Q&A: Introductions on Knowledge and Clear Faith
Introductions on Knowledge and Clear Faith
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I wanted the Rabbi to respond to a passage I wrote (although I know you are very busy, and I would completely understand if you don’t have time to go over the reflections of an unfamiliar person).
This passage is part of the introduction to a letter I once wrote to one of the rabbis in the Haredi public[1], and therefore the style is one that speaks to a person who grew up within the Haredi community (less academic language, more yeshiva-style language. Support from the Talmud and the like, the mindset of a Haredi person, omission of things that carry a distinctly Religious Zionist spirit). I tried to reformulate this passage, unsuccessfully—perhaps aside from the beginning of it. It is important to me to emphasize this because I know that usually reading such a style paints in the reader’s mind some not especially intelligent type, and causes a degree of disdain. It is important to me that you relate—if, as stated, you see fit—to the content of the words alone, and write your opinion of the arguments and their level.
And perhaps, if possible, one more request (a rather cheeky one—but there is something about cheeky requests that makes us grant them…) that there not be too much cynicism…
Introductions on Knowledge and Clear Faith
Stage A
1. The way to clarify what is true is by means of reason. Emotions cannot clarify what is true. (This is obvious, but for some reason people sometimes forget it and claim that they know something clearly when the source is that they clearly feel it is true.)
2. To know that something is correct and true—and in fact any clear knowledge—means to know it with certainty. Uncertain knowledge is not absolute knowledge but rather conjecture or probability (of course there are things that cannot be known with certainty—but that is no reason to treat conjecture about them as knowledge). As long as we do not know with certainty, then if we are asked whether it is true the answer should be that we do not know with certainty.
3. There are two ways to know that something is correct and true: either positively—to see with the senses that it is true (such as seeing that the sun rises), or negatively—to realize that it cannot be otherwise. When one comes to clarify ideas and claims (or the truth of spiritual reality), then the only way is by negation[2].
Stage B
4. Therefore, when one wants to know with certainty that there is a Creator and Guide and Torah, etc., that means to know it with one hundred percent certainty (whether it is a secular person who wants proofs of this, or whether it is a religious or Haredi person from a religious home who wants to examine himself as to whether his knowledge is real knowledge or whether he simply never thought about it before).
5. As stated—having a certain feeling that there is a Creator and Guide who watches over us and cares for us is not enough—for after all this is only a feeling, and it is not the way to clarify whether this is the truth; the way is clarification through reason. (It should be added that for a person who has been religious/Haredi all his life, certainly the feeling that there is a Creator is not enough, since it is to be expected that he would feel there is someone watching over him, etc. Not that this feeling is not good—if there is knowledge that there is a Creator then certainly this feeling is called for, but it is relevant only after the knowledge.)
6. Consequently, even a decision to believe because of the high likelihood that a Creator exists, or because of fear of the risk of terrible punishment—together with the chances that there is a Creator—does not amount to certain knowledge that there is a Creator. They are only probability or a way of life based on risk versus chance, but not knowledge. (As for the word “faith,” it is indeed a long story what the difference is between it and knowledge. But at the end of the day it is clear that one who does not have clear knowledge that there is a Creator, etc., even if he supposes that there is—does not know, and if you ask him, “Are you sure there is a Creator?”—if he is not a liar he should answer, “No”…)
7. For us, the learning public—a claim is much more readily accepted if it is written in the Talmud or in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), so here too this claim is written there: Rashi at the beginning of the chapter Helek in tractate Sanhedrin explains why one who says that resurrection of the dead is not written in the Torah has no share in the World to Come even if he believes in resurrection itself, and these are his words: “What do we care for his belief? For from where does he know that it is so? Therefore he is a complete heretic.”
Stage C
8. We must understand in advance that since we are coming to examine the truth of our knowledge regarding the existence of a Creator, etc., and as stated our way to verify truth is to rule out all other possibilities, then we will need to deal with those claims and rule them out—that is, to deal with heretical claims, something that will be emotionally difficult for most of our public. (And the harder part is to articulate those claims—even as a preliminary supposition—and to know that in order to verify our faith we need to rule them out one hundred percent, and not with flimsy arguments.) But, as stated, that is what is required in order to clarify the truth of our knowledge.
