This isn’t explained in the booklet, because the main attack you presented from David Hume is that it is not reasonable to accept testimony about a miracle. So you attacked him on the grounds that he is conservative and claimed that we are not supposed to see anything unreasonable in a miracle. A miracle is simply a reality unfamiliar to us, but once we have a sufficiently good reason, we should accept it.

But the argument I’m presenting is different. It claims that it is not reasonable to accept testimony about a very rare event, even if it is quite possible that it might happen. Since in the vast majority of cases the witnesses did not actually encounter the event (because it is a rare event), it is preferable to assume that they lied or interpreted reality incorrectly.
For example, if you met a person on the street who claimed he had met the king, he would need to bring better evidence than someone making a claim about meeting an ordinary person. Because the king is one in seven billion people. A miracle is much, much rarer still. For example, the revelation at Mount Sinai is the only foundational revelation event in all of history. So there is almost no chance that someone really encountered it.

I don’t understand. That is Hume’s argument.

No. The argument you brought in the booklet is whether one can accept testimony about an event that is not familiar to us from our experience. Miracles and revelation are things that are totally unfamiliar to our ordinary deterministic reality, and therefore David Hume argues that it is not really reasonable to accept them…
To that you replied that this argument suffers from conservatism and from begging the question. And you also replied in the spirit of “let Yossi hit Yossi” — that induction, according to David Hume himself, is not grounded at all, so it cannot support his claim.

In contrast, I am saying that it is not reasonable to accept testimony about a very rare event even if it is likely to occur sometime. Since in the vast majority of cases the witnesses never encountered it (because it is super rare), their testimony that they encountered it cannot be accepted. Because it is more likely that they lied than that they told the truth. (The net is bigger than the fish.)

I was not privileged to discern this ultra-subtle distinction beyond all detectability. It looks like exactly the same thing to me, and therefore what I wrote there applies to this too.

I’ll use an idea you wrote there.
If you asked Reuven, “What time is it?”
and he answered, “The time is 12:34,”
it would seem that his testimony is not reliable, since the chance of his speaking the truth is 1/1440 (the number of minutes in 24 hours).
Reuven himself has no reason to assume he is mistaken, because from his point of view he knows what came out, so he doesn’t enter the statistical problem to begin with. But I cannot rely on the assumption that he knows, because that is precisely the question when examining his testimony. Therefore I have to weigh several parameters:
1. What is the probability that the time would turn out to be 12:34? (unlikely)
2. What is the probability that he lied / distorted / misspoke?
3. What is the probability that he made a mistake in what he saw or understood?

So true, points 2 and 3 are probably not the most significant. But 1 is highly significant, and therefore it can seriously undermine my trust in his testimony. After all, it is far-fetched to assume that something with a probability of 1/1440 came out, and therefore his testimony ought to be rejected.

(Specifically, 1/1440 is probably not a small enough number to disqualify testimony, but if we are talking about testimony regarding an event that happens only a few times in the world, such as the revelation at Mount Sinai or a solar eclipse, then this is really an extremely tiny number. It is far more likely that they would not witness the event out of the “infinite” possibilities for observation that creation provides us.)

First, the example you gave is mistaken. Probability is not a relevant parameter for such a question. Only if you do not know do you go by probabilities, but if you ask what time it is and someone answers, then presumably he is telling the truth. There is no reason to assume otherwise. Any time he says has a tiny probability, and that has no significance.
The probability relevant to the discussion is the probability that he is mistaken or lying.
But as for our issue, I really do not understand what is going on here.

But the probability that he spoke the truth is minuscule: 1/1440!
So true, there is some credibility in his favor and so on, but still that is weak relative to the probability that he is actually right. (And assuming this were not a case with so few possibilities, like “what time is it,” then he would have even less credibility.)

This is an improvised parable for the question I asked above: most likely there will not be testimony about a miracle, so when there is testimony about a miracle, the probability of assuming it is correct is tiny. The question applies equally to testimony about a solar eclipse, for example, since usually there is no solar eclipse.

Sorry, I wrote that on my phone and autocorrect mangled everything… so I’ll rewrite it.

You claimed that my calculation is not correct,
but the probability that he is telling the truth is minuscule: 1/1440!
So true, he has some credibility regarding his claim, etc., but that still remains weak relative to the probability that he is actually right and telling the truth.
(And if this were a claim without so few possibilities like “what time is it,” then he would not have much credibility at all.)

This is an improvised parable for the question I asked above: after all, most likely a miracle will not occur and we will not hear testimony about a miracle, so when we do have testimony about a miracle, the probability of assuming that it is indeed correct and reliable is tiny. The question is also relevant to testimony about the occurrence of a solar eclipse, for example, because usually solar eclipses do not occur.

