Q&A: The Relevance of Jewish Thought
The Relevance of Jewish Thought
Question
In honor of Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham (you can of course call me S’),
I have heard a great deal about your books, and a lot of people—especially in the yeshiva where I teach—have strongly recommended that I read the book. With God’s help, I intend to read it soon. (Right now I’m under a lot of pressure from another book, on the reasons for the commandments, which I’m in the middle of writing.)
I am very glad that you are writing a book in which you raise this claim, which in my opinion is very important in order to bring religious philosophy back into today’s religious discourse—something important philosophically and especially religiously.
I deal with this question mainly in the conclusion of my book, where I summarize what was said in all the chapters of the book, in which I tried to show that different Jewish philosophers clothed the Torah in different philosophical positions.
I also wrote a very short article (which drew some resistance from the editor because of some extreme wording) in the yeshiva’s journal. To remove any doubt, it does not represent the yeshiva’s position, only my own.
Here is a link to the article:
https://www.academia.edu/36010733/%D7%A2%D7%9C_%D7%94%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%AA_%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%90%D7%99%D7%96%D7%9D_%D7%9C%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F_%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%93%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%AA_-_On_the_alliance_between_atheism_and_conservative_religious_opinion
I have heard a lot about you and am very happy to be in touch. There aren’t many people today involved in spreading Jewish philosophy out of religious motives…
Have a good day,
A kosher and joyful Passover
Answer
Hello,
First of all, thank you for your comments.
I read what you wrote in the article you sent me, and I had mixed feelings. If you’ll allow me to bother you a little more, I’ll explain.
As I wrote, in the book I am currently writing I completely agree with your characterization of Jewish thought and the interpretive flexibility of the sources (and really their lack of content), and I also wrote about the importance of flexibility and opening up possibilities in order to prevent people from leaving. But my conclusion is the opposite of yours: you write that this is precisely why it is worthwhile to study Jewish thought (from the Middle Ages and in general). But if indeed no argument can refute the principles of Jewish thought, then there is no such thing as Jewish thought. (What cannot be refuted asserts nothing, according to a criterion similar to Popper’s criterion of scientificity.**) Therefore, in my view there is actually no point in studying this field at all. In essence, any thought that occurs to you, so long as it is correct, can be called Jewish thought. So why study The Guide of the Perplexed or the Kuzari and not Kant, or read general literature, which can also teach me various true things? The question that arises is whether there is any such field at all. Does it claim anything? After this emptying-out, have you left anything of Jewish religiosity? Expanding it infinitely drains it entirely of content. Who, in your view, would not be considered Jewish (in the conceptual-cultural sense, not the ethnic-biological one)? In general, in my book I argue that there is no Jewish and non-Jewish philosophy, only correct philosophy and incorrect philosophy.
Beyond that, I argue that all this applies to the details. There is a very thin general framework of broad philosophical principles that are true for all human beings, but not believing in them does place you outside the framework of faith (otherwise faith has no meaning at all). Belief in a transcendent being who created the world, was revealed at Sinai, gave commandments, and they obligate us. That’s about it. Beyond that, everything else is Jewish law. Therefore my conclusion is that there is actually no point in studying and engaging in those fields beyond Jewish law. It is certainly not Torah study, and in my opinion it is usually study of no value. This is a collection of Maimonides’ speculations, or those of other thinkers, about providence, free will, and the like, which have no logical basis and no basis in the sources (which, as stated, are interpreted according to your starting assumptions). And even if they do have logic, Maimonides has no added value in that regard. I have logic too. So what is the point of engaging in all this? By the way, the same is true regarding the issue of free choice. In my opinion, the necessary conclusion is that the issue should be examined in a general way and through philosophical and scientific arguments, and there is not much value in dealing with Jewish sources and their approach to it. What will they add for me? Beyond that, the field of Jewish thought suffers from severe vagueness and from a lack of defined concepts and principles, which leads to empty and barren discussions. (I think most of the material in the field is like that.)
