Q&A: Several Questions
Several Questions
Question
1. What is the difference between conceptual analysis, which you attribute great importance to, and plain semantics, where you often say something like, “That’s just a semantic issue, it’s not interesting, call it whatever you want,” etc.??
2. I didn’t understand why we need the verse of “do not stray” to teach us that the Great Court has formal authority. Seemingly it has such authority by virtue of the very fact that it is a court. We call it a religious court only if we grant it authority to decide everything, so why is a special verse needed? Don’t answer me, “Because that’s how they’ll have authority from above,” because that may be useful but it isn’t a justification.
3. Seemingly, in the following argument one derives a norm from facts and there is no naturalistic fallacy:
a. The Holy One, blessed be He, exists.
b. The Holy One, blessed be He, knows what is good and what is bad.
c. The Holy One, blessed be He, commanded in the Torah to be moral.
Therefore one must be moral, and it is forbidden to murder and to lie, etc.
Without arguing about whether the premises are true, if we accept the premises we will necessarily accept the conclusion, even though a norm is being derived from a collection of facts.
4. Rabbi Brandes wrote: “The binding practical framework of Jewish law is the vessel into which one can pour the lights of intellectual understanding in thought; that is, Jewish law is the practical vehicle for thought.” Is that correct? That is: a. Do you agree that Jewish law is only a means to reach some goal (whatever that goal may be)? b. If you agree, what do you think the goal is?
5. Rabbi Cherki writes that philosophy is basically questions about man, the world, and the Holy One, blessed be He. If so, he continues, why not just ask the Creator of the world directly? Because He doesn’t answer—so answer me. If so, he continues, had He answered, there would have been no need for philosophy, and indeed we see this, since philosophy was born with Thales, in the year -587, exactly when prophecy ceased at the destruction of the First Temple.
It really does seem wonderful, although I’m a bit doubtful, because it seems to me that Thales was indeed the first philosopher to create a systematic and coherent philosophical method, but obviously before him people were also asking themselves questions and trying to reach answers, etc. Similar to what you say about Aristotle—that he created logic, meaning its formal structure, but obviously before him people were drawing conclusions from a set of premises… In short, what do you say?
Answer
- Conceptual analysis is the clarification and refinement of the concepts we use, for the sake of clarity in the discussion and understanding the conclusions that arise from it (whether there is any disagreement at all, etc.). If someone draws binding conclusions only from the definition, that really is a semantic matter (the ontological proof).
- That verse defines the authority of the Great Court.
- Not correct. The conclusion does not follow from the facts. You need to add a normative premise that one ought to obey morality, or the Torah, or the Holy One, blessed be He. Without that, at most you can infer from your premises what morality says, but not that one ought to do anything. But if what morality says is a fact (the Holy One, blessed be He, knows what is good and what is bad), then there is nothing surprising about that. And if it is not a fact, then the premise that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows is also not a factual premise.
- I assume that Jewish law has goals, but I do not agree that what is called “thought” can attain them. At least I am not familiar with convincing explanations. So if you mean it as a principled statement, I am willing to agree (that there are conceptual principles that Jewish law comes to realize). But if you are talking about the study of thought as it is actually done in practice, I am very far from agreeing. I have already written here more than once what they told me in yeshiva when I went to the university in the afternoons to study physics. The guys told me that everything is in the Torah, so why go. I told them that if so, I’d be happy if they found for me the solution to Schrödinger’s equation for a rotating potential well; they would save me a lot of time and I could stay in yeshiva and learn. So far I haven’t heard that they found it (I did 🙂 ).
- The claim that philosophy arose when prophecy ceased is an ancient claim, and I too have written it several times (I illustrated it through the story of Shimon the Righteous and Alexander of Macedon), and that claim is not mine either. But there is certainly no proof from here, since drawing a line for the emergence of philosophy is an artificial matter done ad hoc.
Discussion on Answer
1. Conceptual analysis comes to clarify the concepts I am using. It does not make claims but defines concepts. That allows for a clearer discussion. Someone who makes claims from a definition is dealing in semantics. For example, it is important to define democracy before using that term. But someone who argues that religion must be separated from the state because democracy means separation of religion and state is dealing in semantics.
