didn’t do them. So it’s quite clear that there we’re dealing with someone who truly returned. If he truly returned, then we don’t start accounting with him whether there was verbal confession or not, whether he went through all the sins — no, it’s not relevant. You were transformed, you’re now headed in a positive direction, you truly regret that you acted against the command, so that’s it — you are already something else.

Now I want to continue. That’s where we got to. Now I want to continue and talk about the grace involved in repentance, and once again I’ll distinguish here between these two mechanisms of repentance. I’m sharing here. One second. Here it is. So Mesillat Yesharim, at the end of chapter 4, writes as follows: “ואם תאמר, אם כן, מידת הרחמים למה היא עומדת, כיוון שעל כל פנים צריך לדקדק בדין על כל דבר? התשובה, ודאי מידת הרחמים היא קיומו של עולם, שלא היה עומד זולתו כלל וכלל” — yes, this is Rashi at the beginning of Genesis, where the Holy One wanted to create the world with the attribute of justice and saw that it would not work, so He joined to it the attribute of mercy. “ואף על פי כן, אין מידת הדין לוקה. וזה, כי לפי שורת הדין ממש, היה ראוי שהחוטא ייענש מיד, תכף לחטאו, בלי המתנה כלל. וגם שהעונש עצמו יהיה בחרון אף, כראוי למי שממרה פי הבורא יתברך שמו. ושלא יהיה תיקון לחטא כלל, כי הנה באמת, איך יתקן האדם את אשר עיוות, והחטא כבר נעשה? הרי שרצח האדם את חברו, הרי שנאף, איך יוכל לתקן הדבר הזה? היוכל להסיר המעשה העשוי מן המציאות?” What happened, happened. You can’t rewrite history. “אמנם, מידת הרחמים היא הנותנת הפך השלושה דברים שזכרנו, דהיינו, שייתן זמן לחוטא ולא ייכחד מן הארץ מיד כשחטא” — they wait a bit. “ושהעונש עצמו לא יהיה עד לכלה” — not to wipe him out, okay? “ושהתשובה תינתן לחוטאים בחסד גמור, שתחשב עקירת הרצון כעקירת המעשה” — although the deed was already done, now you regret it, your will becomes positive, and beyond the letter of the law this is treated as if you had not sinned. Not “we”; the Holy One, okay? “דהיינו, שבהיות השב מכיר את חטאו ומודה בו, ומתבונן על רעתו, ושב ומתחרט עליו חרטה גמורה דמעיקרא כחרטת הנדר ממש, שהוא מתנחם לגמרי, והיה חפץ ומשתוקק שמעולם לא היה נעשה הדבר ההוא, ומצטער בלבו צער חזק על שכבר נעשה הדבר, ועוזב אותו להבא ובורח ממנו, הנה עקירת הדבר מרצונו יחשב לו כעקירת הנדר ומתכפר לו. והוא מה שאמר הכתוב: ‘וסר עוונך וחטאתך תכופר’, שהעוון סר ממש מהמציאות ונאקר במה שעכשיו מצטער ומתנחם על מה שהיה למפרע. וזה חסד ודאי, שאינה משורת הדין”. Strict justice should not have required giving human beings a pass on what already happened, but this is a special act of grace. He does open by saying that in spite of everything — yes, he says, “ואף על פי כן אין מידת הדין לוקה”. It’s not clear exactly how he explains that. I mean, okay, there is grace here, but why is justice not undermined? It means that apparently — well, clearly no sin remains without a response. True, you are enabled to return, and once you return everything is fine, but it isn’t that they just let it go. They don’t just waive it for nothing. So he says it is grace, but justice is not undermined. Meaning there is some combination here of justice and grace. In any case, what he is basically claiming is that repentance is a special grace that the Holy One bestows on us; it shouldn’t really have worked. The mechanism of repentance should not really have helped us.

Now, yes.

[Speaker B] But in the case of murder — a murderer, the person who murdered — so? What is his repentance worth?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, what is it worth? For whom is it…? And if he selected on the Sabbath, what is his repentance worth? What? If he selected on the Sabbath?

[Speaker B] No, I mean in terms of his relationship with the Holy One. Fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here you are doing —

[Speaker B] — something to someone else. You killed him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but here too you selected.

[Speaker B] It’s not even a case where he can regret it in the normal sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too you selected, so what? You selected. What can you do? It already happened.

[Speaker B] Taking a life is like selecting?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say it’s like selecting. It’s the same idea. More severe — so what? It’s the same idea. Something happened, and still you can repent. There was damage here… there’s damage there too, you just don’t see it with your eyes. So what? Damage to a person’s soul. So what? What exactly is the difference? Damage is damage.

[Speaker D] So it’s more —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More severe, less severe — so what? What difference does that make? On the principled level, really it should not have been atoned for, and yet there is grace, beyond the letter of the law, and it is atoned for. Why? Justice is barren? He selected too — so what? What difference does it make whether it is against another person or against Heaven? The fact that toward another person you also have to appease your fellow — fine. But if you murdered him, he can no longer be appeased. So yes — his claim is basically that this is a special grace.

So Rabbi Elchanan, in Kovetz Ma’amarim — Elchanan Wasserman, yes? — in Kovetz Ma’amarim, the essay on repentance, raises an objection to this Mesillat Yesharim from the Talmud in Kiddushin. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says: even if a person was perfectly righteous all his life and rebelled at the end, he loses the former deeds, as it says, “צדקת הצדיק לא תצילנו ביום פשעו”. And even if a person was completely wicked all his life and repented at the end, his wickedness is no longer mentioned, as it says, “ורשעת הרשע לא יכשל בה ביום שובו מרשעו”. And why not let him be half sins and half merits? Why erase the past? Let the past remain where it is, and whatever he does from now on remain where it is, so that he is half and half. Reish Lakish said: this is when he regrets the former deeds. Meaning, there is someone who changes his way — for the better or for the worse — changes his way, but what was, was, and from now on he is changed. And there is someone who regrets what was. Now if from now on he continues, but he does not regret what was, then indeed it remains half and half. But if he regrets what was, then he loses his merits or his liabilities — whether he repented or went off the path, yes? So he loses what was in the past, for better or for worse. That is what the Talmud says.

Rabbi Elchanan asks: we know that the Holy One inclines toward grace. Meaning, the Holy One goes beyond the letter of the law to do good; He does not go beyond the letter of the law to do harm, right? To do harm is according to justice: you get what you deserve, but not more than you deserve. Reward or benefit — that the Holy One also gives beyond the letter of the law. So now, if Mesillat Yesharim is right, that regret should not really help according to justice, and it is a special grace that the Holy One did with us, that uprooting the will is like uprooting the deed — we erase history, what happened — then this should have helped only the penitent, but not the one who abandons righteousness. If I am now righteous and I regret what I did, then you say that by strict justice regret does not change what was, right? So only beyond the letter of the law? Fine — in the case of a penitent, beyond the letter of the law my sins are erased. But in the case of… the opposite, I don’t know what to call it — if someone leaves religion — if he regrets what he did, why should his good deeds be erased beyond the letter of the law? That’s going beyond the letter of the law to do harm. Do you see? So this Talmudic passage contradicts Mesillat Yesharim — that’s his point. Well, let’s see whether you’re yeshiva guys or not. What do you say about this question? I’m a yeshiva guy — I got stuck on this question. Yeshiva guys get stuck here, but solid householders immediately see that it’s not a question.

[Speaker D] No, no…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A hedge is also useful around this wicked deed. Why should what happened be erased? Think for a second. Once I was giving a lecture and I said this, and someone sitting there told me: I don’t understand. He said: suppose I go to the bank manager — I don’t remember whether this was his example or mine, but that was the gist. You go to the bank manager and say: listen, this bank is a wonderful bank, really first-class, as HaGashash would say, okay? So I have 10,000 shekels in my account, and I’m giving it to the bank employees. Buy yourselves Bazooka gum, all of you, okay? As a gift for the staff. Fine. The bank manager shakes his hand, says thank you very much, all good, goodbye. Next time someone else comes and says to the bank manager: listen, your people are really terrific. I have a minus 10,000 shekels in the bank, and I’m giving it to you — buy whatever you like with it, as a token of appreciation for your work. There too he’ll shake his hand and say thank you, and that’s it, all good? You can waive a positive balance you have, right? You can’t waive a negative balance, right?

