Question

In the lesson on Bava Kamma brought on the site about indirect causation 3a, the Rabbi cited the Talmudic passage in Bava Kamma 60a regarding one who fans a fire and the wind fans it further. In the Talmud there are three interpretive setups—Abaye, Rava, and Rabbi Zeira—and finally the statement of Ravina. The Rabbi explained from the three setups that indirect causation is liable, and I do not understand how the Rabbi learned the Talmudic discussion. Abaye explained that the exemption is when he fanned it from one side and the wind fanned it from the other side—for Rashi, he did nothing, and therefore he is exempt. But if he did act, the liability is not because of indirect causation but because it is considered his actual act. Rava: he fanned it from one side, and he had no reason to expect that an unusual wind would come—but on the Sabbath an ordinary wind would have been enough, so he is liable there. There too he actually performed the act, and it is not merely indirect causation.
It seems that in truth indirect causation is exempt—and the reason for liability in the end result is not indirect causation but rather that it is considered his actual action.
And regarding Rashi’s wording, “he holds that indirect causation in damages…” — from the wording “he holds,” the Shakh infers that according to Rashi, indirect causation and direct-but-induced causation are one and the same, and in any case there is no need to reach the conclusion that there is someone who holds that indirect causation is liable.
Thank you
Thank you.