Q&A: Proper Use of the Thirteen Hermeneutical Principles
Proper Use of the Thirteen Hermeneutical Principles
Question
Where is the line drawn between “the Torah speaks in human language” and “Scripture speaks of what is usual,” statements that turn the details of a commandment as written in the Torah into mere examples that can be expanded, and, on the other hand, an inflexible precision regarding the details of a commandment, viewing them as an absolute rule?
For example, why does the Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael rule: “Just as in the case of a carcass no distinction is made between in the house and in the field, so too in the case of a torn animal we do not distinguish between in the house and in the field,” even though “the text says, ‘meat of a torn animal in the field’” — nevertheless this is only because “Scripture speaks of what is usual,” and therefore although torn meat is mentioned as being in the field, even if it became torn in the house its law is the same (Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael, Mishpatim, Tractate Kaspa, Parasha 20); whereas, from that same school of interpretation comes the ruling that “since garments are mentioned in the Torah without specification, and in one of them the text specified wool and linen, just as there — wool and linen, so too in every case — wool and linen,” and the detail “wool and linen” teaches that the general category includes only that specific detail?
Answer
Hello. I don’t have a general answer to this question, but it depends on at least two things: 1. Logic/reasoning (when there is a plausible argument in one direction or the other, that can determine whether to choose a restrictive or expansive interpretation). 2. The language of the Torah. There are situations where the wording of the Torah implies that this is not an example but a limitation.
It seems to me that the comparison between a torn animal and a carcass is based on reasoning and not on a formal textual analogy. By simple reasoning, it would seem that if in the case of a torn animal no distinction is made between house and field, why should such a distinction be made for a carcass?! It seems to me that torn animal and carcass are not written next to each other, so it is likely that this is a comparison based on reasoning.
Similarly, one can ask when a given verse is a special case that departs from the rule, and when it is an example that really intends to convey a broader rule. For example, fringes appear next to mixed fibers, and from there they derive that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. They could also have said that a positive commandment does not override a prohibition, but fringes are an exceptional case and that is why they are written in the Torah. Here too, this depends on reasoning and on the wording of the verse.
So too regarding the exposition that disqualifies women from testimony based on the verse “and the two men shall stand” — which the Talmud takes to exclude women. Even though usually when Scripture says “men,” it also includes women (“Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah”). Here it seems that reasoning was the deciding factor.
Beyond all this, there is also tradition. There are expositions that support Jewish laws known to us through the tradition from Sinai (supportive expositions). Sometimes a particular reading is chosen because it fits the tradition.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, one could. I do not know what the reasoning of the Sages was in either direction, but I assume that some line of reasoning stood in the background.
Now I have thought that perhaps the consideration is linguistic-interpretive. Two possibilities:
1. The redundancy within the same verse: “shaatnez, wool and linen together.” If this were merely an example, it would have been enough to write only “wool and linen together.” This is essentially a structure of a general category (“shaatnez” / mixed fibers) and a detail (“wool and linen”), in which one may derive only what is in the detail.
2. Another possibility is that they learned it from the duplication across the verses, since the prohibition of mixed fibers (Leviticus 19:19) is not specified at all, while elsewhere (Deuteronomy 22:11) it specifies wool and linen together. That would make it a case of something that was included in a general rule and then singled out to teach.
By reasoning, one could have said that a garment is made of any material, and why then are wool and linen mentioned? Scripture speaks of what is usual.