Regarding the halakhic question, there are halakhic decisors who hold that the rule of "like the practice of the land of Egypt" is only an asmakhta, so this is a rabbinic law. Other halakhic problems that come up in this context, such as mere licentiousness, also seem to me to have rabbinic force. Would it be correct to say that a situation of great pressing need like this would override a rabbinic prohibition (just as human dignity overrides a rabbinic prohibition)? Especially since this is an incidental, not essential, collision with the law.

Oren, what is special about this specific case that you define as a "great pressing need"? How is it different from the usual cases about which it has been ruled forbidden, whether by Torah law or rabbinic law? After all, this prohibition is always hard to live with, and yet it was still forbidden.

They need to ostracize her—as if she were dead. And if the Temple were standing, her penalty would be stoning or strangulation or burning or hanging.
The Torah is not looking for guilty parties; it stated the law for such a case, and that’s that.

Moshe, what?! The four death penalties of the religious court? Where did you come up with that nonsense? The Torah absolutely did not say that this is the the law in such a case. You do not even get lashes for it.

Moshe,
I just now finished commenting to you in a parallel thread about your certainty that is based on no knowledge whatsoever. You cannot present your gut theories (stupid ones) as pure and binding halakhic truth. Especially not in delicate situations where you are acting like a bull in a china shop and stepping on people’s painful sore spots.
Despite my aversion to censorship and silencing, next time I will consider deleting such messages. I’m sorry.

Oren,
I join D.G.’s question. What is special about this case? Every lesbian is in that situation.
You might perhaps claim that Jewish law forbade it only when the act is done out of lust and not because of nature, but that is a very far-reaching claim, and it could also apply to gay men (I think I already addressed this on the site, and even brought evidence for it from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in a kind of ironic reversal).

I think the Sages were not aware of the possibility that a woman or a man could be exclusively attracted to their own sex. In their view, they saw this as an act that was not necessary for a person’s proper life. So I think the whole prohibition spoke about sexual relations of straight women. Regarding gay men it is harder to permit, because that is Torah-level and not derived from an exposition, and since we do not derive the reason of the verse, it is more problematic. But with expositions like "the practice of the land of Egypt," there is more freedom for purposive interpretation (like the exposition of "you shall not show them favor"). Isn’t that so?

It doesn’t seem to me that the Sages understood there to be a difference between women and men. Think for a moment from their own point of view. How did they understand the Torah prohibition of homosexual relations? If, in their view, among women this is evil inclination and not nature, then presumably among men too that is how it is, no? So why would the Torah also forbid intercourse that stems from nature and not from inclination? And if indeed everything is forbidden among men, then the same should be true among women. So there is no logic in changing the interpretation only with respect to women despite the difference in severity of the prohibition.
By the way, even in Torah law there is definitely room for such interpretation, and to see this as a boundary-definition and not a reason. Just as they said that liability for property damage does not apply in a case of compulsion, so too one could say that the Torah prohibition on homosexual relations was not stated in a case of compulsion (and one can discuss whether the exemption is because of compulsion or whether it was never said in such a situation at all). There are lots of such interpretations of Torah-level laws, and the question why they are not considered deriving the reason of the verse is indeed a good question (the usual answer is that this is a boundary-definition and not a reason, but it is hard to give a clear criterion).
Especially if we reach the conclusion that human nature is not as the Sages thought, but that sexual orientation really is nature and not inclination (that is, they were factually mistaken about this), then in my opinion there is no principled obstacle to interpreting the Torah differently from them.

It may be that the Sages did not understand that there is a difference between women and men, but with women there is no explicit verse forbidding sexual relations between women, whereas with male homosexual intercourse there is such a verse. So it may be that there are additional reasons for the prohibition that remain with the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore one cannot derive the reason of the verse. But with women’s relations, the Holy One, blessed be He, did not forbid it in an explicit verse, so all that remains there is the Sages’ reason, and with such a reason one can "derive the reason of the verse."

As I said, that does not seem plausible to me. Whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted parallel to Torah law.

A side note (not directly related to the answer):
In the article linked from Bat Kol, the discussion about what qualifies as an "anus"—someone acting under compulsion—is fundamentally mistaken, because it mixes together different meanings of the word. "The Merciful One exempts the compelled" refers to a compulsion that damages one’s ability to choose. Compulsion in the context of "an alternative route" is something else entirely. That conceptual mixing is incorrect.
It is completely clear that in our case, in most instances there is free choice (even if it is very difficult), at least for someone who recognizes the Torah prohibition, and there is no exemption of "the Merciful One exempts the compelled."

For a mamzer, sexual relations are natural, and still the Torah forbids them.
(In most cultures around the world, sexual relations with animals were also common, and that too was forbidden.)

What about taking non-halakhic considerations into account? After all, in a number of places you said that even though there is a halakhic prohibition, the thing is still permitted because of a non-halakhic consideration. For example, regarding the prohibition of secular courts, and the prohibition against relying on kashrut certification because the certifiers have a vested interest. Why not say something similar here too?

Oren,
Let’s start with the facts: fact—the halakha forbids it.

Are there not enough people for whom halakha does not matter (either in general or in this case) and who prefer a set of non-halakhic values and don’t care what halakha instructs?
Only someone who thinks and believes that in this case halakha is important enough, and whose hierarchy of values places halakha here above non-halakhic considerations, will try to implement it.

Now you need to answer yourself what *you* place at the top of the priorities in this case: loyalty to halakha or loyalty to non-halakhic considerations. No one can answer that question for you.
After all, this is your value system.
Others can only tell you what their priorities are, according to their own moral recognition (for example, I think it is correct that halakha should prevail here, and loyalty to the command of the Torah takes precedence, but that is my value system, [which of course, to the best of my understanding, is the only proper and correct one]).
What is your value system? What are your priorities?

What is the non-halakhic consideration here that instructs us to permit it? The evil inclination?

Again I join Wondering’s question. What is the non-halakhic consideration for permitting it? Has something changed here (as with secular courts)?

Hello Rabbi,

First of all, thank you for the long, warm, and caring response. It was very heartwarming.

I will give your phone number to my sister when the time is right, and if she wants she will call. Right now she is still in the middle of a difficult divorce process.

I wanted to clarify that of course we (the family) are not telling her what to do and not judging her ("Do not judge your fellow…") and we are giving her all the appreciation and respect, alongside all the pain and especially the concern. We only wanted to formulate a position for ourselves, and also in case she asks our opinion.

As for the article, it won’t open for me because of the filtering software. Could you turn the article into a PDF and upload it here?

Thanks again very much.

Does the Rabbi agree with the claim in that article that when two women marry they fulfill the commandment of "He did not create it a wasteland; He formed it to be inhabited"? That seems very, very far-fetched.

D.G., I agree with the distinction, but it is not a sharp one. One can view life as a path for which you have no alternative, and one who walks that path has no other route. In such a situation, even if he can refrain, and certainly when it is very, very difficult, perhaps he is not obligated to do so (granted, the plain sense of the Talmud in Bava Batra is that he is, but a litigant can argue based on commentators to the passage in Pesachim and on the Chafetz Chaim, and this is not the place to elaborate).

Isaac, why? Because it would be a commandment fulfilled through a transgression? That depends on the question whether there is a transgression here. Beyond that, bringing children is not done through a transgression (because the child is not created through the relations between the two partners). How is this different from a couple that violates the Sabbath and brings a child into the world? Would you say there too that there is no fulfillment of "He formed it to be inhabited"? On the face of it, she is right.

I passed the request on to Oren. I hope he will upload the article here.

Here is the article:

Lesbianism and Jewish Law
By: Ziva Ofek

"My ancestors left me room to distinguish myself" (Hullin 7a)

Part I: Introduction
Part II: The attitude of Jewish law toward lesbianism
Part III: Acting under compulsion
Part IV: Value considerations in establishing a lesbian family
Part V: In light of all the above

Part I: Introduction

About three years ago my friend Or told me that, as the manager of the Religious Lesbian Forum http://www.agenda.co.il/266/forum, she wanted to create article(s) addressing the conflict of being lesbian and religious, and in general she was collecting articles on the topic. I expressed my opinion that it was impossible for there to be a forum of religious women on the subject without a halakhic discussion, and she tossed the gauntlet back to me.

I began studying the subject. At the time there were no detailed articles and/or halakhic responses dealing seriously with the issue (and in fact there still are not). I felt that despite my limited understanding and narrow knowledge of Torah, I was dealing with an almost pioneering field in the study of Jewish law and in the world of the study hall.

In the years since then, the study deepened through arguments, disputes, and polemics in various forums. I was exposed to many more sources. I discovered that what I wrote back then was sometimes misunderstood, sometimes deliberately, and sometimes because I had not explained properly. In the years that have passed since then, my positions too have become more radical. I am no longer satisfied with searching for sources for a halakhic permit for my way of life merely so that I will not be ostracized from the world of Torah in which I grew up and which I seek to live in. Today I am also seeking to find meaning and value for my own life and the life of my family within the world of Torah.

And yet, as then so now, Heaven forbid, I have not come to teach and/or instruct and/or issue halakhic rulings in Israel and/or uproot Jewish law from Israel. All I have come to do is to propose a collection of halakhic sources and possible readings which, if with God’s help they are accepted in one way or another by the great sages of Israel and faithful keepers of Israel’s tradition, may serve as an opening and pave a path to finding my place within the community of the Jewish people, and even to finding Jewish meaning for my life and the family I have established.

