It seems to me that in order to deal with the problem, it’s not enough just to write three books on theology — it would also be a good idea to publish them. That way you’ll be able to say, “Our hands did not spill this blood,” and you’ll sleep properly at night. Good idea, no?!

Thank you, our rabbi.

Regarding the last comment, I’m waiting for the publication for another reason: you wrote that in honor of the books being published there would be an open gathering for all members of the site.

D., excellent idea. Are you also willing to finance it and do the work? Or are you only into advice and demands…

Is there a need for financial help to publish the books?
If so, maybe I can help look for solutions.
The Rabbi’s books are very important to me, so I’ll really try to help.

Rabbi, you made me laugh heartily, beard and all. A Headstart campaign to fund your new books would reach the required sum for editing and publication within a week, and you know it. There are so many people who would donate to this project, each according to his means, and once the sum is found, workers will also be found in abundance. Why not open a crowdfunding campaign next week? I’m sure Oren, the site editor, will volunteer as he usually does to deal with it. (Still, I’m only serving here as the minister’s adviser.)
Personally, I’ll contribute accordingly, within my limited means.

No need. For now there are good people helping, and the books are already being edited. I only remarked ironically about demands and suggestions of that sort.

Rabbi, in this connection I want to say thank you! All my faith and understanding of Judaism, and that of many like me, is built on the foundations that you provided and gave. And like you, if at first I felt a need to defend my “heretical” views, today I say them proudly, and I’m glad that I had the privilege of knowing you and living in your generation.

Many thanks.

An accepted fast to all…

I also believe that not all the laws were given at Sinai — and I don’t understand what the problem with that is. That’s what is called the Oral Torah — it lives, renews itself, and updates all the time according to the era.

And on this there is strong and clear documentation that Moses our Teacher sat in Rabbi Akiva’s study hall and understood nothing…. So what greater proof is there than that?

P.S. In my opinion, one needs to be truthful — what’s in the heart should be said out loud. Not to fear damages or anything else — because in the end truth wins. But with that, things that are only in the heart and not in the head need to be clarified to ourselves before we say them, or we should emphasize that they come from the heart…. Because things that come from the head are stronger than things that come only from the heart.

I heard that the split between Conservatives and Orthodox in the U.S. was over driving on the Sabbath. In addition, the Orthodox say, “And there we will offer the obligatory sacrifices,” and the Conservatives say, “And there we offered.”

The question is where the essential distinction lies. After all, there are many disputes in Jewish law, some of them on matters far more substantial than the wording of the prayer. Therefore, if there is some difference, the halakhic differences are supposed to be symptoms of a different attitude toward Jewish law. I did not find such a different attitude.
See my article here:

שמרנות וחידוש

Driving on the Sabbath isn’t substantial?

The permission to drive on the Sabbath cannot define the Conservative movement, because the movement in Israel did not accept it.

And regarding the second matter, I know several Orthodox rabbis who hope that animal sacrifices will never return.

Even if they hope so, that doesn’t mean they change the prayer for that reason. I hope that pork will become permitted. Does that make me Conservative?

The movement in Israel is a branch of the movement in the U.S.

Prayer really is the small part.
The Conservative movement recognizes and encourages same-sex marriage, which means they kick aside even the most severe laws.

As I explained, the question is not what they kick aside and what they accept, but by virtue of what the things are done. If there is a halakhic or interpretive argument at the basis of the proposal, then this is not kicking anything aside but a change in Jewish law. You may accept it or reject it, but you cannot define them as people not committed to Jewish law. That is unlike the Reform movement, for example. See the article I linked above.

Hello Rabbi Michael, may he live and be well,
The things you wrote are sad and challenging. It is clear that there are intelligent and talented young people and adults thirsting to hear words of truth and answers that are intellectually satisfying to their questions and doubts. There is no doubt that one should try to find answers to their questions, even if this involves saying things that depart from the routine and the accepted in the yeshiva world or the religious world in general.
Doubts about the foundations of faith (the existence of God, Torah from Heaven, providence) have always existed, and the ways of dealing with them already began to be paved by the medieval authorities in their books of thought, and of course in every generation there is room for innovation and there must be innovation. One subject that has been treated less over the generations is the structure of Jewish law and its development — in other words: the history and philosophy of Jewish law (parallel to the academic field of history and philosophy of science). This is a subject that unquestionably requires serious engagement, not only for the sake of “Know what to answer,” but also for the future of Jewish law and preparing the way for renewal as in former days, when the sages of Israel dealt with the core of Torah through the methods by which the Torah is expounded. But here one must be careful in two ways: A. not to speak without humility, all the more so in a way that looks self-important, toward the sages of the generations, later authorities and earlier authorities alike, and the earlier authorities no less than the Sages of the Talmud. B. not to undermine in the student the reliability of the Oral Torah, which is something that can happen specifically among those who know a lot but do not know how to resolve difficulties that arise for them, or how to distinguish between what was received from Sinai and what was newly introduced or forgotten, and the like.
Besides this, I think there is immense value in the fact that in certain national matters, such as marriage and divorce, there should be one halakhic authority for the Jewish people, and not private religious courts. This would allow, among other things, new enactments to be established as a court of the state, which is not so if there is no central authority, aside from the fear of chaos.
I’ll be brief — give to a wise man and he will become wiser. With blessings,

