The question is whether you think this is a valid proof.
The distinction between it and all the other proofs discussed in your style
is that while one can argue that all the things we live and think are, say, better for survival, and that can serve as a coordinating factor in terms of survival,
then Hume’s objection to analogical inference comes in, and I use it to say that even evolution, in the best-case scenario, won’t be able to cause our thinking to be coordinated in the sense of analogies and what will happen in the future.
And in addition, evolution is a circumstantial process within the laws, but it cannot provide us with understandings about the laws themselves. Only an entity external to the “world-human” system could do that.

Therefore, even if the sun has risen for 14 billion years, and therefore we would “feel” that it should rise tomorrow, there is nothing in an evolutionary process that would create in us a coordination with regard to metaphysical assumptions about reality itself. And so we have no justification to assume this.
That is, even if the laws of nature really are fixed, we will never know it.
Only a factor outside the system can provide us with the relevant data.

I didn’t understand a thing. Briefly describe what I claim and exactly where you disagree.

You argue that evolution cannot serve as a justification for a number of reasons.
And I argue that most of them can be debated (say, that both thinking and eyes have better survival value, and that we know enough time has passed),
but even so, it would still be possible to offer a proof regarding inductive thinking that would not be justified “even if everything is true.” Because evolution is essentially causal and not teleological. And there is nothing in it that would create for us a justified coordination regarding metaphysical assumptions about reality itself (say, that the sun will rise tomorrow), but only about what has happened until now, and that’s it.
By contrast, an entity external to the “human-world” system could indeed provide us with justification for our knowledge of the world. (Whereas evolution is part of the world.)

I still don’t understand what you’re writing, so I’ll address only the second part.
I understand that you want to argue that although my proof from bodily and mental traits is invalid (as noted, I didn’t understand why), one can still bring a valid proof from inductive thinking (which is in fact what I did. So what exactly is the dispute?). But that claim of yours is actually incorrect. If you accept evolution as an explanation, it can definitely explain the inductive faculty as well. That faculty yields correct insights about reality in light of isolated cases we encountered in the past. Someone who developed a good inductive faculty survives better, because he is better prepared for what he will encounter in the future.
That’s it. If nothing new appears or becomes clearer here, I’m done.

You understood it basically correctly. So I’ll go straight to the heart of the matter.
True, you argued that someone who developed a good inductive faculty survives better.
And that is exactly the point in this argument, and that is how it differs from your argument. Because I agree that this could indeed explain why we developed the inductive faculty—in the “felt” sense, why we feel that the sun will rise tomorrow. (In the sense of actualism.)
But it still cannot provide any justification for our trust that the sun really will rise tomorrow, in the ontic sense.
Because that assumption is not derived from the fact that the sun rose yesterday too—just like Hume’s objection to the circular justification of induction from induction, which itself uses that assumption.
Therefore the ontic justification requires positing metaphysical assumptions about reality, for which evolution cannot provide justification because it is causal and not teleological.
And the better explanation is an entity outside the “world and human” system that provides this justification.

And this is where it differs from all the other proofs, like eyes or ordinary thinking. Because even if with respect to them evolution really can provide an explanation, since they have survival value, inductive thinking will still not be justified. And anyone who really believes in inductive thinking believes in a factor external to the world-system.

I don’t see any difference.

By “I don’t see a difference,” do you mean that you think the proof I presented is invalid?
Or relative to your proofs, and you think both are valid?

I don’t see a difference between your argument about induction and my arguments. It’s the same thing.

Interesting. I’m not sure it’s the same thing.
But if so, then it really is valid. Do you think that most atheist scientists or philosophers are simply “confused” and don’t correctly recognize that they are covert believers?

Definitely. I explained this in the first and fourth notebook/conversation.

The first conversation, regarding Anselm, that he may not be aware of it?

The problem is that I’m really not familiar with or understanding that discussion—would it be enough roughly to read the fourth one? Or does the first have some additional important aspect for this issue?

They’re unrelated. Each makes that claim from its own angle.

Y.K.,
A few comments.
1. On what basis do you assume the correspondence theory as the theory that best describes the truth of a proposition? From what you wrote, the answer is: because there is a God who matches thought with its referent (and even then we would have to deal with Frege’s criticism, from which, unlike the Wittgensteinian solution, God does not escape). But then it turns out there is circularity in your argument, since it is built in this form: 1. God exists, therefore the correspondence theory of truth is valid (for otherwise what else would ground its validity?), 2. The correspondence theory of truth is valid, therefore God exists (for since the correspondence theory of truth is valid, there must be some being that coordinates between proposition and reality). If we were forced to accept the correspondence theory, then there would still be a real argument here, but today we know that the theory contains many contradictions internally; and the philosophers who resolved those contradictions and rebuilt the correspondence theory have also answered the question of how there is correspondence, and they did so far better than God.