At this opportunity I wish to thank Yael Orien for her initiatives and comments, both regarding the first version of this article and regarding its current version, which is still an initial version and a draft for Torah scholars greater than I am, men and women, who will come and engage with this subject. I also wish to thank A.B. for her corrections, editing, comments, the sources she directed me to, and her many arguments that contributed greatly to clarifying my ideas, presenting them honestly, and also changing them. May it be God’s will that in the future all of them will be blessed, under their full names and with pride in being engaged in Torah study for the sake of Heaven.

Part II: The attitude of Jewish law toward lesbianism

On lesbianism in the Talmud, or why it is permitted to be a lesbian
As is well known, in the Written Torah there is no prohibition at all on lesbianism. An analysis of the holiness sections in the book of Leviticus shows that the absence of a prohibition is not accidental (see, for example, the source in Sotah 26b, mentioned below in the section on "mere licentiousness," regarding the conception of what "sexual relations" are from a halakhic perspective. Such a conception is fundamentally not relevant to sexual acts between women. One can also see in the wording of the verses that a woman is not perceived as responsible for forbidden sexual relations, that is, as the subject toward whom the halakhic command is directed, even if she is punished for them, except in the case of intercourse with an animal, and this is not the place to elaborate). However, we are not Karaites, and we have not come for the plain meaning of Scripture, and therefore I will move straight to the Talmud.

It should be emphasized that the Talmud, too, does not forbid lesbian activity, as the Talmud states in tractate Yevamot 76a (there is a parallel passage in tractate Shabbat 65a):
Rava said: The halakha is neither in accordance with the son nor with the father. The son—as we said before (previously a halakha was brought on another topic in the name of Rav Huna’s son). The father—for Rav Huna said: Women who rub against one another are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. And even according to Rabbi Elazar, who said: An unmarried man who had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage renders her a zonah—those words apply to a man, but a woman is merely licentiousness.
In other words: according to Rav Huna, women who rub against one another (the Talmudic term for a lesbian sexual act) are disqualified from marrying a priest (the commentators disagree whether this means any priest or only a High Priest). This itself does not establish a prohibition on the act—this is the place to mention that a divorcée and a widow are also disqualified from marrying a priest. However, even this position is rejected in practice in favor of Rava’s position, which establishes that women who rub against one another are not disqualified from the priesthood, since there is no prohibition here but only "mere licentiousness."

In the parallel in tractate Shabbat (65a), Rav Huna’s statement is mentioned in connection with the conduct of Rav Shmuel, who would not allow his daughters to sleep together. But the Talmud there rejects the reasoning that the prohibition was due to concern for lesbian sexuality between the sisters.

And indeed, according to the plain sense of the Talmud, the Rif ruled (Yevamot 24b):
For Rav Huna said: Women who rub against one another are disqualified from the priesthood—and that is not so. Even according to Rabbi Elazar, who said that an unmarried man who had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage renders her a zonah—those words apply to a man, but a woman is merely licentiousness, and all the more so the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.
That also appears to be the position of the Rosh (Yevamot 8b), who cites the Talmudic text verbatim. In the responsa Avnei Nezer (Even HaEzer, section 139, s.v. 7) it is explicitly established that there is no prohibition: among women there is no prohibition of intercourse with one another at all, and women who rub against one another are merely licentiousness.

Mere licentiousness
Even if the Talmud does not prohibit lesbian sexuality, it labels it with the unflattering term "mere licentiousness." From the context it appears that "mere licentiousness" is an act that is not forbidden by law and yet expresses pritzut, immodesty or sexual looseness, as the opposite of the term "modesty," and usually, as in our case, its context is distinctly sexual, though not always (almost as a mirror image of the concept of modesty). This topic is tangled and complex and deserves separate discussion; it raises significant halakhic and meta-halakhic questions.

We will not discuss the full meaning of the concept. However, since we see with our own eyes that according to the Talmud this is the relevant category for lesbianism (and it should again be emphasized: lesbianism as a term for sexual activity, not lesbianism as a description of personal or group identity), it is worth bringing the parallels to the concept in the Talmud so that we can infer at least some initial directions for value-based and practical treatment of this concept.

In two passages, the Talmud deals with the topic of "mere licentiousness":
In the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Sotah 26b:
Rav Sheshet said: Excluding a case where he warned her regarding unnatural intercourse.
Rava said to him: Unnatural intercourse? It is written "the lyings of a woman" (Leviticus 18).
Rather Rava said: Excluding a case where he warned her regarding contact through limbs.
Abaye said to him: That is merely licentiousness. And did the Merciful One forbid licentiousness?
Rather Abaye said: Excluding a case where he warned her regarding kissing. This works well according to the one who says that the initial stage of intercourse means insertion of the glans, but kissing is nothing at all.

In this passage, the Talmud discusses the laws of warning in the sotah process. The question is what act of adultery is relevant for such a warning. In our context, the Talmud clarifies that a sexual act—even according to the most stringent view—is at minimum insertion of the glans (and not the whole sexual organ, as required by other views). But according to all views, if there was contact of sexual organs without penetration, it is "nothing at all," only "mere licentiousness," and the Torah did not forbid mere licentiousness.

It should be noted that we are dealing with behavior that is clearly sexual at any time and in any place. It is not forbidden for the purposes of warning and seclusion, yet we cannot imagine in Jewish history a Jewish society that praised such behavior by a married woman with another man, or even one that could be indifferent to such behavior without condemning it—and even effectively condemning it in order to try to prevent it, not necessarily through halakhic tools in the technical legal sense of permitted and forbidden. And, as noted, according to the Talmud, not because of the formal law of prohibition and permission.

A second example of the use of the term "mere licentiousness" appears in another source in tractate Gittin 89a:
"Rava said: If there circulated in town a rumor about her that she committed adultery, we are not concerned for her. What is the reason? It is merely licentiousness that they saw in her. As it was taught in a tannaitic source: If she ate in the marketplace, joked in the marketplace, nursed in the marketplace—in all these cases Rabbi Meir says she must leave, Rabbi Akiva says only once disreputable women chatter about her by moonlight. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: If so, you have left no daughter of Abraham our father able to remain with her husband."

The Talmud discusses the question: on the basis of which rumors about a woman should practical steps be taken against her? According to Rava, even if a rumor circulates that she committed adultery, we are not concerned for her (and therefore, for example, there is no need to forbid her to her husband), because the assumption is that they did not really see her committing adultery but rather doing something that is "mere licentiousness." In fact, the Talmud explains, Rava is referring to a tannaitic dispute regarding a woman about whom rumors circulate that she committed adultery. Should she be divorced from her husband or not? And what was she seen doing? "Eating in the marketplace, joking in the marketplace, nursing in the marketplace."

In other words, in the tannaitic dispute the Talmud gives us examples of that "mere licentiousness" which can give rise to rumors. There are those who think that if a woman behaves this way, that is indeed sufficient reason to forbid her to her husband (worth noting is Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s rationale: fear of a total collapse of women’s credibility toward their husbands and a fundamental destruction of family life—that is, the reason is not that this is a halakhic prohibition in itself, but that the reason is rooted in acute public and social policy), whereas in practice it was ruled otherwise. In any case, for our purposes, what is very important is that the examples of "mere licentiousness" are not sexual at all. These are behaviors whose classification as licentiousness is dependent on time and place. That means that clearly, even according to Rabbi Meir, today we would not rule that a woman who behaved this way would become forbidden to her husband, and even the most punctilious in Jewish law would not be willing today to condemn a woman (even outside of formal halakha, in the moral and/or social sense) because she ate in the marketplace or in a restaurant.

In light of the above, for the purpose of asking whether lesbian activity should be condemned at all in our time, we have to examine whether lesbian activity fits the first example or the second. Clearly, in terms of the distinctly sexual nature of the activity, lesbianism resembles the first example more. However, in terms of the fact that it is an activity whose social legitimacy throughout history is dependent on time and place, it resembles the second example more. Of course, this does not in itself forbid or permit lesbian activity, because one may decide that for various reasons we still regard it today as mere licentiousness, and then it is blameworthy activity. But that is not on the formal halakhic plane.

Lesbianism and marriage
However, some halakhic decisors did not rule in accordance with the Talmud, following the Sifra.
In the Sifra (Torat Kohanim) on Leviticus 18:3 it says:
"‘Like the practice of the land of Egypt, where you dwelt, you shall not do’—what did they do? A man would marry a man, and a woman would marry a woman…"
This source is quoted often in Jewish law, and it grounds the prohibition in the marriage.

It is worth noting that the marriage ceremony, in all religions and cultures, is a ceremony with public social significance (and not merely a commitment or an act between the partners themselves) that changes the personal status of those who celebrate it.

A careful reading of this source, which does not use the language of betrothal but the concept of marriage, and moreover refers to "the practice of the land of Egypt"—that is, an act not unique to the Jewish people but shared by all nations and cultures—teaches that the prohibition is on the marriage, which reflects a change in personal status in the normative and legal sense. In my humble opinion, that is the prohibition, and not the sexual act or acts themselves.