Thank you for the response.
Several different points arise here:
1. The style — completely accepted. Though even here one must distinguish between one’s attitude toward the sages of the generations and toward unworthy people who wrap themselves in a rabbinic cloak and create a desecration of God’s name, but this is not the place.
2. Regarding the reliability of the Oral Torah — it seems to me that I insist on this very strongly. Precisely the distinction between what was given at Sinai and what was renewed is what strengthens the Oral Torah. Otherwise we came to strengthen and ended up weakening.
3. Regarding central authority and the Chief Rabbinate — that is another subject and requires length. It is worth noting that this central authority does not really achieve its declared aims (a very significant part of the public no longer marries according to Jewish law, and even fewer through the Rabbinate), and this is not despite the Rabbinate but (also) because of it. Therefore, in my opinion, one should reconsider the assumption that it is necessary and beneficial. Especially since caution about the honor of the Chief Rabbinate and the assumption that its status must not be undermined are exploited by it for forceful and ossified conduct and an unwillingness to open up to additional ideas and tools. I think that what is causing some of the recent change is, among other things, external pressure from private initiatives. By the way, that is how it was throughout Jewish communities over the generations (there was no central authority). And there is much more to say on this.
Again thank you, and all the best,

The Ran on tractate Nedarim distinguishes between things explicitly written in verses, regarding which we already stand sworn from Mount Sinai, and rabbinic expositions, regarding which we are not already sworn and therefore the vow takes effect. Likewise, the Talmud in tractate Shabbat rules not to protest women who eat at dusk on the eve of Yom Kippur, because the Sages’ exposition of adding time to Yom Kippur is not explicitly written in the verse. Kindling fire is explicitly written in the verse: “You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements.” So desecrating the Sabbath by driving is not a mistake but a kick at the Torah.

The Rabbi wants to find merit for the Conservatives and argue that they are less bad than the Reform. Fine, but meanwhile the Rabbi is lending a hand to Sabbath desecration.

The Conservative movement in the U.S. did not hold that driving on the Sabbath is permitted ideally. In the ideal situation it too would prohibit it. The permission was built on the grim reality in America about a hundred years ago, when most Jews worked every Sabbath, and their tenuous attachment to Judaism found expression in visiting the synagogue on the Sabbath.

In that situation, the Conservative rabbis thought that permitting people to come to synagogue by car on the Sabbath would save the Jewish character of life and preserve the weak ties that still remained. They permitted only driving to synagogue, and not for any other purpose.
The movement in Israel would also agree with this principle. It simply thought that the reality in Israel was different, especially because there are synagogues everywhere within walking distance, so one can get to synagogue without desecrating the Sabbath.

It’s worth seeing here, on this matter, from the responsa of the Conservative Rabbinate in Israel:

file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/1420029212%20(2).pdf

Aharon,
You gave a link to a file on your personal computer. As long as I have no access to it, the file might as well be on the moon. You need to give a link to an internet server or set up a site on your computer that connects the file to the network.

Y.D.,
First, the connection between driving a car and kindling fire is far from the plain meaning of the verse. It is much less direct than the connection between unfair advice and causing a blind person to stumble on the road, or between the prohibition (and today, permission) of having two synagogues in one city and the prohibition of “do not form separate factions.” If an Orthodox decisor had done this, certainly if he had done so before the custom and accepted interpretation were fixed, you would not blink. This is a question of interpretation, and you may accept it or dispute it, but I do not see any kicking here (unless in your view one interpretation constitutes a kick at the other).
Second, I did not come to find merit for anyone. I am speaking about facts as I see them, not about charitable judgment. I am not talking about who is worse and who is less bad. On the contrary, those who are committed to Jewish law and transgress it are worse than those who are not committed at all (certainly according to my view regarding secular Jews. And that too is talking about facts and is in no way connected to charitable judgment).

Here we’re entering a loop: if an Orthodox decisor had done this, he would no longer be Orthodox (but Conservative). And just as you claim there is a possible interpretation here, the Christians could jump in and claim that their interpretation is possible too. At a certain point intuition has to step in and decide what is right and what is not. You yourself argue that we do not live in a postmodern world of endless interpretations, but that we do recognize the right thing. I do not pretend to be the Hazon Ish, who ruled that selling land during the Sabbatical year assists transgressors and thereby turned all who disagreed with him into offenders. But even without being the Hazon Ish, I have a family tradition that driving on the Sabbath crosses a red line. Some of my family in America chose that path, and now their children are married to gentiles.

The moral rule says, “Do not judge a person until you reach his place.” I do not live in America and I cannot judge those who live in America (especially in the 1920s). I can, however, say that the Judaism I believe in forbids kindling fire on the Sabbath and forbids driving on the Sabbath even in America. And if a person finds that he cannot live in America without driving on the Sabbath, let him come up to the Land of Israel. The Sabbath is precious enough to me that I would make every effort not to come to desecrate it.

I didn’t understand what secular Jews have to do with this.

Well, that’s exactly where you are mistaken. You think the ruling determines the identity of the decisor, but it is not so. The identity of the decisor determines your attitude toward his ruling. There were decisors who permitted the use of electricity on the Sabbath, and certainly on a Jewish holiday — for example the abridged Shulchan Arukh of Rabbi Toledano and others. In your opinion, are they Orthodox? And I’m not even talking about recent rulings concerning smartphones and smart cards that crop up nowadays. And what do you think about Rabbi Messas, who permitted a woman to go without head covering? He is already a major pioneer in kicking Jewish law around, according to you (rulings with which I personally very much disagree).
Your claims about your family in America are not relevant to the matter in any way that I can see. You are arguing that there is a danger of deterioration. So what? The question is whether such an interpretation has a place or not. By the way, I know several families that are meticulous about every minor and major law whose children ended up in the same state. Again you see that it is not the consequences that determine things, but your underlying assumptions. You only use the consequences when it is convenient for you (that is, when it fits your underlying assumptions).
You certainly can say that the Judaism you believe in forbids this or that. Everyone has his own Judaism, and may we all be well. But what does that have to do with our discussion? If you define everyone who does not think like you as Reform, then of course we are just talking semantics and the discussion is pointless. In my Judaism, Hasidism is nonsense and emptiness. So does that make the Hasidim Reform? I have to say that this is a rather strange kind of argument.

