Q&A: Awareness as a condition for obligation in commandments according to the view that commandments do not require intention
Awareness as a condition for obligation in commandments according to the view that commandments do not require intention
Question
Peace be upon you.
It is well known that there is a dispute among the Amoraim in Rosh Hashanah 28 regarding whether commandments require intention. Now, the view of the one who says they do not require intention is that whenever a person performed the act, even if he blew the shofar merely for music, he has fulfilled his obligation. And seemingly the explanation is that God’s primary will is that the person perform the act in itself, even without an awareness of command and of doing God’s will. And although certainly there is value, even according to that view, in performing the commandment with an awareness of being commanded (and in Chayei Adam, in Kitzur Charedim, commandment 10, even the commandment of “to serve Him with all your heart”), nevertheless the primary will is that he do the act.
Now everyone agrees that if someone ate matzah while insane and then recovered, he is obligated to eat again. Seemingly this is because at the time he was insane he was exempt from all commandments, and since he was not subject to obligation, his act has no value as a commandment-act. But according to the one who says commandments do not require intention, this is hard to understand, since if God’s primary will is that the act be done — and that applies even to someone without understanding — why has he not fulfilled his obligation?
And one cannot say that without awareness there is no responsibility and one cannot be commanded, for the primary will is not that he perform the commandments in light of the command, but that he perform the act in itself, as stated above. According to this, the concept of a “commandment-act” is rooted not in the command, since even without the command one can do God’s will, but in the result. If so, there is no reason that the criterion for obligation in commandments should be awareness, since it is entirely possible to do God’s will even without it. So why is an insane person not subject to obligation?
I thought perhaps he does not fulfill his obligation because this is considered unintentional involvement, and in that respect it differs from one who blows the shofar for music, since there at least he intends to hear the sound of the shofar, whereas here the act is not done out of any awareness at all. But that does not work, for Rashi wrote in Rosh Hashanah 28a (s.v. “you might have said”) that even according to the one who says commandments require intention, if Persians forced him and he ate matzah, he fulfilled his obligation since he derived pleasure from his eating, just as one who was unintentionally involved with forbidden fats or forbidden sexual relations is liable because he derived pleasure. So we see that even regarding eating matzah, the principle of “since he derived pleasure” applies, and it should not be discussed under the category of unintentional involvement. And from there infer to our case: an insane person who ate matzah seemingly should not be treated as one who was unintentionally involved.
Perhaps we should say that even though intention is not indispensable for commandments, this is not because God’s primary will is that the act alone be done, but rather that although His will is that the commandments be performed with an awareness of command, a side exemption was introduced: if he already did the act, he has fulfilled his obligation. And when it is impossible to impose on a person the duty to make sure he fulfills his obligation, then he is not commanded at all, and it makes no sense to judge him as obligated merely because he falls under that side exemption. But this is strained, for from where would the Sages derive such a side exemption? Rather, it must be that according to the view that commandments do not require intention, God’s primary will is that the act itself be done — and so the difficulty returns to its place: why is an insane person not considered subject to obligation, when he is capable of doing God’s will?
What do you think about this?
Answer
I don’t have time to get into the thick of the matter, so I’ll write briefly and off the cuff.
I’m not sure you are right in your assumption that being commanded has no significance. In the case of an insane person, there is room to say that he is worse off than someone who did not intend, because he is not commanded at all. Otherwise, why shouldn’t a gentile fulfill the positive commandment of blowing the shofar even though he is not commanded? After all, according to you it is just the act without the command. More generally, why is a command needed to create a commandment? According to your approach, it should be enough that it be revealed that this is God’s will (see my article on “The Status of Reasoning in Jewish Law” here on the site). And it would seem that in the case of a gentile there is no spiritual correction even if he blows. If so, perhaps the same is true of an insane person.
And especially according to my view, that according to everyone commandments require faith / belief, and without it one does not fulfill one’s obligation (see my article “Causing a Secular Person to Sin”), it is clear that it is incorrect to say that the act by itself is enough. You yourself mentioned the law of unintentional involvement, which certainly is not fulfillment of a commandment. And Rashi’s linking it to intention is a puzzling novelty, though even according to him that is only in the case of forbidden fats and forbidden sexual relations.
