Q&A: Amalek, the Creation of the World, Commitment to the Torah, Morality, and the Number of Those Who Left Egypt
Amalek, the Creation of the World, Commitment to the Torah, Morality, and the Number of Those Who Left Egypt
Question
I found a contradiction in your words that I couldn’t resolve:
1)
“For example, there is a commandment to kill Amalek, which appears blatantly immoral. Standard religious apologetics offers various explanations for why this act is nevertheless moral, but they don’t really convince me. My assumption is that there is a religious value here, and it overrides the moral value of preserving human life.”
And on the other hand: “I assume that Amalek was a people who educated all their children toward murder, and therefore there is justification for killing them even when they are small. The future is clear in advance. Think of a Jew in a concentration camp praying that all the Germans should die, old men, women, and children. That sounds reasonable, no? The assumption was that there was something corrupt in that people, and therefore there is justification for wiping them off the face of the earth. I assume the Torah sees Amalek this way and therefore commands its destruction.”
2) Several times the Rabbi has written that in his view the creation of the world speaks in terms of the science of their time, and it should not be seen as something that describes reality; yet many times the Rabbi also notes that one cannot decide between the different possibilities for reconciling the creation of the world with the biblical story (long days, and so on). So is there supposed to be some kind of correspondence between what is told and reality, only there is no way to decide among the possibilities? Or is there no correspondence at all between the two things, and the Torah is telling a myth (and there is no problem with that at all… because?).
3) Regarding the obligation to fulfill God’s commands: on the one hand, the Rabbi once said that we do it “just because”—in the sense of an axiom that cannot be proven; and on the other hand, the Rabbi argues that we are obligated in the commandments only because of the people’s acceptance at Sinai.
4) Regarding morality without God: the Rabbi said that when someone asks him why one is obligated to fulfill God’s commands, the answer is “just because,” and when he says to you, “What do you mean, just because? Be rational!” then the Rabbi asks him, “Why are you moral?” And just as in the matter of morality the answer is “just because,” so too regarding the obligation to obey God the answer is “just because.”
So morality can rest on a “just because” without God, so why say that there is no morality without God? After all, even if we say that morality requires God, in the end the obligation to obey God is also because of “just because,” so what difference does it make what that “just because” refers to?
5) Regarding the Exodus from Egypt, you argued that it is unlikely that the number 600,000 is typological, since the count of each and every tribe is specified.
If so, does the Rabbi think that the only way to remain a believer in the Hebrew Bible is to believe in the fact that two million people left Egypt—a huge nation by every possible standard for that time, roughly like all of Egypt? Isn’t that a huge difficulty for faith?
And if regarding the story of creation we also say that it’s not literally true, then why not also say that the tribal census is typological? Does the Rabbi hold that one must believe that 2 million left Egypt? But in other places he wrote that perhaps the event was not on the scale described.
Sorry for the many questions.
P.S.: I sent additional questions a few days ago; I assume the Rabbi didn’t notice them. Of course I don’t want to pressure the Rabbi.
Answer
Hello.
1) The claim is made alternatively, as lawyers often do. One can offer an explanation that would fit morality (since there is no obligation that Jewish law contradict morality), but even if not—not such an explanation is required, because Jewish law is aimed at values that are not necessarily moral.
2) Again, this is an alternative set of possibilities. One possible explanation is that this is a description addressed to the people of that generation. Other explanations would resolve it in other ways. Since I do not know how to decide among the possibilities, I do not see much point in dealing with it.
3) We are obligated because of the acceptance at Sinai—but why did they obligate themselves at Sinai? Because of the axiom. Do I become obligated to obey just anyone who reveals himself to me? So too regarding state law. It is supposed to make sense, but the obligation to obey it derives from the citizens’ social contract. The same applies to morality: social contract theory offers a basis for moral obligation, but that is not the logic underlying the commands themselves. The reason we do not murder is not because we signed a contract, but because it is immoral. But society’s ability to make claims against someone who violates morality comes from the social contract.
4) There is no morality without God. See my fourth notebook, part three, on this. But when there is God and there is morality, the explanation for why one must uphold it is “just because”—an axiom. But this is not “just because” in the arbitrary sense (because I feel like it, because I drew lots and that’s what came out), but rather “just because” in the sense that it is so fundamental that it requires no further explanation or grounding in something more fundamental than itself. One may say that moral obligation is simply another aspect of religious obligation. Both of these obligations are based on that same “just because” (the obligation to obey God).
