Q&A: Relative Properties
Relative Properties
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask whether properties that are relative in their very essence say something positive about reality, or whether they are empty of content and are merely a tool of our mind for organizing the information around us in a more convenient way.
For example, when I say that the cup in front of me is resting on the table at a height of 1.2 meters. This is a relative description, since height is a relative thing depending on where I measure the height from, and so too all other descriptions of location merely describe a relation between objects. Do they also have the power to assert something factual? Because every object, and even the frame of reference itself, is relative, so how can it have the power to make a factual claim?
By contrast, when I say that the marker in front of me is yellow, that is an "intrinsic" property; it is not relative to any other object. And therefore there is no problem claiming that it reflects something that really exists in the object.
Answer
I did not understand the question. A relation is a claim about the world/reality: the distance between the book and the floor is one meter. How is that different from the claim about the color yellow?
Discussion on Answer
So what? Why is that relevant? The object could also have been green. And even if there were a difference, why is an accidental property not a claim about reality? Isn't my weight a claim about reality because I can go on a diet? I really am not managing to understand this discussion at all.
I am asking where this property “is located” if it is not part of any object. Green and yellow are properties of objects, even if they are accidental properties, but they are still part of them. But an object's position in space does not reflect an inherent state in the object, but rather an external relation between it and other objects.
So if it is not found in anything, but only in our mind, does it have the power to tell us something about reality?
I've completely lost you. Where is your kindness located? Relations are not necessarily located anywhere, but that does not mean they are not factual claims about the world. By the way, a photon is a physical object, and it too has no defined place in space. So is it also only in our mind? Not to mention your intellect or mine, which also are not located anywhere.
Not every property is connected to location; rather, it is a property of an “object.” That is indeed what I am saying. The same goes for kindness, a photon, or a “soul.”
The issue is: what is the concept of “place”? It is not a concept that is intrinsic to the object, but relative to the other objects. But if so, what connection does it have to the world?
For example, when I have before me two weights, one weighing 10 kg and the other 100 kg, I can claim that the second weight is heavier than the first. The claim that it is heavier is indeed relative—it is not a property of the object—but more of a classification of understanding. Still, it is a true claim, because it compares properties of objects.
But location is a property that is not found in any object, but is relative to all of them, so how does it exist?
Indeed, all of these are properties that exist in the things themselves. For example, kindness indeed does not take up a specific place, but it is still a property of an entity (the soul). Likewise, a photon is an object in the world.
That is exactly my point.
So too, for example, when we make a comparison and a relation between two weights, one weighing 10 kg and the other 100 kg. When I claim that the second weight is heavier than the first, even though I am making a claim involving a relative concept, “heaviness,” it fits reality because it correctly relates to the properties of the objects.
But the question is how a description that is entirely relative can claim something about the world. Because the location of an object is not a property in it, but a relation in reality. But if so, how does that make a factual claim about the world? (It is like an infinite regress.)
I'm sorry, but I've given up. Either you don't understand me or I don't understand you. To me this sounds like nonsense.
Does the Rabbi agree that if in all of reality and existence there were only a single object, it would not be possible to claim what its place is? Because we would have no frame of reference relative to it?
If so, then when there are several objects, our whole ability to claim something like location is derived from the existence of the other objects, but there is nothing real in place beyond a regress of relativities.
If so, is location really a factual claim about the world?
Definitely. If there were one object in the world, it would also not be possible to claim that there are two.
Indeed, my question also applies to absence.
Absence too is not a property of anything, so “where” does it exist? And if it does not exist, how is it true / how does it claim something about the external world?
I will try to ask this from a different angle, because I thought about it again, and absence belongs to understanding, not to description.
What is the correct understanding regarding the location of an object in space: are the coordinates of the individual object a property of the object or of space? If not, then what are they?
With all due respect, I'm done. I explained everything I had to explain.
Location is a property that does not appear in any object. It is an accidental property. The book can be one meter above the floor, but it can also be two meters above it. It is a fiction.
By contrast, the color yellow describes something that really exists in the material.