Q&A: What Is the Point of Ruling on the Laws of Purity?
What Is the Point of Ruling on the Laws of Purity?
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In tractate Kelim, in the Mishnah commentary, there is a dispute among the tannaim on the subject of impurity and purity, and in several places Rabbi Ovadiah of Bartenura rules in accordance with one of the tannaim. I asked one Torah scholar what the point of that is, since nowadays we do not practice these laws, and when the messiah comes then (as far as I understand) he will in any case issue halakhic rulings מחדש according to his own understanding and will not be bound by what we rule. So that scholar told me that apparently
the reason is that this has implications in other places—that is, there is a point in ruling on the tractates in the Order of Purity, because perhaps when we come to issue a halakhic ruling in the laws of the Sabbath, we will be able to resolve the principle under discussion
through a mishnah in Kelim or bring proof from it, and therefore there is importance and practical implication to issuing rulings in the tractates of the Order of Purity. If so, I asked him why the Rif did not do comprehensive halakhic work
like Maimonides. He said he does not know, because on the face of it there does seem to be a need for it. What do you think?
Answer
Ruling on the laws of purity serves several purposes: A. It has direct practical implications in other areas of Jewish law (for example, roofing for a sukkah may not be made from something susceptible to impurity). B. It has indirect implications: a utensil that is considered a utensil for impurity is also considered a utensil for the Sabbath. C. Every study should end with a halakhic conclusion.
Not only the messiah will rule; each of us is supposed to reach conclusions for himself, and so too the sages of every generation. Therefore Maimonides and the Tur also issued halakhic rulings without making sure that all of us would follow their rulings, and not necessarily in order that we actually do so. They studied, and their conclusion is the halakhic ruling. Study is not merely a means to knowing the law, and establishing the law is not the sole goal of study. The form of study is analysis and arriving at a halakhic conclusion. Even in the law of the stubborn and rebellious son, which never existed and never will exist (even in the future), people still issue halakhic rulings—for example, Maimonides in the Laws of Rebels.
I assume that the Rif’s policy was practical rather than purely scholastic. He wanted to decide laws for implementation, and not necessarily as part of Torah study. Therefore he ruled only on the laws that are relevant in our time (something like an abridged Shulchan Arukh). By contrast, with Bartenura it seems to me that his purpose is educational rather than practical (otherwise he would have arranged a law code and not a commentary on the Mishnah).
There are many other things that are needed, and not every sage does everything that is needed. Each person sets his own goals according to his own considerations. The fact that something is needed does not mean that the Rif has to do it. He also did not write books of ethics, commentaries on the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), or medical works.