Q&A: A Straw That Decides Between Two Piles
A Straw That Decides Between Two Piles
Question
There are two thirsty people in the desert, and in my hand is a jug of water that can save one of them. In your opinion, from a moral standpoint am I obligated to conduct a neutral lottery, or are there principled rules for whom to give precedence to, or may I choose however I like, or is there some other option?
Principled rules such as, for example, a higher personal stature (a learned mamzer takes precedence over an ignorant High Priest, a mathematician over a physicist) or benefit to society (a singer who gives pleasure to the masses before a tired geography teacher). Choosing however I like would mean, for example, that I choose the one who is better at driving away flies so that I’ll have a bit more fun for the rest of the journey.
The justification for a lottery is that the value of life is equal (if the jug belonged to one of them, he would not be obligated to give it to the other. To my mind, that means they are equal). The justification for principled rules is self-evident. The justification for choosing however I like is similar to the justification for a lottery—since at bottom they are completely equal, morality is completely indifferent to the distinction between them, and then there is no problem with my using a dry stalk of straw to prioritize between the two identical piles on either side of me. I’d prefer not to get into technical Talmudic issues even if they may be relevant (for example, “migo” in a case of two against two).
If instead of choosing which person to save I were faced with the choice of which of my hands would be cut off, then it seems obvious that there is no moral problem with my choosing the hand that has a circular scar that reminds me of a pleasant episode from childhood. Similarly, if I were faced with the choice of which tooth to pull from so-and-so, and he tells me that as far as he is concerned there is no difference between tooth 8 and tooth 9, then it seems reasonable that I am morally permitted to choose tooth 8 by virtue of the profound reason that the number 9 reminds me of my little sister’s age and therefore arouses my sympathy.
In short: between two things that are equal in their essence, is just any decision enough, or must one decide in an objective, neutral way? This seems like a pretty standard issue and presumably has come up here several times, but I couldn’t find an explicit discussion of it (hard to search).
Answer
Morally: ostensibly, if there is no halakhic consideration obligating you, you may do whatever you want. On the other hand, it is clear that morally it is more proper to give everyone an equal chance at life.
Halakhically: ostensibly, this is a matter of precedence in rescue in the passage in Horayot. Therefore one should follow the precedence rules stated there, and not some other consideration. On the other hand, it is possible that the precedence considerations there were stated only when there is no other consideration that overrides them. For example, the simple logic is that family members take precedence over those considerations. And one can also bring support from the idea of familiar priests—where a person prefers a priest for non-substantive reasons—as well as from the giving of charity, where we have not heard that one may not prefer one person over others (when they are at the same level of need).
But the distinction between Jewish law and morality in this context does not seem right to me, because the halakhic considerations reflect moral conceptions (there are no verses or other sources here, only the sages’ considerations).
In my article on the separation of Siamese twins, I brought that all contemporary halakhic decisors maintain that if the two twins are identical, they should be left to die and one should not perform an operation that saves one of them. I, however, argued that one must conduct a lottery and save one of them. Now the possibility arises of simply preferring one of them at random, and that we have not heard. Admittedly, the consideration there involved the prohibition of murder, and that does not exist in the present case (because this is a matter of non-rescue, not murder).
All this has been discussed quite a bit with respect to priority in providing medical treatment (as also in the health basket). See, for example, here:
http://www.daat.ac.il/encyclopedia/value.asp?id1=751
And here:
http://hebrew.sadnatenosh.org/articles/pikuachnefesh.htm
Discussion on Answer
[Why, in fact, in a situation where I sold two people a ticket for a lottery worth 100 shekels each (the ticket costs 50, for the sake of argument), am I obligated to hold the lottery and cannot arbitrarily choose where to collapse the ontic uncertainty?]
Exactly. That is precisely what I meant: the chance at life is the value being distributed here, and it must be distributed equally. A lottery gives an equal chance to each of the two sides; your personal choice does not.
In judicial discretion, the option of a lottery does arise as a particular case of Rashi’s view that one may do whatever one wants. But it is true that he does not require a lottery, and in that sense it seems that even in his view there is no preference for a lottery.
As for the lottery ticket, why not simply choose the one you like? At least if your liking for him arose after the lottery (otherwise there was fraud from the outset). It seems to me that randomness is important. The arising of affection is admittedly not known in advance in which direction it will go, but that is not a lottery with equal odds (the distribution is not uniform, but depends on my taste).
A side question:
If you fix the principle around “taste” and affection and so on, then yes, that is fraud from the outset. Because, for example, the second buyer probably does not really get 50 percent. But if the selecting principle is left completely open—I might decide based on whose freckles remind me more of the star system on the day I was born, or who has more labial letters in his name—then is that still a non-uniform distribution? Ostensibly it would be a uniform distribution over selection principles.
Of course. That is exactly a lottery. There is no obligation specifically to toss a coin. Any random procedure with equal distribution in both directions is equally acceptable.
Thank you.
Could you explain more why, in a place where there are no precedence rules and where you innovatively require a lottery, simply preferring one side is not equivalent to a lottery? Is the point here that the chance itself is also something of equal value, like a lottery ticket, and therefore it must be distributed equally, even though in the end the outcome of a lottery or preference will be equivalent? By the way, in judicial discretion it does not seem that the option of a lottery comes up at all (and perhaps also not the option of preference).