Q&A: The Reason of the Verse
The Reason of the Verse
Question
In the third part of your wonderful trilogy, you rejected the explanation for why we do not derive Jewish law from the reason of the verse on the grounds that we are not certain that this is really the reason; for if the reason is correct, we stand to lose by not deriving from it (for example, one who lends to a wealthy widow might himself be poor, and so on).
I didn’t really understand the rejection. The concern is that perhaps we will fail to fulfill the Creator’s will: if we derive Jewish law from the reason of the verse and therefore do not apply the halakhic requirement as it emerges from the plain sense of the biblical text, we may violate His will. But if we do not derive from the reason, then perhaps some sort of moral wrong will result, but there is no concern that we will violate His will. (For example, in the case of the widow: if the requirement really applies even to a wealthy widow, then by deriving from the reason we would violate God’s will regarding a wealthy widow. But if the Jewish law is really that it is permitted to take collateral from a wealthy woman and we do not derive from the reason, we will not violate any Jewish law.)
For my own part, I’m more inclined toward Maimonides’ direction, mainly because it is not written anywhere that we do not derive because perhaps that is not the real reason. It says that we do not derive, so it seems like a clear rule: the derivation itself is simply not made. (I’m aware that the Talmud always just states the rule and does not discuss its meta-level, and it may indeed be that this is the meta-level. It’s hard for me to pinpoint it, but it doesn’t seem that way from the Talmud.) But also because I find it hard to accept this remote concern—when the reason is clear to us, why shouldn’t we derive from it? But that isn’t my question. My question is that I didn’t understand your rejection.
Answer
I don’t understand what is unclear. Suppose the real reason for the prohibition against taking a widow’s garment as collateral is as Rabbi Shimon suggests. It follows that with regard to a wealthy widow there is no prohibition. Now if you do not derive from the reason of the verse because maybe you are mistaken, then by the same token, if you do not derive, maybe you are mistaken and in fact it is permitted to take collateral from a wealthy widow. My point is that there are costs no less significant to the approach that does not derive from the reason of the verse and instead sticks to the wording of the verse. And if you have a compelling reason for the commandment, then there is even some advantage to the alternative that this really is the correct reason. Why assume that a reasonable explanation is not the correct reason, and that there is some other reason unknown to us?
Discussion on Answer
I really don’t understand what the discussion is about. When you do not derive from the reason of the verse, you are violating God’s will. He intended that you should take the garment of a wealthy widow as collateral, and you do not. In this case, admittedly it looks like a stringency, but that isn’t true: when you do not allow taking a wealthy widow’s garment as collateral, you harm the lender, who has no security for his loan, and you harm the widow, because no one will lend to her. And so too with every derivation from the reason of the verse—there is a possibility of violating God’s will.
For example, the disqualification of women from testimony. When you disqualify women, you are excluding them. Now suppose I derive from the reason of the verse and include educated women. Should this be applied or not? If I do not validate educated women, I will violate God’s will both by harming women and by failing to bring out a true judgment (because the women’s testimony is not accepted).
(Regarding a true judgment, one could say that this is merely human harm in monetary matters. But including educated women on the basis of the reason of the verse also affects prohibitions between man and God. Two women served as witnesses for a marriage. According to Jewish law, witnesses are required for the marriage to take effect, and the marriage does not take effect. The woman is unmarried, and the groom is permitted to her relatives. But if we derive from the reason of the verse and educated women are valid witnesses, then the marriage does take effect, the woman is not unmarried, and the groom is forbidden to her relatives.)
You are basically going in the second direction.
Fine—you are claiming that in a place where there is also a stringency in deriving from the reason of the verse, then the reason is not correct.
I am claiming that according to the accepted explanation (which you rejected), in those cases we do indeed derive from the reason of the verse.
The case of the widow is simply not correct, because if in fact one should derive from the reason of the verse, then there is no command to take a widow’s garment as collateral (that is, there is no such commandment). At most there is no prohibition against taking the garment as collateral, and I would not be violating any prohibition. Therefore this is a stringency.