And in truth one must ask why someone who blows the shofar for music is not considered to have opposite intention, which according to some of the medieval authorities (the Rashbam, as I recall) is ineffective according to everyone. Clearly this question has already been asked; I just don’t remember it now. For on the face of it one could say that a commandment without explicit intention works because of a reasoning similar to an unspecified act being presumed for its proper sake, as in the opening discussion of Zevachim — though of course intention and “for its proper sake” are two different laws. If so, there really is intention here, except that it is not conscious. To illustrate: a person who comes to synagogue in the morning to pray, but does not intend to fulfill his obligation. It is still obvious that if he came, it is certainly for the sake of the commandment, even if consciously he does not have that in mind. Otherwise he would not be there. If so, even according to the view that commandments do not require intention, intention is in fact required, and the act alone is not enough. Then it is obvious that an insane person does not fulfill his obligation, and he is not comparable to someone who simply did not intend.
However, in light of this, one still has to discuss the case of someone who blows the shofar for music, because there there is certainly no situation of an unspecified act being presumed for its proper sake. With some difficulty one could say that it is like the case of the person praying mentioned above: he is blowing the shofar because of the commandment, but in his conscious mind he is doing it in order to make music. Otherwise, why would he specifically make music with a shofar?! According to this too, there is an unspecified act presumed to be for its proper sake.
Discussion on Answer
But then the question comes back: how would you explain the case of someone who blows the shofar for music? He is not lacking only momentary awareness. He is doing it for a different purpose, so a general life-attitude is not enough. That is not like the prayer example I gave.
A believing person’s general approach to life is that whatever can count as a commandment should indeed count as a commandment.
True, at the time of the act he intends to play tunes and is not thinking about the commandment, but still there is within him, even without thinking about it, a general stance and desire that his ordinary actions should also be commandments if that is possible.
You don’t have to think about everything at every moment. It’s like saying that I love my family members all the time, even when I’m not thinking about them and my feelings are not occupied with them. That is an attitude I have toward them.
And the one who says commandments do not require intention apparently holds that you do not need intention, but you do need a general stance toward actions and toward reality.
(And as an aside, is it a coincidence that Rava, who held that commandments do not require intention, also held that unconscious despair counts as despair, while Abaye, who challenged his view regarding the intention required for commandments, also held that it counts as despair? Maybe it is not a coincidence. Here too it is a question of one’s approach to reality versus conscious recognition and active knowledge. Though it would be going too far to claim a tight connection between the issues, and certainly among the medieval authorities there is no dependence between the disputes.)
So we’ve come back more or less to my formulation.
Your explanation of Abaye and Rava reminds me of the common explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding an unintended act and the reason for the verse, and also regarding the Romans, that everything they instituted was only for their own benefit.
By the way, regarding the mnemonic “Yaal Kegam,” I once thought that five of the disputes revolve around retroactive implications, including unconscious despair. If so, then the core point of dispute is different from the one you suggested.
Yes, we came back to the idea of an unspecified thought, but much more general and abstract.
As for unconscious despair and “retroactively,” I seem to recall that one of the medieval authorities does imply that this is indeed retroactive — the Raavad in Shitah Mekubbetzet, maybe? I no longer remember. But it is not entirely clear how this retroactivity works, especially in the case of produce that became wet and he was later pleased about it, since pleasure is not a legal effect but an emotional state, and how can one be pleased retroactively? Though perhaps it can be resolved.
“Otherwise, why would he specifically make music with a shofar?!” Why not? A shofar used to be a more common musical instrument, not something rare.
It seems more likely that according to the view that commandments do not require intention, the reason is that there is a general intention in life to walk on the straight and good path and to merit commandments, and even if he did not think about it at that particular moment, he has a general stance toward his actions. And that stance and attitude toward one’s actions are enough; there is no need for active intention. That is not the case with an insane person.