Thank you very much. I read it there; it really is interesting. But it seems that דווקא there you seemingly agree with their approach, that the difference between mere belief and knowledge depends on the sensitivity of the claim, for example whether there is a counterfactual statement for it. But here you argue that there is no difference between the two things.
Also, if faith and knowledge really are the same thing, why can’t you say about the lottery ticket that you know you won’t win? (There, by the way, you accepted that assumption.)

I definitely can say that I know I won’t win. True, there is a tiny chance that I will, but a small chance of being mistaken always exists. With the ticket there is another problem, since it is clear that there will be one buyer whose knowledge will turn out false (because one person does win). Still, I don’t see an essential difference.

I think you wrote there that it is pretty much agreed that one cannot say “know” about this:
“I can say, ‘I assume he didn’t win,’ or ‘I believe he didn’t win,’ and the like. But in such a situation it is not correct to say, ‘I know he didn’t win.’”
For example, even if you were never to find out which ticket won, still according to what you said there there is a problem with saying “I know.” You can only say that I know the probability is small… or that it is reasonable to assume I won’t win, but not that I know.

Moreover, if people know they won’t win, then how do they fill out lottery tickets? People do expect to win. They just think the chance that they will win is low.

So why did you abandon the distinction from the philosophers’ hair-splitting between “know” and “belief”? Just because you didn’t find a distinction, did you decide that we should nevertheless abandon this intuition? But why not answer, somewhat in your style from that column, that it is possible this intuition is an epistemic intuition (parallel to a legal intuition)? Even if we do not know how to ground it in defined terminology.

Those distinctions too are philosophical-legal hair-splitting. They have nothing whatsoever to do with reality. Whether you use the term “know” or not is semantics.

There is a difference between knowledge and knowing. I assume you mean knowing.

Knowing cannot be expressed in words. It does not deal with external facts but with internal facts that are directly connected to a person’s consciousness, that is, with experience. For example, a person knows that he is experiencing the color orange while he is looking at something orange.

Belief is overall just a certain feeling (the feeling of being sure about something) attached to external facts that are part of your worldview (knowledge).

Why is this mere semantics? After all, the very person filling out the lottery ticket will not say that he knows he won’t win. He’ll only say, let’s say, that it is likely he won’t win, but not that he knows.
Doesn’t the Rabbi take an essentialist view regarding the realization of concepts? It’s just that from what I happened to read, the writer basically assumed that all philosophers agree that knowledge is not belief, and one of the proofs for that is the lottery example. The second is the case where there is justified belief but it does not lead to knowledge because of an error or something like that. But the problem is that he did not really give an explanation for why beliefs of type A should be called knowledge and those of type B should not, other than that “that’s just how it is,” or that it fits intuition. So in any case it is surprising that the Rabbi maintains that there really is no difference and that it is semantics.

When I say that I believe in God, I mean to say that I know that God exists. Exactly as I know that there is a law of gravity. If you want, call both of them belief; if you want, call both of them knowledge. Both are generalizations based on observations of the world.

Haha, Rabbi,
when the philosophers spoke about counterfactual statements they were not talking about counterexample statements. (counterexamples)

I thought of answering that in fact the general public does distinguish between belief and knowledge, as in the common phrase: “Belief in God is belief, not knowledge!” But then at most, according to them, to know you need belief at a stronger level. And if so, then really if God were the lottery ticket (fine tuning), they would say they know He exists. And the same idea with the law of gravity.

But you can’t get around the fact that there is something intuitive that really distinguishes between the two concepts. And you can especially see it regarding error, for example: I was sure that I knew, but I was wrong. As opposed to: I believed such-and-such, but I was mistaken.