Let me sharpen his question (or rather, my question): is it democratically proper not to bring an agreement for a vote in the Knesset because of the fear that it will not be approved by an irresponsible opposition? After all, one of democracy’s drawbacks is that the majority decides even if it is not right, and that is exactly the case here. Of course, the question is based on the assumption that a vote in the Knesset would not cause this important agreement to be missed.

If the assumption is that the vote will not cause the agreement to be missed, and the assumption is that it is clearly important, then what exactly is the discussion about? Holding a voting ceremony? The question is specifically about a case where there would be an opposing majority in the Knesset that says the agreement is not important and rejects it.
I’ll bring here what was sent to me yesterday and what I wrote about it:

Asa Kasher:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.kipa.co.il/amp/1143446

“Democracy/The State Is Me” — a response to Asa Kasher. Asher Cohen.
“The state is me” bequeathed to us by Louis XIV as one of the statements that became a distinctly anti-democratic symbol. The essence of democracy is, above all, the sovereignty of the people. In modern democracies this sovereignty is reflected in the election of representatives whose purpose is to represent the people, elections carried out in a variety of ways and methods.
A true democracy is one in which elections are free and take place against a background of safeguarding rights connected to the implementation of democracy, including freedom of expression, the right of association, and the right to vote and be elected.
It should be said immediately that in a true democracy, the sovereignty of the people through its representatives is limited. It cannot become the tyranny of the majority and the use of the majority to violate the minority’s basic rights just because it is a minority.
The combination of all this brings about a free marketplace of ideas, without which democracy cannot exist at all. And in that free marketplace of ideas, conceptions of the common good of society are formed and shaped.
Now, Professor Asa Kasher is not coming out against some violation of one of the basic rights without which democracy is harmed. He is not coming out against one of the recognized and accepted principles of democracy in all democracies. He himself admits that if only we were a properly functioning state, then indeed it would be appropriate for there to be a discussion and a vote in the Knesset.
Rather, in his remarks Kasher identifies the common good, which is supposed to be clarified in a democratic way, with his own opinions. “In our parliament,” Kasher argues, “there is an opposition that does not act on considerations of the public good.” But isn’t “the public good” exactly what is always under dispute among groups, organizations, and parties? According to Kasher, issues may be brought for discussion in parliament only when “there is a patriotic opposition,” but right now, he says, that is not the situation. But aren’t “patriotism” and its content themselves among the matters under dispute that should be clarified in the marketplace of ideas?
Asa Kasher’s words are closely connected to Prime Minister Lapid’s statement justifying the avoidance of bringing the agreement to the Knesset because of the opposition’s “wild behavior.”
This is an openly anti-democratic outlook, one that identifies democracy solely with certain positions and outlooks, only with a defined camp. First the prime minister decides what proper or improper behavior is. Then along comes a professor whose global expertise is in ethics, and he determines what is patriotism and what is anti-patriotism, what counts as consideration of the public good and what counts as something else, what is a discussion on the merits and what is not, what is a properly functioning state and what is not—and then he “democratically” justifies skipping over the Knesset.
This takeover of the very concepts of democracy, patriotism, and the public good is reminiscent of the attempt to take over the terms of statism. The principle repeats itself: identify positive concepts that everyone agrees are positive, give them an interpretation that fits only your own positions, and then declare that everyone else is not that. “The state is me” from the days of Louis XIV has slid, in our case, into the concept “democracy is me.” And what if the unpatriotic and non-statesmanlike people win the election? Perhaps we should ignore the election results?

And this is what I answered:
On the face of it, Asher Cohen is right. But it is not so simple. If according to the law the government is allowed to approve the agreement without the Knesset, then the consideration is basically theirs. It has the right to think that the opposition is not acting substantively, but of course one may not use this assumption/position in order to bypass the law. But here the law does not require bringing it to the Knesset, and therefore it is possible not to bring the agreement for a Knesset vote because of their perception of the opposition.

Assume for the sake of discussion that you are the prime minister, and in your honest opinion the opposition is not substantive and is corrupt. According to your approach, wouldn’t that be exactly what you would do? If you are merely using the argument that they are not substantive in order to avoid a vote, but you do not really believe it, that is a different discussion (and even regarding that the answer is not trivial. The assumption is that legally you are not obligated to bring the agreement to the Knesset).

The fundamental question should be formulated like this: can a government take a step that most of the public, or most of its representatives (and of course that is not the same thing), opposes? As opposed to the ceremonial questions about bringing it to the Knesset, this is already a genuinely difficult substantive question. In my opinion, the principled answer is no. But what if in this situation there is information that is not exposed to the public, and if in my honest assessment the public were exposed to it, it would agree (and note well: not on the assumption that the majority of the public is mistaken, but on the assumption that the public does not see the full picture, and if it did see it, it would agree)? Then perhaps it is permitted to do so.

By the way, there is no need to point out that in the opposite case Bibi would do exactly the same thing. But here the discussion is on the principled level.