No doubt: if that is correct, then that is correct. But here we are discussing whether it is correct. You assume that if we do not derive from the reason of the verse, then God’s will is expressed in the wording of the text and not in its reason, and therefore we are not violating His will. But that itself is what is under discussion—whether there is not a violation of His will here. So what is the point of assuming the very thing in question?
It seems to me that we’ve exhausted this.
I’d be happy to exhaust it, but I feel I haven’t been properly understood (apparently I didn’t write clearly), and in my opinion this is a fundamental issue, so it’s important to me to tie up the loose ends.
After all, there is your distinction between Jewish law (God’s command) on the one hand and His will on the other.
The claim of the view that does not derive is that if in truth this is not the correct reason, then you violate the Jewish law.
Because the Jewish law was not to take collateral from any widow whatsoever.
But if this really is the correct reason, then if the lender does not take the collateral, at most there will be a violation of God’s will, but not of a command. (For according to the view that derives from the reason of the verse, there is no positive command to take a widow’s garment as collateral.)
And violating a command is worse than violating God’s will.
Let me give a clearer example: “that his heart not turn away.” How would you explain there that if one should derive from the reason and one does not, there may be an actual violation of the Jewish law?
You were completely understood, and you were also completely answered.
I’ll try one last time. The discussion is over the question whether to derive or not derive from the reason of the verse. So at this point we do not yet have it as a given that we do not derive from the reason of the verse. It follows that your assumption is incorrect—that if I obey the command in its literal wording without deriving from it, I am in any case fulfilling the command. That is true only if we assume that we do not derive from the reason of the verse (and then what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded applies to all widows). But if we do derive from the reason of the verse (that is, the command applies only to poor widows), then obeying the command also with respect to wealthy widows is a violation of God’s will (which, as noted, carries costs both toward leniency and not only toward stringency).
That’s it.
There’s some kind of dialogue of the deaf here, and in any case the discussion hasn’t been exhausted for me.
As far as I understand, Reuven does not at all mean to claim that if I do not derive from the reason of the verse, then in any event I will be fulfilling the command—which is of course begging the question, as the Rabbi says.
What he means is what the Rabbi wrote in the last sentence in parentheses: that the Rabbi assumes that not deriving from the reason of the verse also has a “cost,” but Reuven argues that the costs are not equal. For if we actually derive from the reason of the verse, a situation may arise in which people actively violate God’s will (in the sense of positive action, though not exactly), whereas if we do not derive from the reason of the verse, then admittedly a suboptimal situation may arise in which the lender pays some price, but no one actually violates God’s will.
(The example of “he shall not multiply wives for himself” illustrates this better: if we derive from the reason of the verse, a situation may arise in which he actually marries many wives and actively violates God’s will, whereas if we do not derive from the reason of the verse, then at most he does not realize his right to multiply wives. But even if we are mistaken and one really may derive, there is no obligation to multiply wives, so he is not actually violating God’s will. In other words, the “cost” of this side is lower.)
Yishai, read it again (so this won’t be a dialogue of the deaf). That is only a small part of what he is claiming, and even that has already been answered היטב.
That is clear to me.
My claim is that deriving from the reason can lead to my violating God’s will, whereas not deriving from the reason can lead to serious consequences, but not to the gravest consequence of all—“violating God’s will.”
I see only two possible directions for an answer:
1. Violating God’s will is no more severe than other consequences.
2. Not deriving from the reason can also lead to violating God’s will, when the derivation includes additional cases beyond what is written in the verse.
I don’t accept either direction. As for 1, one can certainly understand that the concern about violating God’s will is the most severe of all.
As for 2, fine—the claim of the view that we do not derive from the reason of the verse applies only where the derivation limits what is commanded in the verse; yes, one may derive when the derivation expands it. (If you prove that according to that same view one also does not derive even when the derivation expands, then I accept that answer.