Q&A: Two on Opposite Banks and a Jew Extending a Hand
Two on Opposite Banks and a Jew Extending a Hand
Question
In the Talmud, Hagigah 13a, it says that words of Torah are not transmitted to an idolater. Tosafot ask: why not derive this simply from the fact that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to study Torah (except for the seven Noahide commandments), and therefore one who teaches him violates “do not place a stumbling block”? They answer: “Here we are dealing even with a case where there is another idolater who wants to teach him, so there is no ‘do not place a stumbling block,'” because it is not a case of two on opposite sides of the river.
In Minchat Chinukh, commandment 232, section 3, he brings that the Mishneh LaMelekh (Laws of Lender and Borrower 4:2) infers from this Tosafot that if there is another Jew who is willing to teach him, then there is indeed a violation of “do not place a stumbling block.” And the Mishneh LaMelekh explains there (in a parallel case): “For it is not at all comparable to a nazirite, for there the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ would not come about were it not for this one handing him the cup [because the nazirite will take it himself. Note by Sandomilov]. Accordingly, even if he handed it to him, he does not violate, etc. And similarly regarding a nazirite too: if another person had handed him a cup of wine in a case of two on opposite sides, and then someone else came and handed it to him, it is obvious that he does violate.”
The halakhic issue is one thing. As for the moral question, I assume you would say that it is like the Jewish law according to the Mishneh LaMelekh, and it is forbidden. For example, the local lord said: whoever breaks So-and-so’s vase will receive ten gold coins, and I see Yossi running to break it. It would be forbidden for me (as I understand your view) to get there first and break it in order to take the gold coins. And even if Yossi has already thrown a stone that in another minute will certainly break the vase, or he threw the vase itself off the roof, one could still say that it is forbidden to break it. Question A: is that correct? (The well-known issue of consequentialism.)
But what do you think לגבי something that has no moral problem in it? For example, the local lord said: whoever cuts off Sandomilov’s hand will receive ten gold coins, and I see Yossi, a known psychopath, running to cut off my hand. Question B: is there any “taint” if I cut off my own hand first in order to take the gold coins? Does that lessen the severity of the local lord’s wickedness?
This of course gets us into politics. Suppose politician A opposes congestion charges, or the transfer/annexation of territories, or public transportation on the Sabbath, or making daycare discounts from the Ministry of Economy conditional on not failing to realize one’s earning capacity, or opposes allowing a same-sex couple to adopt (let’s say he wants to strengthen the “family unit” of father-mother among the public). Question C: is there any “taint” in this politician voting in favor of something he strongly opposes on broad value grounds, but which would have passed even without him, if in return he could somewhat advance, in another arena, goals that in his view are correct? If possible, without bringing in the consideration of public appearance.
Answer
This very principle you described, as I recall, is itself disputed. It is brought in the book Lifnei Iver (Bnei Torah edition).
As for the moral principle, I do not think breaking a broken vessel is a moral problem. Even if you are not a consequentialist, when you broke a broken vessel you did not perform an act of breaking. That is exactly the meaning of the reasoning: you broke a broken vessel. Otherwise the reasoning should have been: you broke a vessel that in any case would have been broken, and there would be no need to assume that it was already considered broken from the outset. One could force that interpretation, that this is what is meant, but in the straightforward reading of the passage it seems to me not so, since they make it depend on the question of whether we go by the initial state or not.
I did not understand why this lessens the local lord’s wickedness. Clearly, you would not cut off the hand without the psychopath and without the local lord’s announcement.
As for the political question too, in my opinion such a consideration is entirely legitimate.
One can engage in casuistry here about the categorical imperative, and I assume that is what you meant. After all, I would not want everyone to vote as I do (because if everyone did not vote, then it really would not pass). But to that I would answer in three ways: 1. I would want everyone to vote on utilitarian grounds if all the others are voting differently. 2. Even the categorical imperative does not have exclusive status. There are considerations that override it. 3. It is possible that such a vote is not a vote for the law (just as breaking a broken vessel is not breaking a vessel). Though that point does require discussion.
By the way, public appearance is a consequentialist consideration. Such appearance has consequences.
Discussion on Answer
I thought it lessens the local lord’s wickedness (and the psychopath’s) because it is a kind of “they coerced him until he sold.” But that is a passage I have found to be an open wound, and I do not presume to enter into it. Have you discussed this issue anywhere at length?
No. If it is not completely clear that he will break it (like a stone flying toward the vase), then it is certainly forbidden for you to break it. True, this needs some investigation in light of the law of a pursuer, where you are supposed to kill him even though he could decide not to murder the one being pursued. But intuitively it seems to me that it is not comparable.
I do not recall having dealt with this.
Again I noticed that in Tosafot’s own words it says that the prohibition of transmitting words of Torah to an idolater does not lapse when there is another idolater who will teach him, and specifically only in the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” (which is defined by the result) is there an exception in a case of one side of the river. What is the logic here?
Simple logic. The prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” is based on the fact that you caused him to commit a transgression. If there is someone else doing that, then there is no “do not place a stumbling block” here, because you did not bring it about. He would get there without you as well. But the prohibition against transmitting words of Torah to a gentile is a prohibition on an act and not on a result. You are forbidden to transmit words of Torah to him. Therefore here there is no exemption just because someone else will transmit it to him. And this explains the inference that this is only when that other person is a gentile, because then there is no one else who will perform the forbidden act, only someone who will bring about the result. In such a case, if you transmit it to him, you have violated the prohibition on the act. But if another Jew transmits it to him, then the Torah is being transmitted to him by Jews even without you.
But how do you decide what is an act and what is a result? Maybe “do not place a stumbling block” is a prohibition on an act, and transmitting Torah to an idolater is a prohibition on a result? (Besides, prohibitions on acts are always an opaque decree of Scripture, sealed and closed.)
One could understand it that way if you assume that the transmission does something to the one transmitting. For example, the value of the Torah and of Israel is diminished in his eyes.
This is an interpretation of the Sages, and I do not see any difficulty in it.
Thank you very much.
Just a clarification: what if Yossi himself is running to break the vase with his hand? Presumably that is not a broken vessel, even without assuming free choice, because it is still not clear what he will do in the end. And all the more so if one does assume free choice, in which case perhaps even retroactively, if he breaks it, there is no determination. Would it be permitted for me to get there first and break it?
If everyone estimates that the chance Yossi will break it is, say, 90% (and not 100%), then would it still be permitted for me to get there first and break it and give the owner of the vase 10% of its value as compensation?
[This general topic fills my thoughts, and so I keep returning to it like someone possessed every chance I get; please understand and forgive me.]