Q&A: The Rationale of Scripture
The Rationale of Scripture
Question
See Walking Among the Standing, chapter 10.
1) In your view, we do not interpret the rationale of Scripture because the commandment adds a religious dimension to the mitzvah, and if we can understand the moral/human/social/rational reason for the mitzvah, we still cannot understand the religious reason. I don’t understand why. What is special about the religious dimension? Why can’t it be understood?
2) Is this explanation parallel to the well-known principle of the Vilna Gaon in the topic of “when the reason has lapsed, the decree has lapsed” — that even though the revealed reason has lapsed, the decree still cannot be annulled because perhaps it has hidden reasons?
3) You reject those who wrote that the reason we do not interpret the rationale of Scripture is because perhaps we are mistaken about the reason, from the fact that the Sages do not interpret it even when the reason is explicit in the verse (for example, “he shall not have many wives, lest his heart turn away”). But one could reject your rejection and say that the Sages indeed do not interpret even when the reason is explicit, because the parameters of the reason are still unclear. What does “lest his heart turn away” mean? At what point does he cross the line into someone whose heart has turned away? Is it when he worships idols? Commits forbidden sexual transgressions? If so, then the rationale itself is not interpreted because the reason is not clear.
4) Moreover, you reject them with another argument: if the reason turned out to be incorrect, then it is good that you did not interpret it; but on the other hand, if it became clear that the reason was correct and you did not interpret it, that means you reached an incorrect halakhic conclusion.
But seemingly that is not so, because not interpreting the rationale of Scripture is always a stringency (not having many wives, not taking a wealthy widow’s collateral, etc.). So even if it becomes clear that the reason was correct, if I did not interpret it then I merely lost a right that I could have had; whereas if I did interpret the reason and it became clear that it was incorrect, then here I actively violated prohibitions.
Answer
1. The religious dimension pertains to spiritual realms, and by their nature they are less accessible to us. Moral principles are naturally understandable to us, but spiritual principles are not. Just look and see that many areas of Jewish law are not understandable, unlike moral principles.
Indeed, I wrote there that it is not necessary for the religious reason to be different. It is possible that the prohibition against murder stems from the religious holiness of human life (as distinct from its moral value), and in that case the religious dimension only adds another layer parallel to the moral-natural layer. Still, there is a difference in the definitions, since for example someone who kills indirectly is exempt on the religious plane, but is a murderer in every sense on the moral plane. And likewise all the discussions about confining someone, bringing the thing near the fire, “the sun will eventually come,” and the like.
2. I do not accept the Vilna Gaon’s position. If there is a revealed reason that seems reasonable to us, especially when the Sages themselves revealed the reason, there is no reason in the world to assume that there are additional hidden reasons that the Sages did not reveal to us.
3. That is exactly what I wrote there. What is the question?
4. I think I explained there that in most cases this is not a matter of stringency versus leniency. If you do not take collateral from a wealthy widow, then you have harmed the lender, who receives no security for his money.