[Speaker E] Right? So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore he can waive it. That’s not beyond the letter of the law — that’s the letter of the law. What did Rabbi Elchanan ask? Rabbi Elchanan asked: if regret over the past is beyond the letter of the law, then what good does it do when a righteous person rebels at the end and regrets the former deeds? What good does it do for him to give up what he did? Because giving up positive things you did is not beyond the letter of the law — it is the letter of the law. You can waive a credit balance you have. That’s why it works. But a penitent wants to waive the minus in his account. That doesn’t work according to the letter of the law. Sorry — according to the letter of the law it does not work; only beyond the letter of the law can it work.

[Speaker E] So the bank manager —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — being willing to accept your negative balance, that would be beyond the letter of the law. There you go. You yeshiva guys are tough customers. Very tough. Yes, that’s it. Need to reset. I thought there were a few practical householders here for dessert. In short, what I want to say is this: if you are a penitent, okay? If you are a penitent, you have a debit balance — sorry, a debt balance. Okay? Now you regret that debt balance; you want to waive it, erase it. Can you? You cannot erase a debt balance, right? Therefore by strict justice this cannot work. The Holy One, beyond the letter of the law, enables us nonetheless to do this — He erases the debt balance, okay? Now the reverse: a righteous person who regrets his former deeds, who rebels at the end, okay? He has a credit balance, right? Now he wants to waive the credit balance — he gives it up, he’s no longer righteous. A righteous person wants to…

[Speaker E] To waive the good deeds? He goes off the path.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Regrets the former deeds” — yes, exactly, he leaves religion. Now he wants to erase the credit balance he has. No problem. It’s yours. It’s your credit balance; if you want to erase it, enjoy. So that works according to the letter of the law, not beyond the letter of the law. It certainly works. Just as I can give you 100 shekels that I have in my account, I cannot give you a minus 100 shekels from my account unless you are willing to accept it beyond the letter of the law. And I can’t give you that on my own initiative just because I decide to, right? So what kind of objection is this?

Now, Mesillat Yesharim says that for a penitent, repentance cannot help according to strict justice, only beyond the letter of the law. So you can say to him: then why does it work in the negative direction? In the negative direction it works because erasing a credit balance works according to the letter of the law, not beyond the letter of the law. That’s why it works.

[Speaker D] What’s the difference? What do you mean by erase?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does the murder victim come back to life now?

[Speaker D] Does the murder victim come back to life?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does the murder victim come back to life? He asks. He regrets it, fine — so that means he didn’t…

[Speaker D] What does that have to do with regretting merits?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He regrets the acts he did. He cannot change the acts he did. All he can do is give up the bonus he gets. Now the question is whether it is a positive bonus or a negative bonus. Okay?

[Speaker B] Why…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The yeshiva guys are still having trouble with this? Fine, then we have to say something in your direction. The claim is apparently that the bonuses you receive cannot be detached from what actually happened in reality. If something happened in reality, then the result is the bonuses you got; therefore if you cannot change reality and rewrite history, then you cannot change it either positively or negatively. If we’re talking only about a bank balance, fine — only about the bonuses — then there is a difference. But if those bonuses only reflect things that happened in reality, the damage I caused or the good effects I caused in reality, then it really is the same thing. If you can’t change what happened in reality, then you can’t change it in either direction. Fine. One can force the objection, I suppose. Usually people say, “one can answer with difficulty”; we don’t usually say, “one can object with difficulty.” But okay, that’s the question.

[Speaker B] No problem — it’s his right. It’s just that the Holy One, beyond the letter of the law, doesn’t want to accept it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is willing to accept your positive things, beyond the letter of the law?

[Speaker B] Yes. If he’s not willing to accept your 1,000 shekels? If the bank manager were willing to accept your —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — 1,000 shekels, would you say he —

[Speaker B] — is doing it beyond the letter of the law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there were a policy not to accept… what do you mean a policy? He can choose not to accept. But he decided to accept the 1,000 shekels you gave him. Is that beyond the letter of the law? What does that have to do with anything? He can choose not to accept, fine. But I’m asking: he did decide to accept the 1,000 shekels you gave him. Do you call that beyond the letter of the law? Give me a brand-new Mercedes as a gift right now, fine? I’m willing to accept it. Did I do something beyond the letter of the law? I was willing to… I could have refused, right? So is that beyond the letter of the law? You can say that. You can say lots of things. You can say it, but it’s not correct.

[Speaker B] You don’t —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — have to accept anything.

[Speaker B] You —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — don’t have to accept anything, but —

[Speaker B] — that still isn’t beyond the letter of the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so you can play with the words and say it. I said, you can say whatever you like. It’s just not correct. In short, the claim is that this is the objection Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman raised to the Chafetz Chaim. What? He raised it to the Chafetz Chaim — after all he was the Chafetz Chaim’s student. He raised it to the Chafetz Chaim and got an answer from him: this is repentance out of love, that is repentance out of fear — he made various distinctions there. Rabbi Elchanan himself uses this in a different direction. He wants to claim — and he also cites Ramchal in Derekh Hashem — that in every commandment and every sin there are two aspects. One aspect is the problematic or positive result of the commandment or the sin.

[Speaker D] And the second aspect —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — is obedience or disobedience. Okay? Suppose I keep the Sabbath. First of all there is the benefit involved in a person keeping the Sabbath, some sort of spiritual benefit or another. And second, there is responding to the Holy One’s command. That in itself is something of value. If I desecrate the Sabbath, then there is the problematic result of Sabbath desecration, and there is also rebellion against the command of the Holy One. Those are two things. So he says there are various practical implications of this. If someone intended to eat pork and ended up eating lamb — someone intended to eat pork and ended up eating lamb — then from the standpoint of disobedience there is a problem: he was not obeying the Holy One’s command. But the bad results won’t occur in practice because he ate lamb, not pork. Okay? So here there is only the subjective dimension, not the objective one. And what is the opposite case? He intended to eat lamb and ended up with pork — which is what we call inadvertent sin. Right? So in an inadvertent sin, what happens? There is no rebellion against the command, but there is the sin itself, objectively. So those are the two sides of the coin. In any case, for our purposes, he wants to claim that according to strict justice, uprooting the will uproots the subjective dimension. Meaning, if I was once wicked — I did not obey the Holy One’s command — and now I repented and became righteous, there is no reason to relate to my wickedness anymore. It no longer exists; I am now righteous. So that follows from strict justice. In other words, the judgment of the person can change through regret according to strict justice, but erasing the deed is beyond the letter of the law. Because the deed is a deed; you cannot erase it. Okay? That’s his claim. Therefore, for a penitent, “עקירת הרצון היא כעקירת המעשה” means that uprooting the will in itself, with respect to the person, is according to strict justice. The fact that it is also considered like uprooting the deed — that is beyond the letter of the law. But in the negative case, with that wicked fellow who regrets — I mean the righteous person who regrets his former deeds — there indeed the will is uprooted, but the deeds remain. Only his will is uprooted, meaning he will not receive reward because he is no longer the person who deserves reward for those good deeds done back then; he is now a different person. But the deeds really do remain — that’s how he wants to argue.

[Speaker B] If a person wants to keep some commandments and says, “Some I do, some I don’t, by my own choice.” Say, “I sanctify the Sabbath, but I watch soccer,” I don’t know. So then can you say, okay, but in his will he’s basically fine regarding Sabbath observance?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he’s not fine. What do you mean? It’s a partial will, so he’s partially fine.

[Speaker B] The question is whether that counts as canceling everything —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It counts as partly yes and partly no. He’ll get reward where reward is due, and punishment where punishment is due. Why do we have to decide that it’s all or nothing? Why do you —

[Speaker B] No, because it’s a kind of hypocritical game.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, a game? It’s not a hypocritical game. He thinks this is something he wants to do and that is something he doesn’t want to do. What do you mean hypocritical? That’s his decision. It’s actually very straightforward: according to his decision, that’s what he does. Fine, what will he get?

[Speaker B] You won’t say, okay, if you accepted, then accept everything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, he’s not okay. Okay — for that he will pay. But for what he does accept, why shouldn’t he receive reward for that? What’s the problem? He is okay in that respect and not okay in this respect. Fine.

Anyway, the claim is that perhaps there — maybe that was your point — I think regarding the person himself you’re right. Meaning, the fact that he does something commanded is not really obedience to the command, because if it were obedience to the command he would do everything, because that too is commanded. So why does he decide to do this and not that? Apparently he doesn’t really have commitment to the command. But as for the positive benefit of the act — what he did, he did; what he did not do, he did not do. So here too I think you can apply it using Rabbi Elchanan’s distinction.

In any case, I want to argue that one can really divide this in relation to the great repentance and the small repentance. Let’s think for a moment: when the righteous person regrets his former deeds, goes off the path and regrets his former deeds, what is that more like? Great repentance or small repentance? It’s apostasy, not repentance, but is it “great apostasy” or “small apostasy”? Great, right?

