In my opinion, what he calls “the marketplace of life” is not what you call “public policy.” He means that just as we ask a rabbi about matters of Jewish law, so too we should ask a rabbi about values.
Many political questions are value questions, and it seems to me that this is what the Chazon Ish meant.

For example—I don’t think the Chazon Ish meant that a rabbi should decide the size of the defense budget, or who should be mayor. But yes regarding any value question, even if it has no purely halakhic ruling.
The Chazon Ish held that every value question should be examined through “Torah insight” by great Torah scholars.

How is the defense budget not a value question? It’s the mother of all value questions. Both in itself and because of the budget taken away from other goals. There are very few questions that do not fall under the heading of a value question. And public policy certainly deals mainly with value questions.

I didn’t understand.
You say that great Torah scholars do not have special abilities for understanding reality, and therefore the Chazon Ish was probably speaking about non-substantive authority.
Afterward you say that almost every question is a value question, not a factual one.

If most of what is called “the marketplace of life” consists of value questions, then great Torah scholars do have substantive authority there. True, they do not have special abilities for understanding reality, but they do have special abilities for understanding the Torah’s values.

By the way, I do not agree with the claim that there are few questions that are not value-based. True, every practical question has a value dimension, but usually the dilemma is about understanding reality, not about value.
If we return to the example—the arguments surrounding the defense budget are usually professional arguments.

Typo. I meant to write that in my opinion he was not speaking about formal authority but substantive authority.
The dilemmas are mainly value-based, including the defense budget. In my opinion there are hardly any professional aspects there at all. The proof is that the debate is conducted by non-professional parties. Dividing a given budget within the army and defense establishment is more professional. But how much to give them as against the rest of the budget for other goals is a clearly value-based question.
Even in the value context I do not accept any special authority of halakhic decisors and great Torah scholars. At least not as a sweeping principle. Their professional authority is Jewish law.

You can disagree with the Chazon Ish, but now his words are no longer strange (as Reuven thought). He simply thinks that the Torah should determine our values.

Obviously this is not something sweeping, but the Torah has a value statement in all kinds of matters.

Thanks for the permission to disagree. Indeed, the Chazon Ish probably thought that the Torah should determine values (and that they can also be extracted from it). I disagree with him on both points. Who said otherwise?

The Hebrew Bible and the Sages are full of value statements; I won’t even begin quoting…
This seems bizarre to me.

Sorry about those last words. Maybe I didn’t understand you.

What is the purpose of Jewish law if not some sort of value?

A religious value, not necessarily a moral one. See, for example, Column 15. Moral values we understand on our own, and the Torah usually leaves them to us as well (“and you shall do what is right and good”), without specifying; the assumption is that everyone understands what that means. And even if the purpose of the commandments is moral—which I do not agree with—that still does not give sages any advantage in understanding morality. They understand Jewish law and discuss questions within the halakhic sphere. The rationale of the verse is another plane, and there they do not necessarily have an advantage.

So I really didn’t understand you above.

1. But at least let’s agree that great Torah scholars have substantive authority regarding religious values.
There are political questions that have a dimension of religious value even though they do not involve a formal halakhic question.

2. Besides that, it is very hard to separate religious values from moral values; in every political question these are mixed together.
If we accept that one should listen to someone who has substantive authority regarding moral values, whom should we listen to?
That each person should just listen to himself sounds nice in our democratic age, but it doesn’t work in practice. People usually look for a guide in order to make their decisions. Most people do not rack their brains over political and moral questions.
If we listen to ethics experts (Asa Kasher, just as an example) who are not great Torah scholars, there is a concern that they will not align with religious values. And as stated, these are mixed together and the domains cannot be separated.

One has to remember what a great Torah scholar was in the eyes of the Chazon Ish: he had very high moral demands from a Torah scholar. So it stands to reason that he saw the great Torah scholars as the only people capable of ruling on political questions.