4. I didn’t understand the comment/question.
6. But “do not stray” is not only authority to judge, but also to interpret the Torah and enact ordinances. Beyond that, it is true that when there is a religious court, it has authority to judge. But the concept of a religious court itself requires innovation.
7. Because he thought he was only describing and not making claims. He was mistaken, of course. People with highly developed analytical ability find it hard to decide. To this day that is still the case.
1. Got it, thanks.
4. You just wrote that you found the solution to Schrödinger’s equation for a rotating potential well, and I was only asking whether you found it through Torah study or physics study…
7. So basically, in your opinion, is the highest level in study to reach developed analytical ability that leads to halakhic rulings?
4. According to their view, it’s the same thing.
7. Analytical ability clarifies the sides, and that makes it possible to reach a decision about what is correct. The analytical ability itself does not make the decision.
4. Yes, yes, I meant in your opinion. In short.
7. Shlomo Tikochinsky wrote: “As a result of dealing with the abstract roots of each position, the analysis in most cases becomes uninterested in the final halakhic conclusion. Each of the positions in the passage is perceived as reflecting a different internal logic, and the logic of each is examined in depth. Once the positions have been examined at their highest level, the student feels difficulty descending to the ‘lower level’ of practical decision in favor of one of them.” In your opinion, how can one be saved from this difficulty? How do you do it, for example?
He continues and writes like this: “Precisely the increase in analytical ability and the refinement of the definitions of the differing opinions in the passage caused an inability to decide between the various positions, and from this there also arose the tendency toward stringency in practical ruling, whose purpose is to satisfy all opinions.”
Do you think he is mistaken?
This is not a question of a high level and a low level. When the two alternatives are set against one another, and each of them is grounded in such a way that it is coherent and fits all the sources, it seemingly appears that there is no way to decide. But intuition can decide. The inability to decide stems from the assumption that deciding is done in an absolute logical way, but that is not so. On the contrary, the role of logical analysis is to place each position on its best possible foundation, and now intuition can decide what is more reasonable.
“I was young and now I am old,” and when I was young I really thought that this was a difference in level. When I matured I understood that issuing halakhic rulings is a more complex occupation and on a higher level than plain analytical Talmudic study. Understanding reality, applying analytical principles to it, and finally reaching a decision—that is a fascinating and astonishingly complex matter. The analytical study is only part of it.
Got it. Thanks so much.
You wrote in the last thread: “Understanding reality, applying analytical principles to it, and finally reaching a decision […] analytical study is only part of it.”
Analytical study (in the concrete state of the case presented by the questioner who comes to ask the halakhic decisor) is the first stage, and understanding reality, applying analytical principles to it, and finally deciding is the second stage—the one you discussed in the following post, right?
תפקידו של הקונטקסט בפסיקת הלכה: מבט על הסבר אקדמי וטיעון הלכתי (טור 166)
Analytical study takes part both in analyzing reality (because the analysis is done through analytical categories) and in applying the principles to it. Of course, in analyzing reality one must also understand reality and not only be an analyst. One without the other is impossible. An analyst who does not understand reality, or someone who understands reality but is not an analyst, will miss the correct result.
In the post you linked to, I am talking about understanding the reality within which the halakhic decisor operates (the context). That is something a bit different.
I think the analysis I did of the labor of building on the Sabbath is a good example of analyzing reality in terms of analytical principles. And so too my comment about joining a prayer quorum by Zoom.
1. I didn’t really understand.
4. Did you mean within that framework, through Torah study or physics study??
6. Is it true that every court, even today’s, even those of non-Jews, has formal authority? Meaning, the very definition of a court is precisely something that has formal authority to judge between people.
7. How do you explain the fact that Rabbi Chaim was not a halakhic decisor in his city? You already said that one must study analytically and in depth, and that one must derive halakhic conclusions from my analytical learning and not just rely on precedents, so how could it be that the father of all analytical Talmudic study could not issue practical halakhic rulings?