And I want to add regarding changing the prayer text. People dismiss it as unimportant. In my opinion it is very important. Because alongside the halakhic issue, the underlying direction matters too. The verse in Psalms says, “I am a companion of all who fear You.” I learn from the verse about the partnership I have with those who fear God, and by fear of Heaven I do not mean only in the technical sense of how God-fearing a person actually is, but in the essential sense — whether the service of God is important to him. The change made by the Conservatives teaches that for them the service of God embodied in sacrifices belongs to the past. In the past we offered sacrifices in this Levantine land, Palestine. Today we live in the modern world. What do we have to do with sacrifices? And when that is the mode of seeing things, the halakhic rulings follow suit. If there is no future for Judaism, why make the effort? Let’s ease things as much as possible so that our integration and theirs into American society will be smooth and comfortable. One cannot demand, and does not want to demand, faith in Jesus, but just as the American bourgeoisie has prayers on Sunday, so too Jews will have prayers on Saturday. And just as the American bourgeoisie arrives by car to church, so the Jewish bourgeoisie arrives by car to the temple.

You are not giving an answer to how there is no interpretive or halakhic relativism, or how we pull ourselves, like Baron Munchausen, out of the mud by our own sidelocks?
It is clear that the Torah was given to us to interpret, but equally clear that there is a foundation beyond interpretation (things explicitly written in the verse). It is a little funny, because this is exactly your move in the book Truth and Not Stable, and yet for some reason you deviate from your basic argument and propose interpretive postmodernism. And when I offer a principled claim — for me this is the Judaism beyond interpretation and the truth will show through it — you mock me. I don’t mind that you mock me; I have a principled question: how do you avoid the loop of interpretation (Sadducean, Christian, Muslim, Karaite, Reform, Conservative, etc.)?

Your claims about electricity or head covering are beside the point. Neither one deals with an explicit Torah prohibition, and the possibility of interpretation or rabbinic enactments is much easier there. The point about marrying gentiles merely gives me an induction that something in the path was not right, as I explained in the following comment (and there is a difference between acts of individuals from an Orthodox home and the principled policy of a movement): if the underlying assumption is that Judaism is a matter of the past, then this is not even a halakhic ruling. Still, it seems to me there is a connection. Even before getting to marrying gentiles or changing the prayer text, there was something in this ruling that crossed lines, so instead of looking down on the Orthodox who broke contact, one can ask what there was in this ruling that caused the rupture.

That “funny” part is just misunderstanding. I wasn’t talking about the question of who is right, and I did not say there is no interpretive truth. What I said is that interpretive truth does not determine who is Reform and who is not. There are also Orthodox interpreters who, in my opinion, are mistaken. So are they Reform because of that?
I explained in the article the difference between Reform and Orthodox, and if it interests you, you should read it there and see how I avoid the loop.
As for the kindling and the marrying gentiles, you are once again repeating arguments that are not to the point, so let’s stop here.

I ask for the difference between Conservative and Orthodox, and the Rabbi does not give me one. The difference between Reform and Orthodox is simple. The Reform do not believe in the authority of the Talmud. The Orthodox do. Supposedly the Conservatives recognize the authority of the Talmud — to what extent? Do they keep a kosher kitchen? Family purity? Sabbath? And from what point does a quantitative difference become a qualitative one?
It is terribly easy to declare that the difference is purely sociological. Such a declaration is typical of Conservatives. Orthodox think otherwise. And still, even among the Orthodox, the Haredim exclude Religious Zionism (the Religious Zionists are not Haredi enough for the word of God because they go with Zionism). The Rabbi claims he does not dismiss arguments. If someone makes a good argument, the Rabbi goes with it. Fine. So now we have to go argument by argument and examine it. We can’t rely on social shortcuts (“we Hasidim do not do A, therefore anyone who does A is invalid from the outset”). We need consistent examination of all the arguments. So now I take the Conservative argument permitting driving on the Sabbath and ask the Rabbi to reject it or justify it. Can the Rabbi come down from Mount Sinai and give an answer?

You are mistaken from beginning to end. This has not the slightest connection to the Talmud. The Reform do not accept the Torah, and certainly not Jewish law. The Conservatives accept both, except that they allow themselves more flexible interpretation. You will not get a difference from me because I have already written twice that there is no difference. I referred you to an article that explains the matter in greater detail. As far as I’m concerned, I’m done. All the best.

https://mikyab.net/%d7%9e%d7%91%d7%98-%d7%a2%d7%9c-%d7%94%d7%a2%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%a8%d7%a6%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%98%d7%95%d7%a8-62/
Call me an ignoramus. In my opinion this is just common sense of ordinary householders. There is a difference between Conservatives and Orthodox, and the fact that I cannot put my finger on the difference to your satisfaction does not mean it does not exist.

There is another question here that the Rabbi is ignoring, and that is whether there is a public that keeps Conservative Jewish law, or whether everything remains among the elite of JTS. Is there internal dynamism of building mikvehs, being careful about kashrut, Torah study among the Conservative masses, or are we dealing with an aging mass that frequents the movement’s synagogues but does not succeed in passing the torch on to the next generation?

It seems to me that the Rabbi once wrote that the masses matter in terms of acceptance of Jewish law. Do the Conservative masses matter, or is the Conservative elite corresponding only with itself?

