Maybe just look in the book Piskei Teshuvot, which gathers material from important responsa works arranged according to the order of the Mishnah Berurah, and see for yourselves the reasons of those who oppose a husband fulfilling his kiddush obligation through his wife? And if that’s hard for you — send your wife to look it up there 🙂

Best regards, Li Kuti

In the Mishnah Berurah it says that a woman can fulfill the man’s obligation because she too is obligated in the commandment. It only says that when there are people present who are not members of her household, it is preferable that she not do so because of the dignity of the congregation, and nowadays it is not clear that a woman fulfilling people’s obligation harms the dignity of the congregation. So Rabbi Aviner’s answer is unclear to me, and borders on being illegitimate (withholding information from the questioner in order to inculcate norms that match the rabbi’s outlook).

With God’s help, 21 Tevet 5781

After I suggested yesterday opening the source for Rabbi Aviner’s words, “Piskei Teshuvot 271,” I went and checked. In the book Piskei Teshuvah by Rabbi Avraham Piotrkowski of blessed memory, a more thorough search is needed because it is not arranged according to the order of the Shulchan Arukh.

In the book Piskei Teshuvot by Rabbi Simcha Rabinowitz, may he live long, Jerusalem 1991, I did not find in section 271 any reference to the topic. Maybe there is a newer expanded edition with a discussion of it.

In the book Divrei Binyahu – Piskei Teshuvot (by Rabbi Binyahu Dayan, head of the “Paths of Halakhic Ruling” yeshiva), question 293 (p. 217), he writes that the husband can fulfill his wife’s obligation by virtue of mutual responsibility, even if she did not pray and her obligation is Torah-level, and likewise a woman can fulfill the man’s obligation in kiddush, since with regard to anything a woman is obligated in, she also has the law of mutual responsibility to fulfill the man’s obligation.

What I did find was that in section 289, paragraph 2, the Piskei Teshuvot (Rabinowitz) writes that in pressing circumstances a woman may eat before the daytime kiddush, since in pressing circumstances one may rely on the halakhic decisors who hold that a woman is exempt from the daytime kiddush (and he cites Da’at Torah in the name of Maharam Halavah in the name of Rashba).

According to this, there is room to say that it is proper that the husband not fulfill his daytime kiddush obligation by listening to his wife, since one should take into account the view of Maharam Halavah in the name of Rashba that a woman is exempt from the daytime kiddush.

Best regards, Yaron Fishel Ordner

As for “the dignity of the congregation” —
According to what Rabbi Yehuda Henkin of blessed memory explained (in the responsa Bnei Banim, based on the words of the medieval authorities), that “the dignity of the congregation” means the concern that people will think the men do not know how to recite kiddush themselves and therefore brought a woman to fulfill their obligation for them — one could say that this concern exists nowadays too, that people will say they do not know how to make kiddush themselves.

(At one point I had some back-and-forth with him on this topic. One time when I went in to see him, he showed me an article he had published in Kolech, and I remarked to him that maybe there is a problem here of “the dignity of the congregation” if a man publishes in a women’s Torah journal, since people might say there aren’t enough women to write a Torah article. And he smiled.)
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Also according to the explanation of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Rabbi Yosef Mashash, that “the dignity of the congregation” is the concern for immodesty (similar to what was said in the Jerusalem Talmud that women walk behind the men in a funeral procession “for the honor of the daughters of Israel, so that men should not fix their eyes on them”) — one could also say that this applies nowadays.

Regarding Rabbi Henkin’s reason, in my opinion it definitely does not apply nowadays, because nowadays there is no reason to think that if the woman makes kiddush we would say the men do not know how to make kiddush, for the same reason that if a man makes kiddush we would not say that the women do not know how to make kiddush. And if people would in fact say that — is there, in today’s situation, really any loss of dignity if a woman knows how to do something that men do not know?
As for the reason of modesty, that too should be discussed in light of what was written above regarding the first reason: since today a woman can function in every respect like a man, there is no reason men would specifically fix their eyes on Jewish women דווקא when the women fulfill their kiddush obligation for them, and that is enough said.

To Petah Tikva Resident — hello,

The Mishnah Berurah in section 271 did not use the phrase “the dignity of the congregation,” but rather “it is demeaning” for a woman to fulfill the obligation of people who are not members of her household. Its source is in Eliyah Rabbah and Derekh Ha-Chayim, and the wording needs to be checked in the original sources. In any case, this is not the source for Rabbi Aviner’s words, since he wrote that she cannot even fulfill her husband’s obligation. So the matter still requires clarification.

Best regards, Y.F.O.

As for “the dignity of the congregation” —
it is worth noting the words of the questioner in the responsa Bnei Banim, vol. 4, sec. 3, who proved from Maimonides and Sefer Mitzvot Gadol that they did not cite the first clause, “All may be counted among the seven, even a minor and even a woman,” but only the second clause, “A woman may not read from the Torah because of the dignity of the congregation,” implying that in the view of Maimonides and Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, once the Sages instituted that a woman should not read publicly because of the dignity of the congregation, women’s Torah reading was completely abolished. See there for what Rabbi Henkin replied.

The questioner there also suggested a different direction for explaining “the dignity of the congregation.” He wanted to say that women did not customarily enter the men’s synagogue because of a “major enactment,” but there was room to say that a woman could read from the women’s section, and against that the reason was given of “the dignity of the congregation” — that it is not respectful for the congregation to hear the reading from someone who is outside the synagogue. And see there for Rabbi Henkin’s reply.

Best regards, the questioner