Q&A: Will and Free Choice
Will and Free Choice
Question
I listened to this morning’s lecture; it was fascinating, and for the first time it really put things in order in my head. Thank you.
Two points came up immediately:
A. The similarity between the creation of the world ex nihilo—the Big Bang—and every act of free choice that takes place in each person, “out of nothing” (in the sense of a physical generator). Truly the image of God. Pretty amazing.
B. Why is it that the compromise you are willing to make here between determinism and libertarianism you are not willing to make regarding divine providence, where you strongly argue that there is only one cause for every event, and if there is a physical cause, there is no other cause? For the sake of free choice you “move aside” the physical aspect—why not do that as well in cases (okay, not many, rare, but one could already haggle over the quantity) of divine providence?
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Answer
Thank you.
A. This similarity is discussed explicitly in my book and on the site in several places. Indeed, our ability to choose freely is the image of God, because only human beings can create events and causal chains ex nihilo. (As distinct from creating objects, where people cannot create them ex nihilo. I addressed this in my recent Ein Aya lectures.)
B. I’ve been asked about this several times on the site. My answer is that in principle it is possible, and therefore I do in fact consistently write that I do not rule out sporadic involvement. But for there to be a reason to exempt something from the principle of causality, there has to be a clear finding that forces me to do so. My awareness of free will is a good enough reason. It is an immediate experience that I have, and so I place great trust in it—enough to exempt it from the principle of causality. But God’s involvement in the world is not apparent anywhere. There is no indication whatsoever that it exists, and therefore I do not see any real reason to assume it. If I did not have an interpretation of the Torah’s verses, perhaps I would still be forced to make that exception. But I do have such an interpretation, and therefore I do not see a reason to make the exception. See Column 243 on my website. Even statements by the Sages are not sufficient reasons, because in my view they did not have scientific knowledge or philosophical skill, and therefore there is no reason to assume that they did not err in their statements about divine involvement.