3. And “love your fellow as yourself”—is that not a moral value?

1. I do not agree. Their expertise is Jewish law, not anything beyond that. The laws aim at religious values, but people of Jewish law have no expertise in religious values beyond the law itself (beyond the letter of the law).
2. I do not understand why there needs to be someone with authority regarding moral values. It is just unnecessary dependency. One should consult and decide. And of course check with a Jewish law expert whether Jewish law has something to say about the matter.
3. To the best of my understanding, no. Perhaps there is moral value in love of one’s fellow (and even about that I am not sure), but the commandment does not deal with the moral value but with the religious value. The same is true of “do not steal” and the like. In any case, even if “love your fellow as yourself” aims at a moral value, halakhic expertise is still relevant only to the halakhic interpretation of the commandment, not to the value at which it aims. In that, the decisor is as much an expert as you and I are.

As someone who knew, to some extent, great figures such as Rabbi Steinman, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, and others, I can testify one hundred percent that the clarity of mind those people had was something beyond description—people who were detached from the cravings of this world, and were able to see and weigh every issue so sharply and cleanly, without any influence or prejudice. It really jars me to see people who are very far from the greatness of the great Torah scholars allowing themselves to disagree with the Chazon Ish—a Jew who fled from all the vanities of this world and created a masterpiece in his books. It was well known that he understood medicine in an unparalleled way. This approach—that great Torah scholars are experts in Torah just as a mathematics professor is an expert in mathematics—is a heretical and contemptuous approach toward the holy Torah, for “turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it.” A great doctor may understand a great deal about medicine in the field he studied, but that does not make his intellect clear and pure, because he has not worked on his character traits, and in practice he has not refined his mind 24/7/365 as the Chazon Ish did. Just imagine a very intelligent person for whom there is hardly a moment in life—including dreams at night—when he is not immersed in Torah study. All this even before the divine assistance that we all know great Torah scholars have. I can testify about a child who studied with me in school: from first through seventh grade, the child did not understand a word the teacher taught. At the beginning of eighth grade he began studying with study partners, with tremendous desire to advance, and continued in yeshiva until he became one of the outstanding students in the yeshiva, married the daughter of a famous yeshiva dean, and became one of the successful senior lecturers in the yeshiva world. Simply open divine assistance.

“For the children of Israel are servants to Me—they are My servants.”

They are My servants, and not servants to servants.

According to the Torah, it is forbidden to obey anyone—not formal authority, not substantive authority, and not any other made-up authority.

Meaning, not only is there no obligation to obey; it is forbidden to obey. The Torah teaches that we are free people. And one who obeys another human being is not free, by definition.

Just a reminder that the Holocaust happened because of all sorts of obedience-lovers, disciplined conformists, and believers in human authority.

A good week to you. The matter of “they are My servants, and not servants to servants” is really not relevant. A slave is someone who cannot choose and decide what to do, as opposed to a free person, who can choose. Thank God, all of us (except perhaps someone trapped in a closed cult) are in a state of free choice. Free choice is the primary condition for all our conduct as Jews who choose the good. I assume you know Rabbi Dessler’s words on this subject. I hope you know the words of Sefer HaChinukh on the commandment “and you shall do according to what they instruct you.” I quote: “Included in the commandment as well is to listen and act at all times according to the command of the judge—that is, the great sage who will be among us in our time—as the Sages interpreted: ‘and to the judge who shall be in those days’—Jephthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation. Meaning that we are commanded to heed the voice of Jephthah in his generation just as Samuel in his generation. And one who violates this and does not listen to the counsel of the great ones of the generation in the wisdom of Torah nullifies this positive commandment, and his punishment is very great, for this is the mighty pillar upon which the Torah rests, as is known to anyone with understanding.”
The issue of obeying sages during the Holocaust was dealt with extensively by Rabbi Mordechai Neugroschel. To say that the Holocaust happened because of lovers of obedience is really not respectful to you. The topic is too complex and painful to assign blame in two words just because your stomach hurts over it. Much success and good health.

That is simply not correct.
The Torah says: “If a matter of judgment is beyond you…”

And only in such rare cases should one do: “Then you shall come to the Levitical priests, and to the judge who will be in those days; and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you the word of judgment.”

The idea is that if you do not know something, you cannot suddenly apply your own discretion after they have told you the law. Because it certainly would not be upright on your part to do so just because the law is inconvenient for you.

To jump from here to a constant obligation to listen is the opposite of what the text says.

Regarding the Holocaust, I did not mean obedience to sages, but rather to the Germans, may their name be erased, who sanctified the matter of obedience.

To be a free person is the opposite of obeying.