Q&A: Question about Column 175
Question about Column 175
Question
The Rabbi argues in column 175 (about free choice and judgment) that a determinist cannot place trust in what he thinks, because it is the result of a technical computational mechanism whose workings we do not know, and therefore it is impossible to trust it. In addition, the Rabbi argues that the only way not to be a skeptic is to place trust (not complete trust) in our own judgment.
Why can’t we apply that same consideration to placing trust in the computational system?
Answer
First, when I say that the only way not to be a skeptic is to place trust in our own judgment, I was not offering an argument against determinism. I was simply pointing out a fact. As far as I’m concerned, you could say the same thing about the computational mechanism. The question is what it is philosophically justified to trust, not what the logical connection is between what you do or think and skepticism.
Second, exercising judgment requires making a decision. A computational system does not exercise judgment; it simply computes. And if it places trust (in itself), then it places trust, period. That trust says nothing. It is there because that is how it is built. This whole discussion cannot even take place if we are mechanical systems.
Discussion on Answer
The reason is my feeling that it seems reliable to me and that it works. In my understanding, you need a reason in order to be skeptical.
I understand.
Is there a reason for giving that trust? Other than the fact that the alternative is skepticism?