9. And an even harder insight: until now we have spoken from the point of view of believers, children of believers, who only want to put a check mark of certainty next to their faith-knowledge (because, like it or not, it turns out that unclear knowledge is not knowledge but conjecture). But if we are honest—if we are at this stage where our knowledge is not certain, then as long as we are at this stage where our knowledge is not certain, the feeling of an honest person is that he is not one hundred percent sure, and if someone asks him, “Tell me, are you sure there is a Creator…?” he will answer, “Not one hundred percent sure; it seems likely, but not certain.” It is hard to express oneself like that, but by way of consolation—perhaps it is more frightening to think about the possibility of burying our head in the sand and not making our faith certain, and then in truth our knowledge is not certain—that is, that all our lives, in terms of the truth, we will be with incomplete knowledge, in effect in heresy… It depends what to call a person who is sure of something without really knowing that it is true. Like a person who is sure that if he sits on the corner of a table he will not get married for seven years—according to the truth is he a heretic about this (because he does not really know it is so, and as in the above Rashi, “from where does he know that it is so? therefore he is a heretic”), or is such a person a believer—except that he is a fool and simpleton? In any case, fools and simpletons are also not something we want to be (although emotionally that is much easier for us than being heretics…)
[1] That rabbi ultimately did not answer me. I tried to send the entire letter to another rabbi whom I thought suitable (Rabbi Nebenzahl from the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem), but it did not work out.
[2] In truth, even knowledge by way of affirmation (which pertains to physical things seen with the senses) is knowledge by way of negation—we rule out all the possibilities of interpreting what we see with the senses in another way (for example, when we see the sun, we rule out the possibility that it is only a picture—by the fact that it shines and dazzles).
Answer
Hello Y.,
Attached is your letter with my comments in bold and underline.
All the best,
Hello Rabbi Michael,
I wanted the Rabbi to respond to a passage I wrote (although I know you are very busy, and I would completely understand if you don’t have time to go over the reflections of an unfamiliar person).
This passage is part of the introduction to a letter I once wrote to one of the rabbis in the Haredi public[1], and therefore the style is one that speaks to a person who grew up within the Haredi community (less academic language, more yeshiva-style language. Support from the Talmud and the like, the mindset of a Haredi person, omission of things that carry a distinctly Religious Zionist spirit). I tried to reformulate this passage, unsuccessfully—perhaps aside from the beginning of it. It is important to me to emphasize this because I know that usually reading such a style paints in the reader’s mind some not especially intelligent type, and causes a degree of disdain. It is important to me that you relate—if, as stated, you see fit—to the content of the words alone, and write your opinion of the arguments and their level.
And perhaps, if possible, one more request (a rather cheeky one—but there is something about cheeky requests that makes us grant them…) that there not be too much cynicism…
Introductions on Knowledge and Clear Faith
Stage A
1. The way to clarify what is true is by means of reason. Emotions cannot clarify what is true. (This is obvious, but for some reason people sometimes forget it and claim that they know something clearly when the source is that they clearly feel it is true). It is important to distinguish between emotion and intuition. Intuition is indeed a tool for clarifying truth, and perhaps even the primary tool, as I have elaborated in my books. After all, a proof is based on first principles (for example, that what I see really exists, and more), but how do you know that the first principles themselves are correct? Will you base them on other principles? Then they are not first principles. Intuition is the root of everything.
2. To know that something is correct and true—and in fact any clear knowledge—means to know it with certainty. Uncertain knowledge is not absolute knowledge but rather conjecture or probability (of course there are things that cannot be known with certainty—but that is no reason to treat conjecture about them as knowledge). As long as we do not know with certainty, then if we are asked whether it is true the answer should be that we do not know with certainty. I strongly disagree with you. There is no certain knowledge in the world about any subject whatsoever (perhaps except for this very point, that there is no certain knowledge. That itself may be certain, though even about that one can debate). All our knowledge is at different levels of probability, and we operate within different ranges of uncertainty. The search for certainty is a misguided idea, baseless and nonsensical, and very harmful as well (precisely because of what you write here: that once you conclude that your faith is not certain, you think you do not believe—and that is not so). This is a serious mistake. Therefore, faith in God, like anything else, is only on the level of what seems probable and not something certain. Even what you see with your senses could be an illusion of various kinds (as is well known, one can create illusions in a person deliberately in various ways—hypnosis, electrodes to the brain, and the like, and there is also a mirage and the like).