5) Clearly, the numbers do not have to be literal; they could be typological. I would actually be happy if that were so, since researchers think it is unlikely that millions of people really left, but rather perhaps a fairly small group—not to mention that within 210 years, 70 people became several million. A bit unlikely. But what can you do? One has to be honest. From the language of the Bible it appears that in this case it really does mean the numbers literally. And indeed, this is a certain difficulty for faith, but I do not think it is a “huge” one. You are right that in principle the tribal census could also be metaphorical (and, as I said, I would be happy if that were a possible interpretation), but I do not see what meaning these numbers could have or why those particular numbers were chosen. Therefore it is more likely that they are meant to describe real numbers.
Discussion on Answer
1. Choose what convinces you. I don’t see the point of chewing this over again and again.
2. I explained that too. It doesn’t seem plausible to me to invent specific numbers with no meaning at all as part of a myth. If that works for you—fine.
1) We are absolutely not chewing this over again and again.
The Rabbi did not answer the simple question: in his opinion, is the moral interpretation of Amalek reasonable (“I assume they were a nation of murderers”), or is it far-fetched (“it doesn’t really convince me”)? Your words contain no answer to this, only that there are two possibilities. But we are asking what the Rabbi himself thinks about the moral interpretation. Is the Rabbi himself undecided about it? What is the difficulty in saying that it is moral, the difficulty that causes you not to be convinced?
2) Here too. The Rabbi did not answer me what the difference is between inventing the number of the days of creation and the number of those who left Egypt.
Sorry for the bother.
We are indeed chewing this over again and again.
1. The explanations regarding Amalek are possible, assuming they really were like the Nazis. I have no information beyond what appears in the Torah, so I cannot say this unequivocally. And since there is no necessity that the command fit morality, there is no necessity that this in fact be the case. That is why I offered explanations in the alternative.
2. The six days of creation describe six stages, so that is not a random or arbitrary number. Therefore there is no problem seeing it as a typological number that describes not days but stages. Not so the number of people in each tribe at the Exodus from Egypt.
As far as I’m concerned, I’m done. Happy holiday.
“The interpretations are possible” directly contradicts “it doesn’t convince me.” And the readers can judge whether the Rabbi and I were chewing this over during the intermediate days of the holiday.
I think I’ve figured out one of Rabbi Michi’s strongest rhetorical tools.
After all, the Rabbi is responding to many threads in parallel, so his decision to end a discussion is legitimate.
Therefore he can say, “we are chewing this over again and again,” without bringing any “proof” of that.
It’s obvious that the person here asked because from the expression “it doesn’t convince me,” it appears that the Rabbi completely rejects this interpretation, as opposed to another place where he himself proposes it.
To say that there are two possibilities in your words would make sense if it had said, “I’m not sure that this is the interpretation,” and not: “it doesn’t convince me.”
In the first answer there is no reference at all to what your real opinion is—whether the interpretation is possible or clearly implausible—and in the second answer there is indeed some reference, but it does not resolve the phrase “not convinced.”
And that’s how the Rabbi manages to make the questioner look like an idiot who doesn’t understand what he reads, and who keeps repeating the same claims.
I suggest having a vote on the site: who thinks A. is right and who thinks Rabbi Michi is right (not on the issue itself, but on the question whether there was repetition here).
Happy holiday, Rabbi.
I couldn’t understand why regarding the story of the Exodus itself you have no principled problem with saying that it is a myth (as you once wrote, though you qualified that you think the event did happen, even if not with all its details), but regarding the numbers that is absurd. After all, if regarding the story itself it is possible to say that it is a myth, that certainly includes the assumption that the numbers written in the census of the people are typological. So why is it not logical that the Torah creates a small myth only regarding the numbers, if it is logical that it created a larger myth that includes the smaller one?
Is it specifically the combination of these two data points—namely, the truth of the general story together with the myth of the numbers—that creates the problem?
2) Does the Rabbi not know of another solution to the problem? Or: if theoretically it became absolutely certain that there were not even 3 million people in all of Egypt, would faith collapse? Or would we say that these verses are not part of the Torah?
1. I already explained this, and I don’t understand what is unclear here. When you give a tribal count like 34,512 people, it doesn’t look like a myth. There is no reason to invent such an arbitrary and specific number that says nothing as part of a myth. Either don’t write how many there were at all, or write some round number (preferably one with significance).
