Q&A: A Difficulty with the Words of Shulchan Arukh HaRav from the Third Root
A Difficulty with the Words of Shulchan Arukh HaRav from the Third Root
Question
Regarding the prohibition against fasting on the Sabbath, Shulchan Arukh HaRav wrote (242, Kuntras Acharon 1) that according to Maimonides it is derived from what is said, “Eat it today,” and the reason he did not count such a prohibition in the enumeration of the commandments is that this prohibition emerges from the commandments and prohibitions regarding the manna, which do not apply for future generations.
Apparently, from Maimonides’ lengthy discussion in the Third Root—for example, from his insistence there that the law of one who steals the sacred vessel is not the plain meaning of the verse but only an allusion—it seems that in his view, if a non-temporary law had been included within verses dealing with temporary laws, it would have been appropriate to count it.
*****
Up to this point I wrote before I studied Yishlach Sharashav. After looking there, I saw that on the one hand, according to the assumptions there, the difficulty becomes even stronger, since the temporary commandments seem to be an entirely different kind of thing (instructions rather than commandments, a lower degree of prophecy). On the other hand, I was delighted to see there (vol. 1 p. 304) that this question is stated explicitly. Allow me to express my admiration for your wonderful work!
There you wrote that one can derive a Torah-level “idea” from those verses, but it is hard to say that this is the view of Shulchan Arukh HaRav himself (it seems you did not mean there to resolve his position, but only to suggest an alternative). And see Rabbi Zevin’s words (HaMo'adim BaHalakhah 2, p. 590), where he tried to explain on the basis of these words of Shulchan Arukh HaRav why a fast does not override Sabbath delight, and according to what was said, his words are difficult [unless we say this: when the prophets instituted the fasts—presumably a halakhic fiction according to your approach—they had to learn from the manna passage that there is an imperative to eat on the Sabbath, and therefore they presumably limited their decree and did not apply it to Sabbaths.]
If anything new has occurred to you about this over the years, I would be glad to read it.
Answer
In my many sins, I no longer remember. I’ll write off the cuff.
A simpler explanation may be possible for why Maimonides does not count this. Because it is not the plain meaning of the verse but a midrashic derivation. And of course it is possible that this is only an “idea.”
If it emerges from the prohibition regarding the manna, which does not apply for future generations, then this too would not apply for future generations. I didn’t understand that explanation.
And regarding one who steals the sacred vessel—why are you assuming that this is a temporary prohibition?
Discussion on Answer
Of course, the one who steals the sacred vessel is not in itself a temporary prohibition. But I inferred from the fact that Maimonides explained its non-inclusion by saying that it is not included in the plain meaning of the verses (and was precise in the language of the Sages about it—“where is it alluded to?”), that if not for such limitations Maimonides would have counted it, even though it emerges from within temporary commands.
Regarding the one who steals the sacred vessel, it is only alluded to in the verse, as stated explicitly in the Talmud, Sanhedrin (“where is it alluded to?”).
I don’t think the inference is necessary. If it were not merely alluded to but actually written, it would have been a temporary prohibition. But since we know from the Sages that it is not temporary, the question arises why it was not counted. And the answer is that it is only alluded to.
“If it were not merely alluded to but actually written, it would have been a temporary prohibition.” A nice innovation. On logical grounds, why shouldn’t we distinguish within the temporary verses between the temporary parts and the non-temporary parts? Suppose the instruction regarding the jar of manna teaches me something about the laws of leftovers—why shouldn’t I divide it and say that the manna is a temporary commandment, while the detail regarding leftovers is not temporary?
It is not reasonable to make such a distinction. If these verses were said for their own time, why should any detail within them be eternal? You need some positive interpretive reason to say such a thing.
A. “Not the plain meaning of the verse but a midrashic derivation” — a good explanation (to move it to the Second Root), but it certainly does not fit the wording of Shulchan Arukh HaRav.
B. “Emerges from the manna, which does not apply for future generations” — I meant that it is learned from the “idea” in it, not a halakhic derivation but a meta-halakhic one.
C. The one who steals the sacred vessel is learned from the verses “they shall not come to see when the holy things are covered,” which according to Maimonides were valid only in the wilderness and therefore temporary. That is the simple reading of the Third Root, in my humble opinion.
With thanks.