This improvised parable is nonsense. Probability is relevant to a random event. But here there is no lottery over the date such that a certain date comes out with such-and-such probability. Please, let’s spare ourselves this nonsense.

I accept what you’re saying, that this is indeed the case for the person who saw it himself: probability belongs to a state of lack of information and not when I actually have information. But that is not true when the observer stands in the status of a witness in the story.
When he is a witness and I need to examine him, then one of the criteria is the probability that he is indeed right and that things really turned out as he says. Clearly here the question arises on its own: is it likely that he “hit” the result he claimed, or not? That is something that must be taken into account.

Gilad, I’ll try to explain it in my own way (I think you’ll understand mine faster than Rabbi Michi’s (: )
The moment one assumes the reasonable assumption that there is an entity that created the world (Rabbi Michi explained that in the four booklets), then there is no reason not to assume that He can do things above nature, since He created it. So the whole matter becomes more reasonable. Now, what you said is very true — every mentally ill person sitting in a psychiatric institution claims some miracle — but that is really not similar to Judaism’s claim. Once we concluded that there is an entity called God, it is more reasonable to assume that He would reveal Himself. Now obviously He would not reveal Himself through one leader. You cannot know whether he is telling the truth or lying. So already we take his testimony with a limited doubt of fifty percent. But if there really is a God, it is reasonable to assume that He would not entrust the values of prophecy to fools, but would do it through a direct message that cannot be subject to interpretation or lies. And that, of course, is Judaism’s claim: the revelation at Mount Sinai. Now there would be room for doubt if there were stories similar to Judaism’s, but since the revelation at Mount Sinai is the only miraculous revelation to an entire people, one that cannot be distorted or lied about, then, as stated, the matter becomes very reasonable. This is not like every fool who claims he had a miracle. And if Judaism’s claim were only about God speaking to our forefathers, there would be room for doubt. But since the most reasonable way is to transmit the message without half-truths and lies that are subject to interpretation, the only way is the claim of witness testimony. And that, as stated, is not common at all, unlike the arguments of mentally ill people among psychiatrists in hospitals.

Thanks, Kobi, but what I mean is not whether it is possible that God would reveal Himself to a nation, but whether it is reasonable to accept testimony that claims this. That is why I gave the example of a solar eclipse. Since in most cases no solar eclipse occurs, and only on a few occasions do solar eclipses occur, it is never reasonable to accept testimony about it.

Because the probability that the witnesses actually encountered the eclipse is extremely tiny, so it really is not plausible to claim that they encountered it. Whereas many times people do lie and exaggerate, so it is reasonable to attribute that understanding here as well.

Gilad, again — can you bring me witnesses to a miracle? Other than Judaism’s claim? Which is not common at all. Now as for the matter itself, from the outset you are unwilling to accept testimony about revelation or about something supernatural. If, say, you were in a city of liars, and literally everyone lies, and you are the one righteous person — would you justifiably feel that everyone thinks you are lying too? But that is not at all the same issue. The point is that imaginary miracles among people are very common. Extremely common. But when there is a historical beginning that forms a people, whether by a supernatural route or not, that is not a common thing at all. There would be room for doubt if you could bring testimonies similar to the Jewish revelation, and not in a cave where the claim cannot be checked and is supposedly in another “dimension.” When you bring me more miracles involving mass groups, then we can talk about also casting doubt on the Jewish revelation. But you cannot compare a miracle or supernatural event of Muhammad, or something that by definition is supposed to be supernatural and the revelation of the metaphysical to the physical, to Judaism’s claim. It’s like you can’t compare a soccer team winning a game to a kid playing soccer against his friend.

I don’t know why you keep evading my example of the solar eclipse.
At the end of the day, when Judaism claims that such a national miracle occurred only once in the entire world, then it is really not common.
By contrast, the national history of peoples can be mistaken or can lie. And throughout the world, many more national histories will lie than tell the truth.
Likewise, as in the example of the solar eclipse, the probability that the Jewish people experienced a revelation is minuscule; it is much more reasonable that they did not experience it than that they did.

Therefore, in the overall calculation, point one (which is less significant) together with point two (which is significant) means that the probability that in Judaism we happened upon that trustworthy and reliable testimony suffers from an unreasonable assessment of reality.

Why do you think the history of the Jewish people is not reliable?
Again, you are not internalizing that this is not the same level. A child playing soccer claims he saw Messi in Israel. After six years another child claims it, and another, and so on and so on — lots more false testimonies are produced.
Whom should we believe and whom not? God knows. But when a soccer crowd of fifty thousand adults and elderly people, children and babies, claim they saw Messi come to Israel, their testimony deserves a more respectable place (even though it is not a reasonable thing for Messi to come to Israel without it being reported in the newspapers, internet, and news). Do you understand the point?