Q&A: Debt and Right
Debt and Right
Question
You said that the definition of Choshen Mishpat is that there is someone obligated and someone entitled, whereas in Yoreh De'ah there is only someone obligated. Therefore, in monetary law one can make stipulations, because all of us can waive whatever right we have, unlike in Yoreh De'ah. Fine enough.
What about honoring one’s father and mother? There is someone obligated (the child) and someone entitled (the parents), and here too they can waive the right they have (a parent may forgo his or her honor), so apparently this belongs in Choshen Mishpat—were it not for the fact that this is not talking about money here. But still, one could say that honoring parents can also be expressed through money.
In short, according to your definition, why doesn’t honoring parents appear in Choshen Mishpat?
(I do have an intuition that honoring parents belongs in Yoreh De'ah, but as you always say, intuition is not enough; you have to define and conceptualize it.)
Answer
A poor person can also waive charity, and then there is no obligation to give to him. So why does charity appear in Yoreh De'ah?
But that is a mistake. Parents cannot sue me in a religious court to make me honor them. They can complain that I do not honor them, and then the religious court will compel me under the rule of compelling the observance of commandments, not under monetary law and obligations. The parents do not have a right that I honor them. I have an obligation to honor them, exactly as with charity to a poor person.
The fact that parents can waive it is because waiving is like saying, “I consider it received,” or “I have no need.” If there is no need, then there is no commandment.
Discussion on Answer
There is a big difference. To cancel the right itself means to say that I, as someone depositing an item with a paid bailee, have no right to receive compensation for theft or loss. To waive means that I do have the right, but I waive it—as if I had already received it and then returned the money to you. The Talmud itself makes this distinction: “One who stipulates on condition that the Sabbatical year not cancel my debt” — that is canceling the right. But “one who stipulates on condition that you not cancel my debt in the Sabbatical year” — that is waiving the right.
Excellent. I just want to make sure: if I want, I can cancel the right by canceling my ownership of the object altogether, right?
Of course.
Very clear. Thank you.
You also distinguish between “canceling the right that I have” (which is impossible) and “waiving the right that I have” (which is possible). I didn’t understand the distinction—that is, I didn’t understand why I can’t cancel my right. After all, I’m the owner of the thing; I can do whatever I want. Just as I can waive it (= give gifts), I can also cancel it, can’t I?