[Speaker D] It’s —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously he did not perform a formal act: regret, abandoning the commandments, resolution for the future not to do commandments anymore, and confession. He truly regrets what he did; he has changed. Right? Clearly this is the great process, not the small formal one, right? The great process works according to strict justice. If you changed, you changed. What complaint can anyone have against you regarding things that were, or give you reward for things that were? Today you are someone else, a different person; you have changed, okay? So that is according to strict justice, not beyond the letter of the law. Therefore one who regrets the former deeds really does become wicked; he loses those merits there because he is someone else. Those merits belong to someone who no longer exists. True, he will not receive those merits, because it’s not him. He is not the one who deserves merits for that. He is a different person; he changed. Why should you give reward for commandments to a person who is now wicked? He is now telling you: I don’t care about all these commandments. He even regrets the former deeds, after all. So what, are you going to force reward onto him for the commandments he did? No — that is according to strict justice, okay? Likewise, in the case of a penitent, in great repentance, it is according to strict justice, not beyond the letter of the law. And here I preserve the symmetry between the wicked and the righteous. And it is a real symmetry, because on the wicked side there is no such thing as a small repentance. For a righteous person who rebels and regrets his former deeds, it is always… “leaving religion,” yes? — always the great version, not the small one. Only on the repentance side do we have both great repentance and small repentance. On the apostasy side there is no such thing as “small apostasy”; it is always big, okay? Therefore there it works according to strict justice. In repentance, it depends what kind: in the small repentance it is beyond the letter of the law — it should not really have worked; in the great repentance it is according to strict justice. Right, I said…

[Speaker E] Right, but he doesn’t deserve punishment for them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is a different person; now he is righteous. What, are you going to punish a righteous person for something that somebody else in another phase did? Let me ask you something. Suppose someone sinned against you, okay? As a human being, not the Holy One.

[Speaker E] In terms of justice, in reality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, certainly. Here, let me ask you —

[Speaker E] Certainly, certainly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me ask you —

[Speaker E] — now —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — a question. You, not a court, okay? Someone sinned against you, okay? And now let’s say you somehow know what is in his heart and everything is transparent; Elijah the Prophet came and told you: the guy has completely turned around, he regrets it, he is now a totally different person. I ask you now — you, as a person, not the Holy One, nothing like that — do you forgive him?

[Speaker E] You —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — as a person, not the Holy One, nothing. It seems to me obviously yes.

[Speaker E] Fine, but just to insist on it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you want? To punish him for things he did in a different phase? Everything is irreversible. Again you return to murder. Everything a person does is irreversible. Everything a person does is irreversible. Murder is terrible, severe, but essentially it’s the same thing. What’s the difference? Obviously — what do you mean? The person is a different person. What do you want from him? He truly changed. What happens, by the way, in an earthly court — I won’t have time to get to this — but in an earthly court in my opinion this also works, like I told you earlier. The accepted view in my circles is that it doesn’t work, but the standard explanation of that view is because we cannot know what is in his heart, because we are human beings, not the Holy One.

[Speaker E] But —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we could know — and that is the assumption here — if we could know, it would work even in an earthly court. The whole point is that it doesn’t help because… I claim that in practice it really does help — not merely that we cannot know, but that in practice it helps. And I have proofs for that, but that’s a topic for separate lectures. Huh? You can say that this is beyond the letter of the law in principle, but you can say “beyond the letter of the law” about almost anything, I suppose. But I’m asking whether you would forgive according to strict justice, not beyond the letter of the law. Okay? The question is whether that would be beyond the letter of the law or within it. You can forgive beyond the letter of the law too. I am only claiming that if you really knew with certainty that the person had truly changed — Elijah the Prophet came and told you — after all, ordinarily you can’t know, okay? He really is a different person. So why should I not forgive him? What do you mean — why should I insist on things he did in an entirely different phase? It’s not even him anymore. Huh? No, in my opinion, according to my claim, that is the letter of the law. You want revenge? Get over it. Revenge is not a positive emotion — get over it. Overcoming revenge is not beyond the letter of the law; there is a prohibition: “לא תיקום ולא תיטור”. Therefore I claim that the great repentance and the great apostasy work according to strict justice. What works beyond the letter of the law is the small repentance, because in the small repentance you have not changed. You are the same person; you went through some technical process. Fine, the Holy One is willing to accept that, and that is beyond the letter of the law. A person, for example, would not necessarily accept such a thing — probably he would not. But even if he did accept it, we would say: well, he’s a truly special righteous person if he accepts that kind of repentance, because it is not something you would expect every person to accept. Whereas the previous kind of repentance — any normal person I would expect to accept that. Right? And if not, then it’s just a psychological problem; he can’t get over it. But on the level of value, clearly yes — you should forgive. What do you want? This is already a different person. What?

[Speaker D] I don’t think so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You need to be an angel because we don’t really see that he changed. If you could see before your eyes how much he changed, then… Look, this suddenly reminds me of something. I once saw a film by a bereaved mother — her son was killed in some attack at French Hill, I think, at the hitchhiking post there. An officer I knew, Hovav something, was also killed there. And she was a peace activist, left-wing, and… in short, dialogue with Palestinians and so on. She made a film about the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa. You know that phenomenon? It’s extraordinary. I think people should really see that film. Huh? It was Tutu — Desmond Tutu — even more than Mandela. Desmond Tutu. Yes.

[Speaker B] What —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What happened there — after all, there had been apartheid for many years. They abused Blacks in absolutely insane ways, okay? At some point things turned around. Nelson Mandela became president of South Africa — everything changed. There was a very serious fear of revenge there, and revenge one can understand very well, okay? Desmond Tutu, who was the chief bishop of South Africa, a very important figure too, like Mandela, declared that there would be no revenge, and they set up local committees that he called the Reconciliation and Truth Committees. And this is how it worked: if a white police officer or some white official or various people who had done problematic things came before the committee and expressed genuine regret before it, they walked out as they were. Maybe they got some community service or something, but that was it. Nothing was done to them. And once again — I have no proof that the regret was genuine. Maybe they did it to escape punishment. Doesn’t matter. That was the policy. Now, it’s unbelievable. They expected bloodshed there. They really expected a massacre after all that happened. By the way, on both sides, because the whites still had more power, even though government had passed to the Blacks. In other words, it really could have been a disaster there, and Desmond Tutu turned the whole thing into a procedure of forgiveness. That is a very Christian spirit. Here it couldn’t work. Here it’s Jews and Muslims. No, really. In the culture of Jews and Muslims it can’t work; in my view it can only work among Christians. And that is the mistake she made in the film, because she wanted to import it here. Huh? Maybe. I don’t know. I think among Christians generally this is more part of the Christian ethos.

[Speaker B] No, they don’t want to carry the burden of anger, they —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They shoot him in the head and unload the anger.

[Speaker B] No, he waits to shoot him in the head.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not talking about someone insulting you in the street. We’re talking about life-long persecution, killing people, abusing them for decades. This isn’t some minor offense… Okay, for a nation really to want that — that’s a step I think deserves a tremendous amount of appreciation. Yes, okay. Okay, no — South Africa today doesn’t look much better either.

[Speaker E] But I’m saying — what was he punished for?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What was he punished for, David? Huh? What was he punished for, David?

[Speaker E] Absalom — but what, so…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said that was punishment for what he did? Who told you that? I don’t know.

[Speaker E] I don’t know —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commentators. I don’t see why you’re forced —

[Speaker E] It’s not —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — to see it as punishment. That’s what happened there.

[Speaker E] The question is, what is the meaning of that surrender?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know how far it was…

[Speaker E] I have no —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — idea. Look, I don’t deal with the Bible, and not by accident, because with the Bible you can do almost whatever you want. So I don’t think I can bring proofs from there for anything. But I’m saying, in general, I think it’s straightforward reasoning that someone who truly repents, and you know that he truly repented, deserves forgiveness according to strict justice. It’s not… And the Holy One can know what is in a person’s heart. We cannot know, and therefore for us it is much more problematic.

In any case, that is basically my claim. But if so, then it turns out that the special grace the Holy One bestowed through repentance is with the small repentance. In the great repentance there is no grace; it is accepted according to strict justice. Okay? And now, first of all, Mesillat Yesharim itself is talking about the great repentance, not the small one, when it says this is grace. Right? He says: “עקירת הרצון היא כעקירת המעשה” — this is someone who truly regretted, really regretted. And he also says: after all, the act was done — how can it be uprooted? He doesn’t say that because you didn’t really regret, no. Even if you truly regretted, the act was done! It was done. In other words, it doesn’t sound like he is talking about the small repentance. And more generally, in many places we see that repentance is some kind of special grace. In many places it says that repentance is a special grace, and it is not plausible that they are speaking only about the small repentance. So apparently even in the great repentance there is something beyond the letter of the law, and the question is what that is. Here I want to make the following claim. This is also in Sha’arei Teshuvah — someone mentioned it in the previous lecture. Huh?

