Question

Following what you wrote about voting in elections:
In my opinion, it is not correct to say that there is no benefit in an individual's ballot, and certainly not for someone who sees himself as part of a certain collective (in our case: the Religious Zionist community, Haredi society).
Take Levi, for example. Levi sees himself as part of the Religious Zionist collective. Suppose that "the Religious Zionist community" unanimously decided that one should vote for Otzma Yehudit. Suppose there are 100,000 Religious Zionists, and 50,000 votes are enough. Levi did not go to vote, because he did not see any practical benefit in his personal ballot.
The very fact that, if there are not enough votes for the party, an accusing finger will be pointed at Levi's community (a justified accusation, which Levi himself would also admit; he would take upon himself part of the blame) shows that there is benefit in the individual's choice. It's just that, practically speaking, you cannot evaluate it when you isolate the individual from the collective.
There is such a reality in which many individuals unite and become a collective. When there is a certain goal that can be achieved דווקא by the collective acting as a bloc, then it is simply a mistake to examine under a magnifying glass the specific benefit each individual adds to the final goal.
Levi's claim that there is no benefit in his ballot contains a certain contradiction. For either way, if you really are part of the collective, then in the matter of elections you are not supposed to look at yourself at all as "Levi." You are not "Levi." By your very decision to be part of the collective, you gave up (in this matter) your personal existence. You are only a robot of the collective who is supposed to put a ballot in the box.
The individual nullifies himself and is absorbed into the collective.
His action is utilitarian because, in being attributed to the larger body, to the collective, it constitutes part of the collective success in achieving the goal.
There are situations in which the individual's benefit is seen and evaluated דווקא from a broad perspective. When Levi goes out to vote, he cannot isolate himself from the collective and ask: is there any benefit to my ballot? That is simply a distortion. The true perspective would be: my choice is beneficial because I am part of the collective, and if the collective votes for "Otzma Yehudit," that will have practical significance.
In short, a person cannot claim, "I see no point in going to vote"—essentially, in extreme terms, his legs are not his own. He has subordinated them to the collective on the issue of elections (and therefore in the end this too is utilitarian).