Q&A: A Difficulty in Maimonides' Approach to the Definition of the Commandment of the Shofar
A Difficulty in Maimonides' Approach to the Definition of the Commandment of the Shofar
Question
Hello Rabbi. Maimonides' view is well known (in responsum no. 142, and in Laws of Shofar 1:3, and elsewhere) that the commandment regarding the shofar is hearing the sound of the shofar, not blowing it. And apparently there are those who disagree (the She'iltot, Geonim cited by Meiri, SeMaG, and perhaps Rabbeinu Tam) and hold that the commandment is to blow it, in which case one would have to say that people fulfill their obligation by the rule that "one who hears is like one who blows." But I find Maimonides' position difficult in light of the Talmud in Rosh Hashanah 29a, where it is explained (and Maimonides rules this way) that the one blowing must intend to enable the listeners to fulfill their obligation, and if he blew with the intention of enabling only the people in his synagogue to fulfill their obligation, and someone passing by in the street intended to fulfill his obligation, he has not fulfilled it, because the blower did not intend to include him. That makes sense if the commandment is to blow, but if the commandment is to hear, why does the blower need to intend to enable that person to fulfill his obligation? It should be enough that he intended for his synagogue, and then the blowing is a commandment-blowing. The Hazon Ish wants to say that each person needs a "commandment-blowing," but that does not seem reasonable to me. I would be happy if the Rabbi has an explanation.
Answer
Hello Sagi.
This is an old question, and I don't recall anything beyond the standard answers that have been given to it (I assume that in the Mafte'ach volume on the passage you will find many references). I think the accepted explanation is that even if the commandment is to hear, it means hearing a blowing that was done for me. According to this, the intention is not exactly to enable someone to fulfill his obligation, because there is no obligation to blow, but rather to direct the blowing toward me or for me. More generally, as is well known, in that Talmudic passage there is a great deal of overlap between intention in the sense that commandments require intention and intention to enable someone to fulfill his obligation. According to what I wrote, the blower's intention according to Maimonides is closer to the requirement that commandments need intention than to intention to enable someone else to fulfill his obligation.
Discussion on Answer
What you said is more or less like the Hazon Ish. To me it feels forced. Why should it be that the blowing has to be for me, and not enough that the blowing is a blowing done for the sake of the commandment?
It may be that the explanation is that hearing something is too passive. It is something that happens on its own and incidentally. Therefore it is more reasonable that we are talking about a blowing that was done so that he would hear it (or at least that it was done for the sake of the commandment; then we are dealing with intention of the second type).
Let me sharpen it a bit more. Even if the intention being discussed is not to enable someone to fulfill his obligation but rather stems from the rule that commandments require intention, there is still practical significance to the fact that this is a blower intending for another person to fulfill his obligation. Even if the blower does not need this blowing for himself, because he already fulfilled his obligation or will fulfill it later, his blowing still requires intention for the commandment, so that the listener can fulfill the commandment through his hearing. So this is something in between intention to enable someone to fulfill his obligation and intention stemming from the rule that commandments require intention.
It does not sound forced to me.
See Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch on the Torah, Leviticus 23:24.
What is the difference between the above and the commandment to recite kiddush or to hear kiddush?