3. There are two ways to know that something is correct and true: either positively—to see with the senses that it is true (such as seeing that the sun rises), or negatively—to realize that it cannot be otherwise. When one comes to clarify ideas and claims (or the truth of spiritual reality), then the only way is by negation[2]. I do not understand what “by negation” means. How can you know something by negation?
Stage B
4. Therefore, when one wants to know with certainty that there is a Creator and Guide and Torah, etc., that means to know it with one hundred percent certainty (whether it is a secular person who wants proofs of this, or whether it is a religious or Haredi person from a religious home who wants to examine himself as to whether his knowledge is real knowledge or whether he simply never thought about it before). Incorrect, as above.
5. As stated—having a certain feeling that there is a Creator and Guide who watches over us and cares for us is not enough—for after all this is only a feeling, and it is not the way to clarify whether this is the truth; the way is clarification through reason. (It should be added that for a person who has been religious/Haredi all his life, certainly the feeling that there is a Creator is not enough, since it is to be expected that he would feel there is someone watching over him, etc. Not that this feeling is not good—if there is knowledge that there is a Creator then certainly this feeling is called for, but it is relevant only after the knowledge). This could be intuition and not a feeling.
6. Consequently, even a decision to believe because of the high likelihood that a Creator exists, or because of fear of the risk of terrible punishment—together with the chances that there is a Creator—does not amount to certain knowledge that there is a Creator. They are only probability or a way of life based on risk versus chance, but not knowledge. (As for the word “faith,” it is indeed a long story what the difference is between it and knowledge. But at the end of the day it is clear that one who does not have clear knowledge that there is a Creator, etc., even if he supposes that there is—does not know, and if you ask him, “Are you sure there is a Creator?”—if he is not a liar he should answer, “No”…). It is indeed true that in religious education this warrants further examination, but it is not true that the feeling (= intuition) is an invalid tool. Every child is also educated in morality, even a secular one. Should he now throw out morality because it stems from emotion or feeling?
7. For us, the learning public—a claim is much more readily accepted if it is written in the Talmud or in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), so here too this claim is written there: Rashi at the beginning of the chapter Helek in tractate Sanhedrin explains why one who says that resurrection of the dead is not written in the Torah has no share in the World to Come even if he believes in resurrection itself, and these are his words: “What do we care for his belief? For from where does he know that it is so? Therefore he is a complete heretic.” Where is that claim written in the Torah? It is not written there. So what then? You believe the Sages and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who interpreted the Torah that way. So once again you have returned to faith and not to the text itself. Obviously.
Stage C
8. We must understand in advance that since we are coming to examine the truth of our knowledge regarding the existence of a Creator, etc., and as stated our way to verify truth is to rule out all other possibilities, then we will need to deal with those claims and rule them out—that is, to deal with heretical claims, something that will be emotionally difficult for most of our public. (And the harder part is to articulate those claims—even as a preliminary supposition—and to know that in order to verify our faith we need to rule them out one hundred percent, and not with flimsy arguments). But, as stated, that is what is required in order to clarify the truth of our knowledge. It is indeed true that alternative claims must be examined, but it is not true that certainty is required.
9. And an even harder insight: until now we have spoken from the point of view of believers, children of believers, who only want to put a check mark of certainty next to their faith-knowledge (because, like it or not, it turns out that unclear knowledge is not knowledge but conjecture). But if we are honest—if we are at this stage where our knowledge is not certain, then as long as we are at this stage where our knowledge is not certain, the feeling of an honest person is that he is not one hundred percent sure, and if someone asks him, “Tell me, are you sure there is a Creator…?” he will answer, “Not one hundred percent sure; it seems likely, but not certain.” True, that is what he will answer, and that itself is faith. And that itself is also our knowledge in every other field. Faith and knowledge are one and the same.