I explain there that for the same reason there is no point in engaging with the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). It too has no content of its own, only creative interpretations that read into it the insights we come with from home. I don’t succeed in thinking of a single thing that anyone ever learned from the Hebrew Bible—that is, that he thought X, discovered that the Hebrew Bible says “not X,” and changed his mind. If that happens, you are doing creative interpretation and fitting the Hebrew Bible to your own views.
I am writing my book with a similar assumption, but not quite so extreme. My claim is that flexibility is indeed useful in preventing people from leaving, but it does not do so at the cost of emptying the framework of all content, because that would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Therefore it is important to open up the possibilities, to explain to people that the framework is much thinner (and broader) than is commonly thought, and therefore even if one does not agree, that does not mean one must leave. But I do not get to a point where the system says nothing at all—that is, where it cannot be challenged logically. If that is the situation, then it says nothing.
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** I am applying Popper’s criterion here even though this is not a scientific field. In the scientific field there are claims about facts, and therefore a theory that no fact can refute says nothing in the empirical sense. But by the same logic, philosophical claims that no argument can refute actually say nothing in any sense. Not only are they not scientific theories—they are empty nonsense sentences devoid of content. If you turn God into an empty concept, what is the meaning of believing in Him? What meaning is there to leaving or joining faith in Him? The benefit you present—preventing people from leaving—comes at the cost of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In order to keep everyone believers, you empty belief of content. But then in fact you have caused all the believers to leave, since their belief is empty of content. They are atheists in disguise. This, by the way, is my criticism of Rabbi Shagar and his mode of thought. Postmodern faith is atheism in disguise because it asserts nothing about the God in whom one believes. So what is the meaning of such faith? What do you believe in? It remains only words without meaning. Syntax without semantics.
Thanks again,
Michi (without the Rabbi Dr. etc.)
Discussion on Answer
Thank you.
So it turns out that a religious Jew is simply a wise and good person who studies and observes Jewish law. That is, there is no dimension in Judaism beyond Jewish law. Everything else is a universal human demand from every person, not a Jewish demand. If Maimonides is wise and an important philosopher, then every gentile should study him as well. (For some reason most gentiles do not think he is such an important philosopher worth studying, at least nowadays.) And if he is not important or useful, then as a Jew there is no point in studying him either. To that I can certainly agree (except that, to the best of my judgment, most medieval Jewish philosophers do not seem especially important or useful to me. But that is of course a matter of personal taste).
Beyond that, I saw in your words a more significant emptying-out of Judaism, because for you the goal is that Jews remain within the Jewish framework only in the sense of praxis, without any faith-foundation whatsoever. In my opinion there is no value at all to praxis that does not come out of faith. I once wrote an article in which I explained (both halakhically and conceptually) that a person who does not believe—even if he observes every detail of Jewish law with all its minutiae—his commandments are not commandments and his transgressions are not transgressions. It seems to me that this is what Maimonides meant at the end of Chapter 8 of the Laws of Kings regarding one who observes because of intellectual conclusion: that this has no religious value, but at most human moral value. And this applies all the more so to one who simply observes because he is used to it and because society expects it of him. I would value him more if he left.
A kosher and joyful holiday,
In honor of Rabbi Michael,
In my opinion, the main reason Maimonides is not considered an important philosopher today is that most people follow modern philosophy (in my opinion, in complete error). When Aristotelian philosophy was more widespread, Maimonides was considered one of the important philosophers, and so too today among people who see medieval philosophy as important. In fact, that has become somewhat more common in the last few decades. (There is currently a Chinese translation of the Guide in preparation directly from Judeo-Arabic…)
Regarding the connection between faith and Jewish law, overall I also think it is not ideal for a person to observe commandments only out of habit. (Still, in order that he continue observing, and from acting not for its own sake one may come to act for its own sake, and it also has a good effect on his life.) But in my opinion one can definitely observe commandments out of a philosophical outlook even with a definition of God different from the conventional one—and in fact with any definition.