[Speaker E] “He repented” — there’s a song like that by Arik איינשטיין.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Anyway, in Sha’arei Teshuvah he writes as follows: “ודע כי החוטא כאשר יתאחר לשוב מחטאתו, יכבד עליו מאד עונשו בכל יום, כי הוא יודע כי יצא הקצף עליו, ויש לו מנוס לנוס שמה, והמנוס הוא התשובה, והוא עומד במרדו, והינו ברעתו, ובידו לצאת מתוך ההפכה, ולא יגור מפני האף והחימה, על כן רעתו רבה. ואמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה על הענין הזה” — in Kohelet Rabbah — “משל לכת של ליסטים, שכבשם המלך בבית האסורים, וחתרו מחתרת, פרצו ויעבורו, ונשאר אחד מהם. בא שר בית הסוהר, וראה מחתרת חתורה, והאיש ההוא עודנו עצור, ויך אותו במטהו. אמר לו, קשה יום, הלא המחתרת חתורה לפניך, ואיך לא מיהרת הימלט על נפשך?” Yes? That reminds me — when we were in the yeshiva high school about two and a half months ago — all the guys ran off to the settlements, the cheerful 1970s, mid-1970s. All the guys ran off to the settlements, and there were one or two who stayed behind, who didn’t run off with their class, a year or two above us. Rabbi Yogel came there to the dormitory and said to them: what, everyone runs away and you stay? What is this? You’re nobodies. Yes — even though ostensibly he was supposed to chase after us and stop us. So here too, yes — the prison chief comes to him and says: the tunnel is right in front of you. How did you not flee? Meaning, even though the prison chief is supposed to make sure they don’t escape.

Anyway — what is this? It is some sort of parable for repentance. What is the point behind the idea of repentance? He says: there is a tunnel already dug for you — how can you not use it? What is the moral? You have this concept of repentance, right? The grace of… how can you not use it? But the special grace of the Holy One is that He dug that tunnel so that we can escape. Notice: this is a different conception from what I said before. In the conception I gave before, what was the special grace in the small repentance we discussed? That it is accepted, right? That it is accepted. The great grace in the great repentance is not that it is accepted. Its being accepted follows from strict justice. If you did great repentance, then according to strict justice you deserve forgiveness. The grace is that such a mechanism exists at all. What do I mean? What is the idea here? Let me try to explain this a bit more.

Maimonides, at the beginning of chapter 2, writes as follows: “איזו היא תשובה גמורה? זה שבא לידו דבר שעבר בו, ואפשר בידו לעשותו, ופירש ולא עשה מפני התשובה”. Yes? He basically transgressed in some matter, came back into a new situation — the same situation itself — and did not fail, because of repentance. “כיצד? הרי שבא על אשה בעבירה, ולאחר זמן נתייחד עמה, והוא עומד באהבתו בה ובכח גופו, ובמדינה שעבר בה” — all the circumstances are the same — “ופירש ולא עבר, זהו בעל תשובה גמורה. והוא ששלמה אמר: וזכור את בוראיך בימי בחורותיך. ואם לא שב אלא בימי זקנותו, ובעת שאי אפשר לו לעשות מה שהיה עושה, אף על פי שאינה תשובה מעולה, מועלת היא לו, ובעל תשובה הוא. אפילו עבר כל ימיו, ועשה תשובה ביום אחד, ביום מיתתו” — sorry — “ומת בתשובתו, כל עוונותיו נמחלים, שנאמר: עד אשר לא” the sun and the light and the moon grow dark, etc. Notice that here it says “זהו בעל תשובה גמורה”, right? And here it says “בעל תשובה הוא”. What’s the difference? The first one actually changed. Right? The first one is in exactly the same situation, everything is the same, and he behaves differently. We isolated the single variable that changed between the two situations, because everything else is the same. What changed? There he was wicked and now he became righteous. If all the other circumstances are the same, that means he is a true penitent. So he is a complete penitent. Fine? According to strict justice his repentance is accepted. There is another person who repented, but it is no longer in his power, there is no longer… fine, it’s not a great test, but that too is accepted. That parallels more the small repentance. You did the procedure, but you didn’t really change when you could have changed, and therefore it is not complete repentance. You are a penitent, but not complete repentance.

There is a Pachad Yitzchak — on Purim — where Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner speaks about “עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי”. What is the idea of getting drunk so as not to distinguish between “cursed is Haman” and “blessed is Mordechai”? The whole work of the day is precisely to distinguish between Haman and Mordechai. So what is the point of this? He says: by way of analogy, the Mishnah in Yoma speaks about the two goats. It says they need to be equal in height, weight, price, everything. It’s not indispensable, but ideally they should be completely equal. Why do they need to be completely equal? The deeper the similarity, the deeper the distinction. Meaning: if the two goats are exactly alike, one goes into the Holy of Holies and one goes to Azazel, then you cannot attribute it to any external parameter — that one is better, finer, taller, shorter, fatter — nothing. They are exactly the same. They cost the same, look the same, everything. So what is the difference? The difference is that by lot one came up for the Lord and one came up for Azazel. That’s all. You need to equalize all the other parameters — isolate variables, like in a scientific experiment — in order to sharpen in contrast the difference that remains. And the lot there is of course a metaphor for their choice. This one chooses good and that one chooses evil. Therefore the two goats have to be made equal. And the same goes for “cursed is Haman” and “blessed is Mordechai.” In children’s books they always draw Haman as some disgusting, ugly figure with an evil face, right? And Mordechai is an angel. That is an educational mistake. An educational mistake, because people think the difference between Mordechai and Esau lies in their innate qualities — they are just like that. Jacob was born an angel and Esau was born an animal. No. They were born the same; they chose differently. Therefore you need to draw them exactly the same. Equal in height, weight, and price — but this one chose this and that one chose that. That is the difference between them. Jacob and Esau, by the way — there is a whole approach about Jacob and Esau. They were born and then exchanged roles, and so on. And in the womb, according to the midrash the Sages say — Rashi brings it — in the womb they didn’t know who would be righteous and who would be wicked. It was not predetermined. It wasn’t that Esau was wicked from the womb and Jacob righteous from the womb. There are other midrashim saying that he wanted to come out by houses of idolatry and so on, but it doesn’t say who wanted to come out here and who wanted to come out there. In any case, there is a midrash that says they didn’t know who was who. Stronger, prettier — that’s already a matter of how you draw him. But he was red-haired. Anyway, in the end the difference between Jacob and Esau is not in their innate qualities, but in what they chose. Therefore the principle says: draw them the same in the children’s books, and show that this one chose evil and that one chose good. That is the difference between them — not that one was ugly, disgusting, repulsive, and the other had a shining angelic face, okay? It’s just…

So he says: the deeper the similarity, the deeper the distinction. You have to make the two things similar in order to make the distinction. Here too, Maimonides says the same thing: how do you know that a person is a penitent? If he is in exactly the same situation, all the circumstances are identical to the previous one, what remains? That there he was bad and here he chose to be good. That’s all. His choice is the difference. But if the circumstances are different, then perhaps the difference is because of the changed circumstances, not because he repented. So that is only an indication that the person really turned into something else, that he is a genuine penitent. The circumstances are the way to discern that, to create that contrast. And that is what Maimonides writes in law 4, three laws later: “מדרכי התשובה להיות השב צועק תמיד לפני השם בבכי ובתחנונים, ועושה צדקה כפי כוחו, ומתרחק הרבה מן הדבר שחטא בו, ומשנה שמו, כלומר: אני אחר, ואיני אותו האיש שעשה אותן המעשים, ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה, וגולה ממקומו, שגלות מכפרת עוון, מפני שגורמת לו להיכנע ולהיות עניו ושפל רוח”. Meaning: I am not the same person. I am someone else.

[Speaker B] Wait, Rabbi — regarding the woman, just taking that as an example: if he now decides to separate from that woman, I don’t know, moves to another country — did he repent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he repented. But repentance — why repentance?

[Speaker B] Because he didn’t put himself again into the… he ran away from the experiment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, exactly — wait, that’s an interesting question in itself. Since you asked, I’ll say something. In principle, he is a penitent the moment he became a different person. Now, in section 1 Maimonides proposes an experiment: how will you know that you are a different person? In law 4 he describes how one becomes a different person. Not how I identify whether you became one, but how you do that work. Okay? It’s not the same thing.

