Q&A: A Commandment That Comes Through a Transgression
A Commandment That Comes Through a Transgression
Question
On the verse, "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: a person from among you who brings an offering…" (Leviticus 1:2), the midrash says (Leviticus Rabbah): "Rabbi Berekhyah said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to this Adam: Adam, let your offering resemble the offering of the first Adam, for everything was in his possession, and he did not offer from stolen goods or from acts of robbery. So too you shall not offer from stolen goods and not from acts of robbery; and if you do so, it will be more pleasing to the Lord than an ox or a bull."
Now this seemingly requires explanation: there is, after all, a well-known rule throughout the Torah that "a commandment that comes through a transgression is not a commandment" (Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, Sukkah 3:1). If so, what would be the initial assumption that with regard to bringing an offering this would be any different?
And one cannot say that the law of "a commandment that comes through a transgression" is itself learned from this very verse, because in tractate Sukkah (30a), the prohibition of using a stolen lulav is learned from another verse:
"…As for a stolen one, granted on the first day of the festival, for it is written: 'for yourselves'—meaning from your own. But on the second day of the festival, why not? Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: because it is a commandment that comes through a transgression, as it is said: 'And you bring that which was stolen, and the lame, and the sick.' Stolen is compared to the lame: just as the lame has no remedy, so too that which is stolen has no remedy."
In other words: what is there about lulav that requires a special verse, or why was lulav alone not enough?
Answer
The question why the rule of a commandment that comes through a transgression is not enough in the case of sukkah was already asked by the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there. Well known are the words of the Minchat Chinukh, who distinguishes between a commandment that comes through a transgression as a rule applying to the person: there is no fulfillment of the commandment, but one has not nullified a positive commandment; and the disqualification of the sukkah as applying to the object itself: the sukkah itself is invalid, and one has sat outside the sukkah. Something along these lines can be said regarding lulav as well (though of course one must distinguish between the cases). Of course, according to the views that hold that a commandment that comes through a transgression is rabbinic, there is no question.
And regarding an offering too, one can distinguish between the question whether the person achieved atonement and the disqualification of the offering itself (which is also non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard). And according to the view that a commandment that comes through a transgression is rabbinic, again there is no difficulty.