Q&A: Overridden or Suspended
Overridden or Suspended
Question
A. Several times I heard the Rabbi say that there is no practical difference between something being entirely permitted and something being merely suspended/overridden (that is how I remember it), and the Rabbi questioned the practical difference regarding adding more prohibitions. While learning the Talmudic passage in Yevamot about the prohibition of a brother’s wife being set aside because of the commandment of levirate marriage, we came up with a framework for what “entirely permitted” and “suspended/overridden” mean, and according to it there is a practical difference. I’ll try to present it as clearly as possible.
Let us take levirate marriage as an example: the Torah commanded us to perform levirate marriage with a brother’s wife, and by doing so did not obligate us to subject ourselves to the prohibition of a brother’s wife (this is according to Tosafot on 3b, who said that this works by the rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition). But at the stage of permission there are two possibilities: either with respect to the fulfillment of the commandment we are not subject to the prohibition — that would be suspended/overridden. Or with respect to the act of the commandment we are not subject to the prohibition — that would be entirely permitted (for the prohibition does not contradict the fact that the commandment be fulfilled, but rather the act of the commandment). And the practical difference would be in cases such as a minor and an adult yevamah, where no commandment is actually fulfilled, but the act is still an act of commandment, and therefore it would be permitted and there would be no prohibition of a brother’s wife.
Answer
I don’t know why my answer doesn’t appear here. I’ll answer again.
Let me begin by saying that in the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and in the Talmud itself there certainly are practical differences involving adding more prohibitions, but my claim is that this does not necessarily follow from the definition of “suspended/overridden” versus “entirely permitted.” Of course you can propose a definition from which a practical difference will emerge, but that is an artificial definition. My claim is that from the very fact that something is “entirely permitted” or “suspended/overridden,” no practical difference follows.
As for your suggestion: you are proposing a certain distinction, and a practical difference follows from it. As stated, that does not touch my claim. You connect it to the distinction between the act of the commandment and the fulfillment of the commandment, but I do not see any connection between that and the distinction between “entirely permitted” and “suspended/overridden.” Obviously, if it depends on fulfillment of the commandment and not on the act, then there is a practical difference in the case of a minor. There is nothing especially novel about that. The question is whether the definition of “suspended/overridden” and “entirely permitted” necessarily yields the distinction between the act of the commandment and its fulfillment. In my opinion, absolutely not.
More precisely: if it is suspended/overridden, it is reasonable to interpret that as referring to fulfillment of the commandment (because the act of the commandment in itself has no value that would override the prohibition). But if it is entirely permitted, there is no necessity that this refers to the act of the commandment. It is possible that fulfillment of the commandment is what permits the prohibition.