Thus Maimonides writes (Book of Holiness, Laws of Forbidden Sexual Relations 21:8–9):
Women who rub against one another—it is forbidden, and this is one of the practices of Egypt against which we were warned, as it says: "Like the practice of the land of Egypt… you shall not do." And the Sages said: What did they do? A man would marry a man, and a woman would marry a woman, and a woman would marry two men.
Even though this act is forbidden, one is not flogged for it, for it does not have a specific prohibition, and there is no intercourse there at all. Therefore they are not forbidden to the priesthood because of promiscuity, and a woman is not thereby forbidden to her husband, since this is not promiscuity. But they deserve disciplinary lashes, since they have done a forbidden act. And a man should be strict with his wife about this matter, and should prevent women known for this from entering to her, and her from going out to them.
I draw your attention to the fact that Maimonides assumes this is a woman married to a husband: "And a man should be strict with his wife."

Similarly, the Shulchan Arukh ruled as well (Even HaEzer 20:10).
The author of the responsa Torah Temimah interprets Maimonides similarly to our proposal, namely that the prohibition is on marriage, and he writes in the responsa Torah Temimah (504, s.v. "Teshuvat HaRambam"):
But a woman is merely licentiousness [that is, mere licentiousness, with no prohibition by strict law], see there; and Maimonides, of blessed memory, was dealing only with the rule stated in Torat Kohanim, that they do like the practice of the land of Egypt, meaning that they do so regularly and consistently, which resembles the practice of Egypt, and it is because of the custom of the land of Egypt that it is forbidden.
True, the author of Torah Temimah did not speak of marriage as a condition for the prohibition, but of "regularity and consistency." However, in my humble opinion it is clear that he means marriage, for four reasons: first, because that is how he interprets Maimonides’ words when citing the Sifra, which explicitly uses the language of marriage; second, because a man and woman who marry—their very first night, presumably—their relations are considered regular and consistent, whereas a couple that chooses not to marry leaves room for dispute among halakhic decisors as to what the status of their sexual relations is at all, even over time, and therefore it seems to me that this is the plain meaning of Torah Temimah; third, that if we interpret the Sifra otherwise, we would have to ask from when relations are considered regular and consistent—after a week? a month? a year? a decade? It seems obvious to me that this is not what the Sifra intended. And fourth, related in reasoning to the previous point, is that I cannot imagine the Sifra intending to forbid relations that are regular and consistent and permit relations that are not regular and consistent (casual hookups), for that would be an actual preference for promiscuity and for detaching sex from a real and binding relationship, contrary to the way and logic of Jewish law.

In short, one can interpret that marriage is forbidden in the sense of the legal rights and obligations of the couple as a couple (those connected to personal status), but there is no prohibition on the sexuality itself.

More on lesbianism in the Sifra, or what exactly is forbidden in being a lesbian
However, not all halakhic decisors thought so. Below we will review different positions that forbid it (as stated, contrary to the position of the Talmud). It is worth noting in this context that Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, whom I cited above, are usually interpreted more stringently than the interpretation of Torah Temimah (see, for example, Maggid Mishneh, Laws of Forbidden Sexual Relations 21:8).

Rashi on tractate Yevamot, in the course of explaining Rav Huna’s words, states that "mesolelot" means "in the manner of male and female intercourse, they rub their genitals against one another…" And in tractate Shabbat, Rashi states that "it is considered a way of promiscuity."

The Tur (Even HaEzer 20) explains mesolelot as "they join together with one another in the manner of intercourse—it is forbidden, and this is the practice of the land of Egypt of which the Sages said: what did they do? A man marries a man and a woman marries a woman." One can understand from the Tur either that the sexual act itself is the prohibition, or that cumulative conditions are required—both the sexual act and marriage.

The Meiri in Yevamot states: "They come one upon another… for their matter is only mere licentiousness. And the expression mesolelot is like a person who treads on a path and does not break through the dirt at all." From this it follows that there is no prohibition, though one might infer from the Meiri’s words that there is no prohibition so long as there is no penetration.

The Rivan explained mesolelot as women engaging in sexual play with one another by means of the semen of their husbands. From this perhaps the prohibition extends even to some form of sexual behavior in general. I draw your attention to the fact that in this source too it stands out that we are talking about married women. In any event, Rivan’s interpretation was rejected by Tosafot and others as implausible.

Interim summary

Study of the halakhic sources proves that there are various answers to the question whether it is permitted to live as a lesbian. Jewish law includes different positions on the matter, ranging from positions holding that there is no prohibition, to a position that all sexual "play" is forbidden, with various middle positions setting different conditions. Of course, one can view the different conditions as alternative conditions (each according to its own view) or as cumulative conditions (in order to satisfy all opinions).

Even if, according to the halakhic decisors, the act cannot be permitted—or should not be permitted, or should not at this stage be permitted—Jewish law recognizes a broad legal concept whereby the act remains forbidden but the one who did it is exempt by law, or in other words: for various legal-policy reasons, Jewish law does not subject the actor to the prohibition. The concept is "acting under compulsion."

Part III: Acting under compulsion

The concept of compulsion—a tool for halakhic development
Rabbi Professor Norman Lamm and Rabbi David Bleich have previously proposed (their words appear in Rabbi Lubitz’s article in De’ot 11 http://toravoda.org.il/files/deot_11.pdf) recognizing homosexuals as acting under compulsion, at least legally, under certain conditions where it is clear that the sexual orientation cannot be changed. Both emphasized that the exemption does not permit the act, but only exempts from punishment. Both referred to men, even though Jewish law explicitly addresses the possibility of recognizing a man’s sexual activity as compulsion, and this is not the place to elaborate. From this it follows that if homosexuality can be recognized as compulsion, then all the more so this should be applicable to lesbianism and female sexuality.

Below I will examine examples of the broad uses that Jewish law makes of the concept of compulsion.

In tractate Bava Batra (57b), Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said:
"‘And shuts his eyes from seeing evil’—this is one who does not look at women when they are standing by the riverbank washing clothes."
The Talmud establishes that the case is where there is no other route except where the women are standing and washing clothes, for otherwise one who passes there is wicked because he went and looked. The Talmud explains that although there is no other route and he is compelled, nevertheless he is expected not to look. That means that the Talmud understands that despite there being a realistic possibility of not looking, legally he is considered compelled. Rashi and Rashbam explain it that way there.

It should be noted that this concerns any path a person is walking, and there are no halakhic limitations on what need led the person to travel. Is it to get to synagogue? Just to conduct business? Maybe to pursue a hobby? It is completely irrelevant—in all those cases, in the Talmud and in later decisors, he is considered compelled. The Talmud here understands "compelled" not as someone physically unable to do something, but in the sense that human nature makes it very difficult for him, and therefore by law he is compelled. Only by the standard of pious conduct, to use Rashi’s language there, is a person expected to overcome human nature. The Talmud does not say that if this is human nature, he must avoid passing there for all his needs and avoid living a full life. The Talmud says that if that is his nature, then he is compelled. For the sake of fairness, it should be mentioned that according to Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh the prohibition applies in practice, but that is already a separate discussion about halakhic development. Clearly that is not the plain sense of the Talmud, and as stated, many decisors did not understand it that way.

More broadly, in the lives of straight men, Jewish law does not recognize absolute limitations. On this point it is enough to mention the accepted interpretations regarding the "beautiful captive woman," or Rabbi Ilai the Elder’s statement: "If a man sees that his inclination is overpowering him, let him go to a place where he is not known, wear black, wrap himself in black, and do what his heart desires, but not profane the name of Heaven in public" (Kiddushin 40a) (see at length Rabbi Itamar Eldar’s article on the Torah portion Ki Tetze: http://www.bat-kol.org/files/45kitetze_eldar.pdf). The Torah recognizes the inclinations of straight men as something integrated into the shaping of halakhic boundaries. Surprisingly, the Torah never demands that straight men "sacrifice" themselves on the altar of their faith, although of course it obligates them, like all of us, to limit themselves and sanctify themselves. Sometimes Jewish law directs them toward such a possibility as conduct beyond the strict letter of the law or as a path for select individuals (abstinence, piety, and the like).

In addition, Jewish law recognizes the concept of "his heart compelled him," and I confess openly that I did not find the halakhic source, and can only refer to the answer Rabbi Sherlo gave on the Moreshet site http://www.moreshet.co.il/web/shut/shut2.asp?id=52815. The question there deals with a person suffering from OCD who, as a result, makes vows compulsively. The rabbi ruled that his vows do not take effect because his heart compelled him (and also advised him to annul them in advance). In other words, it appears that where Jewish law recognizes the force of a psychological-personality difficulty, the person is recognized as compelled. See also in this regard the attitude of Jewish law toward one who took his own life.

One can learn more about the complexity of the concept of compulsion from tractate Makkot 8b, where a compelled person is one whose degree of criminal intent does not rise to the level of negligence. The discussion there concerns a person who killed another person. In any case, in our context what is interesting is the Talmud’s view that a compelled person can be someone whom the law simply does not obligate, because we do not require him to check for an uncommon case (one that it would have been possible to check, and it is a matter of danger to another person’s life!). Similarly, in tractate Bava Kamma 52a, matters of damages are discussed (covering a pit), and there too the compelled person is defined not as one who could not properly cover the pit, but as one on whom there was no duty to anticipate an uncommon kind of damage. In other words, in both cases the "compelled" person is a function of legal policy defining the limits of a person’s duty of caution.

