Q&A: Understanding Maimonides’ words about blowing a shofar from a burnt offering
Understanding Maimonides’ words about blowing a shofar from a burnt offering
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
The Talmud in Rosh Hashanah 28a says: “Rav Yehudah said: One should not blow a shofar of a burnt offering, but if he blew it, he has fulfilled his obligation” … What is the reason? A burnt offering is subject to misuse of consecrated property, and once he misappropriates it, it goes out to non-consecrated status, so he fulfills his obligation. And later the Gemara says: “Then Rava said: In both this case and that case, he has fulfilled his obligation, because commandments were not given for the sake of deriving benefit.”
Maimonides, in chapter 1 of the laws of lulav and shofar, writes: “And likewise, one should not blow a shofar of a burnt offering, but if he blew it, he has fulfilled his obligation, because sound is not subject to the law of misuse of consecrated property. And if you say: But he benefited by hearing the sound? Commandments were not given for the sake of deriving benefit.”
Why, then, should one not blow a shofar of a burnt offering in the first place? The wording sounds like Rav Yehudah’s view, but ordinarily Maimonides rules like Rava that commandments were not given for the sake of deriving benefit, and in his commentary to the Mishnah on Me’ilah he writes that this is “the true law.” Does he hold that “not given for benefit” applies only after the fact? That does not seem likely, since regarding a stolen shofar and someone forbidden by vow to benefit from another person, it seems that he rules that one may blow it even ab initio.
Is the issue that this is a commandment fulfilled through a transgression? What transgression? Misuse of consecrated property? But that is exactly what “commandments were not given for the sake of deriving benefit” was said about.
He also writes regarding a shofar of idolatry that it is valid only after the fact, but there one could say it is because it is repulsive.
Answer
I have not looked into this right now, and I am answering off the cuff.
Leave the stolen shofar out of this, because there is no prohibition on using it; rather, only the commandment is invalidated. By contrast, with a shofar of a burnt offering or of idolatry, and in the case of someone forbidden by vow to derive benefit, there is a prohibition on use regardless of whether one fulfills the obligation or whether there is a commandment involved. The commandment is invalidated because of the prohibition.
You asked what the difference is between someone forbidden by vow to derive benefit, where it is permitted ab initio, and idolatry and a burnt offering, where it is permitted only after the fact. In the case of a vow forbidding benefit, the prohibition is to derive benefit from the owner of the shofar. But benefiting from the sound is not considered deriving benefit from the owner of the shofar, but rather benefit from something prohibited. Therefore, in the case of a vow forbidding benefit it is permitted ab initio, because there the main issue is not to derive benefit from the owner, and there is no prohibition on benefiting from the shofar itself; it is not intrinsically an object of prohibition. By contrast, with a shofar of a burnt offering and of idolatry, the prohibition is to derive benefit from the object regardless of whether the benefit is taken from the owner or not. (And perhaps this depends on whether misuse of consecrated property is theft from the Temple treasury or an independent prohibition, with the item’s leaving the ownership of the Temple treasury being a consequence of that prohibition and not its cause.) Perhaps that is why Maimonides rules there that one should not do so ab initio.
Discussion on Answer
Moshe, hello.
Could you sharpen your point a bit more—what exactly do you mean?
Yehoshua Bango’ — hello. Something seems a bit strange to me in your understanding of the passage.
In the Gemara itself, one must explain that the meaning of “one should not blow” regarding a shofar of a burnt offering is not in the sense of “ab initio,” but rather in the sense of “intentionally” (see Tosafot there).
The explanation is simple: if he blows intentionally, there is no misuse of consecrated property, and it does not go out to non-consecrated status. And the same would apply according to Rava: one should not blow intentionally, and the fact that commandments were not given for the sake of deriving benefit will not help him.
Seemingly, this is also how Maimonides should be explained—because really, what practical difference is there? More than that: if he blows “ab initio,” it is obvious that he has not fulfilled his obligation, because “ab initio” means that you know it is a burnt offering, and then there is no misuse of consecrated property because it is intentional.
This can also be inferred from Maimonides’ wording, since regarding a shofar of a burnt offering he did not write the phrase “one should not blow ab initio,” as he did at the beginning of the law regarding “a shofar of an idolater.”
And if what I am saying is correct, then the question falls away from the outset.
See Pesachim 23, that even if there is no liability, there may still be a prohibition ab initio.