The Conservatives permit and encourage same-sex marriage on the grounds that “human dignity is great.”
In my eyes, a crazy expansion of a rationale whose scope in the Talmud is very narrow and limited, in a way that makes Talmudic Jewish law and its rationales look ridiculous, is crossing a line.
I don’t care who the decisor is, only what the content of the ruling is.

And yes, I know. The sorites paradox and so on. Still, the sorites paradox does not mean there is no such thing as a clear-cut heap.

See the site “A Question of a Lesson” (Google it), year 5771, in the lesson “Between Orthodox Jewish Law and Its Parallels in Other Movements,” which analyzed this.

By the way, it’s a fascinating site regardless. It deals with issues in the philosophy of Jewish law, the possibilities of renewing Jewish law today, and more.

http://www.masorti.org.il/page.php?pid=761

Y.D.,
You’re right — here is the relevant link on the matter under discussion (driving on the Sabbath to a Conservative synagogue, there in question 9).

Regarding your argument with Rabbi Michi, I suggest you read systematically several responsa there on the site (there are 6 “volumes” there); in my opinion it’s very interesting.
When you compare them to “Orthodox” responsa, you come to realize that they have much in common. You see that in principle there is commitment to the Talmud and the medieval authorities, and to the principle of “decline of the generations.” True, there are methodological differences and different axioms, but what emerges from the writing is a serious spirit, not a sloppy one as the common image would have it.

From my impression, I agree that the learned arguments remain at the intelligent elite, and the younger generation is detached from tradition and disdainful of Jewish law. But logically, the fact that Conservative methodology does not succeed sociologically does not mean it is wrong. It may be right, but not “worthwhile.”

Roni,
In my opinion, you ought to bring a link and proof for your claim. It is not fair to toss around “facts” like these (“The Conservatives permit and encourage same-sex marriage on the grounds that human dignity is great”) without evidence.

Aharon, see the Wikipedia entry and the sources there.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative_Judaism_and_sexual_orientation

Roni,

I can’t open the link you sent.

Wikipedia (in the entry “Conservative Judaism”) states as follows:
“In 2006, in a decision that aroused intense controversy, it was decided that the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse remained in force in its explicit meaning; however, based on the supreme importance of human dignity, this did not prevent accepting homosexuals into leadership roles and the rabbinate, other physical relations between them, or recognition of couples. In 2011 and 2016, again on the grounds of human dignity, the Rabbinical Assembly passed resolutions supporting full equality for transgender people and calling for their inclusion and acceptance within communities and institutions.”

I don’t understand a word of this (what does “other physical relations between them” mean?). From the above and from the link there, it does not emerge that there is support for sexual relations (rather, that the prohibition of male intercourse remains in force), nor does it emerge that there is support for same-sex marriage.
What does emerge is that one must not discriminate against such people in any role, and one must not treat them disrespectfully in any way because of their orientation, and that one must not place on them any social or other sanction.

It seems to me that Rabbi Michi would also agree to such a determination.

Aharon,
The younger generation is detached from tradition because their Torah is like the Torah of Doeg — from the lips outward. A Torah that does not come from the heart, and therefore does not enter the heart. Rabbi Ovadia ruled that one must be stringent like the Beit Yosef in the laws of lung adhesions, and today hundreds of thousands of Sephardi Jews spend hundreds of shekels more per month to be careful to buy glatt meat. And that is because Rabbi Ovadia’s Torah came from the heart and entered the heart.

Regarding the answer you gave me: you don’t need to tell me what it was like in America. My grandfather was among those who did not withstand the pressure and did not withstand their inclination, and desecrated the Sabbath. But he did not succumb to the false consolations of the Conservative movement. He knew he was acting deliberately and wickedly (“better that they act deliberately than unwittingly”), and when things improved for him he repented and stopped desecrating the Sabbath. His repentance helped only halfway. My uncle, who saw the Sabbath desecrations, became Conservative, and his children married gentiles. My father, who did not see the Sabbath desecrations, somehow remained religious and came up to the Land of Israel, and there fathered us. Sometimes I think my grandfather’s tragedy was that he did not understand that Zionism is not only an expression of being modern religious (educated, as they called it then — and no, the phenomenon is not Rabbi Michi’s innovation), but also a condition for it. If he had come up to the Land of Israel, he would not have had to desecrate the Sabbath, his son could have remained religious and still studied medicine, and his grandchildren would not have married gentiles. But as the Talmud says, we must hold gratitude to our forefathers who sinned, for had they not sinned, where would we be? Our “I,” or our very essence, is a product of our fate. We can choose differently in the present, but we cannot change the past. If my grandfather had come up to the Land of Israel, then even if my father had married my mother, we would have come out different, and maybe I would not be writing here. Therefore there is no point asking for a different past. This is my past.

I am willing to concede that the Conservative movement had good intentions, but as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

I don’t know how to respond to arguments like these. Such utilitarian channels.

If someone were to gather proof that Hasidism is what preserved the minority that remained faithful to Jewish law during the Enlightenment, would that prove that its underlying assumptions are true?

Personally, I cannot keep “Orthodox Jewish law” when inwardly I know that the thing is being done only out of social considerations.

(By the way, the permission to drive on the Sabbath was grounded halakhically — in their understanding — because of the needs you listed. They did not permit a prohibition only because of a sociological need.)

