Q&A: The Rationale of the Verse
The Rationale of the Verse
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Sanhedrin 69b
“A son, and not a daughter.” It was taught: Rabbi Shimon said: By strict logic, a daughter should be fit to be treated as a stubborn and rebellious son, for everything is readily available to her for sin; rather, it is a decree of Scripture: a son, and not a daughter.
And this requires clarification: Rabbi Shimon expounds the rationale of the verse, and even when the Torah writes a law explicitly he limits it because of the rationale of the verse, as we learned earlier on 21b, where the Torah says, “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” and Rabbi Shimon limits this and says that only a poor widow may not be taken as collateral. And earlier, on 16b, Rabbi Shimon said that one does not make an idolatrous city on the border, based on reasoning. If so, why should we not extend what is said in the verse to a daughter as well, based on the rationale of the verse?
This morning I looked in the encyclopedia and it has an entry on the rationale of the verse, and they referred to Yoma 42b:
“And he shall bring out it” — that he should not bring out another with it, as we learned in the Mishnah: If the cow did not want to go out, one does not bring out a black one with it, lest people say, “They slaughtered the black one.” And one does not bring out a red one with it, lest people say, “They slaughtered two.” Rabbi says: This is not the reason, but rather because it says “it” — by itself. And the first tanna — but it is written “it”! Who is the first tanna? It is Rabbi Shimon, who expounds the rationale of the verse. What is the practical difference between them? The difference is a case where he brought out a donkey together with it.
According to Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to bring out a donkey together with the cow, because everyone knows they would not slaughter it. This implies that even where there is a minority possibility, Rabbi Shimon expounds the rationale of the verse. If so, why should he not also expound the rationale of the verse regarding the stubborn and rebellious son and obligate a daughter as well?
Shabbat shalom
Answer
Hello.
You are assuming that when they say “a decree of Scripture,” the meaning is that there is no reason, or that one does not follow the reason. But it is certainly possible that the meaning is that Scripture decreed that this is not the reason, but rather a different reason (which we also understand). The proof is from this very passage, since the medieval authorities brought the reason for the rule of “a son, and not a daughter” as being that it is not her way to be drawn after transgressions and to rob people. And the Meiri asked: but in the Talmud it says that this is a decree of Scripture (and in the Jerusalem Talmud this is stated even more explicitly). And he answered, in my understanding, that a decree of Scripture is not a law without a reason.
And you can see this as well in the passage on 21a that you mentioned, regarding “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” in Maimonides’ view.
See my article on decrees of Scripture for explanations of this whole issue (including these passages), here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%99-%D7%92%D7%96%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%911-%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%96%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D/
Discussion on Answer
The concept of innovation in the law of a conspiring witness is the main subject of the article; see there.
As for Rabbi Shimon’s wording, it doesn’t seem so problematic to me.
And maybe it can be explained that even if stumbling block A does not result, but rather B, it is still difficult why one should not apply the law of the stubborn and rebellious son because of stumbling block B. To that he says that the decree of Scripture is to apply the law of the stubborn and rebellious son for this reason (= this stumbling block) and not for another reason, but the law itself is clear.
Thank you, I’ll print it out and look at it on Shabbat, God willing.
Even so, one comment: Rabbi Shimon could have said that a daughter is liable to be an even greater stumbling block, except that no stumbling block will result from her if she eats meat and drinks wine, instead of using the expression — but what can I do, indeed let me do and do, because there is a countervailing reason.
And since we’ve come to this, how do you understand the concept of an innovation, where “you have in it only what its novelty gives you,” for example regarding a conspiring witness according to Rava in Sanhedrin 27a? Is an innovation a decree of Scripture plus something more?