Further, in tractate Makkot 9a, a compelled person appears as one who erred in law and/or in fact. A dispute is discussed there about someone who killed another person because he thought he was permitted to kill him, meaning he erred in law and/or in the identity of the victim (from the continuation of the Talmud it appears that the intent is specifically an error in the victim’s identity). The Sages dispute it: according to Rava this is a compelled case, and according to Abaye it is "close to intentional." In tractate Shevuot 18a, compulsion explicitly appears as an error in law, where a case is discussed of intercourse with a menstruant in a certain situation in which a person is exempt if he did not know the law (the Talmud explicitly distinguishes between a Torah scholar and an ignoramus, and the commentators add "Torah scholar" and "ignoramus" for this purpose!). For our purposes, in both cases what is interesting is that a person’s state of mind is what makes him compelled.

In tractate Yevamot 99b, we find a situation of relative compulsion. The Talmud discusses distribution of terumah (one of the priestly gifts), and establishes that terumah is sent to an uncircumcised priest because he was not circumcised under great compulsion—his compulsion is substantial. Rashi explains that this is someone who was not circumcised because his brothers died at circumcision. In contrast, terumah is not sent to an impure priest even though he is compelled, because his compulsion is not substantial—Steinsaltz explains that he could have been careful not to become impure. In this example too, we find that the impure priest is defined as compelled, except that the compulsion does not describe the limits of his ability—since he could have been careful not to become impure—but rather the limits of the responsibility placed on a person.

I have not exhausted all the uses of "compelled" found in Jewish law, but it seems to me that these examples suffice to show how much the concept can serve as flexible, and at times even revolutionary, halakhic policy. In this regard it is interesting to compare Rabbi Lubitz’s article in De’ot http://toravoda.org.il/he/node/2913#_ftnref5 concerning the attitude toward homosexuality. There Rabbi Lubitz rejects any halakhic possibility of recognizing an inner drive as compulsion. In my humble opinion, in light of the above sources, it is worth rethinking the meaning of the concept of compulsion in Jewish law, and in accordance with the view that an inner drive can be recognized as compulsion, there is room to include in it both gays and lesbians.

It is worth noting that in questions asked of rabbis online regarding homosexuality and lesbianism, as well as in various articles, the answers generally establish—usually without any explanation—that this may not be recognized as compulsion. As we have seen, in fact that answer is not necessarily based on the concept of compulsion in Jewish law. In my humble opinion, this standard answer is based on meta-halakhic considerations. Below I will touch on those considerations as they should, to the best of my understanding, be taken into account.

Part IV: Value considerations in establishing a lesbian family

Among the halakhic and conceptual responses given to questioners about homosexuality and lesbianism are answers that, in my opinion, reflect "gutter discourse," in which Torah people express disgust toward people and other personal feelings in a religious cloak. I will not address such approaches here, but it is important to me to mention that they exist, even among rabbis who are undisputedly among the great sages of Israel both halakhically and otherwise. The proven existence of such approaches obligates every person of halakha and every Torah-minded person who comes to deal with this issue to examine himself again and again with honesty of heart, to see whether he is not influenced by such moods.

A legitimate and important consideration raised by Rabbi Sherlo is the question of the value of family, the importance of the family unit, and its proper structure. Indeed, the Jewish tradition does not recognize a same-sex family unit, and some hold that this is enough to deny its legitimacy.

On this point, it seems that those who think so forget that throughout most of Jewish history, the Jewish family unit was not monogamous and was not based on a man and woman committing exclusively to one another, but rather on a woman committing exclusively to a certain man and no more than that (without detracting from the man’s various obligations toward his wife—exclusivity is not one of them). Moreover, in many diasporic communities over significant stretches of Jewish history, it was halakhically and practically permitted, sometimes even without condemnation, to build a family on an unmistakably pedophilic basis by fully marrying an adult to a minor—even a six-year-old or nine-year-old. One can read about this in Professor Avraham Grossman’s excellent book Pious and Rebellious: Jewish Women in Medieval Europe (Jerusalem, 2001).

That is to say: same-sex partnership was never recognized as a legitimate family unit in Judaism, but our understanding of what a proper and worthy family unit is (halakhically and especially meta-halakhically) has undergone such radical change that adding monogamous same-sex partnership would really not be the biggest leap imaginable.

Even so, it is agreed that even small steps must have a strong reason in order to create change in a world of Orthodox Jewish law. It seems to me that within religious discourse (as within secular discourse too), the arguments of family modesty and settlement of the world—which should have been central—were not even mentioned.

Modesty and honesty
It is worth repeating basic truths: where homosexuality and lesbianism are forbidden and carry social ostracism, people live in secret. A life in secret is necessarily a life of licentiousness, a life in which sexuality is separated from the other expressions of responsibility and interpersonal partnership. Worse than that, a life in secret often gives rise to deception of the "legal" husband/wife, who are used for normalization and childbearing but do not receive a real and worthy home and partnership. This can also explain Maimonides, who explicitly refers to a married woman who "rubs against" another woman and commands her husband to prevent this. For Maimonides, the struggle against lesbianism is a struggle against adultery. But today, when women (and men) marry by their own will, lesbians (and gays) who marry against their orientation will very likely end up in adultery. It follows that in our time, fighting adultery requires opposing marriages that will lead to adultery, and encouraging relationships and home-building based on honesty and modesty, even if these are same-sex homes.

And let it be clarified: preventing the possibility of building a legitimate life with members of the same sex is what pushes people who are aware of their different sexual orientation to marry, because the price of living alone and childless is too high for them. They, their spouses, and worse, their children, pay the price afterward.

Forbidden sexual relations
Another conceptual distortion common in relation to homosexuality (and also, though less so, lesbianism) is the approach that does not distinguish this sexuality from other sex offenders, especially in the context of the prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations.

Forbidden sexual relations are usually committed in a situation where the criminal assaults another person (in a very real and practical sense), and therefore recognizing the offender as acting under compulsion abandons the victim. In contrast, here we are dealing with homosexual and lesbian relations done by mutual consent. There is no abuser and victim, but two people who can express love and sexuality with partnership, responsibility, and a couplehood that extends beyond the bedroom. A sweeping prohibition on such relations means, in practical terms, preventing both partners to the act (both compelled people) from their ability to realize themselves as loving human beings and as life partners in the broad sense of the term. In my humble opinion, the severe moral price of such prevention has not yet been sufficiently discussed, and see the sources below regarding the commandment "He formed it to be inhabited."

"He formed it to be inhabited"
Homosexual and lesbian life within society, in a setting of acceptance, recognition, and equality, naturally leads same-sex couples to want to bring children into the world and raise them. Such a way of life encourages moral commitment to the family unit, monogamy, continuity, and commitment to the next generation (biological or non-biological)—a life of social responsibility and family life. It should be noted that the fact that lesbians can give birth and establish families without promiscuity, through sperm banks (and other options of donation without intercourse), is an enormous change in reality that, to the best of my understanding, has not been discussed in Jewish law until now. It should be noted that in the time of the Sifra, Maimonides, and in fact all the commentators who forbid women who "rub against one another," the discussion necessarily was not about building a shared home and responsibility to the next generation, but about adultery.

In my humble opinion, the possibility of establishing a family, including bearing children and raising them together, changes the discussion in an essential way. Especially since already today various biological aspects can be shared by both partners (for example in the case of http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3300881,00.html the woman who became pregnant with a child from an egg donated by her partner), it seems to me important to discuss the Jewish and halakhic meaning of partnership, and all the more so of bringing children into the world.

The Mishnah in tractate Gittin 41a (and many midrashim similarly) establishes:
The world was created only for procreation, as it says: "He did not create it a wasteland; He formed it to be inhabited" (Isaiah 45:18).
This principle has significant halakhic implications. Thus, in the name of this principle, a man is forced to free a slave who is already half-free, because of "He formed it to be inhabited" (there and on 41b), and a Torah scroll is sold in order to marry a woman because of "He formed it to be inhabited" (Megillah 27a).

In tractate Gittin (41b), Tosafot establish: "A woman too—He did not create it a wasteland," or in other words, this commandment applies to a woman as well. Many halakhic decisors, especially among the later authorities, discussed at great length the meaning and scope of this commandment, particularly regarding women.

A minority among the decisors (especially a minority among the later authorities) hold that this commandment does not apply to women (for example: Responsa Ritva, siman 43, s.v. "Od Ani," and at the end of his discussion this also appears to be the view of Beit Shmuel, Even HaEzer 1:2, and also the Pnei Yehoshua on the passage in Gittin). However, most decisors apply this commandment to women, and it is ruled in practice that a woman is obligated in the commandment of "He formed it to be inhabited" in the Mishnah Berurah (153:24), as well as in the Magen Avraham (153:9), Arukh HaShulchan (Orah Hayim 153:15), Responsa Radakh (32, s.v. "Ve’af Im"), and many others.

Some decisors established that although this is not a positive commandment that a woman is obligated in and punished for if she does not fulfill it, nevertheless a woman receives reward for fulfilling it (for example: Responsa Kol Mevaser, part 1, siman 25, s.v. "Gam BeGuf"), or that the commandment applies to women though not as a full obligation (for example: Responsa Havot Yair, siman 31, s.v. "Ve’al Devar"), or that it applies to women but as a commandment upon women as a collective and not as an obligation on each individual woman to establish a family (for example, this is how Responsa Tzitz Eliezer, part 4, siman 16, chapter 12, s.v. "Ule’etzem Kushyat" explains it). However, it seems possible to summarize fairly unequivocally that according to the overwhelming majority of decisors, there is in the very establishment of a family and engagement in procreation the fulfillment of a commandment-act even for a woman.

