Question

Hello Rabbi. I saw that the Rabbi wrote in a responsum that future danger to life for the public is treated as present danger to life, and one may even desecrate the Sabbath for it. And his proof was from the Talmudic passage about a burning coal, according to the Geonim’s approach.
At first glance, I thought I saw a contradiction to this from the passage in Gittin 45 regarding redeeming captives. There the Mishnah says that captives are not redeemed for more than their value, and the Talmud was uncertain about the reason: is it because of the burden on the public, or perhaps because the kidnappers will increase their kidnappings?
The later authorities ask: how can it be that because of the burden on the public they would not redeem them, when there is the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” and a person is obligated to give all his money rather than violate it?
The Hatam Sofer answered in a responsum, Hoshen Mishpat no. 177, that burdening the public is included in danger to life.
So far this sounds exactly like the Rabbi’s view based on the Geonim.
But the Talmud itself is uncertain whether the prohibition is because of burdening the public or because they may continue kidnapping, and the question is whether this is uncertainty about the facts. That does not seem likely, so it appears that the Talmud is uncertain whether we are concerned that the kidnappers may continue kidnapping—in other words, whether future danger to life is taken into account at all, or future calculations generally. That would be unlike the Rabbi’s claim that this is settled. (Regarding burdening the public, it seems to me that this is not a future concern, but a danger to life that has already begun and taken shape.)
And if you say: but Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh ruled in accordance with the reason “lest they kidnap,” then Jewish law follows my view—then I would answer that the halakhic ruling is even more difficult, because according to Jewish law a person is allowed to redeem himself for more than his value. But if this involves future danger to life, how was this permitted? And this is even stronger according to Tosafot, who say that one may redeem his wife for more than her value. In short, why is no future life-saving calculation taken into account in the case of redeeming captives?
In my opinion, the simple explanation is that Jewish law does not take future danger to life into account at all, similar to the approach of the Noda B’Yehuda regarding autopsies—namely, that it is forbidden to dissect corpses in order to save people from possible future illnesses. And the Mishnah’s permission not to redeem captives for the sake of repairing the world is really a victory of morality over Torah, meaning a moral preference for social order contrary to the straightforward halakhic ruling.
I’ve gone on at length, but I would be glad to hear the Rabbi’s response on this matter. Thank you.