2. Nothing collapses, even if we remain with the matter unresolved. This does not strike me as such a cardinal question. There can always be a solution we haven’t thought of. No theory collapses because of a single difficulty, especially one that is not really all that powerful.
I agree that it is unlikely that the number is typological, but that would seemingly imply that one also cannot say that the entire Exodus story as a whole is a myth (as the Rabbi argues may be possible), because the story also contains very specific numbers, and we agreed that they describe truth, so it is not logical that it is a myth.
If the larger story includes a detail that the Rabbi says is not typological, then doesn’t that make the whole story non-typological?
Why not? Why can’t it be a myth into which real facts are also woven? On the contrary, when one says that a biblical story is a myth, that is exactly what one means: that it contains various details that are not necessarily precise.
Do you mean to say that according to the view that there was no Exodus from Egypt, the myth is only the Exodus from Egypt, but the number of the Israelites is not a myth?
Are you joking, or what? What does it mean to say that the Exodus from Egypt is fictional but the number of those who left is real?
The basic claim is that even if a story like the Exodus from Egypt is a myth, that does not necessarily mean that all its details are fictional. It contains details that are added for rhetorical flourish. Therefore, the fact that there are true details in it does not mean the whole story is true. As for whether the overall number of those who left is true—I do not know. As for whether the number of each tribe is true—I do not know (though it does not seem likely to me that the intention is not to report a real number).
I think we’ve exhausted this.
Why joking? I didn’t call the number of people “the number of those who left”! I just called it “the number of the Israelites.”
Actually, from your last sentences I understand that you agree with me. The number is real (that is, the Bible intends to report a real number), even though there was no Exodus from Egypt. Obviously I don’t call them (and didn’t call them) “those who left Egypt,” since there was no such thing, but the number is real (the Bible reports a real number).
Did I understand correctly?
See a related responsum also at this link:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%91%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A8-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%90%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/
The number of the Israelites when? At the departure that never happened? That becomes meaningless. The matter has been clarified, and that is enough.
Alright, I couldn’t understand it, but thanks anyway.
After all, if the whole story never happened, including the numbers in the census of the people (since there are no “those leaving Egypt”), then we are back to the same problem:
the Bible describes real numbers (from its own perspective), and we say they are a myth (like the whole Exodus from Egypt), so it’s not clear to me what we gained by saying that everything is a myth. Maybe someone understood and can explain?
Y, I already explained everything, and I’ll try one more time.
The story of the Exodus from Egypt does not have to be a reliable historical description. It may be that there was some other event, perhaps more minor or in a different form. But still, it seems likely to me that there was some event of some kind (a historical core to the myth).
The numbers of those who left Egypt do not seem reasonable in themselves, but in the Torah this is presented as a real description (interpretively, it is not plausible to relate to it as a typological number).
Therefore the number of those who left is problematic, and this has not the slightest connection to the mythic character of the Exodus from Egypt as a whole. The problem lies in the tension between the language of the Bible and the possibility of seeing this as part of the myth. The claim that the Exodus from Egypt was a myth will not help with this difficulty.
So indeed, I gained nothing by saying that everything is myth with regard to the problem of the number of those who left Egypt (and by the way, I didn’t say everything is myth. I said that we have a story here that is not necessarily historically reliable in all its details).
On the other hand, I also argue that this difficulty does not topple me. It is an interpretive difficulty, and there may be an explanation for it that I do not see. I do not see here an essential difficulty that forces me to draw conclusions. It may be that these numbers have some meaning and are indeed mythic. It may be that these are real numbers and this really was the number of those who left, even though that does not seem likely to me. And there may be other possibilities I haven’t thought of.
I have written all of this in detail and explicitly up to this point. In this summary I have added nothing at all. That is what I above called “chewing it over again and again.”
1) So you gave an explanation for the commandment about Amalek that doesn’t even convince you yourself? Why offer such an alternative?
2) Do you not see any other way out, namely to say that the numbers are not literal? After all, the Rabbi has said several times that even if there was no Exodus from Egypt, it still wouldn’t be absurd for the Torah to command us to keep commandments on the basis of a myth it invented. So why not say here too that the Torah invented a myth of numbers as a literary part of the biblical description? What is the difference between that and the myth of the “six days” in which the world was created?