Q&A: Kant
Kant
Question
Regarding Kant’s imperative: I would want there to be a general law that it is forbidden to tell lies. On the other hand, I would want that if a Nazi policeman asks where my family is, he should lie and not say “in the attic.” So can this be formulated as: I would want there to be a general law that it is forbidden to lie, except in cases where the lie is beneficial? That is, I can change anything that is forbidden to “except in cases where it is beneficial.” Does that work?
Answer
If you’d like, then you’ve got it. But I didn’t understand your question. What do you mean by “does that work”? If you think that’s the correct general law, then that’s the law according to you. I’ll just note that this is one of the main criticisms of Kant’s categorical imperative: that in practice it doesn’t really say anything, because any exception to the rule can be presented as a different general rule.
Discussion on Answer
What meaning does the imperative have if I can interpret it any way I want???
It’s not any way you want, but rather whatever way you think is correct. Is there any imperative that isn’t open to interpretation? The imperative is addressed to another person, so it will always pass through the recipient’s interpretation.
In a case where it technically isn’t good for everyone to do a certain act, but it would be good if each and every person did it in their own case—for example, suppose it’s good that I help some person, but it wouldn’t be convenient for him if the whole world came to offer him help—what would the imperative say in such a case?
The same thing. Behave in a way such that if it became general, the world would be better. If everyone helps whoever turns to them, the world would be excellent. If he’s already been helped, then you’re exempt.
The Nazis presumably used Kant’s categorical imperative to turn the murder of Jews into a general law that every person, at all times and in all places, is obligated to carry out.
You could also formulate it this way: I want there to be a rule that lying is forbidden, but that its level of obligation be a certain one; consequently, rules that I want to have a stronger level of obligation (like the prohibition against assisting murder) would override it.