* because of sociological considerations

Aharon, I made a shortened link for you: https://tinyurl.com/kdb7sgg

Aharon,
The claim I made about words that come from the heart is not a reason or proof of their truth, but a sign. The Talmud says that a person who has fear of Heaven, his words are heeded. That is not a sufficient condition, but it is a necessary one. It may be that he has fear of Heaven and is still mistaken. All one can say is that if the words are not heeded at all, apparently there is no fear of Heaven there, and then he does not enter the conversation at all. It may be that among the Hasidim the words are heeded, but because they are mistaken they are not accepted as Jewish law.

If you have a good argument to take from the Conservatives, take it. On this point I am completely with Rabbi Michi.
I also do not say it was so easy to decide what the will of God was in that difficult American reality. In their defense they will say, “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have voided Your Torah.” Still, there was something so blunt in that decision that aroused Orthodox opposition. Even if people desecrate the Sabbath, maybe it is better that this be in the category of deliberate sinners rather than permitted behavior. Better that they know they are sinning and are offenders, and in the future may repent, than that they think the Sabbath has been permitted to them (and with it the entire Torah). You too are not really giving me a real argument permitting or forbidding driving on the Sabbath, but hanging it on utilitarian grounds (maintaining a connection to tradition). I think that precisely in the Orthodox opposition lies a non-utilitarian argument. The right thing is not to desecrate the Sabbath, even if there is a personal price in the feeling of criminality and wrongdoing on the part of those who desecrate the Sabbath. There is also an indirect benefit to this, since falsehood has no legs, and it is better to tell the truth before the Master of the Universe than to live in falseness. But the main point is not specifically the benefit, but the principled side.

As for sociological considerations, I too agree that they have no place in determining Jewish law.

By the way, Rabbi Cherlow’s book Between Mishkan and Calf grapples with this issue of how one determines God’s true will, and some of my arguments are taken from there.

A Jew who becomes heretical because of “questions of faith.” A strange thing.

“The foundation of complete faith in the heart flows from the depth of the soul’s unique quality within Israel. Corresponding to it is the omer offering of barley, animal food, which tends only toward natural feeling. After it and upon it comes the foundation of intellectual and scholarly elevation. Yet human weakness causes that when one is fit for intellectual inquiry, the foundation of faith-inclination is weakened in him, and when he is whole in faith, he may diminish in learning and wisdom of heart. But the goal of the straight path is that each power not diminish the other nor be diminished by it, but rather that each reveal itself in its full strength, as though it alone ruled. The power of faith should be so whole as though there were no possibility at all of inquiry, and correspondingly the power of wisdom should be so elevated and vigorous as though there were no power of faith at all in the soul. ‘Man and beast You save’ — those who are cunning in knowledge and make themselves like beasts.”

Continuation —
Indeed, this is a special inheritance for Israel, that established faith is natural among them, by virtue of the open inheritance of divine revelation: “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people” — “Has any god ever attempted to come and take for himself one nation from the midst of another nation?” And conversely, heresy among them is unnatural, and possible only by way of drunken brazenness arising from stubbornness or desire. This is unlike the nations of the world, among whom the existence of faith comes specifically through a kind of intoxication, for great tangible matters concerning the foundations of their faith were not revealed to them. Therefore their human nature does not dictate belief, except through intoxicating assent and overcoming naturalness. Therefore simple wholeness of faith is very good for Israel, and it too is clear as broad daylight, “bright as the sun.” {…} And these two fundamental powers reveal their full value and action, in the depths of the soul and the expanses of life, when each appears in its complete essential form, with nothing oppressing it at all, and when they gather and bind together into one exalted unified system. (Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Orot)

“The greatest deficiency that exists in the quality of fear of Heaven when it is not properly connected with the light of Torah, is that instead of fear of sin it is replaced by fear of thought, and once a person begins to fear thinking, he goes and immerses himself in the mud of ignorance, which takes away the light of his soul, trips up his strength, and darkens his spirit” (Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Eight Collections, I:267)

Shlomi, as you brought: “Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people” — “Has God ever attempted to come and take for Himself a nation from the midst of a nation.” Now I also see this in a broader way that no one saw until now. Listen well:
Our God chose us, the descendants of Abraham our father, Isaac our father, and Jacob our father. But among the nations, no “god” and no “idol” chose them; rather, they created it and chose it themselves.

When you think about it broadly, you understand from the midrash that this is right, because the midrash says that God held the mountain over us like a barrel. By contrast, God did not hold the mountain over the nations, but tried to give them the Torah and they did not want it.

From what I started to say from Rabbi Kook — that wisdom is important and a person must not fear thinking — thought also brings faith, and on the other hand thought not in the spirit of Torah brings darkness and mud to the soul. Therefore, as Rabbi Kook says, one has to understand the greatest advantage that exists in the quality of fear of Heaven when it is properly connected with the light of Torah. Great words!
Word game riddle: what is the connection between fear and Torah?

I want to return to the discussion and hope in less sharp tones.

A. You wrote: “The connection between driving a car and kindling fire is far from the plain meaning of the verse. It is much less than the connection between unfair advice and causing a blind person to stumble on the road, or between the prohibition (and today permission) of two synagogues in one city and the prohibition of ‘do not form separate factions.’” Fire is fire (and smoke is smoke and soot is soot), whether it is on the gas stove at home or in a car engine. And when you start a car, you kindle fire. The examples you brought are details of the laws. Giving unfair advice is one manifestation of the prohibition of causing a blind person to stumble on the road. Likewise, the prohibition or permission of two synagogues in one city is one manifestation of “do not form separate factions.” In both cases you have a vague prohibition (what does causing a blind person to stumble on the road mean — sticking out a leg to trip him? And in what cases is there a prohibition of “do not form separate factions” — even when I invite only one friend and not the other?) and the vagueness invites the interpretation of the Sages. The prohibition of kindling fire is not vague but explicit. Kindling fire is forbidden. Period. It is explicit to anyone who reads the verse even without expounding it. In that situation, permitting driving on the Sabbath crosses a boundary between us and the One who gave the Torah.

