Q&A: The Definition of the Minchat Chinukh Regarding the Commandment of Be Fruitful and Multiply
The Definition of the Minchat Chinukh Regarding the Commandment of Be Fruitful and Multiply
Question
To the eminent Rabbi.
Based on what is explained in Minchat Chinukh, commandment 1, section 14, that the definition of the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying is that a person have children who are attributed to him (and therefore, if he had children and they died, he fulfilled the commandment only until now, and from this point onward he is obligated in it again; and likewise a gentile who fathered children while still a gentile is exempt through them when he converts), how is it that we act by postponing marriage and not marrying immediately when we are capable of having children? After all, by doing so we are neglecting for several years the ongoing obligation that a person have descendants. Granted, if the commandment were like lulav or matzah, we would say that he can choose when he wants to fulfill it, since the whole day is its time frame (and with being fruitful and multiplying—the whole of life is its time frame, and likewise if he had children and they died then he would be exempt). But according to the above Minchat Chinukh, this is seemingly difficult, since the obligation is continuous.
With blessings.
Answer
Plainly, if they died, it becomes clear retroactively that he did not fulfill it from the outset. And the consideration to do it earlier, in my humble opinion, is a question of “the diligent perform commandments early,” not of neglecting a positive commandment (and perhaps it depends on the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad at the beginning of the laws of circumcision regarding karet).
As for postponing being fruitful and multiplying, in my humble opinion this is a matter of common sense. A person needs to marry based on his own considerations and not only because of the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying. And if there are reasons to delay, there is no obligation to move it up for the sake of fine points of that commandment. Otherwise he would have to marry at age 13, and we do not find anyone who is obligated to do that.
Discussion on Answer
It seems to me that I wasn’t understood. Take, for example, the commandment of Torah study. It obligates at every moment, and nevertheless the halakhic decisors wrote that there are common-sense considerations that exempt us from it at one time or another—when one wants to rest, eat, enjoy oneself a bit, and the like. Precisely with continuous commandments there is room for such broad general considerations.
So how, in essence, does the Rabbi understand the definition of being fruitful and multiplying? A framework of a situational commandment throughout one’s life that a person have children (and therefore it is permitted to postpone it), or the framework of an obligatory commandment that at the time a person dies he have children (and therefore a person who dies childless neglected an obligatory positive commandment, like someone who did not recite Grace after Meals)?
Without some such combination, I do not understand how the Rabbi resolves the issue in light of the fact that the Minchat Chinukh writes that if he had children and they died, he fulfilled the commandment until now (and not as you wrote, that it became clear retroactively that he had not fulfilled it).
From the Minchat Chinukh you cited, it follows that at every moment there is a rule that he have children (to me personally that is very strange, but this is not the place). And still, since the commandment applies to all moments, there is room for common-sense considerations. I gave as an example the commandment of Torah study, which also applies at every moment, and yet common-sense considerations say that there are moments when it is legitimate not to do it. The same applies to being fruitful and multiplying. When there are common-sense reasons to postpone it, one may do so. The formalistic interpretation of “an obligation every moment” in the literal sense is not correct. It is important that a person have children at all times (according to the Minchat Chinukh), but at moments when common sense says it is possible to delay—one may delay.
Fine. Isn’t that called a situational commandment?
By the way, is the commandment of Torah study a situational one?
Not at all. I am speaking about an obligatory commandment (though regarding Torah study there is room for discussion, at least on the Torah level), and still there is room for common-sense considerations. Precisely commandments that obligate at every moment are framework commandments, and therefore they tolerate division of time based on common-sense considerations.
So in essence this is an obligatory commandment (regarding the final result, that a person have children), whose time frame is situational? (And therefore non-halakhic considerations are effective [only] regarding the timing.)
Does the Rabbi have a better definition of how, despite the obligatory nature of the commandment, there still remains room for common sense regarding the timing?
I think the search for a definition is itself problematic. When I spoke about common-sense considerations, I meant exactly that there are things that do not fit into the formal definition, but it is obvious that they are correct.
That is why I brought the commandment of Torah study as an example. The commandment is to study all the time, and let us assume for the sake of discussion that it is obligatory and not situational. Seemingly, this would imply that one should do nothing else, except perhaps an urgent commandment. It would be forbidden to rest (unless it helps one’s learning), or to eat beyond what is needed and beyond the time needed, and so on. On the other hand, many halakhic decisors wrote that one may live as a normal person lives, and it does not sound as though one must examine every minute of rest or of reading a book to see whether it helps learning or not. Rather, if this is how a reasonable person conducts himself, then it is fine. The obligation to study “all the time” is interpreted as: all the time that a reasonable person should devote to study, and not literally all the time.
I suggested that here too the definition is similar. True, there is an obligation to be fruitful and multiply, but common sense and the reasonable person say that it is not right to marry and become a parent before age twenty, and therefore one should not marry at bar-mitzvah age as would follow from the formal definition. One can define it (if you want definitions) that the obligation applies at every time when it is reasonable to be married and/or to be a parent.
I really am speaking here on a halakhic accounting. If there is a positive commandment that a person have children at every moment, non-halakhic considerations would not help (these are not mere fine points but actual Torah-level Jewish law).
True, we do not find anyone obligated to marry at age 13, which implies that there is not a commandment at every single moment; but that is exactly what my question is about, because the Minchat Chinukh explicitly writes that if they died, then he did fulfill the commandment retroactively (except that he becomes obligated in it again), which implies that he is obligated in the commandment at every single moment—and so the difficulty returns to its original place.