Also very important for our purposes is the view of the rabbi of Brod, that living as a couple even without procreation still involves fulfillment of the commandment "He formed it to be inhabited" (see Noda B'Yehuda, Even HaEzer, siman 6, s.v. "Ve’hineh Bama," who brings his approach and disagrees with it). Rabbi Ovadia Yosef rules similarly: even without procreation, the very life of couplehood, even if biologically barren, constitutes fulfillment of the commandment "He formed it to be inhabited" in the case of a woman. Thus he writes (Yabia Omer, part 3, Even HaEzer, siman 20, s.v. 33, "Ve’likh’ora"):
Thus it is that "to be inhabited" means that the world will be settled by means of offspring. … But … those words apply to a man, who is commanded in procreation, whereas a woman, once she marries, has fulfilled the commandment of habitation.
Yabia Omer gives the broadest and most radical meaning to the application of the commandment "He formed it to be inhabited" to a woman, and he establishes (part 8, Yoreh De’ah, siman 22, s.v. "U’vihyoti"):
"…since the daughter is commanded in ‘He formed it to be inhabited,’ she should not listen to her father who commands her not to marry."

Indeed all the sources speak of marriage to a man, but clearly no practical possibility of a family made up of two women stood before them. If "He created it a wasteland" refers to a life of loneliness without partnership and without children, if the essence of the world and the purpose of its creation is "He formed it to be inhabited," why should our participation as lesbians in the inhabiting of the world have no value? Why would anyone want to put our lives into a state that Jewish law defines as "wasteland"?

It seems to me, and I admit that this is indeed a radical position, very far from the currently existing halakha, that once one removes the fundamentally homophobic principle that "our partnership is different," it is hard to raise an argument for why the principle should not be identical regarding the establishment of our families as well. Why should there not be value to "He formed it to be inhabited" as we are able to fulfill it? Even to the point of defying our parents, and even without children! (following the responsa Yabia Omer).

On this matter I would like to add a short personal confession: it may surprise people to discover how similar a same-sex family is to every other family you know. I grew up in a modern religious family. My parents are professionals, grew up in Bnei Akiva, and with God’s help had and raised four children. Sometimes I look at the same-sex partnership and family I have established (so far, two children, may they be preserved) and I am stunned by how similar my home is to theirs, even in things I thought would be different…

In my humble opinion, the fight against licentiousness and the important value of establishing a committed family unit are among the strongest possible reasons to create change in the prevailing halakhic approach. There are countless examples in which meta-halakhic considerations, such as "human dignity," "one in discomfort," or "great need," have tipped the scales toward leniency and even created halakhic change (and by the way, many of these principles are relevant to our matter as well).

In my view there are other important reasons as well, touching on the character of religious society and its responsibility for the mental and physical well-being of the homosexuals and lesbians living within it. Reasons that reflect the responsibility of religious society to ensure that homosexuals and lesbians continue to live lives of Torah and commandments and give their children an education that will not sever them from the heritage of Israel.

These reasons are weighty and far broader than the halakhic and even meta-halakhic questions I have dealt with. Of course, when issuing halakhic rulings one cannot ignore all these important questions, but this is not the place to elaborate. (I discussed this at length in a response article in Akdamot; see http://www.bat-kol.org/files/brit_yeud.pdf there.)

Part V: In light of all the above
I believe that ultimately the halakhic position should be a position of permission. To tell the truth, I am not sure that in an Orthodox world, even the most progressive one, there is room now (or any chance) for such a halakhic ruling. I strongly believe that in order to preserve our values, our culture, and our Torah, changes need to come step by step. In any event, in my view it is a moral and sacred obligation that one permissive halakhic interpretation or another should be the path forward, so that halakha will not be a tool for crushing human beings but a tool for their growth.

I believe that the way to halakhic change along this path is to ask many hard questions of many rabbis. When rabbis have to look us straight in the whites of our eyes again and again and say, in these words or others: "I am sacrificing you, your future, your sexuality, your ability to establish a family and bear children, and/or the husband you will choose for yourself by paths of open or hidden deceit, and/or your children," I am sure the answers will become less and less categorical and will slowly change greatly…

I believe that some of the above sources can become a tool for them in this change.

I also believe that it is our basic human right to cry out, to scream, and to warn rabbis and the public that we demand solutions. To cry out, scream, and warn in these words or others: "I am not Jephthah’s daughter."

And at a later stage, to cry out the truth of our lives: we are participating in the inhabiting of the world, in our way and according to our ability, as the Holy One, blessed be He, created us.

Please, let us not become endlessly conservative and narrow-minded at the price of sacrificing human beings, our brothers and sisters, to whose dignity and love we are obligated.

Ziva Ofek

Not because of a commandment fulfilled through a transgression. Notice that she relies on Rabbi Ovadia, who wrote that a woman fulfills "He formed it to be inhabited" even without children, and from that she concluded that in a lesbian wedding they fulfill this commandment even without procreation. That is what I wrote is absurd. By her logic, if I adopt a cat and decide that I am marrying it, I will be fulfilling "He formed it to be inhabited"?

Besides that, even if we say there is "He formed it to be inhabited" because of the children, it still would not be right because there is no connection between children from a donation and the wedding. It is not really affected by that, so it does not make the wedding more valuable.

Obviously. It has nothing to do with the wedding. I was talking about bringing children.

Hello Rabbi,

I do not understand how you quote such an article. I have no problem with its goal and conclusion, but with its methodology. It seems to me to be riddled with errors from beginning to end.
To avoid making this long and complicated, I’ll choose a representative sample of simple examples:

1. There is repeated mention of "Responsa Torah Temimah" (in part II of the article). There is no such responsa work. The quotation is from the responsa Torah Lishmah by the Ben Ish Hai. (And anyone who looks inside will see that he understood that the prohibition of "the practice of the land of Egypt" is not "marriage of two women" as the author understood, but a woman’s emission of seed, which would be forbidden even if she did it to herself or if her husband did it to her.)
2. There too (part II), the baraita was cited: "She ate in the marketplace, joked in the marketplace, nursed in the marketplace—in all these cases Rabbi Meir says she must leave, Rabbi Akiva says once disreputable women chatter about her by moonlight. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: If so, you have left no daughter of Abraham our father able to remain with her husband." She understood that Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri came to be stringent or to explain the reason for the stringency, and drew conclusions from that. Clearly he came to be more lenient than those before him.
3. At the beginning of part III, the Talmudic line is brought: "‘And shuts his eyes from seeing evil’—this is one who does not look at women when they stand by the washing… If there is no other route, he is compelled…" From this she concludes: "The Talmud here understands ‘compelled’ not as one who is prevented from doing something in the sense of physical inability, but in the sense that human nature makes it very difficult for him and therefore by law he is compelled. Only by the standard of pious conduct, to use Rashi’s language there, is he expected to overcome human nature."
From her words it sounds as though there is a claim of compulsion for lesbian relations. But no—it has no connection to that Talmudic passage. There a person is doing a permitted act, and stumbling into the forbidden act that presents itself to him (which is something unintended) is considered compulsion. One cannot infer from there an exemption of compulsion for someone who approaches the forbidden act itself.
I won’t go on with more examples (though I can bring more), but it seems to me this is not a worthy Torah article by any standard. I would be glad if you could answer me at least on these three points.

Aharon,
I myself wrote that there are some problematic points there, and still the main thrust of her words is correct. Besides, I do not know of a Torah article by a Torah scholar that does not make mistakes like these. If you know one, you are welcome to upload it here.
On point 3, I already commented above. There is room to discuss that reasoning, and in my opinion it is not far-fetched.

I already commented similarly regarding David Bass’s article (about conversion).
Since I know you are not enslaved to political correctness, I’ll say this in very plain language.
This article is packed with basic mistakes at an extremely, extremely high rate. And when I talk about rate, I am comparing it to articles published in Haredi Torah journals like Moriah, Beit Aharon VeYisrael, Etz Hayim, and the like. In such articles, the names of non-existent books could not possibly get in there—not only because of the skill of the writers, but also because of the editing rules and review process.
Here we are dealing with an article that, by the author’s own account, was written over a very long period, and several people commented on it and remarked on it. No one noticed that the book title was wrong? Or that the Talmud was explained in a completely distorted way?
My assessment is that all the proofreaders of the article are not people of the study hall, but academics, who are unable to read the quotations inside and correct such failures. And that also connects to your views about the (in)ability of women nowadays to study Torah.
I stress again: I have absolutely nothing against the conclusion of the article. What bothers me is the very high rate of mistakes, which shows a low level (and I can find more). With all my criticism of the Haredi public, I am sure an article at this level would never be published in any respectable Haredi Torah journal.

As for the comparison to "there is no other route," even if it is correct, it is novel and needs more development and justification, which the article does not provide.

Aharon, everything you are writing is not relevant here. Yes, there are mistakes there. Yes, it would not be published in a Torah journal (for other reasons too). Precisely because of that I referred to it. It does correctly present the general contours of the discussion.