[Speaker B] No, for myself — do I need to test myself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, no, that’s a different question. Therefore I say, no, that’s a different question. In law 1 he’s talking about an experiment for how I test my being… wait — my being a different person. In law 4 he’s talking about the question of how you are supposed to become a different person. As for the experiment itself, the commentators on Maimonides — for example the Sefat Emet and others — ask: a person isn’t supposed to put himself into temptation. What, you’re supposed to go into some place and provoke yourself and see whether you…? That itself may involve prohibitions, and perhaps lead to prohibitions. So some want to claim yes: that as part of the repentance process you are allowed, and perhaps even ought, to put yourself into temptation, because that is part of the process of repentance. But the accepted understanding of Maimonides is no, not like that. It is a hypothetical experiment. You don’t actually have to do it. You need to get to a point where even if you were in the same circumstances and faced the same temptations, you would not sin. It’s not that you now have to conduct this experiment in practice. Okay? Therefore law 4 is the practical one; law 1 is only an indication of how we can define that he has changed in such a way that even if theoretically he came back to the same place — or practically, unwillingly, whatever — he should not deliberately put himself into the situation. But if he does enter the same situation — yes? — as it says, “עד שיעיד עליו יודע תעלומות שלא ישוב לזה החטא לעולם”. Right? That is “what is complete repentance?” — so says Maimonides, and again notice, complete repentance — “עד שיעיד עליו יודע תעלומות שלא ישוב לזה החטא לעולם”. Well then, what? All of us return to the same sin a year later. All of us find ourselves in the same situation another year later. So what? Therefore all the commentators jump on Maimonides and say: “Until the Knower of hidden things testifies about him” means at that moment. At that moment I am in a state such that in that state I would not return to the sin. It does not always last, and afterward I may fall. But that doesn’t matter; that’s future. When asked, “But what is your state right now?” — my state right now is that right now I would not sin. That is called “שלא ישוב לזה החטא לעולם”. It is not a prophecy about what will happen in practice in the future; it’s a thought experiment. In your present state, you would not come to sin — that is complete repentance. That is what Maimonides says: he is a complete penitent, remember? That is the great repentance.

In principle, in Maimonides, and I think quite consistently, when he speaks about the great repentance he speaks of the complete penitent. When he speaks about the small repentance, he says “this is a penitent,” “who is a penitent.” So there are different chapters devoted to the great repentance and the small repentance. Where he defines the required acts, that is the small repentance. Where he talks about repentance in the sense… yes, here, you see, he is not speaking legally. What, going into exile, changing your name and… it’s not that there is a legal obligation to change your name. He is telling you how to succeed in doing great repentance, not giving the technical legal details.

Now I want to understand, and use this to understand something more fundamental. Earlier we said there is grace in the very existence of the tunnel, in the very possibility of repentance. In the small repentance, the grace is that the repentance is accepted, because after all you haven’t really changed. The Holy One, beyond the letter of the law, accepts your repentance. In the great repentance, if you did it, then by strict justice the repentance is accepted. So what is the grace? The fact that you can do it at all. Why? What’s the problem here? So let’s look for a moment at the problem. We said that the great repentance is to turn oneself around and really change one’s spiritual direction, to become a different person: I am not the same person. Now you have to understand — this is paradoxical on the logical level. Not that it is psychologically difficult. Obviously it is psychologically difficult. I’m not talking about psychological difficulty. It is logically impossible. Why is it logically impossible?

Suppose that you — yes, let’s take a very simplified case, a “point donkey,” as physicists say — when they want to understand how a donkey works, they start with a point donkey, okay? So let’s begin with a toy model. Suppose there is a person who has one principle in his world guiding his behavior, and that principle is maximum reward, minimum punishment. Eye for eye? Minimum punishment. Fine? That is the criterion, that’s all. He has no other value in his world besides that, okay? He wants the world to come with minimum punishment and maximum reward. A towering saint. There is not a clause in the Mishnah Berurah on which he doesn’t take the strictest possible position according to all opinions. The man is hysterical, okay? Or obsessive-compulsive. But everything is for maximum reward, minimum punishment, okay?

Now you want to convince him to start serving for its own sake. Maimonides in chapter 10 of the laws of repentance says that one should not do it for the hope of reward or fear of punishment, but should do the truth because it is truth. Okay? Let’s try to persuade him to serve for its own sake. How do we do that? By giving him greater reward? Right — if you serve for its own sake you’ll get greater reward. What else can you say? After all, you have to speak to him in his own terms, right? If we are trying to persuade him, I can’t just tell him my own view — that doesn’t help. I have to explain to him why, according to his own view, he should act differently. Right? But according to his own view, he should not act differently. That’s his view! What do you want me to do with him? And now understand — yes, this reminds me of the story about Adam HaKohen, who wanted to repent on his deathbed in order to refute the Sages’ statement that even the wicked do not repent at the entrance to Hell. And now you understand — such repentance is impossible. Because it isn’t repentance. That is exactly the problem.

So there is a sort of tangle here. Don’t think now about me trying to persuade him — think about the person persuading himself. How is he supposed now to change himself and move from serving not for its own sake, for reward and punishment, to serving for its own sake? How can that be done? Either way you look at it — I’ll formulate it more sharply — if he reached the conclusion that one should serve for its own sake, then he doesn’t need to change himself; he has already changed, he is already there. Right? But if he is still in the situation where his ideology is maximum reward, minimum punishment, then what does it mean that he will change — who changes whom? After all, he believes that. Why should he now adopt some other value if he doesn’t think it’s correct? And if he does think it’s correct, then he has already adopted it. He doesn’t need to change anything; he is already there.

[Speaker B] But if suddenly his rabbi comes and tells him, “What? You need to improve this, to do things for their own sake.” Then what does he think?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does he think it’s an improvement or not?

[Speaker B] No — suppose he thinks it isn’t right. But let’s say because he respects his rabbi, the rabbi tells him: “Now do all the commandments whose reward is lowest.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Don’t do commandments” — it doesn’t matter. As long as he hasn’t… then no, he has not repented.

[Speaker B] So —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s like Adam HaKohen. He has not repented, because he doesn’t believe it.

[Speaker B] But maybe slowly, over time, he trains himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean slowly? This isn’t about training — that is exactly the point. I’m not speaking about psychological difficulty. I’m talking about a logical problem. Think — when I make a change in myself, after all the process of repentance is not…

[Speaker B] But if someone tells him —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If someone tells him — so what? In the end he has to decide to accept it. And if he accepts it, then he has already changed. So he doesn’t need to change; he already changed.

[Speaker B] I’m saying — let me explain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you want to make… when you demand of a person to repent — wait, wait — when you demand of a person to repent, you demand two things of him: first, to move to another state, right? And second, to do so deliberately in order to improve himself, right? It’s not that it just happened to me and suddenly I became different — that’s not repentance. Repentance — wait, wait, wait — repentance means I am carrying out a deliberate process, right? Whose purpose is to arrive at a better state. Now I ask: that person carrying out the deliberate process already thinks that state is better, right? Because otherwise he would not undertake the process. After all, if he thinks that state is better, then he is already there — he doesn’t need to carry out the process. And the question is: how did it happen in the first place that suddenly he thinks that state is better? That probably happened by itself, not deliberately. So that’s not… forget his rabbi for the moment — I’m asking how it happened to him. If it happened because he truly did it deliberately, that can’t be. Why should he deliberately do that? If he believes in one set of values, will he deliberately replace them with another? He will replace them if he thinks the other values are more correct. But if he thinks they are more correct, then he’s already there. He doesn’t need to do anything. He already thinks it’s more correct — done, he has already repented. So there is no way to describe a deliberate process of repentance.

[Speaker D] No, it’s not only logic. What? These are just words.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? People always tell me that. Whenever I raise a theological issue: “No, well, life isn’t just logic.” These are words. Life is only logic. Fair enough?

[Speaker E] Maybe he misunderstood himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s something else. But then it’s not repentance; it’s just discovering a mistake. That’s not repentance. Repentance means to improve yourself, do you understand? And I’m saying: there is no such thing as “improving yourself” in the sense of turning yourself into someone else. What, am I like Baron Munchausen? I’ll grab myself by my own hair and pull myself out of the pit? There is no such thing. If I’m in the pit, I’m in the pit. So there is a kind of dilemma here. If I already think that other state is better, then I’ve already repented. So it wasn’t deliberate; it just happened to me. And if I don’t think the other state is better, then why would I strive to get to that state? After all, I don’t think it’s better. There’s no… I’m talking about the question of… suddenly I think it’s better.