B. You wrote: “Well, that’s exactly where you are mistaken. You think the ruling determines the identity of the decisor, but it is not so. The identity of the decisor determines your attitude toward his ruling.” And that is according to your own method: “If there is a halakhic or interpretive argument at the basis of the proposal, then this is not kicking anything aside but a change in Jewish law. You may accept it or reject it, but you cannot define them as people not committed to Jewish law.” That is, as long as a person is committed to the Torah and is only interpreting it, he is legitimate. According to this position, it is not clear why the Sages rejected the Sadducees. After all, the Sadducees were committed to the Torah and merely disagreed about the interpretation of certain verses (the authority of the Talmud was not relevant, because there was no such authority yet). One could go with the Kuzari and argue that there is no reasoning element in the laws of the Sages, but only tradition, as the Kuzari claimed. It seems to me you do not hold that approach. According to your method, one who is committed to the Torah — his interpretation is legitimate. But if so, it is not clear why the Sadducean interpretation was declared illegitimate. Is “the day after the Sabbath” meaning Sunday after the first Sabbath not a possible interpretation? And entering the Holy of Holies with incense already inside?
The Karaites also raise the same question — after all, they challenged the claim that the Jewish people accepted the Talmud. According to their view, the forceful imposition of the Talmud through the political appointment by the Muslims — the Exilarch — does not express consent, but only political coercion. Again: why is the Jerusalem Talmud inside, while the Karaites are outside?
Even the assumption of the bull offering for an erroneous ruling by the community assumes right and wrong. We are not dealing with legitimate interpretations but with a correct and an incorrect interpretation. Commitment to the Torah is not enough. One also has to give the correct interpretation. According to your method, it is not clear what the criterion is.

C. You keep referring me to your article on conservatism. It seems to me that you assume I am a conservative. I am not a conservative. Rabbi Chaim Navon sees himself as a conservative. I do not see myself as one. For me, actions require reasons. The reason I keep the commandments does not stem from conservatism or traditionalism in the style of Meir Buzaglo (though that too has to be discussed as to its value), but because I think it is the right thing. If I follow my grandfather (who was also not a conservative), it is because he and I share the same worldview (“and the two of them went together”). It has nothing to do with what set of instructions I received and whether I treat it as constitutive or guiding. The question for me is whether the instructions are correct or not, not what their status is. And if I think they are not correct, I will interpret the whole matter completely differently. There are enough cases where sages arose and completely changed the learning: Rabbenu Tam regarding the head tefillin; “and she shall remain in her menstrual impurity” — the earlier elders said: she should not use eye makeup, nor rouge, nor adorn herself in colorful garments, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: if so, you make her repulsive to her husband, and her husband will divorce her. Rather, what does “and she shall remain in her menstrual impurity” teach? She remains in her impurity until she immerses in water; forcing a divorce writ; sailing on rivers; and more.
The reason I reject Haredism (as an idea) is not because I am a guided conservative and they are constitutive conservatives, but because one who does not say Hallel on Independence Day is, in my view, a heretic (denying the good). There are some who do not deny the good, but because of various halakhic technicalities refrain from saying it; those I do not reject. And one who neither goes to the army nor studies Torah is simply moral scum (“Shall your brothers go to war while you sit here?”), and if he does not go to work he transgresses an explicit section in the Shulchan Arukh (“Afterward he should go to his business, for any Torah that is not accompanied by work will in the end cease and lead to sin, for poverty will cause him to stray from the will of his Creator”; Orach Chayim 156). For me, the question is not what type of conservatives the Conservatives are, but whether they are right or not right. Is driving on the Sabbath permitted (or obligatory) or forbidden? (Here is Rhodes — jump!) The question of who preserves the spirit of the laws seems to me entirely unnecessary.

I saw no high tones in the discussion above. As far as I was concerned, it ended because I thought it had been exhausted. That’s all.
A. I disagree with you about the kindling of fire. We are talking about a fire that no one sees and that cooks nothing at all. Therefore the application of “You shall kindle no fire” to a car engine is far from trivial, and if someone interprets it differently that does not make him Reform. There are interpretations that have been accepted as Jewish law that are much more far-reaching, and not only the ones I brought. There is no point discussing that.
B. Even according to your method, it is not clear what the criterion is. If you think there are criteria, you are naive. There are many decisors throughout the generations who wrote things that others considered utter nonsense. That did not make them Reform. Indeed, anyone who proposes a possible interpretation is legitimate. Where someone disputes the Sanhedrin or the Talmud (which was accepted), that is not halakhically legitimate. Therefore I wrote to you that they do not dispute the Talmud but interpret it. And indeed, if someone were to explain that acceptance of the Talmud is not binding and give reasons for it — from my point of view that is a legitimate approach even if I disagree with it. But as I said, the Conservatives do not claim that.
C. True, I did not refer you to the article because I thought you were a conservative. I referred you in order to explain my own position regarding conservatism, since we had an argument about that. But since you have now commented, in light of what you write here you are the father of conservatives. From your perspective, only an interpretation acceptable to you is a legitimate interpretation.
The question of who is right and who is not is nonsense. There are many decisors who are not right in your eyes, and you would not define them as Reform or Conservative. The question over which we are arguing is not who is right and who is not, but who is legitimate and who is not. The unwillingness to recognize legitimate error is itself against the halakhic tradition, but in any case in my opinion it is a major mistake.
Well, everything here is repeating itself, and it doesn’t seem to be getting anywhere.