I think there is no need to go on at length. If there were no problem with women rubbing, or initial penetration, or genital-to-genital touching, then the Torah would not have written that if a married woman touches the private parts of a strange man, her hand is to be cut off. There is an a fortiori argument here: if it is forbidden to touch the organ of a strange man, then all the more so it is forbidden for one organ to touch another strange organ.

"Organ" is a clean word for the reproductive organ, female or male. It doesn’t matter, because it is a verbal analogy.

Moshe, first you said her punishment is one of the four court-imposed death penalties, and now you are saying (based on this a fortiori) that her punishment is cutting off the hand. So what exactly should be done to her? Both death and cutting off the hand?

Moshe,
The Sages interpreted that the sin in the case of the woman who grabbed the private parts of the man attacking her husband was the humiliation she caused him, and that her liability is payment for humiliation, not cutting off the hand ("then you shall cut off her hand"—money).
Are you coming to invent a new interpretation that is neither the plain meaning of the Torah (which is talking about a case of struggle and fighting) nor the exposition of the Sages, and then derive from it a strange a fortiori argument?

Maimonides understood that cutting off the hand comes from the law of the pursuer:
7. How so? If they warned him and he is still pursuing him, even if he did not accept the warning, since he is still pursuing, he is killed. But if they can save the pursued by injuring one of the pursuer’s limbs—such as by striking him with an arrow, a stone, or a sword and cutting off his hand, breaking his leg, or blinding his eye—they do so. And if they cannot aim precisely, and cannot save him except by killing the pursuer, then they kill him, even though he has not yet killed. As it says: "Then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall not pity" (Deuteronomy 25:12).

8. Whether it is his private parts or anything else involving mortal danger, whether it is a man grabbing a woman—the meaning of the verse is that anyone intending to strike his fellow with a blow that could kill him, one saves the pursued through the hand of the pursuer; and if they cannot, they save him even at the pursuer’s life, as it says: "Your eye shall not pity" (Deuteronomy 25:12). 9. This is a negative commandment—not to spare the life of the pursuer.
(Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life, chapter 1)
But that has no connection to sexual relations without danger.

Roni—what do you have to say about Y.D.’s words?

Y.D.—what do you think, or what does Maimonides think, the law would be if the man whose private parts she grabbed grabbed her private parts back?

Y.D.—what do you think, or what would Maimonides think, if her husband grabbed his rival’s private parts?

Does "then you shall cut off her hand" apply equally to a man who grabbed another man’s private parts, or only to a strange woman?

From law 8 I learn that she is commanded to save her husband, so I still do not understand why she should have to pay humiliation damages.

——————
Last but not least—Hobbes—

Regarding male homosexual intercourse it says, "They shall surely be put to death." Regarding Sabbath desecration it says, "They shall surely be put to death." All the more so for women rubbing against one another. For women do not have a protruding organ like a man, and therefore for lesbians the Torah uses the term of women rubbing. Good question, but why didn’t you address the verse that forbids male homosexual intercourse and its punishment? That is necessary here. Now, it does not matter what her punishment is right now, because the main thing is that the Torah sees this as a sin in terms of touching the private parts of a strange man.
Allow me to ask you (without looking up a halakhic answer on the internet), in your clean judgment:
1. If there were a fight between two women, and the sister of one of them came and grabbed the private parts of her sister’s rival—what is her law in your opinion?
2. If there were a fight between two women, and the boyfriend of one of them came and grabbed the private parts of his girlfriend’s rival—what is his law in your opinion?
I stress: answer cleanly, without looking up a halakhic answer online.

Moshe,
According to Maimonides, grabbing the private parts is only an example of a danger of irreversible injury that justifies injuring limbs and even killing by anyone who happens to be nearby (the Rabbi expanded on pursuit in the post "The Kite Runner"). If such danger exists, there is a law of pursuer; if not, not. Male and female do not matter. It is only an example.

Payment for humiliation is according to the Talmud’s approach (and Rashi on the verse following it), which understands the verse in a totally different way. It is not talking here about a threat of irreversible injury (peace to the private parts), but about causing humiliation because of the way the fight was resolved by the woman. The imposition of humiliation damages is done in court and not by whoever happens to be there.

This has no connection to sexual relations, because to the best of our knowledge, in lesbian or heterosexual relations no damage is caused to either party (except maybe pregnancy resulting from heterosexual relations). Since that is so, requiring payment for humiliation or applying the law of pursuer to one of the parties is simply wrong. And since the Torah also does not see women rubbing against one another as intercourse, one cannot apply the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse to women (women’s anatomy is so different that there is simply no room for comparison). We are left with the verse of the land of Egypt, whose prohibition is unclear, as everyone here has gone on about.

Moshe, what do I have to say about Y.D.’s words?
Even the words he brought in the name of Maimonides have sources in the words of the Sages.
By contrast, your interpretation has no source in the Sages, nor does it fit the plain meaning of Scripture. It is simply your own invention, with no source and no logic (what does "if men strive together" have to do with this? And what does "to save her husband from him that smites him" have to do with this?).
That is not how one learns Jewish law. The bare minimum is to check what was written about it before you.

And to your question, the same law applies if a man grabbed another man’s private parts:
He is liable for humiliation damages if this is an action not needed for self-defense, and in the case of a pursuer, it is permitted to save the victim by injuring one of the pursuer’s limbs.

I did not write the last message.
Please distinguish between the usernames.

Moshe,

You are writing utter nonsense, in this thread and in other threads too, and you are really lowering the level of the site.

The Rabbi himself wrote to you in the current thread:

"Moshe,
I just now finished commenting to you in a parallel thread about your certainty that is based on no knowledge whatsoever. You cannot present your gut theories (stupid ones) as pure and binding halakhic truth. Especially not in delicate situations where you are acting like a bull in a china shop and stepping on people’s painful sore spots.
Despite my aversion to censorship and silencing, next time I will consider deleting such messages. I’m sorry."

I ask that the Rabbi carry out his threat and delete your nonsense.

Hobbes,
This is Moshe’s way of learning Torah, so there is no reason to be condescending; one should simply answer him plainly. What the Rabbi wrote there too was meant to teach him Torah (not to condescend to him), and indeed since then there has been some trend of improvement. I trust the Rabbi to know how to manage his own site.

Yes, Y.D. Since I was responding to your words, I accidentally wrote the username of Besadeh Hashem.

Y.D., the problem is (just one example I remembered) that after I gave up trying to explain very simple things to Moshe (about ordination and the renewal of the Sanhedrin), he responded:
"I wish you emotional release—your eyes don’t see because of your head… In your jumble it is obvious that you only want to weaken my proven and super-logical conclusion."
"On the contrary, my brother, if I weren’t learning something from the discussion here, I would have disappeared long ago. Thanks to you (the mistake in the source), I found the proofs that confirmed what I knew and had investigated for their confirmation. And truly there is no point slogging through what has already been proven.
The truth is—don’t get me wrong—you do demand justified explanations, and at the right time. You attack in a not-so-nice way, and that’s a shame."
"It is also clear to me that the discussion has run its course, and if there’s anything else you want to ask—I’ll gladly answer, my brother." (Really, thanks. I’m touched.)

I am not trying to attack anyone; if anyone was offended by the previous message, my apologies.

Here is another pearl from Moshe, from that same thread (The Authority of the Talmud):
"And therefore our brain tells us (a person’s healthy logic), and you have that too, my brother, believe me—maybe a little less than me, but you have it. I’ll give all of you a very thick hint and let’s see who understands…"

It is a time of trouble for Jacob, and from it he shall be saved. I see that most people here are not interested in an in-depth, Torah-based discussion, including the layers of commentators and their views and explanations, and apparently Chabad has no place here. And I, the humble one, speaking in my own name, of blessed memory, see the door by which I entered and go out to graze in Boaz’s field and gather stalks…

Between us—who would want to discuss in such conditions. Farewell, and pity the fish.

I will spare you my answers and responses from now on. My rest is in forgiveness in the Garden of Eden….

I am taking my words in this thread with me to the World to Come. We will discuss it there. All the best. And thanks for the expulsion…….
I accept it with full understanding… 🙂 🙂 🙂

Maybe, dear friends, let’s have a meeting and close this discussion orally while recording it. The way our forefathers learned in the study halls back in the day. Who’s interested? It’s possible even by mobile or internet network—requires a camera on the computer, internet connection, and a microphone. We’ll coordinate times and close this discussion orally. For the Lord will reprove.

The Lord redeems the life of His servants… and none who take refuge in Him shall be held guilty.

🙂 Why? The point is not that I (and I think the others too) am not interested in an "in-depth" discussion, etc. The point is that if I have no clue about a topic, and yet for some reason I choose to express an opinion, I don’t decide that I am 100% right and hand out hints and bizarre questions to the rest of the "idiots" who haven’t yet reached my marvelous level, and I don’t insist that I am right.

Wondering has come back to life!!

Blessed is He who revives the dead.

Actually he was always in the background like a ghost, waiting for an opportunity for more nonsense and drivel worthy of a "wondering." But let’s not overload a thread that has long since been full of irrelevant things.

Moshe, I don’t want to nag, but I would ask you to keep your promise above in the thread:

"I will spare you my answers and responses from now on"

Please, if you would.

To the honorable Rabbi "To Moshe," I ask you not to descend to personal attacks. Your last response was, in my humble opinion, not fitting for this site (and as is well known, I am not suspected of any affection for the Torah and musings of His Honor Moshe, may he live long, so I cannot be accused of tossing out politically correct slogans instead arguments).