[Speaker E] And what happened? How did you turn around?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, exactly! That’s what I call “not deliberate.” I don’t know — it happened to me. But no, that’s not repentance. Repentance is a process you are supposed to do deliberately, not something that just happens to you. If it happens to you, you get no credit for it — it happened to you. So what? Someone hit me on the head with a hammer and suddenly changed things in there. Right. So I’m saying that therefore this is impossible. That is exactly what I’m talking about. The process I called great repentance is impossible on the logical level, not just the psychological one. It is impossible, because repentance is a process I am required to do, not a process that merely happens to me. If it happens to me, I deserve no credit for it. I do repentance — regret — meaning, I enter into it, I regret, I understand, until I become a better person, a different person. But that means I am striving toward that state. But if I’m striving toward that state, then I already think that state is better, no? So I’m already there! What do you mean give something up? Why should he give it up? If those are his convictions, why would he give them up? You’re presenting it as if this were just an impulse.

[Speaker G] He knew it, but he didn’t believe it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean he knew it? That doesn’t matter. You’re presenting it as though working for reward and punishment was just an impulse in him. Then you say: he really understood that serving for its own sake is the truly correct thing, but he had an impulse, so he acted for reward and against punishment. Okay — that I can understand. A person then repents, gives up his impulses, and goes back to doing what he truly believes in. Fine? No, no — what difference does it make what he recognized? That’s not the issue.

[Speaker G] The question is what he thought. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should he move? What do you mean “in order to move”? No. He can’t do anything. After all, he believes this. Why should he turn himself into something else? No, that cannot happen. It won’t happen.

[Speaker G] It just won’t happen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it cannot happen. That’s what I’m saying. No, it cannot happen. It’s an impossible process. If a traumatic event happened to him — again, that’s not deliberate, that’s exactly the point. If someone smashed me on the head with a hammer and changed various things in me and suddenly I became a towering saint, am I a penitent? Do I deserve credit for repenting? No. Repentance is a process in which you recognize that you are sinning, recognize your problematic state, and strive to reach a better one.

[Speaker B] So he —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the outset, keeping the Sabbath was already his value. So he doesn’t need to repent; he is already there. Now I want to sharpen this a bit more. For this I need the problem known in philosophy as weakness of will. There is — let’s formulate it as Donald Davidson, the American analytic philosopher, formulates it. There is a huge literature on this; it fills shelves in philosophy libraries. But he puts it like this. We essentially have three assumptions, each of which seems very reasonable.

One assumption: what a person thinks is the right thing — that is what he wants to do. “Right” here in the broad sense, not only morally right, but after considering all his beliefs — okay? Morality, interests, desire, everything. So after he weighs everything, this is what he thinks is right to do. If that’s what he thinks, then presumably that’s what he wants to do, right? Second assumption: if he wants to do something, presumably that’s what he will do, unless something else prevents him — stops him, doesn’t let him, impulses, whatever. But in principle, as long as it is in his power, what he wants is what he will do, right? That’s the second assumption. It too sounds reasonable. Third, there is what he calls uncontrollable actions. What are uncontrollable actions? When we talk about sin, usually — when we think to ourselves, or about the concept of sin in general — sin means doing an act that I myself understand is not okay. Right? That is called sin. Because if I don’t understand that it isn’t okay, then I’m just coerced, and it isn’t sin. A sin for which I need repentance is the kind where I understand it isn’t okay and I do it anyway.

To make it more concrete: let’s say I’m on a diet, okay? Suppose someone decided to go on a diet for his own reasons — medical, aesthetic, whatever. Now he sees a cream cake sparkling at him from the table, okay? And he doesn’t hold out — he eats it. He eats the cream cake. Now I ask him: well? What does he say to himself? “I was weak,” right? “My will just wasn’t strong enough.” In other words he is saying: I really understood that I shouldn’t eat it, but I didn’t do what I understood — I was weak. That is what Davidson calls an uncontrollable action, okay?

Now Davidson’s claim, in addition to the first two assumptions, is a third claim: sometimes a person has uncontrollable actions. Sometimes a person sins. “Sins” here in the broadest sense, not necessarily a legal or moral sin. “Sin” means to miss the mark, to go in a direction he himself believes he should not go in. Now notice: “should go” after summing up his entire range of considerations — not only morally. Fine? Suppose a hired killer — that’s not an uncontrollable action. He understands that murder is bad, okay? But he wants to make money. So the value or interest of money overrides the moral value, and indeed he does exactly what he decided. That is not an uncontrollable action. It fits perfectly into the first two assumptions.

Now he says that these three assumptions, each of which independently sounds very plausible and reasonable, are not compatible with one another. Because if everything you think is right is what you want, and what you want is what you do, then how can there be cases where you do things that you do not think are the right things to do?

Now let’s go back to the cream cake to sharpen it a bit, because at first it’s hard to grasp. This is a huge problem in philosophy, by the way — it really is a real problem. I’m not sure there’s any answer. It sounds like some word game; it’s not a word game. It’s a real problem, a serious one. Think of the cream cake. The person says to me: look, I myself knew it wasn’t right for me to eat cream cake, but I did it anyway. I ate it anyway. I fell. My will was weak. I ask him: tell me, were you coerced? Meaning, you were incapable of restraining yourself — an irresistible impulse? Fine. Then it isn’t sin. You don’t need repentance for it, right? It isn’t sin; you were coerced. Right? Even in criminal responsibility, if it’s an irresistible impulse there is no criminal liability, okay? So you weren’t coerced, right? You weren’t coerced. Rather, the desire for pleasure overcame the desire to diet, okay? Then what are you telling me, that you did not do what you wanted? That is exactly what you wanted. You wanted the pleasure more than you wanted the diet, that’s all. You’re telling yourself stories. But no — you made your calculation, and that outweighed that, and therefore you did it.

So what is he really saying? “Excuse me, my impulse overpowered me.” Fine. Your impulse overpowered you — were you coerced? No problem. But if you were coerced, you don’t need forgiveness; it isn’t a sin at all. You were coerced. If you weren’t coerced, then why did you do it? Because the consideration of pleasure outweighed the consideration of the diet. Meaning, in your scale of values, pleasure stood above the diet. That’s all. Therefore, says Donald Davidson, there can never really be such a thing as sin. There cannot be such a thing as sin. Sin is always a case where I do something that I myself did not think was the right thing to do. I don’t know what these sins are, big or small. Explain to me with regard to the person who ate that cake. I’m now asking about returning in great repentance? In a moment. I’m on the way there.

[Speaker B] But he also wants to enjoy!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just as he wants to diet, and in him the desire to enjoy is stronger than the desire to diet. Therefore he ate. That’s all. So what are you telling me stories about weak will? There’s no weak will here. That desire was stronger than this one, that’s all. Right — stick to this point, don’t move to another one.

[Speaker E] That’s exactly what Donald Davidson is claiming.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the problem of weakness of will. It doesn’t feel intuitive because we always perceive ourselves such that when we fail, we say: that’s not really what we wanted to do, we fell, we didn’t hold out. But Donald Davidson says to you: think carefully. What do you mean you fell? Were you coerced? That’s something else, but then you don’t need repentance. If you weren’t coerced, then why did you do it? Because that desire was stronger than this desire. So that is what you wanted. What you did is what you wanted. No stories. Conscience? Conscience is psychology.

[Speaker G] Maybe we need to pause and say there are two desires here, and you have to choose between them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and he chose between them, and he chose to eat.

[Speaker G] No, he didn’t choose. He was swept along. Why was he —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, he didn’t choose?

[Speaker G] Then he’s coerced. He just served his desires.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not coerced — but then why, then why did he do it?

[Speaker G] He didn’t do it, but —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t manage to choose? So why did he do it? Power, force. Because he didn’t —

[Speaker G] — succeed in doing the… reflection, so —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Decide whether that is coercion or not. In a moment I’ll get to a similar formulation. I understand; I’m also going to say something like that soon.

[Speaker D] It doesn’t necessarily solve the problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, we’ll see in a second.

[Speaker D] In a person’s life it isn’t black and white —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes and no — but that doesn’t help. All this “yes and no” is just words. In the end, what he did is what he wanted to do.

[Speaker E] So —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not yes and no and… that’s it. What he wanted is what he did. The problem is that there is no such thing as sin.

