Q&A: A Question on Tzafnat Pa'neach
A Question on Tzafnat Pa'neach
Question
With God's help,
a0
Good afternoon.
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I happened to see somewhere that you write about yourself that you studied the teaching of the Rogatchover, so I’m taking the opportunity to direct to you a question that I’m having trouble with.
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Maimonides, in chapter 6 of the Laws of Naziriteship, when he defines what “tum'at tehom” is, says that this impurity applies specifically when we are dealing with a dead person and not with someone who was killed, and he explains: “for the one who killed him knew about him.” Apparently he derives this from what is said in the baraita: “They spoke of tum'at tehom only with regard to a dead person alone.” The Ra'avad, there, objects to him and argues that the baraita came not to exclude someone killed, but seminal / flux impurity. It is unclear whether he disputes the law itself or only the interpretation of the baraita, though it is fairly clear that he does not dispute the law in practice. However, the Tzafnat Pa'neach there takes this as a dispute in the law itself. In his view, they disagree about whether the knowledge of the interested party counts as knowledge. According to Maimonides, yes; according to the Ra'avad, no. He argues, as is his way, that this is already a dispute in the Talmud between Abaye and Rava. For example, in Makkot 6, when Rav Pappa asks Abaye, “If so, then let the slain person save him,” he answers: “No, where he killed him from behind.” But Rava answers him: “We are speaking of those who uphold the wording of the verse” — meaning, according to the Tzafnat Pa'neach’s reading, that the knowledge of the interested party is not considered knowledge. Or for example in Keritot 26: on the assumption that Yom Kippur atones for sins that no person knows about, the Gemara asks from the case of a sota with whom Yom Kippur passed, that she should not need to bring a sacrifice. Abaye answers that the man who had relations with her knows. Rava chooses a different answer. The same is true regarding the broken-neck heifer: Abaye answers that the killer knows, and Rava answers differently.
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My question is: what is the reasoning for saying that the knowledge of the interested party is not considered knowledge? What is the difference between his knowledge and that of any other person? In our case, tum'at tehom is impurity that no person recognized, according to the baraita. If so, why, when the killer knew, is it still considered that no person knows? Maybe the Rogatchover defined the dispute for us, but did he explain it too? Reference: Rabbi Chaim… This seems very arbitrary to me. Let’s say that the Brisker distinctions that people say are not really explained are far more explained than this distinction.
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By the way, it does not seem to me that one can really define without explaining. That seems ridiculous. The claim that Rabbi Chaim says only the “what” (as opposed to Rabbi Shimon) seems inaccurate to me. Someone there either made a mistake in the diagnosis or at least did not express himself well.
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In any case, I’d be happy for a response.
Thank you very much, and have a kosher and joyful Passover.
M.
Answer
M., hello.
Since it’s Passover eve, with apologies I’ll answer briefly.
First, I completely agree — and I’ve written this more than once — that the Brisker approach that asks only “what” and not “why” is sheer naivete. There is no “what” without a “why.” If you don’t understand the “why,” you can propose countless kinds of “what,” and this is not the place to elaborate.
By the way, in this sense the Rogatchover is very Brisker. He defines and does not explain. Of course, a definition always also provides understanding, and therefore also clarifies the “why.”
As for the knowledge of the interested party: don’t look for some mystical kind of answer. Clearly, the interested party is a person like any other, and when he knows, then there is indeed a person who knows. But sometimes the law under discussion specifically requires the knowledge of someone external, and only then will the matter be considered “known” for this purpose. That can stem from various reasons. For example, when the killer knows that he killed, he will not spread that information further, and therefore it is not considered something that stands to become known, or is destined to become known, publicly, as in the rule of “before three people.” Perhaps tum'at tehom counts as such only when it stands to become information of the public at large, or at least could potentially reach the public at large.
And the reasoning here is that one who became impure through tum'at tehom is regarded as under compulsion, and therefore the frontlet effects atonement for him, and obviously even if the killer knew about it, the impure person is still under compulsion, since the killer will not reveal it, as above. So if what we are looking for is the element of compulsion in the matter, it makes sense to define things such that the knowledge of the interested party does not help.
It should be added that in the laws of testimony as well, the interested party is not considered a witness. And according to the Ra'avad cited by the Rosh in Makkot 7 — and see further regarding dividing a statement — this is not invalid testimony but no testimony at all, unlike the testimony of relatives or wicked people, for example. The meaning of this is that he is not considered someone who brings information to the knowledge of the religious court. And that is also the rule of “let the slain person save him.”
However, according to this, it still requires some further thought why there is a connection between the different contexts of the interested party’s knowledge. Seemingly, each such context is a separate discussion, since in every context we have to ask whether the interested party’s knowledge is effective or not. If indeed in all these places Abaye is following his own consistent view, then presumably there is something shared here. And perhaps indeed in religious court as well, the information on the basis of which judges can rule is only public information, and therefore the testimony of the interested party is ineffective for defining it as such.
And of course these matters still require further clarification, and this is not the place to elaborate.