A. To the best of my knowledge, the labor of kindling is separate from the labor of cooking. The saying goes: there is no smoke without fire. If smoke comes out of the exhaust pipe, apparently there is fire. Especially since we know how a car is built and do not treat it as a black box. Maybe not Reform, but also not correct. The fact that there are far-reaching interpretations in Jewish law in other cases is not relevant to this case. The question is whether in this case a far-reaching interpretation can be given here and now (again: “Here is Rhodes — jump!”).
B. True, but I am not claiming that the difference is sociological. The Pharisees did not always sit on the Sanhedrin, and still they did not define the Sadducean Sanhedrin as legitimate. For them it was an erring court, and anyone who followed its ruling would need to bring the bull offering for an erroneous ruling by the community (theoretically; I do not know whether they actually brought one). The Karaites argued that the imposition of the Talmud by the Exilarch with Muslim backing was not legitimate. Are the Karaites legitimate in your view, or in the view of the Jewish tradition (and how did the Talmud become Jewish tradition)? By the way, the Beit Yosef somewhat idealized the claim that the nation’s choice was the Talmud. In a certain sense he is right, and still, historically, the imposition of the Talmud on the Jewish people was not accepted democratically by referendum. It was forced by the Exilarch appointed by the Muslim caliph (who ruled the whole area from China to Spain). In that reality the Karaites argued that speaking of the authority of the Talmud was ridiculous. Their claim was not accepted and they were cast out — but again, who are the real Jews, the Rabbanites or the Karaites (and who decides the issue — history? the Nazis, who refrained from destroying Karaites?)
By the way, the Hasidim too were once almost cast out in an essential sense, and in the end it was decided that the difference was sociological. As for the Sabbateans, to this day it is not clear to me whether they really went outside the fold (except for those who converted, such as Sabbatai Zevi and Jacob Frank).
C. The examples I brought were revolutionaries. People who knew an earlier reality and rejected it. If you convince me, again here and now, that one may drive a car on the Sabbath, you will join that respected group. In the 1940s it did not work for the Conservatives (and it seems to me there were some serious names there). I agree that there are legitimate disputes and mistakes. I am simply wondering why there are cases in which one side suddenly ceases to be legitimate (Sadducees, Karaites, and perhaps today’s Conservatives). Maybe in hindsight it will turn out, as with the Hasidim, that the difference is sociological. I do not feel that way, and therefore I would not rush to conclusions and issue declarations to the nation (just a bit of good advice from someone who hopes he values and respects you).

*If you convince me and the entire halakhic world

I’m attaching here someone who proposes a side permitting homosexual relations with a condom (see his answer to Israel). He is admittedly a bit odd, as one can see from a brief browse on the site, but still it is clear that what he proposes does not come from any sort of conservatism, but only from an attempt to see the halakhic truth as he sees it:

מתוך מכתב לידיד הומוסקסואל דתי ירא שמיים ומדקדק בהלכות

Many thanks for the suggestion. The matters remain where they were.

Good luck (it seems to me you’ll need it).

If in your view the difference is sociological, then why do you identify yourself as an Orthodox rabbi (for example in the letter to the lawyer of Rabbi Dov Haiyun)?

To Y.D., forgive me for answering on Rabbi Michael’s behalf. Rabbi Michael identifies as an Orthodox rabbi because sociologically he belongs to that sector. This discussion is very interesting, but to continue it you need to move forward. The Rabbi argues there is no essential difference, and you argue that driving on the Sabbath is an essential difference. The Rabbi has already explained here more than once that in his opinion this is not an essential difference. There are disputes over Torah-level laws even among rabbis whom you would certainly define as Orthodox; even you agree that if an Orthodox rabbi rules something that you are sure is mistaken in a Torah-level matter, that does not make him non-Orthodox. And the connection between kindling fire as written in the Torah and driving a car is not entirely trivial, at least in Rabbi Michael’s opinion, even though he himself does not think it is permitted to drive a car on the Sabbath. So if you want to continue the discussion, you need to find a different distinction.

Elhanan,
You didn’t understand the question. The question was why the sociological difference matters, and I brought proof of its importance from the fact that Rabbi Michi chooses to identify as Orthodox. I understand that I come across as a nuisance, but still, it interests me.
With your permission.

Hello Rabbi Michael,
After quite a long break in reading your very important book Truth and Not Stable — I finished it last night (good thing there is the between-semesters break). Naturally, the final chapters especially challenged me, and I want to remark that I was puzzled by the wording on p. 364, according to which a supra-rational source for faith is “meaningless gibberish,” etc. Later you quoted Maimonides in several places, but one important source is missing: “Know, my masters, that it is not fitting for us to believe except in one of three things: first, something for which there is clear proof from a person’s reason, such as arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; second, something a person apprehends through one of the five senses, such as certainly knowing that this is a person and this is black, and the like, by seeing with his eyes… and third, something a person receives from the prophets” (Letters of Maimonides, p. 479). The three sources of truth according to Maimonides are logical inference, testimony of the senses, and prophecy.
Prophecy is not a rational source, even according to the synthetic picture, because it is not mere intuition, and yet it supplies factual information. On p. 375 you dismissed it with a rather vague sentence: “Prophecy is a supernatural phenomenon that is very hard to critique.” You added that our conviction regarding the prophecy of Moses our Teacher was because “we saw with our own eyes (that the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke with him).” This is an astonishingly simplistic formulation; see Guide of the Perplexed II:33 (especially at the end).
There was room and need to elaborate more in trying to explain the phenomenon of prophecy, even if we have not experienced it. After all, our faith in the Torah — as distinct from faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, whose source is indeed intuition, like the faith of Abraham our father — depends on the concept of prophecy.
By the way, the Nazir’s concept of auditory receptivity, which can indeed be understood as intuition within the framework of the synthetic picture, probably aims higher, toward the concept of prophecy, whose renewal the Nazir famously longed for, but that is not the place to elaborate.
And again: I enjoyed the entire book, though I would have done without a few cynical turns of phrase.
Happy festival,

Greetings.