Regarding Maimonides, in my opinion one must make an important distinction between what he says—that is, what the Jew must believe—and the reason he says it, namely, that he arrived at it through philosophical inquiry. Which means that if he had arrived at different conclusions through philosophical inquiry, he would have defined the obligation to believe differently. In other words, what matters is the philosophical truth, not Maimonides’ halakhic determination, even according to Maimonides himself.
Have a good day and a happy Passover
I understand this is from email and an attempt was made to hide the questioner’s name, but that doesn’t work with a link. If he didn’t agree to publication, that’s not appropriate.
As for the matter itself, if S’ is here, I don’t understand the benefit of reinterpretation. The possibility of remaining religious for social and political reasons (in the broad sense) exists even without reinterpretation, and it is also clear that within religious society there are people who do not believe in what they see as the foundations of religion and nevertheless observe commandments (at least partially, if there is anyone who observes fully). So how would reinterpretation help them? Will they feel better that instead of lying to themselves in principle, they are lying in interpretation? And how will that help the confused teenager, beyond the possibility of observing without believing?
A fascinating discussion! Drawing in and pushing away at the same time.
Discussions like these can specifically cause intellectual abandonment.
Religious people—are some of you just putting on an act for its own sake?
Just to stay in line… or do you actually believe in the existence of God? From which there must follow a reality of providence. Open to constant interpretation—but still, it exists.
Or are you really discussing creation, creatures, and the general laws embedded in all this? Philosophy is a wonderful thing, but if the conclusion is that there is a God—because there is no God openly revealed in practice—and therefore any involvement with Him so to speak in things written in His name is secondary… and merely for human amusement and thought…
Then why do you observe or believe at all? And what exactly are you observing,
if you have no understanding or acceptance from earlier generations as a personal connection to God?
If everything is open, everything is inner imagination, and God exists but is hidden—
then why is our religion different from other religions?
And why cling to it?
If a person is rational, moral, and good-hearted (in his character traits), does he need religion or God or not?
In honor of Rabbi Michael,
First, thank you for the very serious engagement with the article. Overall, I half agree and half disagree with what you wrote.
I very much agree that there is no such field as Jewish thought in the essential sense of the term. Jewish thought is the thoughts of Jews (or of religious Jews to one degree or another; there isn’t much point in arguing over that). In my opinion there is indeed no difference between Maimonides, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, or Kant (just as, in my opinion, there was no such difference in Maimonides’ own eyes). But that does not mean one should not study them; it only means one should study them as one studies other philosophers. I study Maimonides because he is an important and interesting philosopher, not because he has any authority whatsoever. The goal is indeed to read him the way I read Aristotle or Kant, to judge the ideas according to their content and decide whether to accept them or not. The field of philosophy is important—whether philosophy written by Jews or not—because it helps a person arrive at truth: truth about God, about the world, about providence, and it can also show us what kind of life one ought to lead morally and in terms of values. Therefore, in my opinion there is indeed no Jewish thought, only philosophy, but there is religious importance to engaging in philosophy. Judaism is defined sociologically by Jewish law, and correct belief (Guide of the Perplexed I:50) is defined only by truth, regardless of who said it. It is important that there be people who study Jewish law in order to know how to issue halakhic rulings (and I was not privileged with the talents suited to that field), and it is important that there be people who study philosophy in order to help people develop their thought.
In my opinion, even beliefs such as creation of the world and the revelation at Sinai are subject to endless interpretation, and therefore they are no more binding than anything else. One can interpret the revelation at Sinai as a parable for Moses’ apprehension of God (Narboni’s interpretation on the Guide III:32) and still be a very good Jew, just as one can believe in the eternity of the world or of matter and still be a very good Jew. Of course, one can also be a very good Jew and be completely mistaken philosophically, and sadly there are many such people. On this point I actually agree more with Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (especially in Or Hashem, Article 2, Principle 6), who holds that one can be a good Jew and mistaken—and not with Maimonides. The main purpose of my article was (and in general this is my overall goal) to enable people who do not have supernatural belief to remain within the religious-social framework. In my humble opinion, too many people feel that the religious system pushes them away (or alternatively, secular people are not drawn to it) because of one belief-content or another.
Thanks again for the response.
Have a good day and a happy Passover