[Speaker E] The sin was that he preferred this consideration over —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — that consideration. Fine, but that is what he truly prefers. So what do you mean “sin”? No, that is his scale of values. Now what do you want from him? Here I come back to the problem of great repentance. You now want him not to return to that sin forever. What does that mean? To change his scale of values. But I said: that is his scale of values. So what does it mean to change his scale of values? Does he now already understand that this is the wrong scale? Then that is not really what he wants. If it really is what he wants, then that is his scale of values. So what do you want — that he himself should change his scale of values? Do you understand? Because if he doesn’t change the scale of values, nothing will change, because what he wants is what he does. Now to tell him to change his scale of values — that is the logical problem I talked about before. You go to a person who has a given scale of values and tell him: change your scale of values. He says: why would I do that? This is my scale of values. Explain to me, from within this scale of values, why that other scale is better. Obviously you won’t succeed, because this is his scale of values, not the other one. Okay? So it can’t work.

Do you understand? The problem of weakness of will is serving me here to explain the problem involved in the great repentance. The problem in the great repentance is not that it is accepted. If you did it, you are a different person, and the Holy One will accept it. The problem is: how is such a thing possible at all? How is it even conceptually defined that there should be such a process called great repentance? This really reflects the problem of weakness of will.

[Speaker C] A question about the guy with the cake who took upon himself to go on a diet. The moment he took it upon himself to go on a diet, he knew he would come to a test, right? He knew that, I don’t know, his scale of values would get flipped or something. But the mistake occurred at the moment he took it upon himself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But then when he got to the cake, suddenly his scale of values changed.

[Speaker C] Even though he knew it would happen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Which is what usually happens, no? Usually, if you ask a person what happened, that will be the description. When I accepted the diet on myself, obviously I knew there would be tests, but I decided to stand firm as a wall. Until the wall was less firm, and in the end I fell. Huh?

[Speaker G] Why are you calling it a value? Maybe it’s just his desire to eat the cake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s the whole set of considerations. I don’t care whether you call it a value or whatever else, the whole set of his desires. I don’t care what term you use. Values are only part of desire. So the point is that there is some kind of logical problem in the demand, or assumption, that one can deliberately do great repentance. It is simply not conceptually defined. Because the one doing the repentance is in a given set of values, so why should he aspire, by force of that set, to move to a different one? And if he aspires to the other set of values, then the other set is his set, not the old one. So he is already there. He doesn’t need to make the journey; he is already there. How can there be a deliberate process in which I move from value set A to value set B if at the stage when I was in A I did not believe that B was really the correct set? But if I did believe it, then I am already there. So what’s the issue? No step is needed. But how did that itself happen to me? If it just happened to me, not deliberately, then that’s not repentance. There is some tangle here. You need to understand — this isn’t hairsplitting. There is something here that is a real problem. Maybe I’ll formulate it… or before that —

[Speaker E] Maybe what matters is only the result. Not how he got there — only the result matters.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that doesn’t help. Sorry. If the result merely happened to him, then he deserves no credit at all for the result. Credit is for what you did. What do you mean? When you act as an agent, that’s what you get credit for. If something happens to you, then it happens to you. There’s something here that for many years I’ve wondered whether it counts as repentance or not, in the spirit of what you said earlier. I’ll get to it in a moment. But I want to clarify something first. The problem is basically: how can I take myself from within the system and pull myself out of the pit, yes, move to another value system, or shift to another value system? As he says — let’s return to Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya. Remember the story of Elazar ben Dordaya? We talked about him last time. He says: heaven, seek mercy for me; mountains, seek mercy for me; moon, stars, I don’t know what, all sorts of things. What is this? What does he want? Right? There is a sort of helplessness here, and I think it is a wonderful literary description of what I’m describing. Fine, but Elazar ben Dordaya is the very figure who taught us the notion of great repentance. After all, there we saw that in one hour you can turn yourself around without all the technical details. That is the great repentance. And what the story is telling you — that sense of helplessness saying, wait, I want to turn myself around. What do you mean “I want”? So how do you do that? What — I’ll turn myself around? Then I’m already there, basically. He is looking for some Archimedean point, some leverage point outside himself that will somehow help him turn around. In other words, there is some tangle here that you can’t make sense of. Am I already there? Or do I do it deliberately? But how can I turn myself around? I change myself — who is the changer and who is the changed? If I, the changer, already believe in that other system, then whom am I changing? I’m already there. If the changed one is still here, then who is the changer? The changer is also me. I change myself. This is something not conceptually defined.

I think the way to look at it is perhaps really this question: if someone from outside does it to me — say the Holy One does it to me — then it has no value, because He did it, not me. If I do it, then it has value, but how does it happen? I cannot turn myself around. So there is a kind of dilemma: it can’t come from outside and it can’t be done from inside, so how does such a thing happen?

Now there is one line in Avinu Malkeinu that is exceptional in the whole list: “אבינו מלכנו, החזירנו בתשובה שלמה לפניך”. What is that? You are basically saying: look, the only way out of this tangle is to say that in some sense I am not… that this dichotomy — if the Holy One does it, it lacks value; if I do it, it is impossible — the only way somehow to bypass it is to say that there is not such a sharp dichotomy between His doing it and my doing it. There is something — the mystics call it a divine point within the person. I don’t like those terms. But on the logical level, I’m saying there really is no other way to relate to such a situation unless you give up that dichotomy. Meaning: if you understand that some action is not done from outside, but also not from inside, but some sort of thing that happens together — I don’t know exactly — something like that. Now that is just words. I don’t know how to pour more concrete content into it. But at least it points in the direction that if I give up this dichotomy of outside and inside, then maybe the problem disappears, or weakens, or I don’t know exactly what. But now I’ll formulate this in a more philosophical and less mystical way.

I want to make the following claim: when a person sins — and in a moment I’ll come to a formulation similar to what you said earlier — my problem is this. If a person sins because that is really what he believes in, then there is no responsibility there. That’s what he believed. What do you want from him? If he sins even though that isn’t what he believed in, then why did he do it? After all, if he did it, then apparently that’s what he believed in, okay? Otherwise why did he do it? That is the dilemma. The only way out of this tangle — and now leave mysticism aside; I’m now talking really on the human psychological level, leave the Holy One aside — is to say that the person is basically not acting out of choice.

What do I mean? I want to argue that choice comes in two layers. The first layer is deciding to be a chooser — meaning to keep hold of the reins and not let the horses determine my route. I determine the route, okay? The second layer is: once I am choosing, then choose the good, okay? Now can there be a situation where a person chooses, but chooses evil? It is very hard to imagine such a state. Theoretically possible, conceptually possible — but very hard to imagine. Because if he really understands that it is evil, why does he do it? Why does he choose it? I’m not talking about a case where his impulses overpower him and he has no choice. I mean, he chooses lucidly, fully in control, and chooses to do evil — what is evil in his own eyes. Not objective evil; what is evil in his own eyes. I’m speaking only according to his own view. Okay? If it’s not according to his own view, then he is coerced. Therefore my claim is that what is required of a person first and foremost is simply to be a chooser. If he is a chooser, he will choose the good; he won’t choose evil. When a person does something bad, it is simply because he let go of the reins. He let the horses determine the course, and the horses took him to a place where he really did not want to be, where he did not believe was the right road. But he got there not by lucid choice, because if it had been by lucid choice then Davidson would be right — he wouldn’t have gotten there. What do you mean? If that isn’t what you think you should do, you wouldn’t do it. So how does it happen? Human beings are complicated creatures. A person says: I let go of the reins, and now the horses take me. The impulses are the horses, yes? They take me. Okay? So it’s not that I decided to do an action that I myself think is wrong. No, that doesn’t happen. But what did happen? I let go of the reins for a moment, as if I fell asleep. I fell asleep in a way that I understand can also lead to sin, yes? Otherwise I wouldn’t be responsible. I want two things here: to explain how the sin happened, and at the same time preserve responsibility for it. Because if it is coercion, then there is no responsibility. Okay? So I want to argue that letting go of the reins is your fault. But there was not a case where you chose to do something that you yourself think is wrong. That does not happen. What does happen is that you fool yourself, fool your surroundings, whatever, but you drift off. Right? Someone who boards a ship — as the Talmud in Sabbath says — within three days before the Sabbath and falls asleep. And now the ship sails, and suddenly he finds himself on a ship moving on the Sabbath. What can he do? But when he fell asleep he knew this was what would happen. Okay? In human beings it happens in more complex ways. But many times we know such a phenomenon where a person deceives himself. You basically say, fine, I’ll go, what can happen? It probably won’t happen. And of course it does happen. I’ll go there, there will be cream cakes there, right? Fine, but I’m strong. I accepted a diet on myself. No problem. And yet he goes there because beneath the level of consciousness he really wants to eat. But no, no — I’m going there because I’m very strong. And in fact I lull myself to sleep, let go of the reins, and in the end I eat. Now that is a situation where I can do something that is not in my control, and yet still be responsible for it, because I let go of the reins. Not because I decided to eat — I didn’t decide to eat. My impulses took me there. But it wasn’t coercion. It became coercion after I brought myself into that state of coercion, after I let go of the reins. So my responsibility is for letting go of the reins, not for the act itself.

