Q&A: On Erasing the Names of the Wicked
On Erasing the Names of the Wicked
Question
Regarding the obligation to erase the names of the wicked: if there is an air conditioner called the “Nimrod Air Conditioner,” is it permitted to buy it? Also, is it permitted to mention it by name? Or should one call it “the air conditioner,” for example, without mentioning the brand? Likewise, if I have a friend named Nimrod, am I allowed to call him by his name? Or must I change it and call him something like “bro,” or “man”?
Answer
People are not accustomed to prohibit this nowadays. Already in the time of the Sages there was Rabbi Ishmael (although Rabbi Jonathan Eybeschutz explains that his father apparently held according to the view that he repented. I’m not sure). Sanctions of this kind, such as not mentioning the name, need to be evaluated in light of their real-world effect. Today it is not correct to use them.
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Questioner:
Following up on this question: in tractate Yoma 38b it says, “What does ‘but the name of the wicked shall rot’ mean? Rabbi Elazar said: decay should rise in their names, so that we do not bring them up by their names.” More generally, do laws like these that are mentioned in the Talmud become void if they are not practiced? And if so, what is the logic that Jewish law should be nullified in the face of custom?
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Rabbi:
This is about naming one’s son after a wicked person, not about refraining from mentioning his name (see Rashi there). To this day people generally do act this way, although this is not Jewish law but rather proper conduct (it was not brought by most halakhic decisors). And what Tosafot brings there also does not necessarily prove that this is law rather than a good custom. If it is a custom or proper practice and not law, then it depends on place and time—whether it helps or harms.
In general, as a matter of principle, Jewish law is sometimes overridden by custom. There are two mechanisms that explain this: 1. If this is an enactment or decree, then when there is an opposite custom, that is a sign that it was not accepted, and therefore it is void. 2. When it is Torah-level law, some see the acceptance of a practice as an indication that the interpretation is correct or incorrect. If a law is weakly held in your hands, follow the custom. “If they are not prophets, they are the sons of prophets”…
More generally, we find that custom uproots law. See discussion here.
Regarding “Nimrod,” perhaps one can also add as a supporting factor for leniency the view of commentators who say that Nimrod was not wicked, for example:
Ibn Ezra on Genesis, portion of Noah, chapter 10, verse 8
“Nimrod”—do not look for a reason for every name if it is not written. He was the first to display human might over the animals, for he was a mighty hunter. And the meaning of “before the Lord” is that he would build altars and offer those animals as burnt offerings to God; that is the plain meaning, while the midrash takes a different approach.
Radak on Genesis, portion of Noah, chapter 10, verse 9
“He was a mighty hunter before the Lord”—this means that he also prevailed over wild animals, hunting them with his strength and cunning, until people marveled at how he was able to overpower them. It became a proverb on people’s lips, so that when they saw in those days, or in later times, a person overpowering wild animals, they would say of him: this one is like Nimrod. And he explained “before the Lord” as an intensification of might, for such is the way of language: when magnifying something, Scripture associates it with God, as in “a great city of God” (Jonah 3), “the mountains of God” (Psalms 36), “its boughs were cedars of God” (Psalms 80), “a flame of God” (Song of Songs 8), “deep darkness” (Jeremiah 2). And there is one who explains (Ibn Ezra) that he hunted animals and sacrificed them before the Lord, while the view of Onkelos tends toward our explanation, for he translated: “a mighty warrior.”