"To Moshe" and "Wondering"—every Jew, whoever he is, has a certain spark that comes out here and there in sayings that bring life back. As my teacher said: live by your tongue (the Oral Torah) and not by your sword. And as the wise one said: guard your tongue from evil and your lips from speaking deceit. And as Hannah said: "Talk no more so very proudly; let not arrogance come out of your mouth, for the Lord is a God of knowledge, and by Him actions are weighed."

For anyone who did not understand—I mean, do not extinguish Jews’ sparks. In short, do not train your tongues in gossip but in words of Torah and love and peace. The Lord loves people who do not slander with their tongue and do not place shame and reproach on their fellow men and women.

It would be worthwhile, dear friends, for us to meet and get to know one another, and speak person to his fellow, and not consume one another, as it is written: happy is the man… rather, his delight is in the Torah of the Lord, and in His Torah he meditates day and night.

"Let the righteous smite me in kindness and rebuke me; let not the oil of the head refuse my head, for still my prayer is against their evils."

Give your consent. I long to see the active people of the blog with my own eyes.

Moshe,
I completely agree (although I understood almost nothing from your response, which looks like a jumble of verses and random sentence fragments).
In case I was misunderstood,
my last response was not directed at you but at "To Moshe."

Wondering—mistaken. There are things I can agree with you about, as it is said: "And he sent letters by couriers on horseback, riding on swift steeds…" "Honor and majesty are before Him; strength and joy are in His place," and "Laban called it Jegar-sahadutha, but Jacob called it Galeed." And clearly your Torah outlook rests on what was said, but you need to explain one thing, as it is written: "The lion roars and the fierce lion’s voice…" "She makes linen garments and sells them, and supplies belts to the merchant," and "He took six hundred chosen chariots and all the chariots of Egypt…" And especially the next verse hits you thigh on hip: as it is written, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes."

I didn’t express an opinion, so you have nothing to agree with or decide that I got wrong. But never mind.
I did not understand a word of the message, but I ask our Rabbi Hobbes to record this pearl: "And especially the next verse hits you thigh on hip: as it is written, ‘Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes.’"
For some reason I don’t think I am the fool who is supposed to be hit.

My Torah outlook rests on what exactly? On the verse "and Jacob called it Galeed"? What?! Are you sure you’re with us?

Following this discussion, I came across a news interview today with one of the marchers in the Jerusalem Pride Parade. He claimed that he feels his sexual identity is something that is neither male nor female. There are also many stories of people who report that from a young age they felt they were born a man in a woman’s body or vice versa. It reminded me that in some cases in Jewish law we need to define a kind of fuzzy-logic spectrum in order to solve certain difficulties. For example, in the last series of lectures in Ra’anana you mentioned such a spectrum with regard to a pursuer: there is a classic pursuer, and there is a faint pursuer (a fetus in its mother’s womb). That is, on the one hand it is not an ordinary pursuer, but there is a smell of pursuer about it ("like a pursuer," in Maimonides’ wording, with the comparative prefix). So perhaps in the same way one could define that there are people who are not really male, but "male-like," with the comparative prefix, or a faint male (and similarly on the female side, "female-like"). Such people are not included in the prohibition of "You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a woman," because they are not the male the Sages were speaking about, but something else whose existence the Sages were not aware of. In the Sages’ conception, reality was dichotomous: either you are male or you are female; there is no middle state. But if we accept the conception that there can be intermediate states of gender, that could change our halakhic attitude to homosexuality. What do you think?

Although perhaps one should expound the word "et" in the verse: "And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman; it is an abomination" to include one who is similar to a male (that is, one who is "male-like").

What does this have to do with the Sages? They did not legislate the prohibition of "You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a woman," and there is no reason that because of their worldview being different from the definition you suggested we should change anything.
By the way, the Sages did recognize intermediate states (aylonit, androgynos).

Another possibility for expounding the word "ve’et" is in the spirit of what is written in tractate Bava Kamma 65b:
He does not pay the guilt-offering either, for it is written: "with the principal and its fifth… and his guilt-offering!" The Rabbis said to you: the verse interrupts with the word "et." And Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai? The verse joined it with "ve’et." And the Rabbis? They say to you: the Merciful One should have written neither the vav nor the word et. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai? He would say to you: it was impossible not to write et, in order to separate between property of Heaven and ordinary property, therefore the vav came and joined the verse.

That is, the word "ve’et" is interpreted as connecting the current verse to the previous verse, which is:
"And from your offspring you shall not give to pass them to Molech, nor shall you profane the name of your God; I am the Lord." In other words, the word comes to teach us that giving of one’s offspring to Molech is also in the category of abomination.

To D:
The question is how one should interpret the verse: "And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman; it is an abomination." The interpretation of the Sages is what binds us. I came to suggest that the Sages interpreted the verse so that the prohibition applies to males only, and not to one who is merely male-like.
As for an aylonit, she is a full woman, only incapable of giving birth. As for a tumtum and an androgynos, it may be that the Sages treated them as doubtful woman / doubtful man, and therefore applied the stringencies of both to them (a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently). It may be that the Sages were not aware of the reality of intermediate genders (which perhaps do exist), and therefore maybe all of their interpretation does not apply to such genders, which were outside their scope.

I agree that we are bound by the interpretation of the Sages, but to start splitting hairs and say that apparently they interpreted it as applying to all men because they did not know that maybe there are intermediate genders, and if they had known there are, then maybe they would have interpreted it as applying only to men—that seems wildly exaggerated. If the authority of the Sages applies even when they are mistaken, then I’m right in any case. And if not, why try to split hairs over what they would have said if?! One could say that maybe there is a factual mistake here, but to take a verse on which the Sages did not explicitly write their opinion (whether all half-men are included or only 100% men) and start thinking what they would have said and what they would have said if, does not seem like following the Sages.

I’m attaching a short video of the interview with the person I mentioned above (the one who said of himself that he is neither male nor female; his name is Ariel. The news system refers to him in the masculine, "participant," and he himself sometimes refers to himself in the feminine), so you can judge for yourselves:

Oren, this is a possible reinforcement for the proposal I raised in light of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s words—that people with such a nature were not forbidden.
The proofs from aylonit are problematic because all those intermediate states are physical. In the Sages there is no recognition of an intermediate state in exclusively psychological parameters. And in general, the Sages discussed this entire issue only in terms of physical signs.
As for the ability to determine that the Sages were mistaken, in my opinion it exists, but here this is not a simple factual mistake. On the face of it, for such a halakhic change one would need another court to permit it.

If he sees himself as both male and female together, maybe psychologically he is an "androgynos." And if we assume that his self-definition has meaning—then one should give him the laws of an androgynos, who is forbidden both with a male and with a female.

With blessings for a complete recovery within all the sick of Israel,
S.Z. Levinger

I thought of another idea: one could compare a person with reversed sexual inclinations to a left-handed person. In Kabbalah too there is a link between the left-right axis and the male-female axis.
In tractate Shabbat 103a it says:
Granted, if he wrote with the right hand he should be liable—because that is the normal way of writing. But with the left hand, why? That is not the normal way of writing! Rabbi Yirmeya said: They taught this with regard to a left-handed person.

We see here a principle taught by Rabbi Yirmeya: that in principle the act of writing of which the Torah spoke is the act of writing by a normal person with the right hand, whereas when a right-handed person writes with the left (a straight man lies with a man), that is not considered normal writing and he is exempt (or not considered normal lying and he is liable). But if a left-handed person writes with the left (a gay man lies with a man), that is considered normal writing and he is liable (or considered normal lying and he is exempt). One should remember that the difference between left-handed and not-left-handed is ostensibly a mental difference (in the brain and not in the shape of the hands). Also, with regard to phylacteries it is known that a left-handed person puts them on his right hand, which is his left. What do you think about that?

That is already very far-reaching.
First, my impression is that people see left-handedness as a physical difference and not a mental-psychological one. It is a genuinely functional difference (though it is true that its root is in the brain, but almost every functional matter has its root in the brain).
And you are also assuming that the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse is on unusual intercourse. And where do you get that from? We find exemption due to deviation from the normal manner in various prohibitions, but here this would be a definition of the prohibition itself as a prohibition of unusual intercourse. I see no source for that, unless we go back to my argument from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, but then it is not specifically connected to the concept of deviation from the normal manner.
For a collection of laws concerning a left-handed person, see here: http://asif.co.il/download/kitvey-et/gulot/gulot10/08.pdf
Though I did not find there whether a left-handed person who writes with his right hand is considered unusual (I am not entirely sure of this, but for now I have not found evidence).

Maimonides wrote:
A left-handed person who wrote with his right hand, which for him is like everyone else’s left hand, is exempt.

Good.

Following the discussion above, is there room for the consideration of "its ways are ways of pleasantness" in determining the interpretation of the prohibition, so that it would not apply to gays/lesbians? That is, it seems reasonable to assume that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not intend the prohibition to apply to such people because the ways of His Torah are ways of pleasantness, etc. The reason the Sages did not raise this consideration is that they probably were not aware of this phenomenon (reversed sexual orientation), and even if they were, they thought it was something very rare that did not justify specific treatment, and generally stemmed from evil inclination and not reversed sexual orientation. The very fact that the Sages did not address specifically people with reversed sexual orientation indicates that they were not aware of this phenomenon.