It is hard to express oneself like that, but by way of consolation—perhaps it is more frightening to think about the possibility of burying our head in the sand and not making our faith certain, and then in truth our knowledge is not certain—that is, that all our lives, in terms of the truth, we will be with incomplete knowledge, in effect in heresy… It depends what to call a person who is sure of something without really knowing that it is true. Like a person who is sure that if he sits on the corner of a table he will not get married for seven years—according to the truth is he a heretic about this (because he does not really know it is so, and as in the above Rashi, “from where does he know that it is so? therefore he is a heretic”), or is such a person a believer—except that he is a fool and simpleton? In any case, fools and simpletons are also not something we want to be (although emotionally that is much easier for us than being heretics…)
[1] That rabbi ultimately did not answer me. I tried to send the entire letter to another rabbi whom I thought suitable (Rabbi Nebenzahl from the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem), but it did not work out.
[2] In truth, even knowledge by way of affirmation (which pertains to physical things seen with the senses) is knowledge by way of negation—we rule out all the possibilities of interpreting what we see with the senses in another way (for example, when we see the sun, we rule out the possibility that it is only a picture—by the fact that it shines and dazzles).
Discussion on Answer
Y., hello.
Indeed, I only received this now.
It is hard for me to discuss things with such gaps, because I no longer remember what the previous discussion was about (in the meantime there have already been hundreds of others). I commented on your file {in curly brackets {} }.
All the best,
Hello Rabbi,
I’m impressed by you. By the way you relate to every questioner. By the seriousness with which you address every argument. By your decision to make yourself accessible to the public’s questions even though that means devoting a great deal of time to it. By how quickly you answer questioners. By the lack of condescension in your answers despite your enormous knowledge. (I know it’s a bit hard to read things about yourself that border on admiration… but that’s how it is when there is something to appreciate… and also, at the end of the day, it’s nice to hear genuine compliments…)
The main idea
If I understand correctly—the main idea is that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge. The closest thing we have to knowledge is probability {Not always probability. Sometimes there are questions for which there is no way to calculate a probability, and then we speak about plausibility. For example, I do not know the probability that there are no fairies, but in my eyes the plausibility of that is high.}. We call it knowledge, but we do not mean one-hundred-percent certain knowledge, rather ninety-nine point nine {Not necessarily. Knowledge is when I decide that this is the truth. The degree of plausibility can be whatever it may be. There is more certain knowledge and less certain knowledge (but never completely certain).}. And indeed if someone asks us about anything in the world whether we know it with certainty—the answer, if we are honest, will be “no.”
So all our knowledge is nothing but conjectures—very well-founded and highly probable conjectures, but not one-hundred-percent certainty. A conjecture that if we see a wall in front of us, and for twenty-five years when we saw a wall and touched it we felt the solidity of matter, and for twenty-five years when we felt the solidity of matter and moved with great force toward the matter—it hurt, then probably now too if we run into the wall it will hurt… But there is no clear knowledge, and it could be that this wall does not exist (there are indeed those who try to argue this—that man does not really live in an environment of matter, but is full of illusions, and his senses are synchronized with the illusions and convey to him sight, hearing, and sensation in accordance with the illusions [as I recall I saw in the book Thoughts on Reality, from the IDF Radio Open University series, in the first chapters]. Like very sophisticated virtual-reality glasses. {That is indeed what idealists or solipsists think (that there is no world, only our cognition).} )
Just one point of attention—according to this approach, in the religious sphere it comes out that there may be considerations that could tip the scale toward committing transgressions. For if all knowledge is only ninety-nine percent, then if, for example, the options are that they threaten you either with dying a slow death in the torments of Sheol, or with worshipping idolatry (in action), then that one percent will enter into the calculation, especially if you still have many years left to live… {Very true. Even if there is a very high moral price (for example, a prohibition against saving a non-Jew on the Sabbath), I am not sure I would obey. The plausibility that this is true (is there a Holy One, blessed be He, and is this really what He commands—for after all, this is the Sages’ interpretation) stands against the high moral cost. Fortunately, the dilemma is avoided for me because in my opinion even from the standpoint of Jewish law he should be saved, and this is not the place to elaborate.}
Likewise, if there is a commandment to know something—then it cannot be fulfilled (unless you interpret that even in the Torah’s language, when it says knowledge, it means near-absolute probability {In any case, a commandment to know is impossible. At most there is a commandment to investigate, and the knowledge will arrive or will not arrive as a result of the investigation. You cannot dictate the results of my inquiry in advance, otherwise it is not an inquiry.} ).