2. I also didn’t really understand the basis for the hasty rejection of the possibility that by virtue of the human being (that is: subject, society, etc.) there is a correspondence between statement and reality. After all, from Kant to the present there have been very central schools in philosophy that accept this option as completely correct and demonstrate it masterfully again and again. Even if you don’t agree with them, there is still no reason to dismiss all that thought with a wave of the hand. (Even in today’s discussion of the concept of truth, the schools that root it in the human being are more numerous than those that do not.)

3. As for the proof, let us assume we accept it. The question will then be whether the thought “There is a God who coordinates between thought and reality” also proves God. If yes, then this is begging the question (for on what basis do you assume there is truth in that claim?). If not, then we will not be able to prove God from other thoughts either (for there is no ontic difference in them). One might even say that any thought about thought itself (consciousness) negates this proof.

4. I also see no reason to rule out the claim that the source of this understanding is the world. Hume himself thought so. The first time we saw the sun rise we were filled with wonder (Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 8a); the second time as well, but by the tenth time we were already used to it happening. From that point on, this is not a theory that says, “the sun will rise tomorrow,” but rather a psychological habit of the form, “if the sun rises tomorrow, I won’t be surprised,” and that habit gets projected into a guess expressed in the first sentence (which is not a primary assertion, but an expression of the habit).

There are several more comments one could and should make, but it’s late. Good night.

I think these comments should also be directed at me (and maybe even more so). I’ll address them briefly, because it’s hard to elaborate, and I addressed some of them in my book/notebook.
1. To the best of my judgment, there is no other solution that offers a satisfactory definition or meaning for the truth of a proposition. I’m familiar with some of the analytic treatment and really do not accept it, and certainly not Wittgenstein. I also don’t think that the difficulties that lead to that treatment require it. But someone who thinks this is a game, and truth is only a rule within it, or basically a convention (even if its source is implanted in all of us, but not in the world), is not adding much beyond subjective theses (or inter-subjective ones). The argument is directed at someone who is not a subjectivist (and therefore not a skeptic).
2. The existence of one philosophical school or another is not an argument. In my understanding, in the end they all map onto conventionalism (even if it is built into us), mere speculation, or correspondence (which requires God). It is important to distinguish between the language in which truth is described and truth itself. I agree that language is human (inter-subjective), but in my view the content is objective. When a tree falls in the forest, it does not make a sound; rather, it generates an acoustic wave. But in our language, the existence of an acoustic wave is described as a sound (because when there is an ear there, that wave produces in the consciousness of the owner of the ear a cognitive phenomenon of sound).
3. This is the only question that really has substance in my opinion. Its answer is twofold: a. I have explained more than once that every logical argument begs the question, and therefore begging the question is nothing but saying that the argument is valid. This is the emptiness of the analytic, and therefore all valid logical arguments, as Malcolm once said, are illuminating tautologies. b. Even if the basis for the claim about God is also God, that is no refutation. Just as the statement that the basis for determinism is itself deterministic (determinism that compels truths upon me) is not a refutation of determinism (which I do not accept, but for other reasons). After all, if you argue that this very claim itself is being forced on me by God, then once again you have arrived at the conclusion that God exists. So either way, God exists. Exactly like if you were to argue that determinism is forced upon me, you have again arrived at the deterministic conclusion. We have simply returned to the fact that the matter begs the question, and on that see point a.
An alternative formulation (by way of negation): the claim that God exists is consistent (it presupposes itself, but it is consistent), while its opposite is not (because truth as correspondence without God is impossible). I explained this more in the fourth conversation in my book, when I discussed proofs of a “theological”-revealing character (as opposed to a “philosophical”-creating one).
By the way, reflective claims about consciousness are of a different character, and there perhaps one can speak about truth without presupposing God, because that is looking inward and not outward. See Schopenhauer. Therefore your final remark is, in my opinion, incorrect (though I’m not sure I understood its purpose).
4. In order to ground this understanding in the world itself (empiricism), Hume emptied it of content. Thus causality became for him a merely logical-temporal linkage, while omitting the essence of causality as a relation of causing. I elaborated on this in my book The Science of Freedom (on the three components of the causal relation, apparently in the fifth chapter). The proof is aimed at one who is unwilling to accept that emptying-out and understands that a causal relation is what we usually take it to be. Again, a “theological” proof (with a touch of begging the question).