They found that the Sages sometimes used that in order to establish the boundaries of Jewish law, but that is rare. It is not clear to me where and when this can be applied. In principle, one could use it to wipe out large parts of Jewish law.
It seems to me that the interpretation itself that you are proposing (that this was forbidden only to someone for whom it is inclination and not orientation) I already presented above. But it is hard for me to take that to an actual halakhic permit.

But according to what you are saying, it comes out that one can never use the consideration of "its ways are ways of pleasantness," and yet we did receive it in tradition as a legitimate halakhic consideration, so we are obligated to make some use of it sometime. Is this case not an obvious one that requires using this tool? And if not here, then where yes?

If I were coming to the passage as a blank slate, there would be more room for it. But there are precedents, and no one raised such a consideration in our context. So I am doubtful how much use can be made of it. Would you make a similar consideration to permit theft for a kleptomaniac? Even Rabbi Ilai, who wanted to permit a person that to which his inclination overpowers him, was rejected in practice (by the Rif and the Rosh, Moed Katan 17).

As for a kleptomaniac, even in a life-threatening situation Jewish law does not permit him to steal (saving himself with another person’s money), whereas regarding reversed sexual orientation Jewish law could permit it in a life-threatening situation (at least in the case of lesbians, where it is not a matter of forbidden sexual relations).

As for a person whose inclination overpowers him, I am speaking less about the difficulty of overcoming inclination and more about the fact that Jewish law seemingly decrees upon a person with reversed sexual orientation that he must give up an integral part of human life—partnership. In Rabbi Ilai’s case, it was a matter of inclination, which is not an essential part of the person, but something secondary and momentary that one needs to overcome at a specific moment (or give in to privately at a specific moment). In the case of people with reversed sexual orientation, beyond the issue of overcoming momentary inclination, there is the relinquishing of the dimension of partnership in life. Even someone who has no problem overcoming sexual urges would probably still find it very hard to give up a healthy and satisfying partnership. I think this is a basic psychological need, just as a person has a need for society. I seem to recall that in the past you mentioned Maimonides’ words: "Let him go out to caves and thickets and deserts, and not conduct himself in sinful ways," which no one considers living by. Presumably that stems from the fact that a person’s need for society is a fundamental psychological need, and a decree of life in total loneliness is almost like a death sentence (that last part is already my own interpretation). The same applies in the case of people with reversed sexual orientation.

We are not dealing here with a question of permission, but with interpretation from the outset: what the Torah forbade. Therefore I do not see a difference between lesbians and gay men. By the way, according to most opinions a person is allowed to save himself with another person’s money.
You made a distinction, but why not bring that too under "ways of pleasantness"? Where is the dividing line? My claim is that I do not know how to draw a line.

Maybe one cannot define a clear criterion for when something is considered contrary to "ways of pleasantness" and when not, but intuitively it seems to me that decreeing a life of loneliness on a gay person is something clearly contrary to ways of pleasantness, whereas decreeing on a kleptomaniac not to steal, or on a person with a strong sexual drive not to go to prostitutes, is not contrary to ways of pleasantness. Most inclinations that the Torah commands us to overcome are usually inclinations for which a permitted outlet can be found, along the lines of what is brought in the Talmud in Hullin:
"Yalta said to Rav Nahman: Since whatever the Merciful One forbade us, He permitted us something corresponding to it. He forbade us blood—He permitted us the liver. Menstruant blood—purity blood. Animal fat—wild animal fat. Pig—fish brain. The forbidden bird—fish tongue. A married woman—a divorcée during her husband’s lifetime. A brother’s wife—the levirate widow. A gentile woman—the beautiful captive. We want to eat meat with milk! Rav Nahman said to the butchers: Roast udders for her. But did we not learn that one must tear it open? That refers to a pot."

This Talmud teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, always leaves an opening to satisfy the impulse (which He created) in permitted ways. Also in the case of homosexuals, it is reasonable that He left an opening for satisfying their drive in permitted ways. As for kleptomania, in my opinion one must distinguish between a drive that comes to harm another person (the drive to steal, the drive to murder, etc.), where the Holy One did not leave an outlet for satisfying the drive because it comes at another person’s expense, and a case where it does not come at another person’s expense (like homosexuality), where it is reasonable that He did leave an opening.

If so, we have here a combination of a clear place for exposition together with a fairly strong logical argument. If there were a great religious court in Jerusalem, do you think they would make an exposition along these lines:
"‘The lyings of a woman’—why do I need it? To teach you that the prohibition applies only to one whose way is to lie with a woman, excluding one whose way is not to lie with a woman (a homosexual)."

I understand the argument, and still, as long as there is no line, it is hard to permit here. A kleptomaniac also has no permitted alternative.

I don’t understand what is so difficult about kleptomania. I’m bringing a quotation from the Wikipedia entry on kleptomania:
"Although the act is perceived by him (the kleptomaniac) as illogical and wrong, and although between thefts he will feel anguish, shame, and guilt, these feelings do not have the power to prevent recurrence, and the theft will likely be carried out countless more times."
Clearly that is not the situation of a person with reversed sexual orientation.

Beyond that, I bring here a quotation from the Wikipedia entry on "its ways are ways of pleasantness":
"‘Its ways are ways of pleasantness’ as a generative principle:
Rabbi Isaac of Vienna, in his book Or Zarua, inferred from these words regarding a case where the yavam is an apostate (that is, someone who converted to Christianity, in the case he discusses), that it is not ways of pleasantness for the yevama to marry the yavam, and he ruled practically that in such a case the yevama is exempt from levirate marriage.

There are those who wrote to permit the prohibition of commerce in new grain on the basis of ways of pleasantness, because at the time the Temple stood, new grain was common, and it is not ways of pleasantness that it should be impossible to trade in it. Rabbi Shmuel Wosner wrote that one should not permit prohibitions on the basis of ‘its ways are ways of pleasantness’ when this is not explicit in the Talmud. However, from the words of the Radbaz, the Hakham Tzvi, and others, it appears that they do treat the rationale of ways of pleasantness as a generative principle.

Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman writes in Kovetz He’arot that the rule of ways of pleasantness is only a sign that this is the Torah’s intent, and as Rashi wrote that the exemption of ways of pleasantness in the case of someone who died without sons and then afterward a son was born to him is because, through the reasoning of ways of pleasantness, it is necessary that the Torah’s intent in the verse ‘and he has no son’ refers to the time of death. And according to Tosafot, that the tooth was forbidden, this too is by force of the rule of ways of pleasantness, so one can say that this is a sign for the time the bond takes effect."

It seems that despite what you said above, the halakhic decisors did make creative use of this halakhic tool.

Why is it important what the kleptomaniac feels? He feels that way because society has not yielded to him on the value of theft. Society has yielded to the gay person, so he stopped feeling that way (he felt exactly that way until a few years ago). On the contrary, we even cause the kleptomaniac bad feelings—so it is even less in keeping with ways of pleasantness to do that.

The fact that they made use of this principle does not help me determine the line. It seems to me that usually they did not use it to take a severe Torah prohibition and narrow it down to a few cases. They mainly use it where there are two reasonable interpretive possibilities and it chooses between them, or where it qualifies and excludes a certain case.

Following this discussion and in connection with the recent lecture series in Ra’anana on reasoning, I was thinking about the verse:
"And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman; it is an abomination."
It seems that this verse contains a clear place for exposition—the two words "the lyings of a woman" are apparently superfluous. In addition, there is a fairly strong logical argument here: that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not forbid His creatures something essential for proper life (like food, air, sleep, and sexual relations). A proof for this reasoning is from the Talmud in Hullin 109b:
Yalta said to Rav Nahman: Since whatever the Merciful One forbade us, He permitted us something corresponding to it. He forbade us blood—He permitted us liver. Menstruant blood—purity blood. Animal fat—wild animal fat. Pig—fish brain. The forbidden bird—fish tongue. A married woman—a divorcée during her husband’s lifetime. A brother’s wife—the levirate widow. A gentile woman—the beautiful captive. We want to eat meat with milk! Rav Nahman said to the butchers: Roast udders for her.

This Talmud teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, always leaves an opening for satisfying the impulse in permitted ways. Also in the case of homosexuals, it is reasonable that He left an opening for satisfying their urge in permitted ways. Regarding kleptomania, in my opinion one has to distinguish between a drive that comes to harm another person (the urge to steal, the urge to murder, etc.), where the Holy One did not leave an opening for satisfying the urge because it comes at the expense of another person, and cases where it does not come at the expense of another person (like homosexuality), where it is reasonable that He did leave an opening.

If so, there is here a joining of a clear place for exposition with a fairly strong logical argument. If there were a great religious court in Jerusalem, do you think they would make an exposition like this:
"‘The lyings of a woman’—why do I need it? To teach you that the prohibition applies only to one whose way is to lie with a woman, excluding one whose way is not to lie with a woman (a homosexual)."

Oren, I do not understand why this permission does not harm another person.
At the systemic level, it lowers the value of family life; a couplehood without the capacity for procreation, where that capacity exists, lowers the value of family and children. If so, to a certain degree it is like kleptomania.
And do not challenge me from an aylonit, which is permitted, because she is simply not fit to give birth at all.

I agree with the consideration, and indeed there is room for such an exposition.
Reuven, the harm to society in my eyes is minor. We are speaking about people who in any case will not establish a heterosexual home. Only to them is this permission being proposed.