First of all, I’m glad the book has been useful.

When I spoke about supra-logical sources for faith in God Himself, there I entirely stand behind my words. After all, there the issue is faith itself, and therefore one cannot rely on faith and Torah themselves (and therefore prophecy as well), or hang things on one heavenly source or another. Therefore, when one reaches a conclusion about faith, it must necessarily be through intellectual tools (including synthetic intuition). My intention was to object to people who, when they do not find a reasonable grounding for faith, hang it on heaven, on supernatural events, on channeling, and the like (especially: “I believe in God because the great sages of the generation told me He exists.” The great sages derive their status, to whatever extent and wherever it exists, from faith in God). The midrash about Abraham our father, also brought by Maimonides at the beginning of the laws of idolatry, presents this explicitly (that Abraham wonders who turns the sphere, and thus arrives at the Master of the palace. It does not begin with revelation but with intellectual wondering. Revelation comes afterward).

This discussion is no less necessary when dealing not with faith in God itself, but with understandings about the world (and also about the Torah). We plainly see that quite a few strange and baseless beliefs take root among the public (including Torah scholars), beliefs whose absurdity is usually defended by saying that faith is above reason and does not need logical scrutiny, and so on. It was against that that I objected (and of course Maimonides too dealt with this extensively). For me there is no principled difference between engaging in philosophy and science and engaging in faith and its contents. Everything is done with the same tools, on the basis of the relevant sources of information (therefore I do not accept concepts like “a Torah intellect,” if the meaning is not intuition that exists in other contexts as well), and therefore everything must stand the test of reason (either regarding the content itself — is it logical? — or regarding its source — is it clear that it comes from above?).
However, when dealing with supra-intellectual sources of information in other matters (not faith itself), there we also have God as a source on whom to rely. Therefore in this context I certainly did not mean to deny sources from prophecy or revelation. Obviously that is the foundation of everything (it seems to me I discussed there the Binding of Isaac and the critiques of Abraham for obeying the divine command. I explained the experience of revelation, and that one cannot critique it without experiencing it oneself. And that is the meaning of the sentence you quoted from me. I entirely stand behind it). Still, in the final analysis these too are only sources of information, like observation (not hallucinations and not experiences), except that the prophet has sources of information — observation — different from those of an ordinary person. God reveals Himself to him or shows him things, and this is not essentially different from the information sources of a scientist in a laboratory that is inaccessible to most laymen. My argument was directed mainly against claims that deny reason and hang various conclusions and beliefs on supernatural sources (what is called New Age and other evils). As I understand it, either we are dealing with intuition or we are dealing with nonsense.
In other words, I was speaking against people who seek certainty and, finding no way out, cling to supra-rational sources as an alternative, such as the supposedly all-capable and supernatural knowledge of one person or another. Reliance on prophecy itself requires a source (such as the prophetic passages in the Torah), and without that it violates “You shall be wholehearted” and what follows from it. And even there, you certainly do not need me to tell you that Maimonides couches it in an intellectual and logical (or observational) mechanism.
By the way, this is the purpose of the last part of the book. There I tried to present a systematic logical system dealing with soft inferences (not deductive ones), and to show that there is logic behind synthetic thinking as well (in the words of Rabbi HaNazir). Unfortunately, people who read the book did not understand exactly what the purpose of that part was. In my eyes it is an essential and important part of the discussion. There I try to show that scientific, Torah, and halakhic inference cannot be made using rigid logical tools, but on the other hand that it does have validity (even if not certainty) and that it is possible to critique it and improve it.

Regarding belief in Moses: if we did not see with our own eyes, or something equivalent, then indeed it is not proper to believe in him. Maimonides’ interpretations both of prophecy and of the revelation at Mount Sinai (which themselves, in my understanding, are drawn from his own logic and synthetic assumptions, and therefore their force depends on the extent to which the learner agrees to those assumptions. There is no tradition here) place it on something more abstract, and still it is supposed to be a source of information that convinces me intellectually and logically (perhaps similar to the certainty and clarity of the Binding that I mentioned above). If he means something other than that (I usually deal very little with these areas, because of what I wrote above — that I do not place much trust in such interpretations that Maimonides derived from his own reasoning and not from tradition), then I disagree with his words as well.

One should remember that the book does not deal with Judaism (the few Jewish sources there are brought only for illustration). I speak there about ways of arriving at truth and certainty for any human being on various subjects.
Happy festival, and thank you for the comments,

Greetings,
Everything you wrote is agreed. I only remarked that one cannot reject “supernatural” sources sweeping without addressing the concept of prophecy. By the way, you did not mention there the Binding of Isaac or how Abraham was supposed to be convinced that he needed to bind his son. As for the revelation at Mount Sinai — seeing with the eyes could not have been a source of conviction that this was a prophetic revelation. The Kuzari holds that the whole people then reached the level of prophecy, whereas Maimonides, who holds that one cannot prophesy to a frog, or to an unwise person, must resort to “seeing the sounds,” which is apparently an experience of a “sixth sense” whose reliability is higher than that of the five senses (don’t be too quick to disagree with Maimonides…).
All the best,