Knowledge by way of negation
My intent was simple—that the way to know the truth of something with certainty is by raising all the possible options for claiming that the thing is not true, and ruling them out. Example: a child wants to know with certainty that he is the biological son of his parents (something every child deals with at some stage…)—he first raises all the other options: 1. that they adopted him as a small child, 2. that they adopted him as an infant, 3. that he was switched by mistake in the hospital nursery. And in order to know that he is their biological son he has to rule them all out, and only then will he know with certainty that he is their biological son. [Of course, at each stage of ruling out there are sub-stages, such as: in the stage of ruling out that he was adopted as a child—he relies on the fact that there are pictures of him as a baby with his parents. Then he has to know with certainty that those pictures are genuine photographs of him, and again this is by raising all the options for claiming otherwise (for example, that they pasted pictures of him into the environment of his “adoptive” parents, or that these are really pictures of another child, or that he is merely imagining that he sees pictures of himself when in fact what he is holding contains pictures of a goldfish and a mango…), and then knowledge of what is true comes by ruling out all the options except the one true one that remains].
I added to argue (in the note) that in truth there is no such thing as knowledge by way of affirmation, and even sensory sight that there is a wall in front of me is not knowledge by way of affirmation but by way of negation—an inference that it cannot be that this transmission from the eye to the brain does not reflect the truth {I do not agree. There is no real difference between knowledge by way of affirmation and by way of negation. When you rule out the assumption that you are adopted, you are using knowledge by way of affirmation (that adopted children behave this way or that, and so on). This is an artificial distinction. To say that all fairies have three wings is to say that they do not have two, and vice versa.}.
Resurrection of the dead
Regarding the remark about belief in resurrection of the dead—indeed I did not go into it in the letter, since it was not brought for its own sake but only as a note regarding Rashi’s idea that belief without a basis is itself heresy. On the matter itself, indeed if one believes the Sages’ interpretations when it is not certain to him that the Torah cannot be interpreted in any other way—then indeed there is no knowledge here that there will be resurrection of the dead, but only conjecture (that the Sages’ interpretation of the verse is the correct interpretation). Knowledge would come after it is certain to him that there was the Exodus from Egypt and the revelation at Mount Sinai and that the Torah is from Heaven (and this—according to my approach in the letter—after it has been clarified to him that no other possibility is relevant), and only if he concludes that these verses in the Torah cannot be interpreted in any way other than the way that indicates resurrection of the dead.
Indeed, I am aware of the problem that these interpretive readings of the Sages do not appear to us to be necessary, and I am aware of the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that indeed these readings are not absolute and are not the source of the belief in resurrection of the dead, but the opposite—the rational conclusion that there will be resurrection of the dead is the source for interpreting those verses that way (Maimonides’ approach. And see Rashba responsum, part 1, sec. 9 [cited in the introduction of Mossad HaRav Kook to Rashba’s commentary on the aggadot of the Talmud, p. 13], that those verses can be interpreted differently, but what leads us to interpret them as indicating resurrection of the dead is the tradition regarding resurrection of the dead). Those medieval authorities probably interpreted “one who says there is no resurrection of the dead from the Torah” as meaning someone who denies the concept entirely, and not someone who agrees with it (following a rational conclusion) but thinks it is not written in the Torah. What I wrote referred to Rashi’s interpretation (who perhaps understood that there is no way to decide intellectually whether there will be resurrection of the dead or not, and therefore in his view the only option besides a source from the Torah is blind faith {I no longer remember the argument there. I assume I already wrote my view.}).
Hello Rabbi,
I’m impressed by you. By the way you relate to every questioner. By the seriousness with which you address every argument. By your decision to make yourself accessible to the public’s questions even though that means devoting a great deal of time to it. By how quickly you answer questioners. By the lack of condescension in your answers despite your enormous knowledge. (I know it’s a bit hard to read things about yourself that border on admiration… but that’s how it is when there is something to appreciate… and also, at the end of the day, it’s nice to hear genuine compliments…)
The main idea
If I understand correctly—the main idea is that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge. The closest thing we have to knowledge is probability. We call it knowledge, but we do not mean one-hundred-percent certain knowledge, rather ninety-nine point nine. And indeed if someone asks us about anything in the world whether we know it with certainty—the answer, if we are honest, will be “no.”
