No.
I’m asking whether this is a matter of the produce or of the soil.
And to sharpen the question I’ll explain where it comes from.
I saw someone explain that the uniqueness of vegetation in the blessings [relative to animals] is because the entire system of commandments in the Order of Zeraim relates only to things that grow from the earth, [and that doesn’t necessarily follow, but according to his view]. If the commandments are about the soil and not about the produce, then one could reject the claim that this is the relevant point in the commandments. But if the commandment is about the produce, then yes.

So this is a linguistic question. I answered.

An attempt: over animals one says the blessing “by whose word all things came to be,” whereas for vegetation special blessings were assigned of their own (“who creates the fruit of the ground” and “who creates the fruit of the tree”). It was explained that vegetation has an advantage because with it the commandments dependent on the Land are performed. The question was why — or whether — this is an advantage of the plants, or whether it is only an advantage of the Land of Israel, and therefore there are commandments regarding what comes out of it. If it is only an advantage of the Land (and the plants only derivative from that), then seemingly the explanation for the special status of the blessings falls away, since that distinction exists even outside the Land of Israel.

And about that I wrote that these are laws regarding things grown from the soil in the Land of Israel.

But one can still ask whether the Land of Israel is the cause (and fundamentally there is no special status to vegetation), or a condition (for the actual appearance of vegetation’s special status in practice). In other words, the questioner assumed the simple reading is that the Land is the cause, and asked whether there is room to say that it is only a condition.

Wow, Ubar, exactly!
And Rabbi, what’s the answer?
Is the Land the cause?
In practice this is asking for the reason behind the verse, but it’s a reasonable inquiry.

Smile, Mr. Ish, because I didn’t guess correctly by chance; rather, a few days ago here on the site I was dealing with the law of a verdict completed on the basis of conspiring witnesses, and then I remembered that in Measures for the Study of Jewish Law, when he discusses all kinds of forms of “two causes” (I don’t have the book, but I remember there are various such categories there, with nice practical ramifications), he also discusses whether that completed verdict is an additional cause for liability or a condition. When I was dealing with that in another question, I thought of mentioning something about it, to suggest an explanation there for why Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach introduced something to Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai, but it seemed to me then (and still seems to me) like mere pilpul, so I didn’t write it there. And in my opinion, your conceptual inquiry needs a practical ramification in order to stand on its own feet. And the practical ramification you suggest — whether there is some “special status to vegetation,” such that the Torah instituted commandments for it and therefore the Sages instituted for it the special blessings over produce of the ground and produce of the tree (aside from wine, bread, and mezonot) — seems very shaky.

Yarekh, what does your mother smell like?
This is an entirely conceptual inquiry, especially if we follow the rationale, and the question is whether the point is the soil or the foods and produce. Why does it need a practical ramification?
And indeed the practical ramification I wrote is also entirely conceptual.

According to what you say about the shuruk and the dagesh, then an angel teaches me the entire Torah and my words are correct 🙂
This fundamental inquiry exists in anything where several conditions are needed for liability. If you ask me to guess, I’d guess there are dozens and dozens of such cases throughout the Talmud. There is an entire category about this in Rabbi Amiel’s Measures for the Study of Jewish Law, with different structures, and I don’t see any way to decide it without a practical ramification. But of course, if someone has a meaningful point to make about it even without a practical ramification and says it, I will certainly listen.