I will formulate my question more clearly. Since according to Maimonides it can be inferred that the verse addresses the religious court and not the damager, and assuming that damages are like a loan written in the Torah, must we conclude that nowhere is it actually stated that there is a monetary obligation imposed on the damager, but only an ability of the religious court to collect?
I know that it may seem as though I connected the commandment with the monetary obligation, but that is not my intention. I am simply inferring from the fact that Maimonides learns that there is a public commandment, that the verse speaks to the religious court and not to the individual, and from that I drew my conclusion. Unless one claims that the verse really does deal with the individual, in which case my question returns: from where did Maimonides derive that there is a commandment upon the religious court? Rav Saadia Gaon, by contrast, in the new Book of Commandments, indeed writes that this is a commandment of the individual.

Of course there is an obligation on the damager; otherwise, what is the religious court collecting from him?! Just as in the example I gave above, Israeli law also forbids stealing, otherwise there would be no justification for punishing the thief.
The term “religious court” in the words of the Sages means the community of Israel as a whole (as in: if a minor is eating forbidden carcasses, the religious court is commanded to separate him from it). Legal rules are imposed on the public, because a legal system is a public matter. Even a debt that Reuven owes Shimon is adjudicated in religious court. Therefore, when one says that this is a commandment upon the religious court, the meaning is that this is a public commandment: the liable party is liable, and the religious court collects from him. Not for nothing did the Halakhot Gedolot count these laws within its “sections.”

We find a similar category in fixed interest, where the religious court has the power to compel, but the person is not personally obligated (see Yoreh De'ah 161, Taz, se'if katan 3). My point is that there is a public obligation to compel the damager to pay, and the damager, as part of the public, is also obligated to act toward that end, but this is not out of a private personal obligation, rather by virtue of the public commandment.

Are you asking now or answering? That is what I wrote.
Incidentally, with interest this is compulsion regarding commandments and not legal compulsion, so it is not related to our discussion. Simply speaking, the lender also has an obligation to return it to the borrower, but the borrower has no right to receive it. I discussed this at length in my article on Choshen Mishpat.

Maimonides counts:

In commandment 177—
— that He warned us against eating creeping things generated from decay, even though they are not a known species and are not generated from male and female… this is the creeping thing generated from decay that does not produce one similar to itself.

And in commandment 178—
— that He warned us against eating worms generated in fruits and seeds.

And in commandment 179—he goes even further and says—
And do not find it far-fetched that a bird should be generated from the decay of fruits, for we always see birds generated from decay, and they are larger than a small nut… And this ant mentioned here is the flying ant generated from the decay of fruits, which does not reproduce… and the wasp generated from decay… And it is not impossible for a wasp or an ant or other species of birds and creeping things to be generated from decay and within foods, except in the eyes of fools who have no knowledge of natural science, and who think that no species can come into being one from another except from male and female, because they see this to be the case for the most part. So preserve these principles and understand this matter, for it is a statement spoken aptly.

So what happens with the enumeration of the commandments in light of updated science since Louis Pasteur?
Of course Maimonides is not to blame; this is explicit in the Sages. And although he did not follow the Sages against science, here Aristotle and the science of the time thought this too. In any case, what happens with the enumeration of the commandments?

Nothing will happen. Nowhere do we find in the Sages that when they disagreed about a certain commandment, they clarified what would enter in its place to complete the count of 613. These commandments drop out, and that’s it.

So there will not be a count of 613, granted. So maybe your intent is this point (which has already been said before): that the whole matter of the 613 commandments is ultimately just Rabbi Simlai’s exposition, and not everyone holds that way. By the way, also what is said about it corresponding to the number of limbs in the human body—it is known that this is not so. And in any case, according to everyone there are additional commandments beyond the 613, such as the commandment to remember the Exodus from Egypt every day, which Maimonides rules as binding and nevertheless did not include among the 613; and similarly other commandments which, according to some medieval authorities, are included, and according to others are not included, even though they agree that they are commandments, just not ones that entered the framework of the 613.

I’d just be happy to know whether that was your intention, and if not, then what you did mean.

Even if one does agree that this is the count, still nobody makes calculations like that. Apparently because things can always be adjusted after the fact.

By the way, can the Talmud regarding lice—that they do not reproduce—be explained to mean that they do not reproduce through a male, and the intent would be to parthenogenesis, which is known today, and they were speaking about a species for which that was apparently the case?

Anything can be explained, but why is there a need to explain it away? The Sages did not know beyond what was known in their time.