I didn’t mean to assume that God was not revealed at Sinai, but rather that if the Torah is not true, then He was not revealed.
I only assumed that if God was not revealed at Sinai, then presumably He is also not a commanding God (God exists, but not one who commands you to do anything). So according to that, in a conflict, the side on which the moral value would override the religious one is only if Judaism is not true but some other religion exists in which God commanded only moral things—and that’s what I said does not seem plausible.

Is this a continuation of the pilpul? I wrote that I am not sure; that does not mean that as far as I’m concerned the doubt is evenly balanced. On the possibility that He was not revealed, you can conclude that He also does not exist (I don’t see any necessity in that). So what? Before you ask me about morality, ask me about the other commandments too (aside from Amalek). In short, a bizarre discussion.

What I understood from the Rabbi is that because your belief is not certain, your commitment to Jewish law is not total, and therefore if it clashes with morality you won’t know what to do. (The other commandments are a burden you are willing to bear on yourself as long as you are not “liable to others,” so about them I’m not raising the question.) Do you agree that the entire validity of morality is on the assumption that God exists, and if He does not exist then there is nothing to prevent anti-moral acts? Therefore, the only basis for coming and saying that you would need to obey the moral command and not the halakhic one is only if there exists a God who commands morality and was never revealed to human beings and never disclosed His will to them. I said that this is far-fetched. So if in all likelihood your obedience to the moral command is mistaken when it contradicts the halakhic one, then what is the logic of following it? After all, most likely you are violating God’s command.

I don’t understand why the Rabbi doesn’t understand the question; I’ll try to explain: insofar as everything that gives morality its binding force is God, then why should the moral command be preferred over the divine command (of course when there is doubt about the existence of the latter)? After all, from what was said, if God does not exist then morality too has no validity.

To Aviv, it seems to me the answer is simple—there is the “God of morality” (to use Kreif’s phrase…). That is a simpler assumption than the existence of the “God of history,” and therefore even if there is doubt about the existence of the God who was revealed at Sinai, there is less doubt about the existence of a God who commands universal morality.

The main reason people refrain from believing in a God who was revealed at Sinai (or anywhere else) is because God does not take any interest in us at all and is indifferent to us. So someone who believes—that God commands and has a relationship toward us—from there to religious life the road is short and obvious.

I’ll answer one last time because I don’t understand this insistence.
First, I am not certain about anything. Not about faith, not about morality, and not about anything else. Anyone who thinks he is certain is deceiving me or himself, or he is simply foolish or confused. But the fact that I am not certain does not mean that I have no positions on these issues. Not being certain does not mean an evenly balanced doubt. So yes, I am committed to Jewish law, but because I do not have complete certainty, in cases where the moral cost is enormous I will consider whether and how to act. (Usually there are halakhic workarounds that everyone uses, but people are not honest enough to admit it.) This does not have even the slightest connection to the question of Jewish law and morality, because even if I were completely certain of both, there would still be room to ask which overrides which. And even within Jewish law itself there are conflicts in which one value overrides another, and the same is true within morality.
Therefore, the question of which overrides which is not connected to my level of certainty in the systems, but rather to cost versus benefit. If there is a very large moral cost as against a halakhic obligation, I will consider whether to fulfill it. If there is a very large halakhic cost as against an ordinary moral obligation, the consideration will be the opposite. Whether I am certain or not about the two systems has nothing to do with the question of which overrides which. Even if my confidence is 80%, that is so regarding both of them, and therefore the value that will prevail is still the more important one (the greater cost). Of course, if there is a difference in the degree of confidence, that too will enter into the calculation. For example, a halakhic instruction about which I am uncertain (because there is a possibility of interpreting it differently, and there is concern about error, and not only because of the concern that perhaps all of Jewish law is incorrect because there is no God or because He was not revealed) will be weaker when set against a moral command that is clear to me at a high level.
That’s it. I’ve exhausted this to the point of bleeding dry.