Q&A: The Reason of Scripture — Questions on a Chapter in the Book It Will Send Out Its Roots
The Reason of Scripture — Questions on a Chapter in the Book It Will Send Out Its Roots
Question
While reading the chapter on the reason of Scripture in the book It Will Send Out Its Roots, a number of questions and difficulties came to mind: [I do not know whether the Rabbi currently has the time to answer privately, or whether this website is the convenient platform for that. I’ll try.]
- One of the central claims there is that it is unreasonable to say that commandments have no reasons, since there is a hierarchy of leniencies and stringencies. But this is difficult for me: surely the intention of those who maintain that there are no reasons is not that there are no reasons at all, but only that there are no specific reasons; rather, there is one general matter of the King’s decrees (in Rashi’s formulation). If so, we could say that the hierarchy stems from the desire to allow for gradations of rebellion or of obedience. The goal that a person fulfill God’s decrees can be realized more fully when there are lighter and more severe commands; in that way one can test the level of a person’s acceptance of the yoke of Heaven’s kingship, what he gives up and what he does not, map out rankings of the righteous, the intermediate, and the wicked, and so on.
2. Regarding deriving law from the reason of Scripture, the claim was raised there that one should not attribute the refusal to do so to fear of error, because refraining from such derivation can also itself result from error. This is difficult for me: after all, in order to add unspoken definitions to a commandment or transgression, I have to perform an act of interpretation, and doing such an act without confidence, speculatively, is not reasonable. Why should we not remain with the primary meaning? [In the case of “you shall not take a widow’s pledge”: why should we not remain with the meaning that includes all types of widows? We should not fear that we are acting in error when we do not take collateral from a wealthy widow, since we are acting in light of the Holy One’s command according to the best interpretation available.]
3. Regarding the possibility that Jewish law is not dictated by the reasons, it is argued there that one cannot say this about God’s Torah, which is coherent, and therefore when the fear of error in determining the reason does not exist, we may safely infer the details from it. But this is difficult for me: God’s Torah is complete in the context in which it was given. There is no reason to determine, for example, that it is formulated in the loftiest rhetorical form, or that mathematical equations are embedded in it. Why should we not say that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the reason is not part of the law, the perfection of the Torah is focused on the plain meaning and on what can be inferred or derived from it? What is the basis for assuming a detailed correspondence between the laws and the unwritten reason? Another problem: let us assume that somehow we hit upon the correct reason; we would still need to make further lucky guesses in order to derive unequivocal conclusions from it. This is a double speculation.
4. The possibility that the details of the laws do not stem from their reasons is brought there only as a forced possibility (in a footnote in the name of Rabbi Yosef Engel), because of “no distinctions” and the like. But this is difficult for me: why should we not say that the details stem from a general structure of the commandments? God wanted there to be a uniform legal character to the commandments, and that character is what defines the commandments in Jewish law, not the reasons (call it formalism). In general, the commandments were not given as a collection of particulars (like the various prophecies) but as a whole, called “Torah.” It is reasonable that such a whole would adopt uniform patterns from the outset. [And further: as a matter of fact the Torah is made in the format of the laws of the nations, and the laws of the nations have uniform patterns for those reasons.]
5. It is also written there that in places where a reason is stated explicitly, it is unreasonable not to derive law from it. But this is difficult for me: according to the above, it is certainly possible that the reason was written for another purpose, not in order to be legally expounded, but to teach something meta-halakhic about the purposes of the commandments and their reasons, to straighten the heart, and so on. On the question of why the Torah shares only some of the reasons, Maimonides answers this in prohibition 365.
Answer
- This is entirely theoretical. I do not see how murder or adultery causes less obedience than eating pork. It is completely unreasonable. On rereading I understood that your intention is to say that the hierarchy itself is arbitrary, because the Holy One wants there to be a hierarchy. Again, very unreasonable. Basically, the Torah is playing games with us when it says that one thing is an abomination and another is terrible and awful. Everything is arbitrary and we are being toyed with. One could also say that every time I say the word “very,” three demons and two fairies are created. I have no way to prove that not to be the case, but it is not reasonable. In some commandments the Torah itself says there are reasons (“that you not bring guilt upon the land,” “that his heart not turn away”).
- I explained there that if I have a reasonable explanation, then it is the presumed one, and whoever claims that it is incorrect bears the burden of proof. If that explanation lacks plausibility, then you are right.
- I did not understand. What does this have to do with the plain meaning? The reason is the plain meaning.
- This takes us back to the first section. Now you are suggesting that the details are arbitrary rather than the commandment itself. What difference does that make? In my view that is unreasonable for the same reasons. Besides, the Torah usually did not determine the details at all; the Sages did. And if what you say were true, then their interpretations would have no force or meaning. They themselves certainly thought that this is how one ought to act.
Discussion on Answer
I forgot to write thank you for the engagement and the answers. It is rare for an important author to be so accessible for discussion about his books.
My pleasure. But as for the level of “important,” I have not yet reached it, alas. Maybe I’ll deteriorate to that point someday.
5. It may be so, and it may not be so. The burden of proof is on the one who says that it is. When the Torah says “that his heart not turn away,” it means to say that this is the problem with multiplying wives.