In short, a logical argument is always based on some assumptions, and the assumptions contain the conclusion in one way or another (otherwise it could not be extracted from them by logical tools). Therefore a logical argument is always directed at the “already convinced”; in fact, it merely reveals to them that they are unconsciously “convinced.”

Mikyab
1. I meant the solution of the early Wittgenstein (who supported the correspondence theory), not the later one. In any case, there are other possible theories of truth besides the correspondence theory that are not subjective (for example, the coherence theory of truth). Or one can even deny truth altogether (which is a common approach nowadays).
2. This is not an argument meant to prove their thesis (Kant says x, therefore x). It is simply a claim against dismissing out of hand the possibility that correspondence originates in the human being. I seem to recall that in a few places I saw you also support the position that if there are serious arguments on some subject, it is proper to treat them seriously, even if the views that emerge from those arguments are far from your own. And what prevents us from thinking that reality does not exist objectively, yet its foundation is laid by consciousness (as Kant thought)? For if we assume two substances (language/thought and the reality external to it), we will have to explain the relation between them, and then we will quickly arrive at absurd theses like the conventionalism you described. Nor can we say that consciousness is matter, since we have evident certainty that it is not matter. It follows that our only option (if we avoid subjectivity like fire) is to assume that the foundation of reality lies in consciousness, and that it is consciousness that posits *objective* reality.
3. Regarding a., then there is absolutely nothing in the argument presented above to prove God. For the deductive argument “opens our eyes” only with regard to the new information we absorbed by induction/analogy. But if we challenge the validity of the way we receive the new information into our cognition with objections such as Hume’s fork, then it is as though we are asking deduction itself for new information. For the new knowledge about God cannot come from induction, nor from analogy (in its strict logical sense), and we agreed that we have no other tool for receiving new information. (I base this on the fact that above you wrote that you reject philosophical rationalism.) As for b., isn’t that a subjective thesis? In a “purer” formulation it could be stated as: “I believe because God forces me to believe” > “And how do you know God forces you to believe?” > “Because I believe that God forces me to believe”—and so on endlessly. The argument based on negation also negates itself, for it assumes the coherence theory of truth (according to which truth is what is consistent relative to the other things in the system) in order to explain its own premise, and from there it proves that the correspondence theory of truth is the correct one. And if you say that in this way the correspondence theory of truth becomes part of the coherence theory of truth (since the correspondence theory is consistent relative to the rest of the system once we have brought in God), then you have removed our reason for accepting God.
4. I still don’t understand why we should not accept Hume’s attack (even in its stronger formulations). For then you return the whole thing to the issue of faith, and on that you base God: 1. I believe that Hume’s attack is incorrect, 2. Since that is so, I need to explain how there is causality, 3. Eureka! There is God! Why not simply say from the outset, “I believe there is a God,” if the first premise is based on faith?

You are entering here into a discussion of all the details of the argument, and they did not come up here, and I don’t think this is the place for it. I elaborated on them extensively elsewhere. You’re forgetting that this is a specific question that raised one remark following the reading of those materials, and there is no point in recreating that entire discussion here. When you say that someone dismissed a claim out of hand, you are referring to what is written here, but what is written here is based on a very long discussion elsewhere.
Therefore I will answer briefly:
1. It is no accident that Wittgenstein himself was not satisfied with his early phase. Truth as coherence means subjectivism (as long as you are coherent, you are right). All this verbiage is empty.
2. Correspondence originating in the human being is impossible for several reasons that I detailed in my writings.
3. A deductive argument never gives us new information, and that is precisely the emptiness of the analytic. Logic only clarifies for us what is contained in our assumptions. Therefore all logic is tautology (sometimes illuminating and sometimes trivial).
I certainly do not reject philosophical rationalism, and I don’t recall writing anything like that. But for that purpose rationalism must be redefined, and this is not the place.
The circle of reliance on God is incorrect. If you assume it, you necessarily fall into subjectivism or conventionalism. I have evidence regarding an encounter with Him, or assumptions from which His existence can be derived. But without Him there is no meaning to evidence, for then I cannot be sure even of that (because of your circle). And again you return to coherence, which is another name for subjectivism.
4. Simply because it is clear to each of us that causality is not merely a logical relation and temporal sequence. It is a clear intuition that there is no reason to deny, and in my opinion Hume himself did not deny it either, but for some reason chose to ignore it.