Question

In the last part of the book That Which Is Present and That Which Is Not, in the example of mixing scholarship with the halakhic plane (in the context of understanding Meiri’s remarks about gentiles), the Rabbi argues that each plane has to be complete on its own. In the context of drawing conclusions for our own time, I completely understand that it doesn’t matter what reasons motivated the halakhic decisor; rather, one has to address the arguments themselves.
But Katz explains in his article the reasons that caused Meiri to rule as he did, and in explaining Meiri’s conduct I didn’t understand why it is not reasonable to say that if you don’t find a logical reason why someone did not carry his distinction through to the very end, then apparently it was caused by some psychological reason (or by a decision not to uproot the matter entirely). After all, this is an explanation of the person’s behavior (in this case Meiri, but the Rabbi does not agree with this general scholarly approach), and behavior—including halakhic ruling—is definitely influenced by psychological motives as well. So I didn’t understand why it is said that Katz (and the general approach of scholars) fell into a misunderstanding on this issue. (The Rabbi mentions there in one of the lines the assumption that no one does things without a sufficient philosophical basis, according to his view. Does the Rabbi reject the possibility of acting out of fear / concern / various emotions, without a logical foundation?)