I wanted to ask one more question. In the booklet, the Rabbi writes that once we assume it is reasonable that there is a God, then it is reasonable that He would reveal Himself, etc. etc., and on the other side we have testimony from the Jewish people to that effect. So there is no reason to reject it.

But in the end, this intuition too stands against Hume's principle, so how does the Rabbi accept it?

Hello. It's hard for me to conduct a discussion with gaps like this.
There is nothing preventing there from being a one-time event. "What has been is what will be" applies to the conduct of nature. And even in nature: for example, I was born only once. Does that contradict Hume's principle? The Big Bang also happened only once.

Sorry—maybe I should open a new question then? With an introduction and everything? I'll try to keep it short here.

When you were born, no contradiction to the laws of nature took place. But an event like a miracle is a "break" in the laws of nature. If so, that really does contradict Hume's principle.
Hume's principle, regarding the laws of nature, in other words says that the laws of nature are constant (their value is always positive and never negative/empty [only before their formation was the value empty]).
Why do I claim this? Because we have an intuition—an awareness—of the mind's eye to this claim.
The proof is that you assume the laws of nature exist also outside the Earth, and that they also existed in the past before we existed. However, we have no reason to assume that the laws of nature indeed always existed.
The only thing that can support this is an external cognition of the mind's eye about the reality of the universe.

If so, when I hear testimony about a break in the laws of nature, this contradicts a basic intuitive-cognitive awareness for me—that the laws of nature are constant. In such a case I have a significant reason to reject the report.

By contrast, the Rabbi mentioned that David Hume's argument also attacks every new scientific discovery. But according to the principle I mentioned, that is a mistake. Not everything that is outside our experience thereby becomes unreasonable.
His argument concerns anything toward which we have the opposite cognition—an intuition. In such a case, testimony about it becomes unreasonable.
An analogy: when you see a table that is red, and a friend testifies to you that it is blue—will you believe him?! So too in our case, intuition is cognition, and testimony against intuition is significantly weaker. Therefore, because we have an intuition that the laws of nature are constant, only in such a case is testimony about a break in them fit to be rejected.

By contrast, testimony about the discovery of a new substance, a new animal in the world, a new equation for the laws of nature—all these do not contradict the intuition that laws of nature exist. Nor do we have an intuition that the current equation for the laws of nature really describes the laws of nature in the best possible way. It is only our attempt to quantify our cognition of the laws of nature into an equation. But indeed, we have no certainty about that.
In such a case, new testimony need not be rejected.

I don't see any difference. If we reached the conclusion that there is a God, then His decision to reveal Himself one time, or to create a world, has no problem in it and does not contradict Hume's principle.

Of course there is no problem with creating the world together with its laws.
I am claiming that the problem is after the laws were created. Then "what has been is what will be" basically says that we have an intuition that the laws of nature are constant. If so, revelation is a contradiction to this intuition.

And if you say that you do not have this intuition, then why does the Rabbi assume that the laws of nature also existed in the past, or will exist in the future, as in the whole problem of induction?

All right, I don't really understand what the problem is with God deciding to reveal Himself once in history, and how this is connected to Hume's principle. But I have nothing to add.

Maybe our definition of Hume's principle is different.
I mean specifically the sense related to induction and the assumption that the laws of nature are constant. Not necessarily all of human experience—only in the sense of the laws of nature.
Why does the Rabbi assume they are constant? As you wrote in the book, based on a certain cognition—the mind's eye, etc.
If so, there is a cognition that the laws of nature are constant.
And if you hear that someone violated them, that contradicts this cognition. Because the moment they were violated even once, they are no longer constant (that is a logical contradiction, if so).

So I don't understand what is unclear.
Your claim that God's decision to reveal Himself / perform a miracle does not contradict this matter—is not clear to me.
After all, once you claim that the laws of nature were violated, it means your cognition is not correct. For it claims that the laws of nature always were, also in the past, and so too in the future.
And if the cognition is already not correct, then you have no reason at all to assume that the laws of nature are constant.
So you have to decide: either the cognition is correct, and then you have a basis to assume that the laws of nature governed throughout the whole creation of the world from the Big Bang until now; or it is mistaken, and then you have no reason for that.

Maybe this sharpening will help:
We have three cognitions—
1. Laws of physics exist in the world.
2. The same laws of physics prevail throughout the universe.
3. The laws of physics are constant.

I agree that it is possible that God can do miracles, etc. etc., and God is, for example, parallel to the laws of physics, so there is no problem with 1.
But I claim that if you accept the third cognition, you cannot accept miracles. Because a miracle is a break (even if momentary) in nature. And then that is no longer possible. And consequently testimony about a miracle must ultimately be ruled out.

I'll write one last time. God's decision to reveal Himself is not a contradiction to the laws of nature. And certainly it makes no difference whether He did so once or many times. Especially if His very existence does not seem to you to contradict the laws of nature. That's it. I'm done.

I'm not speaking דווקא about revelation, but about miracles in nature that go against the regular course of nature, for example the plague of blood, the burning bush, and so on. (Revelation is metaphysical, perhaps a spiritual vision, so that is not related to nature.)

If so, in the end there is a contradiction in a miracle to the law of nature. The laws are supposed to operate in way A, and this operates in way B. Why is that not a contradiction?!?

Now we've moved to a different question. Not revelation but miracles. I addressed that in the book.

That was the question from the outset. Only now did I understand that you distinguish between the idea of revelation and miracles….

By the way, in the book it actually seems that you proved the opposite—that there cannot be miracles.
(In the case of miracles and laws of nature), there is a contradiction with Hume's induction principle.
And then you said that perhaps we may contradict this intuition if we have a better reason.
But in the next chapter you already mentioned how correct Hume's intuition is regarding the laws of nature. And that is from the example of f=ma, where we see how well Hume's principle matches induction and consequently their constancy.
And therefore, if you have an intuition of constant laws of nature + long empirical support, it follows from combining your remarks that miracles cannot be reported.

^?