Now why am I very unsure whether this is a solution? What? Okay, the question is whether such a thing counts as coercion — bringing oneself into coercion. If it were coercion then I wouldn’t be —

[Speaker G] — responsible for it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! Which means it isn’t really coercion. So “bringing oneself into coercion” — interesting halakhic questions arise about that in various places. A responsum of the Rivash and so on. In any case, what I want to say is: why do I wonder whether this really solves the problem? Because I ask: why did he let go of the reins? That too was a decision. Did he want to make that decision? So what are you telling me stories for? Then he chose to let go of the reins. He chose not to be a chooser. That too is a choice that he chose. So now I can repeat the weakness-of-will argument on that decision — not on the decision to eat the cream cake, but on the decision to let go of the reins. And there too I can say the same thing: if you let go of the reins, apparently that is what you wanted to do. If you didn’t want it, why did you do it? Ah, were you coerced? If you were coerced, then you are not responsible. The whole process can now repeat itself with regard to letting go of the reins. So in practice it isn’t at all clear to me that this truly solves the problem.

[Speaker G] But maybe you could say: yes, you should have been a bit stronger, held onto the pain a bit more. Again, if he —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I know, he should have. But why really wasn’t he stronger? Because —

[Speaker G] He chose not to be stronger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! So he chose that. So what is this “he let go of the reins”? He chose not to choose. That is an active choice not to choose, even though he thought that was not the correct thing to do. So what have you gained? You are still in the same tangle. The person lucidly chose something he thinks should not be done. What is that thing? Not eating the cream cake? No — that thing is simply letting go of the reins. Therefore the problem of weakness of will remains exactly where it was.

What do we gain nevertheless? Why do I still perhaps think this is a solution? Because the person did not decide to perform an action whose content is bad in his own eyes. He decided to let go of the reins. Letting go of the reins is not an action; it is just being in a state of not choosing. That’s all. So he didn’t do something whose content was evil in his own eyes. I’m not entirely sure. I’ve been wrestling with this for years. Because what do you mean — that too is a decision. If you think you need to be a chooser, why did you decide not to be a chooser? The same weakness-of-will dilemma can be run on that too. It’s just that here somehow it feels easier to imagine someone really deciding to let go of the reins. Deciding — even though he thinks it’s not right — deciding to let go of the reins. Because it is not directly eating the cake; it only indirectly leads to eating the cake. He only lets go of the reins, and then the horses take him to the cake.

[Speaker B] But in retrospect sometimes they say here that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No reward? But I’ll tell you — we weren’t speaking about reward and punishment. We were speaking now about the question: for what do I need to repent?

[Speaker B] No, why do you want to… why does a person…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I want to repent because there is a commandment to repent, okay? There is a commandment to repent; I want to repent. Not because of reward and punishment! I want to repent in order to become a better person.

[Speaker G] Meaning, isn’t it ultimately on the plane of correcting one’s understanding? Reaching correct understanding?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But when I let go of the reins, “reaching correct understanding” assumes that I understand that my current understanding is wrong. How do you —

[Speaker G] — know that? When I let go of the reins, I let go of them in the right way. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But letting go of the reins itself is not right, so the same problem exists there. Not the eating of the cake at the end — the very decision to let go of the reins. I can formulate all the same things about that.

[Speaker G] Why did you let go?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you thought that was the right thing to do; otherwise why did you do it?

[Speaker G] So why did you do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because at that moment I didn’t want to fight.

[Speaker G] Ah, you didn’t want to fight at that moment, but —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you knew that wasn’t okay, right?

[Speaker G] If I’m holding a rope and a ten-year-old child is hanging from it, okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I let go of the rope he dies, right — but it’s really hard for me to hold the rope now. Again, if you are coerced, then you are coerced, no problem. No — if you aren’t coerced, then why did you do it? Because you preferred the comfort of your hand over the life of the child — so we’re back to the cake. That’s all. So we’re back again to the fact that that’s what you wanted. So don’t tell me you didn’t want it. That’s not weakness of will — you did what you wanted. Exactly the same. What I said about the act itself I can also say about letting go of the reins.

[Speaker G] Maybe the claim against me at that moment would be: why didn’t I sharpen and strengthen — I don’t know —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If, if, if —

[Speaker G] — if I didn’t sharpen it, then was I coerced?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it wasn’t sufficiently sharp in me, then was I coerced? The decision not to sharpen it is the very same thing; I can attack it with the same argument. You’re only retreating one step further back each time.

[Speaker F] So then this is determinism throughout the whole process of choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right! Exactly the claim! Right!

[Speaker F] And what I want to claim —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — is that it’s not just determinism. You have no answer to it. It’s not just determinism. There is no answer to it. What you wanted is what you did. It’s not determinism. You could have chosen differently, but you chose this. That’s the claim. This is not a deterministic claim in the usual sense. I’m not denying your ability to choose; I’m only claiming that what you did is what you chose to do.

[Speaker G] And don’t tell me you didn’t choose and really thought otherwise. No — this is what you decided you wanted, this is what seemed right to you, and this is what you did. By choice, not because of determinism. I think you don’t realize that there are several levels of understanding at that moment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying those several levels — those words won’t help. At whatever level you want, about that level I will ask everything I’ve asked up to now. At that level, what you decided to do — is that what you thought was right to do, or not? If yes, then what do you want? You’re not coerced. If not, then why did you do it? None of these contortions will help. In the end there is some decision you made, for which you are responsible. About that decision I ask the question. Therefore there is some tangle here, and I don’t know whether it has any answer at all. I mean… not only whether there is an answer, I don’t even know if it’s answerable.

[Speaker B] Maybe reward and punishment are counted as an integral. Meaning, if you ate a lot of cream cakes and got a belly, if not then you go…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. I’m talking about the sin of this one cream cake, not the belly.

[Speaker B] But in the end they measure how many —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. I’m asking about this cream cake. I’m not measuring anything. I’m asking now: how did this sin happen? This sin is impossible. How did it happen? That’s what I’m asking. Leave the belly alone.

[Speaker D] But still — no, the rope still — I was controlled —

[Speaker B] — by the impulse. I mean, if the impulse said… that’s different if it’s —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s the impulse, then you’re coerced. That’s exactly the point! Either way. Either you decided to do it, or you didn’t. If you didn’t decide, then you are coerced. If you did decide, then that is what you wanted — so what do they want from you? But —

[Speaker G] Then why are they judging him? What is the problem here? He’s judged for choosing in that moment —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if you really think that is the right thing to do, then what exactly do they want to judge you for? Because that is what… because that is what you thought. No — why should you think? You did it, so apparently that is what you thought was right.

[Speaker G] Maybe choice isn’t —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Moral, not moral — I don’t care. But taking all your considerations together, the pleasure outweighs the morality. Okay, fine. That’s your scale of values. So what do they want from you? Fine — that’s what you thought was right. “Right” taking everything into account, not only morality.

[Speaker G] I didn’t strengthen the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean you didn’t strengthen it? But that’s what you truly thought — so after all that’s what you thought.

[Speaker G] I thought it wasn’t okay. If I thought more, then I’d strengthen the first value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: why didn’t you think more? Why didn’t I think more? Yes. Because at that moment I wanted more to… meaning because you wanted to. That’s it. So you wanted it. I was lazy.

[Speaker G] You were —

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] — lazy, so you wanted to be lazy. That too is a want. It’s not relevant. You won’t escape this. In the end, what you did is what you wanted to do. That’s all. No matter — the question is, bottom line, which one prevailed. Obviously that is your point of choice. But if you chose this, then apparently this is what you thought one should do, right? So what do they want from you? That’s really what you wanted. I’m not talking about determinism. I’m talking about the fact that if you chose, then apparently that is indeed what you thought was right to choose. You thought and you chose — not deterministic. But what do they want from you? If that’s what you thought, then that is your position. Now what — from within that position are you supposed to conclude that another position is more correct? Why? If you reached that conclusion, fine, but then it happened to you; you didn’t initiate it. You can’t deliberately try to get yourself to another position. That’s the problem here. Fine.

[Speaker D] No, no, that’s it — we’re done for today.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is the problem of weakness of will. Meaning, the great repentance — it is a special grace that it is even possible at all. Not that it is accepted, but how there can be such a mechanism in the first place. Yes.