Q&A: Twilight
Twilight
Question
Have a good week,
Why don’t we apply the presumption of prior status to twilight, keeping it in its previous status so that it is still daytime now, as we do in other cases of doubt?
(Is this necessarily dependent on the dispute over whether we apply a presumption to something whose status is bound to change?)
Thank you very much.
Answer
The Magen Avraham, in the Talmudic discussion of rabbinic prohibitions during twilight, distinguishes between the outgoing day and the incoming day because of the presumption of prior status.
But simply speaking, this is a presumption regarding something whose status is bound to change. Besides, there is an opinion that twilight is not a doubt at all but a different kind of entity altogether (both day and night), and therefore it cannot be decided by the ordinary laws of doubt. There is also room to discuss whether this should be treated as a legal doubt rather than a factual one—meaning, how to relate to this time, not what this time actually is. If so, perhaps presumptions do not apply there either.
Discussion on Answer
A. Good question. The examples are of a presumption where the status actually changed. For example, the presumption that a person is alive is a presumption regarding something bound to change, and nevertheless we do follow it. Still, there is a distinction between "perhaps he died" and "perhaps he will die," and in the case of "perhaps he will die" we are indeed concerned even though it is not known that he died. So it seems that here the change is obviously going to happen within a short time, and therefore we do not follow the presumption of prior status.
B. You assume that if there are several opinions, then that itself creates a doubt. But perhaps this very difficulty proves that twilight is not a doubt, and the other opinion was rejected. What I meant was that the doubtful treatment of twilight comes from certainty, not from doubt, and therefore it cannot be decided by force of a presumption.
C. As above.
I now saw two sources that discuss this issue:
https://www.hiluka.co.il/%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%96%D7%A7%D7%94-%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%90-%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A7-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA
I understand, thanks.
B. At first you brought this reasoning (a definite doubt) in order to challenge the Magen Avraham, and in the end the assumption not in accordance with the Magen Avraham is what establishes the reasoning. (About that Rabbi Yeshayahu Karlitz said: what they call modus ponens, we call modus tollens.)
C. How is it "as above"? In a legal doubt, why should this be a definite ontic doubt, etc.? It is an ordinary halakhic doubt, and if so it will happily join the circle of double doubt.
Among the various explanations in the link you brought, what is added beyond the two here (a presumption that is about to change immediately, and treatment as a definite doubt—and perhaps also legal doubt) did not appeal to me: the flimsy and ragged arguments. But really I am unable to judge anything in all the laws of the presumption of prior status, even though I have spent many hours of my life on them, and I cry out in utter amazement: what did the Holy One, blessed be He, see to afflict us with this bizarre plague—the bent of the Jewish people, spread enough—and this requires further study.
B. I did not bring that as a defense of the Magen Avraham. On the contrary, the Magen Avraham is cited in order to present a view that the laws of presumptions do apply to twilight (not really, because he does not say to be lenient regarding Torah prohibitions during the twilight of the incoming day). So there is love here, not a married woman. 🙂
C. If it is a different entity, then the laws that apply to it also stem from certainty, not from doubt, and there is no legal doubt here.
The Jewish people spread very much, but the presumption of prior status does have logic to it (sometimes the logic is legal-halakhic, meaning that it makes sense to rule that way—not necessarily that this is the reality). The problems are mainly in the details of the laws that were innovated by the later authorities.
(It seems to me that in A-B things got mixed up. In any case, what matters has already been clarified.)
As for legal logic, I do not know what that is (perhaps it is just another name for planting cucumbers), although in the past I studied your pamphlet on migo and legal reasoning. But presumably this is not the place for that, tucked away in some other responsum corner. Soon and speedily I’ll look through what is on the site, and with God's help I’ll understand.
A. Is a presumption regarding something whose status is bound to change a weak presumption even before we actually see that it changed?
B. Why should it matter that there is an opinion that twilight is a different kind of entity? There is still a double doubt here: perhaps twilight is in fact a doubt, in which case we decide it based on the presumption of prior status (say, for the outgoing day, and we rule that it is day), and even if it is a different entity, perhaps its law is still like daytime. Though admittedly it cannot be reversed.
C. The presumption of prior status in a legal doubt is apparently not accepted in practice as a presumption, but the side that says it is could still combine into a double doubt (again, it cannot be reversed): perhaps we do follow the presumption of prior status, and then its law is like daytime, and even if we do not follow the presumption, perhaps it itself has the law of daytime.