Q&A: Custom as a Formal Obligation
Custom as a Formal Obligation
Question
Is there any point in keeping a custom when one observes its external form without its inner spirit?
For example, saying Selichot while one is "trying" to rush through the words as fast as possible, since he does not connect to the content. Does the custom obligate one to say the text even when in any case he has no intention of fulfilling the mindset or intention behind it?
Given that in your view custom is binding [I saw that you write that this is because of "do not forsake" (- a strange exposition) or a vow (- even stranger)], does everything practiced by the Jewish people have to be observed, including every act or prayer or stringency practiced by the community to which one belongs?
Answer
In principle, all of these are binding, although the parameters of customs are not sharply defined, and each person’s practice is in his own hands.
As for your question about a custom without a soul, I do not see how this differs from any law that is observed without its soul. What is the difference between Selichot without intention and prayer without intention? Moreover, I disagree with your assumption that the desire to hurry necessarily indicates lack of intention. Beyond that, there are also more general intentions to which the very act of participating in Selichot testifies, even if there is no intention directed to the words themselves.
The reliance on the verse "do not forsake" is rooted in the Talmud (Pesachim), and I do not see it as any stranger than many other laws. In simple terms, though, it seems that this may also be just a scriptural support for a principle whose foundation is reasoning or enactment. The reliance on the laws of vows is indeed more difficult, although given the fact that a person is part of the community, the conduct of the community can perhaps be considered a collective vow (actual conduct is no worse than explicit verbal commitment, as in the law of a good custom that one repeats several times).
Discussion on Answer
I disagree. The discussion in the Talmud and among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) treats a communal custom as a vow of the community, and it binds even an individual who did not personally practice it that way (and the explanation for this is brought in my remarks above).
For example, here you can see quite a few such references:
http://www.olamot.net/shiur/%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%A0%D7%93%D7%A8
I have now seen in the responsa of Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayim, sec. 145, where he discusses a deathly ill man who feared that his wife would remain an agunah if he died (because the brother-in-law was far away), and the question is whether it is possible to write her a bill of divorce on the second day of a Jewish holiday. In the background lies the fact that nowadays the second day of a Jewish holiday is weekday by Torah law:
But in the case before us, this matter of delaying his yevamah without levirate marriage or halitzah is certainly minor and an exigency in comparison with actively desecrating the second day of the holiday by performing labor forbidden by Torah law, for the sages were greatly concerned for this custom, because it is weighty indeed. And how great is the force of this custom, that in the sanctification over the holiday they say "this festival of Shavuot" and likewise in prayer, and this would be speaking falsehood toward Heaven; were it not that the sages trusted in the Almighty who completes matters on my behalf, they would not have allowed such a practice, and all this is so that people should not come to treat it lightly and perform labor. See how severe this matter is. And the words of Tosafot on Sukkah 44b, s.v. "here," require some examination in what they wrote that on a holiday one should not say "and commanded us," but only mention it in kiddush. This requires examination, for regarding eating maror, on the first night it is rabbinic, and on the second night they do say "and commanded us." And likewise what they wrote that kiddush and prayer are only mention—did it seem light in the eyes of our rabbis, the Tosafot authors, to say "this such-and-such festival day" in falsehood and deceit, were this custom not strong and severe?
And it seems close to me to say that this is a Torah prohibition by force of a vow made publicly and spread throughout all Israel. And all the leniencies with which we are lenient about it, and regarding its punishment to excommunicate, as the Ran wrote at the beginning of the chapter "A Place Where They Practiced," means that from the outset they accepted it as a rabbinic prohibition. But what they accepted, and the manner in which they accepted it, is a Torah prohibition, and one transgresses "he shall not break his word." And the vow means the acceptance that they accept upon themselves, and "what comes out of your mouth you shall perform"—this is charity, as the Ran wrote in the first chapter of Nedarim 8a, s.v. "upon him to rise early," and see Ran Nedarim 1b s.v. "because it is said," etc. In any case, this is a grave prohibition, more than this case of one who was prevented from having his yevamah released by halitzah. And we do not say to a person: sin with a grave prohibition so that your fellow will not be punished with a minor penalty. And I have elaborated somewhat on this because, due to our many sins, the lawless among our people have now proliferated; they have set up a false vision and laugh at the second day of the holiday because it is "just a custom," and they have not wished to walk in the footsteps of the sages of Israel. They speak from their own minds; they do not know and do not understand; they walk in darkness.
If a custom is binding, then how did you write in other answers on the site that one can be lenient with them? I don’t understand—if a custom is something binding, how do we know what level of difficulty permits setting aside the obligation? [And certainly if it is like a vow, in which case it is even more severe.]
It is accepted that Sephardim need to lengthen the Selichot and begin them from the start of Elul, because of the abundance of their sins during the year: eating legumes, Heaven forbid, on Passover, and not practicing the mourning customs during the Three Weeks (and some say because they do not accept Ashkenazi students into their institutions).
When you take upon yourself to be strict about legumes and soaked matzah products (in accordance with the Rabbi’s stringent opinion), and about the customs of the Three Weeks, you can comfortably be lenient regarding Selichot.
Yossi,
I can only join, like "Judah and more for the reading," your honored opinion, sir. 🙂
Ashkenazi,
Customs are a double-edged sword. Any nonsense can become accepted as a custom. Therefore the laws of custom as well are themselves rooted in custom, and they are very flexible. Only when something is clearly established as a proper custom does the obligation to act in accordance with it apply. The question of what is included in the category of a binding custom is itself very flexible, and here there is room for judgment and common sense.
I once explained in a similar vein the rule that in pressing circumstances one follows the lenient opinion. For seemingly the laws of doubt are part of Jewish law, and if we are dealing with a Torah-level doubt we should be stringent; so when do we ever find that under pressure it is permitted to transgress a Torah prohibition (according to Rashba and most medieval authorities, who hold that the laws of doubt are themselves Torah-level)? We are forced to say that where we have decided that there is a doubt, the obligation is to be stringent. But the decision of what counts as a doubt is itself flexible. And if there is a pressing circumstance, one may decide that we choose the lenient opinion, and then there is no doubt here, so the rules of stringency in a Torah-level doubt do not apply. And so too in many other examples.
Where have you seen that if someone claims one can cut corners with customs? If it’s binding, then it’s binding. What does "flexible" mean? When I don’t feel like it? When I hate it?
Clearly Selichot is not some foolish custom, and certainly it began as a proper custom. Our problem is that we do not connect to it and say it only with our lips, but there is no doubt that it has the force of a full-fledged custom. And about that the question is: how do we know one may cut corners with it?
Since this really does bother me, I’d be glad if you could convince me more.
Thank you.
I wrote and explained my view. If you do not agree—that is perfectly fine.
I did not fully grasp the view of our holy sages.
In observing customs there are two parts: a person’s obligation to keep his own custom is by the law of a vow, as explained in Nedarim 15a, and there it is explained that this is only rabbinic (apparently because there was no actual verbal utterance). But the additional point that children must keep their ancestors’ customs is explained in Pesachim 50b, where it is derived from the verse "do not forsake." So this is a combination of two different laws, different in their essence.