So all our knowledge is nothing but conjectures—very well-founded and highly probable conjectures, but not one-hundred-percent certainty. A conjecture that if we see a wall in front of us, and for twenty-five years when we saw a wall and touched it we felt the solidity of matter, and for twenty-five years when we felt the solidity of matter and moved with great force toward the matter—it hurt, then probably now too if we run into the wall it will hurt… But there is no clear knowledge, and it could be that this wall does not exist (there are indeed those who try to argue this—that man does not really live in an environment of matter, but is full of illusions, and his senses are synchronized with the illusions and convey to him sight, hearing, and sensation in accordance with the illusions [as I recall I saw in the book Thoughts on Reality, from the IDF Radio Open University series, in the first chapters]. Like very sophisticated virtual-reality glasses.)
Just one point of attention—according to this approach, in the religious sphere it comes out that there may be considerations that could tip the scale toward committing transgressions. For if all knowledge is only ninety-nine percent, then if, for example, the options are that they threaten you either with dying a slow death in the torments of Sheol, or with worshipping idolatry (in action), then that one percent will enter into the calculation, especially if you still have many years left to live…
Likewise, if there is a commandment to know something—then it cannot be fulfilled (unless you interpret that even in the Torah’s language, when it says knowledge, it means near-absolute probability).
Knowledge by way of negation
My intent was simple—that the way to know the truth of something with certainty is by raising all the possible options for claiming that the thing is not true, and ruling them out. Example: a child wants to know with certainty that he is the biological son of his parents (something every child deals with at some stage…)—he first raises all the other options: 1. that they adopted him as a small child, 2. that they adopted him as an infant, 3. that he was switched by mistake in the hospital nursery. And in order to know that he is their biological son he has to rule them all out, and only then will he know with certainty that he is their biological son. [Of course, at each stage of ruling out there are sub-stages, such as: in the stage of ruling out that he was adopted as a child—he relies on the fact that there are pictures of him as a baby with his parents. Then he has to know with certainty that those pictures are genuine photographs of him, and again this is by raising all the options for claiming otherwise (for example, that they pasted pictures of him into the environment of his “adoptive” parents, or that these are really pictures of another child, or that he is merely imagining that he sees pictures of himself when in fact what he is holding contains pictures of a goldfish and a mango…), and then knowledge of what is true comes by ruling out all the options except the one true one that remains].
I added to argue (in the note) that in truth there is no such thing as knowledge by way of affirmation, and even sensory sight that there is a wall in front of me is not knowledge by way of affirmation but by way of negation—an inference that it cannot be that this transmission from the eye to the brain does not reflect the truth.
Resurrection of the dead
Regarding the remark about belief in resurrection of the dead—indeed I did not go into it in the letter, since it was not brought for its own sake but only as a note regarding Rashi’s idea that belief without a basis is itself heresy. On the matter itself, indeed if one believes the Sages’ interpretations when it is not certain to him that the Torah cannot be interpreted in any other way—then indeed there is no knowledge here that there will be resurrection of the dead, but only conjecture (that the Sages’ interpretation of the verse is the correct interpretation). Knowledge would come after it is certain to him that there was the Exodus from Egypt and the revelation at Mount Sinai and that the Torah is from Heaven (and this—according to my approach in the letter—after it has been clarified to him that no other possibility is relevant), and only if he concludes that these verses in the Torah cannot be interpreted in any way other than the way that indicates resurrection of the dead.
Indeed, I am aware of the problem that these interpretive readings of the Sages do not appear to us to be necessary, and I am aware of the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that indeed these readings are not absolute and are not the source of the belief in resurrection of the dead, but the opposite—the rational conclusion that there will be resurrection of the dead is the source for interpreting those verses that way (Maimonides’ approach. And see Rashba responsum, part 1, sec. 9 [cited in the introduction of Mossad HaRav Kook to Rashba’s commentary on the aggadot of the Talmud, p. 13], that those verses can be interpreted differently, but what leads us to interpret them as indicating resurrection of the dead is the tradition regarding resurrection of the dead). Those medieval authorities probably interpreted “one who says there is no resurrection of the dead from the Torah” as meaning someone who denies the concept entirely, and not someone who agrees with it (following a rational conclusion) but thinks it is not written in the Torah. What I wrote referred to Rashi’s interpretation (who perhaps understood that there is no way to decide intellectually whether there will be resurrection of the dead or not, and therefore in his view the only option besides a source from the Torah is blind faith).